Going grey : the mediation of politics in an ageing society by Davidson, Scott
Loughborough University
Institutional Repository
Going grey : the mediation
of politics in an ageing
society
This item was submitted to Loughborough University's Institutional Repository
by the/an author.
Additional Information:
• A Doctoral Thesis. Submitted in partial fulﬁlment of the requirements for
the award of Doctor of Philosophy of Loughborough University.
Metadata Record: https://dspace.lboro.ac.uk/2134/13536
Publisher: c© Scott Davidson
Please cite the published version.
 
 
 
This item was submitted to Loughborough University as a PhD thesis by the 
author and is made available in the Institutional Repository 
(https://dspace.lboro.ac.uk/) under the following Creative Commons Licence 
conditions. 
 
 
 
 
 
For the full text of this licence, please go to: 
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/2.5/ 
 
University Library 
.~ LOl;lghbprough 
.Umverslty 
AuthorlFiling Title ...... .P.:.!y.!.P...??..0!. .................... . 
........................................................................................ 
-, 
Class Mark ................................................................... .. 
Please note that fines are charged on ALL 
overdue items. 
0403910595 
111111 111111111111111111111 11111 

Going Grey: The Mediation of Politics in an Ageing Society 
By 
Scott Davidson 
A Doctoral Thesis 
Submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the award of Doctor of 
Philosophy by Loughborough University 
June 2008 
© By Scott Davidson 2008 
~t1 Loughhorough 
\;:~ University 
Pi!kington Lil,rary 
Date 2S-i'lf/11 
Class T 
Ace CLl-0 3Q I OS-q,s-No. 
I 
I 
• 
i 
"Going Grey - The Mediation of Politics in an Ageing SocietY 
Abstract 
Population ageing is transforming the age structure of the electorate in Britain. 
The pace of the age-shift in electoral politics is being accelerated by the widening 
gap in turnout rates between younger and older age groups 
Within this context some writers have begun to believe that the grey lobby will 
grow ever more powerful and difficult to ignore. Lloyd (2002) argues the UK is 
beginning to reflect US politics where the MRP has been described as a larger and 
more powerful lobby than organised labour. Some respected theorists and 
prominent writers such as Sinn (2002) and Dychtwald (1999a) go as far as predicting 
ageing democracies such as Germany and the USA will soon become 
'gerontocracies'. For other writers the situation is more paradoxical, a case of large 
numbers but small influence excluded from political influence by the consequences 
of their exit from the workplace (Walker 1998), with little evidence of increased 
responsiveness by governments or pOlitical parties to organised groups of older 
people (Vincent et aI2001). 
This thesis inves'tigates the rise of the grey vote and the mediation of 
population ageing by the political parties and the media in response to the 
demographic transformation of the electorate. It establishes and investigates the 
theoretical place of age and older people in society, the manner in which the media 
portrays ageing and the place of age, cohort and generation in electoral behaviour. 
For the first time the shifting age structure of the electorate is quantified at 
constituency level and projected forward to the year 2025. 
In recognition of the close relationship between politics and the media in 
constructing and negotiating dominant narratives and discourses a content analysis 
of how the UK press have framed and discussed the implications of population was 
undertaken. The General Election of 2005 was used an opportunity to further 
analyse media framing and to conduct a content and discourse analysis of how the 
political parties constructed narratives around ageing issues and the position of older 
voters. Qualitative case studies of how flagship current affairs productions by the 
BBC that focused on the political implications of ageing were also incorporated into 
the analysis. 
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The continued rise of the grey vote is projected by this research to put older 
voters in the position of numerically forming majorities in large number of 
Westminster seats. The emergence of around 300 seats with a 'Grey Majority' leads 
this research to contend that no political party that seeks to regularly form a majority 
in the Commons will succeed without securing significant voting support from older 
people. Population ageing is rarely front page news, but it is frequently incorporated 
as a sub-theme in a wide range of stories. A 'time bomb' narrative which accepts 
many neo-liberal normative assumptions is gaining ground particularly in elite 
journalism. The main parties currently consciously reject these narratives and are 
involved in developing complex discourses for negotiating the terms of allocating 
additional resources and attention to ageing issues. The constructions and re-
constructions of the baby boomer generation are emerging as a focus point for these 
competing narratives of the likely implications of the new 'grey politics'. 
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Chapter One - Introduction and Background 
Every hour life expectancy in Britain rises by another 16 minutes (Kirkwood 
2001). By the middle of this century society will have an age composition never 
seen before in human history. In the 1880s just over seven per cent of the 
population was aged over 60, similar to estimates of the 16th Century, but, lower 
than estimates of the proportion of older people in the 1 ih and 18th centuries. By 
the 1980s this proportion had incrementally crept up to 17%, and over the past 50 
years the population of the UK has aged considerably. While the proportion aged 
under-16 has decreased from 24 per cent to 20 per cent, the population aged over 
60 has increased from 16 per cent to 21 per cent (Thane 2000). The ageing process 
will accelerate over the coming decades. The number of people aged over 65 is 
projected to increase by more than 1 million to reach 11.9 million in 2011. By 2040, 
it will have risen to more than 15 million (Huber & Skidmore 2003). As a societal 
trend population ageing has some way to go before levelling off. The electorate that 
chooses the government of the day is ageing. The rise of the 'grey vote' is already 
apparent at the start of the 21 st century, but by the middle of the century it will have 
reached dramatic proportions. As life expectancy rates continue to improve in 
combination with forecasts of low birth rates, it is estimated there will be a near 
doubling of the population aged 65 years and over between now and 2050 
(Pensions Commission 2004). A key component in the future growth of the grey 
vote will be the fast approaching retirement of the baby boomer cohorts. The 
boomers have been identified by a number of commentators as significant, not just 
for their weight of numbers, but for their qualitatively different characteristics as a 
cohort. The boomers are seen as possessing higher expectations of consumer and 
public services which will translate in political action with the necessary political 
reforms (Churchill & Mitchell 2004). 
The demographic age-transition of British society raises many questions and 
holds a myriad of policy implications that are not limited to bread and butter ageing 
2 
issues such as pensions, health and social care, but also ranges across family 
policy, the labour market and cultural change. This thesis has chosen to focus upon 
the challenges facing political parties and their communications and election 
campaigns. We live in what is sometimes described as a youth-obsessed society 
where only very recently one of the major parties of government, in the shape of the 
Labour party, re-branded itself as the 'new' against the 'old', with its then leader 
Tony Slair making the case for his party in a book entitled 'my vision of a young 
country'. The country may be experiencing an age transformation, but in the 1990s 
at least it was still possible to develop a political brand in juxtaposition against the 
old. Only a decade later it must be questionable how tenable it would be for a major 
party to 'run against' the demographic characteristics of the voters. 
To study the changes that population ageing heralds for political 
communication it is also necessary to evaluate how the mass media is reporting 
and framing the implications of ageing. The extent to which media effects alter and 
influence political behaviour remains controversial and complex, however, even if 
the weight of evidence were to come down on the side of minimal impact on social 
attitudes, media content would still matter because the political elite believe in 
media effects and evaluate media content on a daily, sometimes hourly, basis 
(Gould 1999; Jones 2000; Rawnsley 2000; Sarnett & Gaber 2001). 
It is neither feasible nor desirable in any major study of this nature to attempt 
to separate the behaviour and story narratives of the media from party 
communications. The thesis accepts the arguments that the disciplines of political 
marketing - use of opinion research and environmental analysis to produce and 
promote a competitive offering which will help realise organisational aims and 
satisfy groups of electors in exchange for their votes (Wring 1997) - are an 
increasingly useful model for explaining the behaviour of parties. Political parties 
that seek power need to achieve significant national.vote (or 'market') shares to 
realise their basic strategic goals, but in the near future this market share cannot 
practically be obtained unless they obtain the polling endorsement of large numbers 
of older voters. The changes in communication content and style required to 
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successfully campaign for grey votes will be delayed by the levels of residual 
ageism and the old orthodoxies of marketing and advertising practitioners who fear 
the implications of any brand being too closely associated with 'the old'. But, 
ultimately we should expect parties to act rationally and not deny themselves power 
by perversely clinging to attitudes from a previous era. 
Our political imaginations and debates are often infused with impressions of 
the defining demographic characteristics of the parliamentary seats that are 
contested so keenly by the parties seeking power. Currently, these impressions 
when applied to constituencies such as Scarborough or Torbay may elicit,images of 
pleasant coastal towns, but they are just as likely to be along the lines of The 
Guardian newspaper's on line constituency profile of Torbay ' ... sunny southwest 
coast resort with many pensioners' (The Guardian 2006). Scarborough or Torbay 
may often be defined by their large retired populations, but, as will be seen in 
Chapter Six, in 20 years time seats in the Rhondda, Bootie, Basildon and 
Sunderland will have the same, or indeed, older, age profiles than the Torbay of 
today. The next general election in 2009 or 201 0 will take place in the middle of an 
age transformation of British society. By 2025 this transformation will see the 
electoral destiny of most parliamentary seats settled by older voters who will cast, 
as this research will demonstrate, over 50% of votes on polling day. Yet, debate on 
the inexorable rise of the grey vote has been strangely muted despite the ever 
widening age gap in turnout, the sheer weight of numbers, and the emergence of a 
Labour-Conservative 'Grey Battleground'. 
Strategic reorientation toward the greying electorate may be a slow process 
but the growing ranks of the retired have been apparent for some years and the 
changing age profile is seemingly bound to influence the conduct of politics. 
However, it has been the recent, and dramatic, drops in turnout amongst younger 
age groups which has served to both accelerate and exaggerate the impact of 
population ageing. Data from the British Election Study suggests the stark 
differences in voter turnout between age groups was not a factor until after the 1992 
general election (Clarke et aI.2004). Younger age groups in the 1970s showed 
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lower turnout rates, but in subsequent elections their turnout increased bringing 
them into line with the wider electorate. But, this trend seems to have been broken 
in the 1990s, with voters that joined the electorate in this period holding onto their 
lower propensities to vote. These new voters are considerably more susceptible to 
forces that are working to suppress electoral turnout. A natural assumption to make 
might have been that the historically low turnout rates for first-time voters in 2001 
would increase in 2005 in line with the increase in overall turnout, yet it appears 
turnout rates for voters aged 18-24 dropped further in 2005, and turnout in the 25-
34 age band stood still (phelps 2005). This raises the prospect that these cohorts 
will always have participation rates below those of previous generations - locking in, 
and accelerating, the age transition of the electoral market. 
The burgeoning ranks of older voters pose a number of important questions 
on the current and future interactions between public policy and the electoral cycle 
based solely on consideration of people who have passed the state retirement 
ages. However, to fully evaluate the age effect on the democratic process there is a 
persuasive argument that the definition of the 'grey vote' should be widened to 
include segments of the electorate who are close to retirement, and indeed, 
perhaps to all men and women aged over 50. The inclusion of the over 50s can be 
justified on several grounds. Firstly, people in their 50s start to personally 
experience the many manifestations of age discrimination in society, most critically 
in employment where the proportion of British males aged 55-64 who were in 
employment has fallen from 80% in 1979 to 62% in 2002 (Humphrey et al 2003). 
Secondly, the over 50s have reached a stage in their life courses where they have 
to consider retirement and 'old age' as issues requiring practical, sometimes urgent, 
personal attention. Voters who are nearing retirement will be acutely aware of any 
inadequacies or inequities in the pensions system. Finally, the family structure of 
many over 50s is likely to include parents who will be in their 70s or 80s. Further 
heightening awareness of the quality, or lack of quality in health and social care. For 
many, acting on behalf of relatives who require long-term care can become a 
discouraging experience. 
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The significance of the changes reaches beyond numbers. Older people 
have been shown to have higher levels of engagement with civic society and the 
democratic process. Older people aged over 50 are more likely to have lobbied their 
MP or local councillor, or taken an active part in a campaign (Electoral Commission 
2005). Older volunteers are also largely responsible for maintaining the grassroots 
organisation of the major political parties (Seyd & Whiteley 1994). Nor is the 
activism of older people strictly confided to 'traditional' politics. Pensioners are more 
likely to be 'consumer' activists than young people. But, it is the baby boomers who 
are most likely to be consumer activists. A study for the National Consumers 
Council which investigated levels of consumer activism through participation in a 
range of 'typical' activist activities found that boomers were the most likely to have 
taken part in at least five of these activities in the preceding 12 months (National 
Consumers Council 2002). 
Within this demographic context some writers have begun to believe that the 
grey lobby will grow ever more powerful and difficult to ignore. Some such as Lloyd 
(2002) argue that the UK is beginning to reflect US politics where the American 
Association of Retired Persons has been described as a larger and more powerful 
lobby than organised labour. Some respected theorists and prominent writers such 
as Sinn (2002) and Dychtwald (1999a) go as far as predicting ageing democracies 
such as Germany and the USA will become 'gerontocracies' within the next five 
years. Evidence suggests that in the USA at least, candidates and campaigns 
target senior voters more than other age groups (MacManus 2000). While the 2004 
presidential election campaign saw a large increase in the number of political 
adverts on tel.evision that addressed the concerns of older voters (Kaid & Garner 
2004). 
However, for other writers the situation is more paradoxical, a case of 'large 
numbers but small influence' excluded from political influence by the consequences 
of their exit from the workplace (Walker 1998), with 'little evidence of increased 
responsiveness by governments or political parties to organised groups of older 
people' (Vincent et aI2001). Yet, the very fact that informed opinion can be divided 
on this issue demonstrates how radically different the debate on the electoral 
importance of older people is now in comparison to only two decades ago. In 1982 
in one book that was to become a frequently cited work within the field of social 
gerontology Chris Phillpson was writing: 
'This book has been written in a period of crisis for elderly people. Health and 
social services are being substantially reduced; questions are being raised 
about the ability of society fully to protect pensioners against price increases; 
older workers are urged to retire as soon as possible as a means of reducing 
high unemployment amongst young people.' 
Philipson (1982) 
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In the first decade of the Twenty First Century some core elements of 
Phillipson's prognosis of crisis in the welfare of older people have been turned on 
their head. Health and social care spending have increased considerably and 
considerable efforts are being made by governments across the globe to keep older 
workers in the labour force as well as striving to find public consent for rises in state 
pension and public sector pension retirement ages. 
The evolution of a new politics sponsored by the profound demographic 
changes will not take place without the input and influence of the media. The mass 
media holds a special role in its ability to set public policy agendas. This agenda 
. setting ability has been noted in a number of publications, such as Franklin (1994) 
and his notion of 'media democracy', as well as McQuail (2000) and Eldridge et al 
(1997). As will be seen in Chapter Two the media have been accused by a wide 
range of researchers of predominantly portraying older people using negative 
stereotypes and for framing older people as a burden on society as a whole. The 
stereotyping remains a constant in much media coverage of older people, but many 
journalists also subscribe to the aims of the third age movement which is attempting 
to reconstruct the meaning of later life as an opportunity rather than a problem. The 
negative media content about older people and population ageing is not a historical 
phenomenon, to this day highly respected reporters pronounce with certainty that 
population ageing is having stark and overwhelmingly negative consequences for 
society. Take this example: 
'It turns out it's not the really old we have to worry about, it's the nearly old, the 
ones who want to live hard and die not very young at all. With the poor 21 SI century 
tax payer footing the bill ... 
We've got a battle on our hands alright and judging from the past few weeks this 
isn't going to end well for the young.' 
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The quote above comes from Stephanie Flanders, who was then the Economic 
Editor of the high profile BBC current affairs programme Newsnight, and was used in 
a package on 'grey power' that was broadcast in February 2005. Within this quote, 
and certainly within the full report from which it is taken, is a fast crystallising agenda 
on how to respond politically to the ageing of the UK population. Within this agenda is 
an apparent parallel fear and awe over the perceived onset of 'grey power'. This 
framing of the implications of population ageing overlaps with many key components 
of neo-liberalism - the re-emergence of support for 19th Century 'classical' liberalism 
applied to modern economics through advocating the reduction of the role of the 
state in welfare alongside net reductions in social spending by the state (Harvey 
, 
2005). According to the left wing theorist, Robin Blackburn, for neo-liberals the urge 
to use population ageing for 'demographic doom-mongering' in order to agitate for 
their preferred response of cutting back on public pensions and encouraging citizens 
to make provision for their own retirement by contributing to commercial pension 
funds, is irresistible (Blackburn 2002). 
The view that the media, in particular, is encouraging and increasing anxiety 
about the implications of population ageing was endorsed by Andrew Smith, when he 
was a government minister. In a speech to an Age Concern conference (DWP 2004) 
the then Work and Pensions Secretary argued: 
'Too often in politics and the media, images of older people are negative. 
They're accompanied by doom and gloom warnings about a potential health 
care or pensions crisis.' 
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In the final stages of writing for this thesis a disconcerting case study arose 
that demonstrated the continuing acceptability of ageist content in the mainstream 
.British media - the use of age to attack the then Liberal Democrat leader Ming 
Campbell. Campbell resigned as party leader in October 2007 bemoaning constant 
media references to his age, 66. A visual demonstration of the ageist lampooning 
of Campbell comes from the reproduction (Graphic No 1) of Steve Bell cartoons 
published in the Guardian in March and September of 2006. 
Graphic No 1: Steve Bell cartoons mocking Ming Campbell on the basis of his age. Cartoon on left 
'Zimmerframe' published March 3 2006. Cartoon on right 'prepare for death' published September 19 
2006. 
The imagery in the Bell cartoons draw upon symbols of decrepitude and 
mental and physical decline; the zimmer-frame; the wheelchair; the blanket over the 
legs; the 'prepare for death' text - the comedic notion that a man in his mid-60s 
could hold a position of leadership. The treatment of Campbell is a stark example 
of how age prejudice still resonates with the writings on the subject by Simone De 
. Beauvoir who argued that in western society age eventually turns everyone into a 
social problem (De Beauvoir 1970) as she noted that it is rare for old age to be 
looked upon as the crown of life' and that society views time as belonging to the 
young to seek fulfilment,with older people forced to see themselves as 
'unproductive and powerless'. 
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Old ~ge may have held a low social value for much of the 20th Century, but 
none the less, we might expect the current age-related demographic transformation 
of society might attract a considerable volume of attention from academia - not least 
from those with an interest in the political implications and the media's portrayal of 
socially excluded groups. However, this has not been the case and the motivation 
to begin to fill this research gap has been compelling. Time and again other authors 
who have entered this field have commented on the dearth of existing research. 
Communication and ageing is a rather minority interest in the social scientific 
community to date. There is more research, at the time of writing, on 
communication, ageing, and the media in the United States than in the United 
Kingdom. In fact, such research in the UK, particularly portrayals of the elderly in 
UK advertising, is 'rather sparse' (Williams et aI2007:3). As Midwinter (1991) noted, 
UKbased research on population ageing and the mass media is a scarce 
commodity and there was 'surprisingly little data' on ageing issues and older people 
in the press. Vesperi (2003) noted that despite the enormous literature on 
journalism, studies of aging in both print and broadcast news are relatively sparse, 
and Sedlakova (2005) argued that only minimum attention was paid to old age as a 
socially constructed phenomenon and the role of the media in the creation of this 
construction. Even in sociology researchers have declared age to be a relatively 
neglected area of inquiry' (Pilcher 1995). Blaikie has argued that the evolution of 
cultural studies during the youth revolt of the 1960s ensured ageing was constituted 
as the distant but conservative 'other', in the process ageing with the languishing of 
the rebellious attitudes seen as fundamental to social progress (Blaikie 2006). Yet, 
while cultural industries and academic research orientate towards the young, the 
relentless shift in the economic centre of gravity orientates spending power towards 
older people. 
This research has sought to use a diverse range of research methods to 
bring new data and analysis into this highly important, yet currently neglected, field 
of inquiry. National projections of the changing age-composition of the country are 
available from the Office for National Statistics and the Government Actuary 
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Department, but there is no data on the localised impact of the age transformation 
on individual parliamentary constituencies. This research project has produced 
demographic projections on how the age structure of Westminster seats will change 
up to 2025 and analysed some of the electoral implications of the results. A key 
research concern is how population ageing is being represented and framed by the 
mass media in news and current affairs, as well as by the main political parties in 
the content of their political communications materials. The strategies of political 
parties were also studied to understand further how they segment the electorate by 
age variables and how they use that research data to target older voters in their 
campaigns. 
The structure of this thesis investigates the mediation of population ageing 
and the rise of the grey vote over seven further chapters. Chapter Two quantifies 
further the rapid ageing of society before considering the main schools of theory 
that have sought to explain the position of older people within society and the 
implications of demographic changes that have moved older people away from a 
historical minority status into a position that now encourages theorising on the 
potential exercise of power through older people's position as citizens and voters. 
This chapter also investigates age discrimination and stereotyping as well as media 
portrayals of older people which then links in to three key studies (Midwinter 1991; 
Groombridge 1999; Bergstrom 2001) which look at the media's coverage of 
population ageing as a phenomenon. Chapter Three analyses the politics of ageing. 
The analysis includes the role of age as a variable in influencing voter behaviour 
and the debates around the inter-relationships between life stage and generations. 
The Chapter also considers the rise of political marketing and practical application 
of voter segmentation in the context of the growing size of the grey vote. Chapter 
Four explains in detail the methodological approach taking in gathering new data 
and analysis in the pursuit of this thesis. Chapter Five is a quantitative and 
qualitative content analysis of the British national press' coverage of population 
ageing issues during a three month period in 2004 alongside a more in-depth 
analysis of a flagship BBC drama documentary that showcased the theory that 
ageing will lead to sharp inter-generational conflicts in the future. Chapter Six charts 
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the rise and distribution of the grey vote and analyses the new political geography 
of Britain. Chapter Seven provides in depth content and strategic analysis of how 
the media and the political parties portrayed older voters and ageing issues in the 
general election of 2005. Chapter Eight provides commentary and further analysis 
of the new data generated in Chapters Five, Six and Seven, and lays out the 
summary conclusions on this research project. 
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Chapter 2 - The Great Age Transformation 
This chapter reflects on the rapid ageing of the population before considering the 
main schools of theory that have sought to explain the position of older people 
within society. It will incorporate discussion of the implications of demographic 
changes that have moved older people away from an historical minority status into 
a position that now encourages theorising on the potential exercise of power 
through their position as citizens and voters. Traditional sociological based theories 
tended toward various forms of structural determinism that included attempts to 
rationalise the marginalisation of older people as being of mutual benefit to both 
society and the older person (Cumming and Henry 1961, Kastenbaum 1993, 
Neurgarten 1996). These theories were contested by ideas grounded in a political 
economy approach that critically examined the role of welfare and pensions 
systems in structurally constructing poverty and social exclusion (Phillipson 1998). 
More recently, there has been a reaction against institutionalised ageism that 
consciously attempts to use theory and research to reconstruct the social meanings 
and the language used to describe later life and older people. Walker (2002) dates 
the emergence of 'active ageing' to the US in the 1960s as a strategy for denying 
the onset of a disengaged old age through the maintenance in later life of activity 
patterns and values more typical of middle age. This active ageing movement is 
considered in contrast to recent neo-liberal theorising that has drawn upon rational 
choice economics to problematise population ageing and raise the spectre of inter-
generational conflict if states refuse to radically reduce welfare spending on issues 
such as pensions and social care (Pinera 2004). The final sections in this chapter 
look specifically at stereotyping and media portrayals of older people which then 
links in to three key studies (Midwinter 1991, Groombridge 1999 and Bergstrom 
2001) which consider the media's coverage of population ageing as a phenomenon. 
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2.1 The Demographic Transition 
The population profile of the UK is ageing. The Government Actuary's Department 
(GAD) estimates the proportion of the population aged over 65 will rise from 13.2% 
in 1971 to 24.4% in 2050 (House of Lords 2003).150 years ago average life 
expectancy in England was a mere 42 years, by 1911 it had reached 50 years and 
in the modern age it is now over 75 years for men and 80 years for women (GAD 
2002). Not only are people living longer lives, there are also staying healthier for 
longer, and it is reasonable to assume this long-term trend that started in the 
nineteenth century will continue long into the twenty first century. This is neither a 
new, or unexpected, phenomenon, yet the response to this demographic evolution 
has been inconsistent. Social and medical advances which have increased the 
average human lifespan have been celebrated, yet there has been a parallel 
disquiet over the consequences of the ensuing changes in age profile. 
The fall in fertility rates alongside increased life expectancy reduces proportionally 
the pre-adult population and increases the ratio of society who are in later life. This 
shift in the shape of society can be expected to impact on all areas of social and 
economic life. 
The rises in UK life expectancy are in line with similar rises in other countries that 
make up the wealthiest economies internationally. (Figure 2.1) 
Figure 2.1: Life Expectancy in Selected Countries. Source: UN World Population Prospects 1950-
2050. 2002 revision. 
Japan 81.5 Germany 78.2 
Sweden 80.0 Greece 78.2 
Canada 79.3 New Zealand 78.2 
Spain 79.2 United Kingdom 78.1 
Australia 79.2 Finland 77.9 
Switzerland 79.1 USA 77.0 
France 78.9 Ireland 76.9 
Norway 78.9 Cuba 76.7 
Belgium 78.7 Portugal 76.1 
Italy 78.7 Poland 73.8 
Austria 78.5 Hungary 71.7 
Netherlands 78.5 
Figure 2.2 visually demonstrates the changing population age distribution for Great 
Britain and how the proportion of people aged 75+ converges with the proportion aged 0-
14. 
Figure 2.2: Graph from GAD projections database. Changing age distribution in Great Britain. 
Base year 2005. 
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The number of people of state pensionable age is projected to increase by 9.3 per 
cent from 11.1 million in 2004 to 12.2 million in 2010. Allowing for the change in 
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women's state pension age, the population of pensionable age will then rise more 
slowly, reaching 12.5 million by 2020. However, a faster increase will then 
resume with longer-term projections suggesting the number over pensionable 
age reaching 15.3 million by 2031 and 17.5 million by the middle of the century. 
Accordingly the average age of the UK population is expected to rise from 39.5 
years in 2004 to 43.3 years in 2031. In the longer-term, projections suggest that 
the average age will continue to rise beyond 2031, reaching 45 years by the 
middle of the century (GAD 2005). 
The working age population will also become much older. In 2004, there were 2.1 
million (12 per cent) more working age adults aged below 40 than were aged 40 
and above. By 2010, there will be just 1.0 million (five per cent) more and, 
influenced by the change in women's state pension age, by 2020 there will be 0.9 
million (4 per cent) fewer working age people below 40 than aged 40 and above. 
(GAD 2005) 
Currently the retired population is noticeably less ethnically diverse than the 
population as a whole. Recent estimates put 21 % of the white population as 
being aged 60 and over, but only six per cent of the black and minority ethnic 
population as being aged over 60. However, demographic trends will see the 
retired population becoming rapidly more diverse as citizens who immigrated into 
the UK from Caribbean in the early 1960s, followed by citizens who immigrated 
from India, Pakistan and Bangladesh in the 1970s reach retirement age over the 
next two decades (House of Lords 2003). 
The demographic data charts very clearly the steady but consistent ageing of the 
population. The ageing of society is by no means a new phenomenon and we can 
look forward with a high degree of certainty, natural or man-made catastrophes 
aside, to seeing this trend continue through the first half of the 21 st Century, by 
which point the age structure of society will have become radically different to that 
of the mid-20th Century. As we shall see in Chapter Five in the near future older 
voters will represent the majority of votes cast in large swathes of the UK's 
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parliamentary constituencies. But, how is this age transformation being 
interpreted and how are its implications for society being mediated and theorised? 
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2.2 Theories of Ageing 
The trend of the age structure of the population moving towards higher 
proportions of older people and ever increasing median ages has been taking 
place over a prolonged period of time, and accordingly drawn the attention of 
theorists from across a wide range of disciplines. 
The research into political communications activities and media content that has 
been undertaken in support of this project has been almost entirely original in its 
main areas of focus, but still required setting against the sociological and social 
policy literature in order to evaluate resonances, or dissonances, with theories in 
these fields. 
The esteemed place of elders in many ancient or tribal societies indicates the 
place of chronological age has always been a factor in the organisation of power 
within human societies. Historical research suggests that in the UK it was the 
advent of fixed retirement ages over the period ranging from 1850-1950 which led 
to more rigid and bureaucratically driven definitions of old age that have been 
more prevalent in the modern era (Vincent 2003). The advent of fixed retirement 
created a new identity for older people associated with the absence of occupation 
and economic worth. 
The recent popularity of active ageing and the emphasis on consciously 
prolonging the social engagement of older people sits in contrast to one of the 
first widely accepted theories in the sociology of ageing which dominated debates 
in the initial post-war period, that of disengagement theory which originated out of 
the work of social gerontologists in the 1940s and was associated with the 
'Chicago School' (Cumming & Henry 1961; Neugarten 1996). Disengagement 
was viewed as a mutual process where the individual and society would reduce 
their levels of social interaction. This process enables society to induct more 
economically productive younger people into positions of importance while 
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allowing the old time to prepare for the ultimate withdrawal of death. As people 
enter later life they detach themselves from their social roles in anticipation of 
their eventual death (Gilleard & Higgs 2002). This theoretical approach places 
older people as actively seeking release and perseverance of their own self-worth 
from the competitive expectations of society. 
Disengagement was criticised for giving intellectual credibility to ageist 
assumptions that social isolation and poverty in later life were somehow natural, 
and on the grounds that disengagement from the labour market was often hardly 
a matter of personal choice but rather enforced by the rules of retirement welfare 
schemes (Katenbaum 1993). Indeed, the phrase disengagement could be fairly 
swapped for socially excluded and the invisibility of the old from prominent roles 
in television potentially demonstrates the mass media's historical acquiescence to 
this process of disengagement/social exclusion. It should be expected that 
citizens who are disengaged from society would also be expected to show lower 
levels of interest in current affairs broadcasting, yet, older people are the biggest 
consumers of news output (Hilt & Lipschultz 2005). 
A more individualised attempt at refining disengagement that emerged in the 
early 1970s through the work of theorists such as Atchley (1971) was continuity 
theory, which argued that as a person moves into old age they substitute roles 
lost, be they from their career or within the family, for new similar roles related to 
their own personality types and lifestyle. The logic of continuity theory is that 
people who have been politically or socially inactive in earlier life stages are 
unlikely to become activists in later life, and those who have always been active 
citizens are unlikely to suddenly withdraw from those roles on retirement from 
work (Hooyman & Kiyak 1996). However, continuity theory provides little 
opportunity for quantitative testing and focuses on life story narratives to the 
exclusion of structural influences. 
The 1980s saw the development of structural approaches to explaining the 
socially excluded condition and relative income poverty status of most people in 
later life. In the UK Townsend (1981) and Walker (1980) were influential in 
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arguing that dependency in old age was produced structurally, and that old age 
was being artificially constructed as a social problem. In this model the operation 
of social security and long term care policy were critically examined as the key 
drivers for determining the quality of later life. Townsend (1981) and Olson (1982) 
argued that state welfare policies were depriving older people of a socially 
productive identity, and were reducing them to a position of dependence - indeed 
the widespread use of the term pensioners tagged older people with the primary 
public identity of recipients of state welfare. This political economy perspective 
developed further structural theories based upon the assumption that 
dependence in later life is, far from being an inevitable outcome born out of 
biological determination, a product created by the operation of a number of 
economic relationships. The prevalence of widely accepted ageist social attitudes 
that viewed older people as unproductive burdens on society in the view of this 
school of theory legitimised iniquitous mechanisms that forcibly expelled older 
workers out of the labour market, as well as the manipulation of older people as 
voiceless beneficiaries of welfare strategies and the privileging of professional 
interests over the social needs of older service users. 
As part of this period where structural theories dominated academic activity 
attention was directed to the life course and its relationship to issues such as 
pensions, employment and discrimination in health care, often motivated by the 
notion that it was society, not biology, that dominated and determined the quality 
of life for older people. Writers in the structured dependency school called for a 
focus on the need for the full integration of older people into society and a 
rejection of their disengagement or separateness (Gilleard & Higgs 2000). 
Fennell et al (1993) described this process as 'welfarisation' and proposed it as 
. an explanation as to what they saw as a problematic focus within academic 
circles on research exploring social action to meet need, rather than 
understanding the root causes of social exclusion and poverty in later life. 
However, although attempts to refocus attention away from welfare policy and 
onto widespread ageism within society are important contributions, there are also 
dangers in concentrating social policy research too narrowly on fostering change 
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in social attitudes, when to this day the common experience of retirement is a 
sharp drop in income (Age Concern 2002). 
When Townsend more recently (2006) re-visited the historical development of 
structured dependency theories he again defended the approach's need to 
critically investigate retirement, poverty, institutionalisation and the restriction of 
domestic and community roles for people in later life. Townsend believes the 
period was beneficial to understanding: 
"A great deal of evidence relevant to these forms of dependency emerged 
during the 1960s and 1970s including: a fixed age for pensions; the minimal 
subsistence afforded on the state pension; the substitution of retirement 
status for unemployment; the near-compulsory admission to residential care 
of many thousands of people whose faculties were relatively intact; the 
enforced dependence of many residents in homes and of patients in 
hospitals and nursing homes, and the conversion of domiciliary services into 
commodity services. " Townsend (2006: 165) 
Townsend argues that inquiry into artificial dependency led to a critical review of 
welfare policy that recognised the desirability of weeding out elements of 
parsimony and coercion. For the near-future he invests some hope in the 
incorporation of human rights frameworks as having a beneficial impact on public 
service design. Chris Phillipson was another key contributor to structuralist 
school of thought who more recently has noted the major changes in the nature of 
being old today in comparison to the immediate post war decades 
(Phillipson 1998). For researchers in the 1970s Phillipson argues there was a 
clear sense that older people were mainly poor, shared similar social attitudes 
and held limited aspirations in terms of life style: 
" ... This may have been an unsatisfactory stereotype then; it certainly must 
be considered as such now. Despite the trends and similarities to be 
identified in this study, there are huge variations among old people and this 
diversity has undoubtedly been a feature of social change .. ." Phillipson 
(1998: 10). 
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Phillipson and Townsend were two of the leading names in the structuralist ' 
school within the sociology of ageing. They defend the rationale behind the 
approach in the historical contexts of its development, but also recognise societal 
change demands new paradigms for understanding these changes. In the 1970s 
and 80s much of the focus on the welfare state was born out of a desire to 
challenge the distressing poverty experienced by many in later life. In a similar 
vein the 1990s saw another conscious attempt to use research and theory to 
challenge marginalisation and social dependence in later life by reconstructing 
the meaning of old age and re-inventing the exit from full-time employment as an 
opportunity rather than the beginning of the end of an individual's contributions to 
society. The emphasis on the real, and potential, contributions to society by 
people in later life also served as a tool to challenge neo-Iiberal perspectives that 
posited growing proportions of people in later life as a social and economic 
burden. 
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2.3 The Third Age 
Poverty in later life remains a constant social problem. It made logical sense in 
the mid to late 20th Century to discuss older people - a sub-section of around 10-
20% of the population, who were disproportionately poor and socially excluded -
in the language of disengagement and structuralised dependency. Fifty years 
later and these approaches have become increasingly unsustainable for general 
application when the "old" begin to represent up to 30-40% of the population -
depending on definitions - and contain growing levels of social diversity and 
income inequality. 
In this context the third age, or active ageing, emerged as a counter discourse to 
structural and disengagement theories. Associated at its early stages with Laslett 
it has developed into a movement of writers and practitioners who adopt the view 
that later life is an opportunity, and that disengagement should be actively 
resisted (Laslett1989). According to Gilleard & Higgs (2002) third age theory can 
build on class, cohort and generational paradigms, and it is often the platform 
used by writers who wish to emphasise the significance of the baby boomer 
generation. The third age places its emphasis on creating positive social 
identities for the retired, seeking out personal fulfilment, and stressing 
contributions made to society by older people in areas such as caring and 
volunteering. The third age paradigm has extended itself well beyond academic 
theorists and has now attained an almost official state endorsement status as to 
its social worth. For example, UK Government has attempted to support this 
agenda through various reports (PIU 2002) and initiatives such as Age Positive. 
The third age opens up. new interpretations of the meaning of later life and how 
older people locate themselves in regards to citizenship and social activism. 
Firstly, there is a growing element of flexibility and choice on when, if or how 
someone exits the labour market. Forced retirement at a set age has now made 
way for flexible retirement that, depending on the circumstances of the individual, 
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may retire before state pension age, retire in stages by taking part-time work, 
more home working, etc or choose to work full time for any number of years 
beyond state pension age. This process opens up the creation of a post-work 
identity, a narrative of the self, their life story, but also the reflection on the 
question of 'how should I live' (Gilleard & Higgs 2002). It also allows a rejection 
of the older person as victim stereotype as exampled by Doyle (1997) who 
criticised academic research as well as media content for placing a misleading 
significance on the place of crime in the lives of older people based on his 
findings that older people are not very likely to be involved in crime - either as 
victims or perpetrators (Doyle 1997). 
The third age has also taken the form of what might be called a cultural 
movement that aims to reconstruct the place of older people in society. The 
language and narrative used by groups who use the term exemplify much self-
awareness of their place in this reconstruction. Take these examples: 
Third Age Press is an independent publishing company which recognises that 
the period of life after full-time, gainful employment and family responsibility 
can be a time of fulfilment and continuing development ... a time of 
regeneration ... Third Age Press exists to provide materials to encourage that 
regeneration'. (Third Age Press 2007). 
'"The Third Age Employment Networks role is to interpret demographic change 
and help people and organisations build advantage from it. We work to remove 
age barriers to opportunity. We do this by explaining, consulting, sharing, 
advising and pioneering ideas and action'. (Third Age Employment Network 
2007). 
'Third Age - the most exciting time of your life!' (Third Age 2007). 
"Third Age International provides the tools and support you need for improving 
the quality of your life and health in the Third Age. We bring people of the baby 
boom generation together to help each other find ever-increasing levels of 
passion, purpose and joy in the aging process". (Third Age Foundation 2007). 
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The third age is representative of a wider trend within the more materially secure 
democracies of the West. Identities in retirement no longer need be forged 
through a person's previous positions within the workforce. There is increasing 
interest in the manner in which people can now forge identities through consumer 
and cultural consumption. Lifestyle choice is increasingly important in the 
constitution of self-identity and daily activity (Giddens 1991). Indeed, for some, 
there is more freedom in creating new social roles and identities in retirement -
once released from 'the hamster wheel' existence of shift work or the grind of 
many nine to five jobs. The apparently widespread acceptance of the upbeat 
narratives on later life found in the third age suggest it may be possible to find in 
society a feel good tone dominating debates over an ageing society. However, 
some of the greatest advancements in human society have also been presented 
in more threatening terms when viewed through the paradigm of a scramble for 
scarce public resources disastrously antagonised by an explosion in the numbers 
of older people. 
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2.4 Framing the Demographic "Time Bomb" 
An ageing society can be viewed as one of the great indicators of success in the 
progress and development of human society. The main contributory factors to 
population ageing are often those which can be linked to social and scientific 
advancements: the leaps forward in combating child mortality; the increases in 
life expectancy derived from progress in medical science; the near universal 
access in the UK and other advanced nations to many, although not all, of new 
health treatments and the increases in wealth, all be it grossly uneven increases, 
enjoyed by many older people (McMichael et al 2004). Yet, there is an apparent 
absence of any sense of achievement or celebration of these advances by writers 
and protagonists who chose to centre their theorising around the phenomenon of 
an ageing society. 
Why are these great advances presented as a grave problem for society? Despite 
the positive outlook promoted by the 'active agers', there is an influential body of 
opinion which portrays population ageing as a severe threat to future economic 
prosperity. The 'strain' on public spending is predicted to lead to political 
resentment and struggles between younger and older recipients of state spending 
(Turner 1989). Irwin calls this the 'age stratification' approach where members of 
different age cohorts perceive their interests to be at odds with members of other 
age cohorts (Irwin1996). 
The advent of what might be called a grey society has generated contrasting 
responses from social thinkers. On the one hand population ageing was seen as 
a threat that could threaten democratic stability and would require the state to 
jettison its responsibilities in areas such as pensions as social care in order to 
preserve the perceived benefits of a shrinking state (Peterson 1999). This sense 
of disquiet has led some influential writers, such as President Ronald Reagan's 
former economic adviser, Professor Laurence Kotlikoff, to go as far as seriously 
predicting 'generational war': 
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'If you look at the number of old people that we're going to have to take care of 
in the future, and if you look at the bills that our kids are going to have to pay, 
anybody that doesn't think there's a generational storm and a big generational 
war coming, must be on Prozac.' (Kotiikoff quoted from Appendix One 
Transcript of BBC 2004 drama documentary 'If the generations fall out.' 
Paragraph 214) 
This perspective was nurtured during the ascendancy in the 1980s of assertive 
conservative politics in the UK and the USA, and set an ideological tone of the 
need to 'roll back' the state's role in welfare in favour of free market economics. 
During this period Samuel Preston published a widely discussed paper that 
argued that children in America were directly losing out to older people in terms of 
state welfare support (Preston 1984). In the UK, and from a wholly different 
perspective within field of social gerontology ageing was also being framed in 
terms of groups competing against the old for resources through publications 
such as Johnson et ai's (1989) self-explanatory titled book 'Workers versus 
Pensioners'. As part of this framing of the challenges of an ageing society 
Kotlikoff (2004), developed an economic model he called 'generational 
accounting', in order to argue that western governments will not be able to meet 
their future spending commitments on welfare and social care. Likewise, 
Cardarelli et al (2000) have attempted to apply a similar model to assess UK 
public spending. Some evidence indicates that alarmist interpretations of 
demographic trends have been used as a rhetorical cover to justify neo-Iiberal 
inspired policy objectives of reducing taxes and public spending on welfare. In 
the memoirs of David Donnison, the senior civil servant with lead responsibility for 
income benefits during Margaret Thatcher'S first term of government, it is 
indicated that ideology rather than demographics were the core drivers behind 
shifts in welfare policy direction during the early 1980s (Cunning ham 2006). From 
an epidemiological perspective Gee (2002) argued that in her summary of 
available research that any retrenchment of costs caused by the needs of an 
older population were not based on evidence but possibly remained unchallenged 
as they meshed with neo-liberal objectives (Gee 2002). 
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The neo-Iiberal framing of the consequences of population ageing has stimulated 
other writers to contest the underlying assumptions and conclusions that gained 
political currency in the 1980s. There is acceptance that an ageing society 
necessitates social and economic planning to re-calibrate the workings of welfare 
states in order to meet the demands of a post age-transformation society, but 
there are also new arguments for the need to nurture inter-generational solidarity 
as well as the accommodation of increased public spending in social care and 
income support for later life. A good example is Robertson (1997) who is critical 
of what she calls the 'apocalyptic demography' advanced by writers such as 
Kotlikoff. She argues against framing population ageing in terms of generations 
scrabbling for resources and advocates promotion of the notion of inter-
dependence between generations, going beyond delayed direct exchanges such 
as the parent who cares for the child, who cares for the parent in later life, but 
also emphasises indirect exchanges which build healthy pensions and education 
systems. 
Although not exclusively, the main drivers of this 'apocalyptic demography' tend 
to come from neo-liberal writers on social and economic affairs. In the UK Phil 
Mullan (2000) has published a rebuttal of inter-generational conflict narratives in 
his book The Imaginary Time Bomb. The Time Bomb metaphor frequently re-
occurs in much debate on the implications of population ageing. Problems and 
traits which are stereotypically associated with older people at the level of the 
individual, such as dependency, conservatism, low productivity, and an absence 
of dynamism and innovation, are grafted onto the future traits of society as a 
whole. The demographic transformation is greeted with the certainty of knowing 
the baby boom er cohorts will retire over the next three decades shifting the age 
structure of society away from younger age groups. For Mullan (2000) the 
inevitably of these factors give weight to the pertinence and appeal of the "time 
bomb" metaphor: 
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'The fuse has been lit. It will take about 20 years to smoulder but the 
explosion seems inevitable. The demographic catastrophe is just 
waiting to happen ... " 
"Ageing has become regarded as another of those inevitable 
phenomena, such as global warming, which we can probably do little 
about and which will force us all, sooner or later, to lower our sights 
with respect to our expectations of the future.' (Mullan 2000) 
In this regard the time bomb narrative performs the function of turning ageing into 
a neutral, non-ideological, apolitical pretext for legitimising reductions in public 
and especially welfare spending. In practical terms, these moves do not result in 
reductions in spending, because spending is rising, for example the UK long term 
care system, assuming it remained unchanged would see its costs rise from 
£10.1 bn in 2002 to £24bn by 2026 (Wanless 2006), it would be more accurate to 
argue that national governments are anxious to retard the rate of spending 
growth. In a similar vein Alan Walker identified the growth in the 1980s of an 
ageing panic by means of justifying a wider anti-state agenda. He believed the 
political concerns about the costs of population ageing had been amplified 
artificially in order to legitimate policies aimed at diminishing the state's role in 
financial and social support for older people (Walker 1990). 
There is further evidence that the pessimistic time bomb narratives were originally 
sourced from neo-liberal agendas evidenced through Mullan's citation of the 
importance of the US pressure group Americans for Generational Equity (AGE) 
for developing a narrative of the spectre of inter-generational conflict. AGE was 
formed in 1985, it was chaired by Republican senator David Durenberger and 
supported by a number of vested interests who could be expected to benefit from 
reductions in public welfare spending such as Medicare's private competitors, 
insurance companies and banks. AGE attempted to argue that the retirement of 
the baby boomers would lead to a revolt amongst younger generations against 
the 'greying' of the government budget. 
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In North America other writers have also sought to directly address the 
demographic assertions of the neo-liberals. In Canada Gee and Gutmann (2000) 
have rejected the framing of population ageing as a crisis, not least because the 
nature of the transformation is slow and evolutionary in nature, and they criticise 
the manner in which welfare policy proposals to reduce social expenditures in 
response to ageing are constructed as urgent and without alternative (Gee /le 
Gutmann 2000). In the USA Friedland and Summer (2005) point out that America 
is already older than at any point in history and that future demographic change is 
much easier to anticipate than other forms of social change. Since 1900, the 
number of Americans age 65 and older has doubled three times. Since 1960, the 
population aged 65 and older has doubled while the overall population has only 
grown 57 percent. However, far from economic stagnation in a period of 
significant ageing, since 1960 US GDP has nearly quadrupled. They further argue 
that the critical challenge of an aging society is not so much how to accommodate 
the older population, but how to ensure the productivity of future workers, 
regardless of age (Fried land & Summer 2005). Alongside Mullan these 
contributions present considerably more optimistic prognoses of the implications 
of population ageing although they explicitly take time bomb narratives as their 
defining reference point, even if their objectives are to put forward evidence for its 
rejection. 
Despite the temporary prominence of neo-liberallobbies such as AGE, inter-
generational equity campaigns have found it hard to shift public opinion which 
remains broadly supportive of state spending on welfare for older people. AGE 
disbanded in 1990 and was inactive for 16 years before being reincorporated in 
2006, and Walker in 1990 found no specifically British social data that supported 
the idea of growing inter-generational resentment. Indeed, a few years later 
(1996) Walker was to argue that the 'demographic imperative' was a purely 
manufactured construction aimed at facilitating the restructuring of welfare states. 
Even if we were to accept that some factors existed that would encourage age 
conflict, there are a myriad of factors which forge ties across age groups. Not 
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least the inevitability of ageing for younger people and their own ambitions and 
aspirations for later life (Holladay & Coombs 2002), alongside the empathy older 
people can feel for the problems of youth having already been there themselves. 
(Ward 1979). 
'Apocalyptic demography' is not limited to concerns on public spending, nor is it 
entirely a product of US economic conservatives. An ageing population is often 
portrayed as being inherently less economically productive. Bytheway (1995) 
believes these attitudes are ageist, and demonstrates the longevity of such 
notions by quoting the 1949 Royal Commission on Population: 
"A society in which the proportion of young people is diminishing will become 
dangerously un progressive, falling behind other communities not only in technical 
efficiency and economic welfare, but in intellectual and artistic achievement as 
well" (Royal Commission 1949:121 Cited Bytheway 1995) 
More recently, Huber & Skid more (2003) have lamented what they see as policy 
debates haunted by the spectre of demographic 'time bombs', resulting in 
negative public debates focused on the fiscal dimensions of an ageing society, at 
the expense of wider social, cultural and political implications. They also discuss 
whether the debate would benefit from being recast as being about a 'pre and 
post-transition' society. 
Writers who have responded to the neo-liberal framing of the social 
consequences of an ageing society have often challenged the framing from within 
a political economy approach by arguing that demographic pessimism is a 
political useful construct for elites and that policy concern about the cost of ageing 
has been amplified artificially in order to legitimate policies aimed at diminishing 
the state's role in financial and social support for older people. (Walker 1990). 
The alleged economic imperative for public spending cuts to accommodate 
growing numbers of older people is based upon a number of contestable 
assumptions over the impact of population on economic growth. In contrast to the 
'time bomb' framing when the House of Lords Select Committee on Economic 
Affairs investigated in detail the economic impact of population ageing they 
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concluded that it did not pose a threat to future prosperity in the UK but none the 
less, there are real economic questions that need addressing (House of Lords 
2003). The ageing of the population will increase the number of older workers 
relative to younger workers in the labour market. If older workers are close or 
perfect substitutes for younger workers in terms of productivity, then this shift in 
the age structure of employment can be achieved with minimal economic 
disruption. If, on the other hand, older workers differ significantly from younger 
workers in their skills, trainability, productivity and reliability, an ageing of the 
workforce may have significant economic impact. 
A further criticism that needs to be made of the proponents of apocalyptic 
demography is that it is based on what might be termed theistic economics - that 
there is only one path, one outcome, one truth. That somehow there is an 
historical inevitability of the conflicts they posit. Yet, there are a number of 
grounds on which this particular brand of economic pessimism can be 
challenged. For example, it is possible that an increase in labour participation 
rates in the UK would be beneficial in ameliorating some of the so called 
'burdens' and is a highly feasible prospect in the light of experience in other EU 
countries. If over the next 30 years the UK raised its participation rates for older 
workers and for women to the current levels in Sweden or Denmark, this would 
generate an extra two million workers, and would serve to keep the ratio of 
workers to total population in the UK stable at its 1999 level (House of Lords 
2003). This solution would also be available to other EU countries which are 
ageing at a faster rate than the UK but who also have lower participation rates for 
older workers than the UK and Scandinavian economies. Italy may be portrayed 
as vulnerable to ill economic effects of population ageing, but none the less 
possesses considerable room for manoeuvre in its labour market which could 
address related concerns. In evidence to the same House of Lords inquiry the 
CSI made a similar point by reference to the UK's recent labour market history, 
and suggested that raising the participation rate for the 50-65 age group from its 
current level to the average for all people of working age of 79 per cent is a 
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realistic objective, given the fact that the employment rate for men aged 50-65 
was 84 per cent as recently as 1979, whereas today it stands at 70 per cent. 
The directions that society will take in response to population ageing are not 
exclusively located around the weight of opinion in the fields of social and 
economic theory. The economic debate is critically important, but responses to 
ageing are in many ways directed by the combination of social-economic 
circumstances with deep lying societal attitudes about older people, many of 
which are negative or simply discriminatory and posses synergy in combination 
with the visceral imagery of the old and the associated influence of media 
portrayals of individual and ageing. The response to population ageing is not 
purely a matter of 'dry' economics but also heavily reliant on complex, sometimes 
contradictory, attitudes towards older people and the meaning of later life. 
32 
2.5 Ageist Stereotyping and Discrimination 
The debate on the implications of population ageing goes far beyond macro 
economics and broad social trends, The portrayal, linguistic and visual of the 
characteristics and perceived personality traits of older people, plays a key role in 
constructing responses and expectations of the meaning of an ageing society. 
One strong and recurring theme in the body of research into ageing and society is 
the identification of systematic discrimination against and stereotyping of older 
people. The accusation is that ageist attitudes permeate most levels of society: 
'ageism legitimates the use of chronological age to mark out classes of 
people who are systematically denied resources and opportunities that 
others enjoy, and who suffer the consequences of such denigration, ranging 
from well-meaning patronage to unambiguous vilification'. (Bytheway 1994) 
Bytheway asserts that the word 'old' is widely associated with scorn and 
vilification, to be deployed as part of abusive language in conjunction with words 
such as silly or stupid. He also criticises the frequent use of the word 'elderly' in 
social policy and care literature, even though it may have some positive roots, 
such as connotations of the word 'elder' to denote respect and knowledge. But, in 
general use elderly is clearly codified and is unhelpful in the way it is used as a 
blanket reference to all people age over 65 or 75, in the process ignoring 
diversity. It is • ... as though "the elderly" are a group of people who have conspired 
to place this burden (monetary) upon us" (Bytheway 1994) 
Bytheway's scoping of the problem of stereotyping makes a good fit with 
Pickering's (2001) appraisal of the stereotyping process as homogenising an 
individual's place within the recepient social grouping, certain attributes that may 
apply to certain members of that group are taken out of context, often 
exaggerated and then applied to the group as a whole. The generation of a 
stereotype often comes at a cost to those who are stereotyped as they are placed 
into a marginal position that holds a subordinate status, with the allocated 
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attributes evolving into a 'natural' state of being (Pickering 2001). An eye-catching 
example of this process of stereotyping evolving negative attributes becoming a 
natural state of being, in this case, the impact of ageing on physical ability, comes 
in Figure 2.3 and the BBC's coverage of a ban in the USA of older fans from 
attending a Rolling Stones concert. The management of the venue deemed that 
all people aged over 45 would be physically unable to dance during the concert. 
As many reporters noted at the time, this was despite the fact that the combined 
age of the band's members was 246. 
Figure 2.3: Screen Clipping of BBC news story on people aged over 45 "banned" from a Rolling 
Stones Concert 
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Investigations into negative stereotypes of older adults held by other age groups 
found associations of impairment, slowness, senility, neglect, loneliness, 
sadness, stubbornness and inclination to complaint. The same sample also 
came up with positive traits such as sociability, kindness, family orientation and 
volunteering (Hummert et al 2004). Research examining ageism in children's 
films coined the phrase 'animated gerontophobia' and argued that American 
society revered youth but deplored ageing. Well known Disney films used 
stereotypical characterisations of the 'mean old lady' and persistently depicted 
ageing as negative (Perry 1999). 
The prevalence of ageist attitudes has roots that stretch beyond the post war 
period. The 1834 Royal Commission on the Poor Laws argued against certainty 
of public provision in later life for fear of failing to induce 'labouring people' to 
work hard and make their own provisions (Thane 2000). Macnicol (1998) found 
evidence of the extent to which the ageism of the 1930s informed Beveridge's 
thinking, and ultimately the final shape of Britain's new welfare state institutions. 
In statements that formed some of the early drafts of the Beveridge Report - the 
cornerstone document which heralded the modern British welfare state, ageist 
sentiments were prominent:: 
, It would be a reprehensible extravagance to give full subsistence 
income to every citizen, as a birthday present on his or her reaching 
the age of 65 or 60' (Beveridge page 381 Cited MacnicoI1998). 
'the state should reserve the right to reduce pensions below 
subsistence if the cost of living fell, or there was an economic 
recession' (ibid). 
As with most groups who become stereotyped, there is considerable nuance in 
the perceptions of older people. Indeed, there are a number of positive 
stereotypes in society, but overall, researchers have tended to conclude that old 
age is viewed rather negatively (Palmore 1982). In studies where older people 
are given a central voice in research the results suggest a degree of ambivalence 
and suggest that there are mixed feelings about the ageing process and that 
older people themselves tend to rate ageing positively in some areas and 
negatively in other dimensions. (Palmore 1999) There is a mixture of positive and 
negative characteristics ascribed to older people by younger age groups 
including: nagging, irritability, cranky, weak, feeble-minded, verbose, cognitively 
deficient, asexual, useless, ugly, miserable, and unsatisfied with their lives (Kite & 
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Johnson, 1988). On the positive scale older people are considered as kindly, 
sociable and supportive. There is a strong relationship between older people's 
bodies and physical appearance and how their social identities are stigmatised. 
The frequent use of the adjective 'wrinkly' defines older people through a physical 
characteristic of ageing and associates their social identity to physical decline. 
Yet older people studied by Thomson et al (1991) created their own subjective 
identities without reference to appearance or physical ability. They accepted they 
were 'slowing down' but they did not 'feel' old. When it comes to the sexual and) 
physical appeal of older people, they are typically viewed with distaste (Fournier, 
2000). 
As many older people themselves construct identities that draw upon some of the 
negative traits emphasised in the stereotypes, it comes as no surprise to see that 
ageist attitudes are by no means the sole preserve of socially conservative 
media, and its assumptions cut across traditional left-right boundaries. In 2007 
the New Statesman splashed its front page with the story 'the great generational 
robbery' that argued for welfare cuts for older people (Islam 2007). Take also this 
example from David Cox, a documentary maker and regular contributor of think 
pieces in the left of centre media such as The Guardian and the New Statesman 
and his advocacy for prioritising low tax rates for businesses over secure incomes 
in later life and boldly states: 
'We should face up to reality, and allow the old to be poor.' (Cox 2004) 
Cox and Islam would both be sure to vehemently deny this is an ageist platform, 
but the advocacy of low income in retirement as a tolerable policy outcome 
suggests poverty in later life is more acceptable than poverty for other age groups 
and using 8ytheway's definition of ageism, would suggest a denial of resources 
open to others. In another example of how casual ageism has been an 
acceptable currency on the intellectual left Vincent et al (1999) recount the story 
of one 'liberal' professor, Douglas Stewart, at the University of California who in 
1970 railed against the immigration into the San Diego region of retirees in an 
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article in the bastion of US liberal publishing - the New Republic .. Under the 
banner headline 'Disenfranchise the Old' he wrote: 
'There are simply too many senile voters and their number is growing. 
The vote should not be a privilege in perpetuity, guaranteed by 
minimal physical survival, but a share in the continuing fate of the 
political community, both in its benefits and its risks. The old, having 
no future, are dangerously free from the consequences of their own 
political acts, and it makes no sense to allow the vote to someone 
who /ilctuarially unlikely to survive, and pay the bills for the politician 
or party he (sic) may help elect...! would advocate that all persons lose 
the vote at retirement or age 70, whichever is earlier.' (Stewart 1970 
cited in Vincent et al 1999). 
Ageism as an attitude, unsurprisingly, has frequently been translated into applied 
age discrimination in the delivery of goods and services. The charge of ageism 
can be legitimately levelled at key public services and at the manner in which 
professional practitioners treat older people. The creation of the NHS in 1948 
raised expectations that standards of care and treatment for older patients would 
be radically improved from the legacy of neglect from the inter-war successors to 
the Poor Law infirmaries. However, Bosanquet argues that rampant age ism in a 
number of sectors of the medical establishment meant that geriatric medicine was 
considered a poor relation and services of particular importance for older patients 
were starved of resources (Bosanquet 1978). Professors at teaching hospitals 
were singled out for passing on highly ageist attitudes to their students who were 
advised by one to 'not be contaminated by contact with geriatriC patients'. 
(Bosanquet 1978) 
Laurent concluded that attitudes towards older people in Britain could be 
summarised as being regarded as 'stupid, decrepit, feeble, or unusually eccentric, 
wise or sweet natured, and in any event to be patronised. '(Laurent 1990: 20). 
She also referred to a contemporary report from the health think tank, the King's 
Fund, that claimed that ' ... such attitudes pervade the health service and mean 
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that services are based on deep seated stereotypes of what old people are like, 
rather than what they need or want.' The article went on to note that far too often 
older people are 'fobbed off" by health professionals because age alone is 
responsible for their ills, and that caring for the elderly is low-status work. 
Treharne argued that care for older patients was an unpopular field in most 
clinical careers, including clinical psychology, medicine and social work (Treharne 
1990). The unpopularity of career paths that involved working closely with older 
patients was also apparent amongst nurses, even though they were recognised 
as the most needy, disadvantaged group of patients, there was not a willingness 
to work in the area. Jones found that generally held negative stereotypes and 
prejudices played an important roll in reinforcing discriminatory practices 
(Jones1988). Yet it is increasingly clear that many chronic conditions associated 
with later life are strongly correlated to life style. A large proportion of the 
difference in life expectancy between various groups can at least be partially 
attributed to variations in lifestyle and diet. New technology is providing more 
sophisticated mapping of how the brain functions (Dychtwald 1999). If lifestyle 
and diet are controlled for there is actually very little decline in cognitive abilities 
between the ages of 20 and 70, and the brains of healthy people in their 80s are 
virtually as active as those of people in their 40s (Giddens 2007). 
Age discrimination in health and social services has gone beyond a mere benign 
neglect or status of poor relation to other clinical services. Ageist attitudes have 
also facilitated a widespread toleration amongst practitioners of physical and 
mental abuse against older service users. A recent report by the House of 
Commons Select Committee on Health (2004) concluded that around a half a 
million older people were suffering from abuse at any given time in the UK and 
that the most common setting for abuse was domiciliary care. While substantial 
levels of abuse were physical or mental, the Committee also found medical abuse 
through the over-use of neuroleptics - anti-psychotic drugs which have a sedating 
and calming effect and are used to reduce, prevent or pacify psychotic thinking 
and behaviour. The report stated that there is over-prescription of medications, 
particularly of anti-psychotic medication for people with dementia, not on clinical 
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criteria but frequently deployed in the care environment as a tool for ensuring that 
the care of people with dementia is easier for the staff. Additional evidence of the 
medical abuse of people in care homes came from a study of 22 nursing homes 
in South London that provide accommodation for 935 residents aged over 65, 
which established that a quarter of residents were prescribed anti-psychotic drugs, 
and of these, a disconcerting 82% were found to be inappropriate (Burstow 2002). 
In part the abuse can take place because social care staff hold positions of power 
over older people who are excluded from taking part in decision making about 
their own lives by virtue of their physical or mental health. It is hard to imagine 
that these levels of institutionalised abuse would be tolerated by society if 
children or young people were the victims. The outcry would be huge, action 
would be swift, that these responses do not occur when widespread abuse of 
older people is exposed is a strong indicator of how the construction what 
constitutes rights and dignity in later life works to a lower standard than in 
younger life stages. 
Ageism has also been put forward as an explanatory factor in the systematic 
exclusion of a large number of older workers from the labour market. The 
employment rate for older workers aged over 55 across the member states of the 
EU stood at 40.2% in 2003 (EU Commission 2005). Of course, turn that statistic 
around and we see that 6 out of 10 older workers are not actively employed. This 
does not count as an unemployment rate of close to 60% because a great 
proportion would not be included due to their long term sickness/disability status 
or through forced early retirement in the public sector that is the widespread 
practice across Europe. However, the data stands as evidence of the 
marginalised position of older workers. For older people aged 65-74 across the 
EU in 2003 only 5.6% remained in employment (EU Commission 2005). 
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There have also been historical factors relating to the UK economy which have 
pushed the trade union movement into supporting measures that would take older 
workers out of the labour market. The prime factor has been the cyclical return of 
high levels of unemployment in the British economy over the Twentieth Century. 
Indeed high unemployment levels were a driving factor in the Labour movement's 
support for reducing the state pension age in the 1930s. In 1934 the Labour MP, 
John Banfield speaking in favour of a motion in support of state pensions at 60 
said: 
'Millions of pounds now spent in unemployment pay would be better 
spent in pensions for the aged ... We are spending money, in many 
instances, at the wrong end .. .it should be possible ... to pension men 
and women at 60 and take them out of industry and to bring in the 
young people to do the work of the community, the work of 
commerce, and the work of the nation during those years when they 
are most fit and able to do it.' (John Banfield MP Hansard 1934 cited 
in Phillipson 1982). 
During recessions and periods of high unemployment there was a quiet 
consensus between employers and trade unions that redundancies should be 
targeted at the older workers as exiting from the labour forces was perceived as 
some kind of lesser evil than youth unemployment. There was also a steep 
increase in the number of older workers who were medically defined out of the 
labour market and put on disability benefits (CampbeIl1999). In the Spring of 
1999 this figure stood at 15.2% of workers aged between 50 and 60, in stark 
comparison to the 4.5% of 25-49 years old economically inactive due to disability 
(DWP 2006). Little thought was given to considering what productive/positive 
social roles men and women forced out of paid employment as early as their 50s 
would play for the remainder ofthe lives. 
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This section has detailed some of the hard evidence of the prevalence of ageist 
attitudes in a wide stratum of society and the existence of age discrimination 
against older people in the workings of the labour market and in the delivery of 
public services. We have also seen in Section 2.4 some conflicting responses to 
the social and economic policy implications of population ageing and the 
emergence of framing the associated issues in the negative language of the 'time 
bomb'. All ageing societies face choices on how to respond to the challenges of a 
greying society. These choices, as with all key public policy decisions within what 
Franklin (1994) has called our 'media democracy' will be significantly influenced 
by the frameworks and agendas set by the mass media. The media treatment of 
population ageing develops within a constant interaction with the political 
process. The responses of political parties to population ageing will be 
considered in later chapters, but in the light of the media's influence on politics, 
how far do the ageist attitudes so far identified find their reflection in the media's 
portrayals of older people and population ageing? 
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2.6 Ageing in the Media 
The age transformation of society should influence the production of news and 
other media in many ways. It will radically alter the labour market and accordingly 
patterns of media consumption. It will change the shape and interactions of the 
family that will further alter patterns of media use. The age composition of 
audiences at different points over each 24 hour cycle will become more 
pronounced. It is one of the most important transformations that require reporting 
and analysis during the course of the current century. 
As we shall see in this section older people are the most avid consumers of news 
media, and the shifting audience demographics suggest any mass media product 
will need to do well with older audiences to establish leading figures in terms of 
audience share. With older people representing such a large, and growing, 
proportion of media consumers, it might be expected that the modern media need 
to move beyond merely reflecting historical ageist attitudes in society, but instead 
be at the cutting edge of changing attitudes during the great age transformation. 
Of course, a realistic prediction must be to anticipate media content will reflect the 
continued existence of ageist attitudes alongside attempts to commercially benefit 
from the growing spending power of the 'grey pound'. However, there is a 
problematic dearth of previous research material that specifically investigates 
media content and societal ageing. Mass communication research has generated 
a large volume of work on media portrayals of different groups within society. 
However, studies into the portrayal of older people, or the issues identified as 
being central to their quality of life, are rare in comparison to research which has 
focused on youth, the other group thought to be most at risk of social exclusion in 
terms of their age demographic. 
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The work that has been done has primarily been focused on the portrayal of older 
people in terms of character stereotyping, and rather less on the key ageing 
issues. Furthermore, the balance of work tends towards television rather than 
newspaper portrayals. Yet, these omissions in research relate to some of the 
heaviest users of mass media in society. There appears to be a broad consensus 
that older people, although the biggest consumers of media, and particularly 
news media, are under represented in the media, and where they are not ignored, 
they are often portrayed using negative stereotypes. Yet, as demonstrated by 
Figure 2.4 it is older audiences who have the biggest appetite for television news. 
Viewers aged 55+ were found to be consuming over 180 hours of national news 
coverage per year compared to less than 80 hours per year viewed by younger 
adults aged 25-34: 
Figure 2.4: Hours of national news viewing by age group. (Taken from Hargreaves 2002), 
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Older people are the heaviest consumers of television programming, with the 65+ 
age group averaging 5 hours 14 minutes a day watching television. - compared 
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with an average across all age groups of 3 hours 38 minutes. The appeal of 
factual programming appears to increase with age. This is particularly true in 
relation to local community issues and events, foreign and domestic politics, but 
does not apply for coverage of show business. About half the older audience 
(aged 55+) do not think that older people are portrayed realistically in factual 
programmes. Even more believe that the views of this age group are often 
ignored, and they are consequently keen to see more older people appear in 
such programming. These opinions are echoed across the sample, regardless of 
age. (Hanley 2002) 
Older people are the largest, and apparently keenest audiences of television, It is 
feasible that this fact would find both reflection and expression in the prominence 
of older characters and presenters, However, when Nussbaum et al (2000) 
reviewed the results of 11 studies that took place from 1979 to 1997, nearly every 
study concluded that less than five per cent of characters on prime time television 
were aged 65 or over. Indeed, far from dominating the schedules other studies 
would indicate that older people are more likely to be portrayed on television 
through their negative stereotypes than any other section of society (DaiI1988). 
This finding resonates with studies of older people's own perceptions. A survey 
in Scotland by Fell and Foster (1994) found that older people tended to think the 
media portrayed older people in a negative way, with 44% saying portrayals were 
negative, and only 40% believing portrayals were satisfactory. 
The news media has laid itself open to criticism in the way it excludes and 
stereotypes older people. For example, in the 1980s Pollack (1989) was arguing 
that the mass media had failed in their duty to educate themselves about the 
dimensions of social policy issues stemming from population ageing and how 
they might affect older people, and accused editors of believing the issues were 
too boring or depressing to warrant serious coverage. There is a strong case for 
arguing that too high a proportion of media content is too negative about the 
qualities of older people. But, as with so many issues there is a high degree of 
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plurality within media content, with significant evidence suggesting that while 
older people may be low profile in certain circumstances media coverage 
successfully avoids the deployment of ageist stereotyping. For example, when 
studying coverage of John Glenn's return to space at the age of 77 in US news 
magazines such as Time, Hilt (2000) found little in the texts that could be 
considered ageist. Another study of the portrayal of older people in television 
advertising (Roy & Harwood 1997) or in prime-time entertainment programming 
(Kessler at a12004) found that while older people were under-represented, when 
they were portrayed, it was more likely to be in a positive light through depictions 
as active, happy information providers. 
When it comes to the image of older people in newspapers and magazines there 
is further research evidence of the extent to which negative stereotyping takes 
place. Older people are often portrayed as a problem group in society and in 
particular, an expense or a burden on the rest of us. Popular issues in print media 
include the dismissal of older employees, loneliness and the objectionable 
consequences of 'grey pressure.' Disproportionate attention is paid to extreme 
and eccentric issues such as older gamblers and older people lying dead for 
weeks in their apartment. On the other hand little attention is paid to older 
people's contribution to informal care and volunteer work (Evers1998). Print 
media aimed at older people, perhaps unsurprisingly, is more likely to promote 
portrayals that link to the idea of active ageing. Magazines such as Yours and 
Choice produced content that consciously develops a positive self-image of 
'proper' ageing for older readers (Featherstone & Hepworth 1995). A study of 
one food-related commercial advertising campaign in the UK found older people 
portrayed in decreasingly traditional roles, indeed, as the campaign developed 
over a number of years it increasingly put older characters into increasingly 
adventurous roles (Williams et al 2007). 
Problematically, certain genres of media coverage that ostensibly seek to portray 
individual older persons in a positive light through such adventurous roles, often 
do so in a manner that is likely to reinforce some of the negative stereotyping. 
From personal professional experience, communications practitioners working in 
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older people's advocacy organisations often roll their eyes at the positive 
stereotype genre piece of the smiling 'abseiling granny' when used in promotional 
literature aimed at the grey market. Take the following two examples taken from 
the Barking & Dagenham Post and the BBC's national news web site. 
Figure 2.5: Screen clipping from the Barking & Oagenham Post. Headline: "Phyllis takes the 
plunge". Published October 2 2007. 
Phyllis takes the plunge 
02 OCtober 2007 
A DAREDEVIL pensioner showed nerves of steel as she' 
abseiled 120ft down the side of. building. 
Phyllls Bush. 78. plunged down the side of Romford's YMCA 
. on September in aid of Saint Francis Hospice. 
Figure 2.5 is a perfect example of the abseiling granny. A women abseiling is 
itself difficult to justify as a news story, unless the story fits the criteria of being 
unusual in some way. This is the peg on which 'daredevil' Phyllis makes it into 
print. Although we can be almost certain of the absence of malicious intent on the 
part of those who had a hand in producing this story, the story none the less, 
reinforces an ageist stereotype of the older person as physically incapable and 
risk averse. A similar imagery is found in Figure 2.6 where the BBC uses another 
picture of a 'daredevil 'pensioner being strapped onto the wing of an aeroplane. 
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Again this story is clearly intended to be positive and upbeat. It draws upon third 
age narratives and gives us approving copy over retired workers who will not be 
withdrawing from 'social life'. Yet as with Figure 2.5 the pictures are chosen 
because they are in harmony with ageist assumptions. In Figure 2.7 from the 
same BBC story a picture of an older man in an astronaut's kit is used, but any 
positive intentions are contradicted by the picture caption: 'not as comfy as 
gardening gloves'. Certainly gardening is a measurably popular pastime with 
many older people, but gardening also works as a symbol of retirement and 
withdrawal from work - indeed, enforced absence from work for high salary 
professions is often referred to as 'gardening leave'. The text of the story is a 
broad endorsement of active ageing, yet the picture selection reinforces negative 
stereotypes and the gardening caption suggests we should resist the notion of 
older astronauts, who really should be pottering around in their gardens instead. 
All of this in despite of the recent space exploits of John Glenn covered earlier in 
this section. 
Figure 2.6: Screen Clipping 1 from BBC News web site. Story headline "A Pension for Adventure". 
Story published on September 42001. 
Tuesd,;,y;-4se-Ptemlier;-ioiJi;lii:3S-GMT-i7"35iij( 
A pension for adventure 
Forget queuing at the post office, 
tomorrow's senior citizens want to be off 
globe trotting,accoroing to a new survey. 
But will the .'third age' be as exciting as 
some are hoping? 
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Figure 2.7: Screen Clipping 2 from BBC News web site. Story headline "A Pension for 
Adventure". Story published on September 42001. 
Such ambition and 
adventurousness is 
, part of the recent 
cultural push towards 
"actiVe ageing', says 
Professor Simon Biggs 
from Keele University's 
: School of Social 
Relations and author of 
, The Mature 
. Imagination. 
Whereas people once "Not as comfy as my 
assumed they would gardening gloves" 
withdraw from 'social 
fife" as they aged, newer generations of 
pensioners are increasingly seeing retirement 
as a time to "re-engage" with society. 
The pervasiveness of ageist assumptions and the marginalisation of older people 
as protagonists and subjects of broadcast media content cannot be seen as a 
mere reflection of wider societal ageism. Large sectors of the mass media either 
are, or perceive themselves to be, under economic pressure to satisfy younger 
audiences as a higher priority than the preferences of older consumers. 
The advertising industry has been identified as one of economic pressures to 
deliver younger audiences by Carrigan and Szmigin (2000) and in the process 
marginalise older people in the media, either by ignoring them, or portraying them 
through the use of negative stereotypes. Indeed, other writers believe the industry 
desperately wants to disassociate itself from older people, who it connects with 
images of decrepitude and physical repugnance (Long 1998). Further evidence is 
found in the media industry's explicit understanding that advertisers will reward 
programmes which appeal to younger audiences, often at the expense of output 
which is popular with older people (Seager 2004). Younger audiences are felt to 
be more open to the reception of advertising messages, and therefore, media 
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content which can deliver younger audiences will be rewarded financially. The 
following quote is as good as any for demonstrating industry attitudes: 
'From a TV point of view, there is little point targeting the grey market as 
they watch anyway. By definition, they are available to view. I don't think 
any media producer would find a future with older viewers, they don't grow 
brands really.' (Darren Benton, business manager, Charinel4. Quoted in 
Seager (2004)) 
The economic driver for a youth-obsessed media is easy to explain. Advertising is 
the core source of income and the costs per thousand of older readers or viewers 
that advertisers are willing to pay broadcasters or press titles are way below the 
rates they will pay for younger age groups. The mass media business model is 
highly reliant on selling audiences to advertisers rather than promoting output on 
the basis of content (Kleyman 2001). The depth of the desire to attract advertising 
money by chasing younger viewers is demonstrated by comments given by 
senior industry figures such as former president of NBC, Jeff Zucker, who told the 
New York Times 'if we're going to survive we have to attract younger audiences' 
and proudly boasted that NBC was the only network that year 'that's ageing down 
this summer' (Kleyman 2001). 
Demonstrating that the pressures to attract young audiences are not restricted to 
commercial broadcasters, in May of 2004 the BBC decided to abandon a revamp 
of its political programming, despite the fact that the new formats had increased 
the number of viewers, because the additional viewers were over 45, and as such 
had the 'wrong demographic' (Byrne 2004). According to MediaAge (1998) 
German broadcaster SA T 1 decided to withdraw programmes on the basis that 
they attracted older audiences, a move which provoked heated public debate on 
the mass media's apparently conscious strategy to exclude older viewers. In 
addition to the commercial pressures the advertising industry, in its age structure 
is highly unrepresentative of wider society. In 2007 the average age of 
advertising agency staff was 31 years and 61.6% percent of employees were 
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aged under 30 (IPA 2007), providing further context on why the industry may 
struggle to understand and empathise with the needs of older audiences. 
The body of research on the relationship between older people and media 
content is still relatively thin on the ground. Of concern for this thesis has been 
the further dearth of material that specifically consider the media's treatment of 
population ageing and the mediation of its meaning and the interpretation and 
framing of the kind of responses society needs to make. There have been, 
however, three quality works which have addressed questions that lie close to the 
concerns of this research project. 
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2.7 The Contributions of Bergstrom, Groombridge and Midwinter 
A fair volume of useful research exists on media portrayals of older people, but 
very little has been done to specifically investigate portrayals of population 
ageing. An ageing society brings with it public policy challenges and choices of 
great consequence, so an appreciation of the directions in which media content is 
potentially influencing outcomes is likely to be of considerable research utility. 
This section analyses three studies that have specifically looked at aspects of 
media coverage of population ageing and as such provides useful yardsticks for 
the analysis of this project's own content analysis of media coverage of 
population ageing. Midwinter (1991) oversaw a wide ranging project that 
incorporated the media's treatment of some key ageing issues. Groombridge's 
(1999) study specifically focuses on demographic issues, and Bergstrom (2001) 
as an industry insider produced a fascinating perspective on the treatment of age 
in daily newspapers. 
Midwinter (1991) in conjunction with the Centre for Policy on Ageing (CPA) used 
surveys, interviews with broadcasters, content analysis of national newspapers, 
and some qualitative analysis of media outputs, to gain insights into the rationale 
behind some of the portrayals that were produced. The CPA was originally 
formed in 1947 through the Nuffield Foundation as a grant giving body but by the 
1980s it had evolved into a 'think tank' promoting 'new attitudes to age'. The 
study's main conclusions from the content analysis of newspaper coverage was 
that few writers specifically write about age as a primary topic, but that 
'everybody's age is brandished in the press' as shorthand index for providing 
quick descriptions of people in the news. Midwinter argued that the combination 
of the invisibility and negative stereotyping of older people in TV was mirrored in 
the print media, and argued that: 
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The idea that 13 or 14 million UK citizens are beyond work and family-
rearing, most of them good health and some of them well-ta-do is not well 
represented, although it would be false to say it is left out entirely.' Midwinter 
(1991) 
The Midwinter/CPA research observed the use of age is ubiquitous in the print 
media, and we are all used to the giving of a protagonist's age in many news 
stories even though it is not always clear why this may be pertinent to the issues 
at hand. The prevalence of this journalistic tick would matter little in a society 
devoid of ageist assumptions, but it becomes problematic when the language 
used serves to cue the reader to draw upon a repertoire of negative stereotypes 
about ageing that were discussed earlier on in this chapter. In Australia, one 
response to this has come from Pearson who has drawn together academics and 
practitioners together to challenge the unnecessary use of age in reporting and 
develop guidelines for a more sensitive approach to the reporting of age (Pearson 
2002). Midwinter also noted a similar situation to this project in that UK based 
research on population ageing and the mass media is a scarce commodity: 
'Although there is considerable information on the incidence and the 
treatment of older people on TV, there is surprisingly little data on the 
same question apropos the press.' (Midwinter 1991) 
Midwinter's work was complemented eight years later by Groombridge's specific 
focus on the press and population ageing. Groombridge with support from the UN 
as part of the International Year of Older Persons, provided a content analysis of 
3,686 references to older people and older people's issues recorded from 1,096 
national and local papers over the course of one week in June 1999 
(Groom bridge 1999). Unlike the great majority of existing work, this study did 
actively seek to analyse media awareness of demographic issues. The sampling 
time frame sought to avoid any week where it was known there would be a focus 
on a particular ageing issue. None-the-Iess, the sample included press discussion 
of a governmental code of practice on age discrimination, the complexity of 
income benefits for older people, a legal victory for National Bus pensioners as 
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well as stories that the then Prime Minister, Tony Blair, wanted to appoint a 
private secretary under the age of 45, in the same week as he made a speech 
against ageism in the work place. 
Groombridge concluded that ageing issues were given 'medium prominence', in 
that there was a considerable body of coverage, but it was rare for the topic to hit 
the front pages (Groombridge 1999). Disappointingly, a large proportion of the 
coverage was comprised of stories, particularly crime stories, where the older 
person was the victim, and a 'sadly predictable' use of patronising and/or 
derogatory language such as 'bed blockers', 'sprightly', 'vulnerable' and 
'remarkably fit and well for a seventy year old'. This fits with Hummert et aI's 
(1992) finding that discourses centred around the concept of the 'elderly' are 
utilised by the news media, and to a lesser extent in political communications in a 
manner that can be argued to represent the assignment of lower cognitive and 
language abilities of older people (Hummert et aI1992). The question of what 
group term should be applied to older people recurs frequently in this thesis and 
will be considered further in relation to political communications materials. 
Groombridge considers this question in evaluating the rather negative terms 
found in his content analysis. When pensions are the subject of discussion 
'pensioner' may be appropriate, but runs the danger of looking irrelevant and 
condescending when used elsewhere and 'OAPs' may be conveniently short for 
sub-editors but could be considered equally condescending. 'Older' people 
carries less negative baggage although may be considered euphemistic when all 
. of us are 'older' than someone else. Groombridge pointed to research that shows 
many older people think that 'old' applied to people 10 years older than they are, 
and that 'elderly' is unpopular with older people. Groombridge's research team 
summarised their 'impressions' of the regular story genres concerning older 
protagonists that appeared in their content sample: 
1) The GoldenlDiamond wedding. The 100 plus birthday 
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2) The reunion, memorial or veterans parade 
3) The pensioner as victim of a fall, fire, accident etc 
4) The mugging, burglary, con man victim 
5) Fundraising or charily work 
6) The mountain climber, cyclists etc who defy expectations about age 
7) Social events, dances, bowls etc 
8) Caring, residential issues 
9) Victims of planning, council incompetence or bungling 
10) The "Victor Meldrews" - "disgusted" pensioners who feel ignored and mistreated. 
The negative language and story genres that emerged from the Groombridge 
research demonstrates a range of ageist responses, from the pure ageism that 
sees the older person holding lower social worth through to a more 
compassionate ageism where there is human empathy, but it is expressed in a 
manner which takes away social agency from the older person. This resonates 
with some of the discussion in Section 2.6 of the process where, certain genres of 
media coverage that ostensibly seek to portray individual older persons in a 
positive light through such adventurous roles, often do so in a manner that is 
likely to reinforce some of the negative stereotyping. Other research shows that 
middle aged and younger adults respond to the higher frequency of problems with 
receptive and expressive language skills in older people by adopting their speech 
style when communicating with older people in what has been branded 
'patronising speech 'or 'elderspeak'. Patronising speech results in an 
overcompensation of perceived expression and cognition deficits in the older 
person by simplifying speech through the act of speaking slower, louder voice 
and with increased grammatical simplicity. When the cognitive assumptions of 
'elderspeak' feed into the narratives of the enfeebled elderly, this kind of 
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discourse can serve to entrench further the identities of older people as orientated 
toward illness and death (Taylor 1992). 
Groombridge's conclusion that ageing issues were of 'medium' prominence in the 
press shows a much higher level of prominence than Midwinter's earlier 
conclusion that little consideration was given to the treatment of older people 
specifically in the press. This trend of increasing coverage is further supported 
when the Groombridge study noted how the profile of ageing issues had 
increased in comparison to the findings of the 1977 Royal Commission on the 
Press, which set a brief to leading media researcher Denis McQuail to report on 
how often newspapers mentioned important issues such as housing, health, 
education, pensions or retirement. According to Groombridge, McQuail could only 
record in his content analysis that coverage of pensions and retirement 'could 
only just be counted'. 
Midwinter and Groombridge investigated media portrayals from a UK academic 
perspective, Bergstrom produced a media practitioner's perspective that 
investigated similar issues and cited Groombridge's findings (Bergstrom 2001). 
Hans Bergstrom is a former editor-in-chief of one of Sweden's major national 
press titles Dagens Nyheter. He still writes as an independent journalist, but 
crossed over into academia as an Associate Professor of Political Science at the 
University of Gothenburg and conducted his study into ageing and the press as a 
Shorenstein Fellow at Harvard University. In his study (2001) Bergstrom explains 
his interest in the issue stems out of a recognition of the global demographic 
transformation toward 'an ageing society' and the associated emergence of new 
issues and thus new stories that warrant, in his view, widespread media 
coverage. But Bergstrom poses the question: 'But is the print media - arguably 
the eyes and ears of our society - taking due notice?' Bergstrom observes that 
staff of varying age and experience are creating newspaper content, but it is 
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questionable whether the final product is currently catering to the news and needs 
of all people, or perhaps only the needs of those in sought after demographic 
categories. 
Bergstrom also investigated the volume of press content of ageing and attempted 
to gauge the main perspectives. He selected for in depth analysis two papers -
the Boston Globe and Dagens Nyheter- on the basis of their quality and "strong 
anchoring in their regions'. Smaller content comparisons were made with the San 
Francisco Chronicle and the New York Times. His research design aimed at 
delving deep into a limited range of titles to see how editorial and managerial 
leaders in similar settings handled the same ageing challenge. The content 
analysis was conducted through searching sample newspaper sections at 
different points over a 10 year time period using Lexis Nexis. The search criteria 
were to include articles that contained 'ageing' in combination with 'population' or 
'society' and was balanced with in-depth interviews with journalists at both 
papers .. 
Bergstrom's content analysis found there was a mild, if erratic, tendency for the 
amount of coverage to increase over the time period. Within this sample 
Bergstrom constructed what he called a 'gloom index' that categorised and 
counted articles that linked ageing in some way as being a cost or a problem - or 
alternatively if the articles saw ageing as a sign of progress or holding some 
opportunities, they were given a neutral coding. Bergstrom's coding found that 
negative articles on ageing outnumbered positive associations by a ratio of three 
to one, but that reporting had become marginally 'less gloomy' over the most 
recent three years in the study. He also made a generalised observation that few 
articles within his sample directly focused on issues pertaining to an ageing 
society, because he believes that ageing and the generational transformation is 
not at the heart of what the press want its readers to see. Rather ageing is 
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incorporated into other issues such as business's attempts to understand 
emerging baby boomer markets, or trends in jobs market often wrapped up in 
specialist sections i.e. motoring, gardening etc on the motivation of providing 
stories that attract advertisers seeking out the grey pound or dollar. Although 
Bergstrom sees some positive outcomes to these trends as it provides space for 
stories that supplement traditional news stereotypes and increase the diversity of 
journalism. 
Bergstrom's study also indicated some evidence of an institutionalised ageism at 
work in the newspaper industry. Bergstrom found that the median age of 
journalists at Dagens Nyheterwas 50 and 45 at the Boston Globe, indicating a 
strong cohort of co-workers born in the 1950s, although for Dagens Nyheter, a 
larger proportion of younger staff members were to be found in senior roles, with 
35% of senior editorial positions occupied by someone below the age of 40. But 
Bergstrom found a tension between older journalists and senior management that 
revolved around the ongoing waves of 'downsizing' and redundancies. Job cuts 
were disproportionately aimed at older journalists, who in turn, viewed this as 
evidence of management placing higher value on "new blood" over 'experience'. 
Management were accused of being motivated by a desire not be out of touch 
with the young, by hiring younger staff, and there was suspicion that management 
would find younger journalists easier to 'control' than senior. reporters of ·stature'. 
The impression was not dissipated by one senior manager telling Bergstrom that 
younger journalists were more 'compliant'. 
Bergstrom describes the segment of the newspaper market in the age range 
between 45 and 70 as being an extensive group that is increasing in numbers 
more rapidly than other groups. It has a high media interest and its members, on 
average, have on their hands more free time and economic resources - yet 
surprisingly he found this group to have been largely ignored in the marketing 
strategies of the newspapers studied. This group has been allocated a low 
marketing priority status due to shared strategic concerns that in the booming 
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high-tech regions of Boston and Stockholm, quality morning newspapers are 
vulnerable to competition from new media for younger readers and a subsequent 
loss of advertising revenues to the Web. Market research that had segmented 
the readership of both titles led to giving priority to categories of reader such as 
the 'young', 'high-tech people' aged 25-40, those who had recently moved home 
and women. This has led to editorial targeting through the development of more 
technology supplements, entertainment listings and expanded business sections. 
The 45-70 age group Bergstrom believes has been taken for granted, mainly 
through an expectation that their higher levels of brand loyalty stops editors and 
media executives from fearing their abandonment of the printed press for the 
web. But, also taken for granted through industry-specific stereotyping of age-
related consumer behaviours i.e. get them when they're young, keep them for life, 
the young will try new things but the old are set in their ways. Again, as seen in 
Section 2.6, a combination of stereotyping and the mostly advertising led 
pressures to secure younger audiences can be seen to be key drivers in 
downgrading older audiences and ageing issues in the generation of media 
content. 
It is interesting to note that where significant work has been done in relation to the 
news media and the policy consequences of ageing, such as the three examples 
discussed in this section, they have come from outside the usual 'production line' 
of academic inquiry and writing. Groombridge and Midwinter's work were both 
inspired and materially assisted by NGOs with a specific interest in advancing the 
interests of older people, while Bergstrom's interest came as a media practitioner 
who had crossed over into the world of academic writing. 
In conclusion, this chapter has scoped the dimensions of the great global age 
transformation and discussed how social theorists have attempted to place the 
relationship of older people as individuals and as a group to society as a whole. 
We have seen the early 20th Century's attempts to rationalise social isolation and 
powerlessness challenged by ideas based around theories of structuralised 
dependencies. More recently, we have seen close inter-relationships between 
social theory with cultural movements that seek reconstruct the meaning of later 
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life in a more positive light. But, there have been contrasting responses to 
population ageing and a broadly neo-liberal strand of thought has built negative 
narratives of impending 'time bombs' that will explode the promised land of small 
government and low tax takes. Elements of this apocalyptic demography draw on 
ageist stereotyping of the qualities of older workers and consumers. Ageism and 
age discrimination have deep roots in our society and it accordingly informs the 
media's coverage of ageing, although this section demonstrates that, as might be 
expected, changes are taking place in how journalists and other contributors to 
the mediation of the subject are framing the implications ofthe great age 
transformation. 
The shifting age structure of society, and the growing, near majority, proportion of 
older citizens and voters, necessarily moves theorising away from the 
marginalisation older people toward the potential birth of 'grey power: This is not 
least through the highly visible involvement of older voters in democratic politics 
and in actions such as voting, debating and campaigning. If older people show no 
variation in political attitudes and behaviours there may be little of practical 
consequence to the theorising, but as we shall see in Chapter 3 that age acts as 
a meaningful variable in explaining political behaviours in several significant 
ways, both through attitudes and behaviours of voters and in the way the political 
parties conceptualise, communicate and interact with older people. 
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Chapter 3 - The Politics of Ageing 
T.,iflgf w'" juJt IS 
tt";~1e for mygel'lfration 
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Figure 3.1: Posy Simmonds cartoon strip. Reproduced from Pilcher (1995) 
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Figure 8.1 
Opportunities 
vary by cohort 
membership 
Source: Posy 
Simmonds. 
Reproduced 
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Any transformative shift in the demographics of a country demands 
consideration of not if this will lead to changes in the conduct of politics, 
particularly electoral politics, but howthings will change. To grasp the 
consequences of population ageing we need to understand the political attitudes 
and behaviours of older voters. The net impact of these traits will be increasingly 
magnified with the transition from being a marginalised minority to a powerful 
near-majority, or indeed majority of voters, in large numbers of Westminster 
seats. In electoral terms there needs to be consideration of the relationship 
between the voters' chronological age and their behaviour, but also how cohorts 
are influenced by being born at a particular time in history and how important 
events and social trends impact upon them. In recent times much of the debate 
around age and politics has centred on the wide differences in the participation 
rates between younger and older people, not the least the growing gap in turnout 
rates. These issues will be examined in this chapter alongside a consideration of 
how the behaviours and strategies followed by major political parties may adjust 
to the changing age composition of the electorate. It should be borne in mind this 
is a period where much interest has been generated by the incorporation of many 
marketing and management techniques into political strategies and organisation, 
crucial among these has been the ever more refined targeting of key voter 
groups. 
3.1 Age and Voting Behaviour 
With older people more likely to register and vote at increasingly diverging 
rates than younger people the ageing of the electoral register and, more crucially, 
votes cast on polling day accelerates at a faster rate than the ageing of the 
population as a whole (phelps 2005; Davidson 2007). To understand the 
significance of this step increase in the number and proportion of enfranchised 
older people this requires an exploration of the meaning of age as a variable in 
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political behaviour. If there are no discernible age-related differences between 
voters in terms of their electoral preferences, the way in which they interact and 
participate in democratic politics, their experience of democracy, or their attitudes 
and preferences then the study of age and politics would be no more than a 
mechanical collection of data. However, if age does matter then the rapid ageing 
of the electorate requires significant attention from the research community. 
Theories on voter behaviour can be broadly divided between structural 
based explanations where by individuals develop political attitudes and 
behaviours through socialisation according to the social groups to which they 
belong and choice-based theories which focus on individuals and their 
rationalised cost-benefit assessments {Harrop 1986}. The early pioneering 
psephologist Andre Siegfried attempted to correlate various social and 
geographical variables with electoral preferences in the early 20th Century. He 
saw relationships between, amongst other things, types of soil patterns and 
voting preferences. Siegfried hypothesized from village-level data that a causal 
chain existed, beginning with the local geology linking in turn to the degree of 
population concentration, the mode of land tenure, the ratio of large, medium, and 
small farms and finally political behaviour (Brustein 1981). From the 1930s 
survey research techniques associated with the Michigan School became 
popular. These involved the analysis of large quantitative data sets that sought 
relationships between factors such as class, race and education and voting 
behaviour. In the American Voterstudy it was argued voter decisions were a 
result of long term processes of socialisation and that strong party identifications 
developed which should be seen as pivotal in understanding and predicting 
behaviour, even where a voter has switched from their prime party identification 
(Campbell et aI1960). The Michigan School approach, although influential 
internationally, was better suited to the US system of government and politics 
where voters register as supporters of one party or another in order to participate 
in the primaries system for selecting electoral candidates. The cycle of 
registration and primaries provides a wealth of data for those researching US 
politics that does not exist in most other advanced democracies 
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Political preferences grounded in social characteristics such as class, race, 
age and gender are central to structural explanations. These theories overlap in 
many practical ways with choice based theories because social groups provide 
spaces within which inter-personal interaction, lived experience and learning take 
place. Collective awareness by any demographic group of shared material 
interests opens up the potential for a political party or movement to mobilise and 
construct their foundations of electoral support. The most obvious examples here 
would be the Social Democratic and Labour parties of Western Europe because 
of the historically strong correlation between voting support for these parties and 
class identity. 
Regardless of age or life stage the perceptions of shared interest exerts a 
powerful socialising force in determining voting behaviour. But to what extent 
should it be expected that these forces and ideas apply equally to a Briton born in 
1930 and someone born fifty years later in 1980? The rise of strong third parties, 
such as the SDP and then the Liberal Democrats in the UK and the SNP in 
Scotland, in addition to the widespread phenomenon of voters voting for different 
parties depending on which legislature was being contested, reduced the strength 
of class based voting in Britain. As recently as the General Election of 1970 the 
combined national vote share of the Conservative and Labour parties was as high 
as 89.5%. By 2005 the combined vote for the two main parties had shrunk to 
67.6% of the national vote. This underlines the declining value of class as a 
predictor of voting and also calls into question the salience of generational 
differences in class-party allegiances for explaining and predicting electoral 
behaviour. 
If class-based voting is in decline, how can the preferences of the growing 
proportion of non-class based voters be explained. This decline in both the 
number of voters who identified with one party and the number of voters who 
identified strongly with a party became a key variable in the development of the 
theory of partisan dealignment (Crewe1984). This approach claimed to better 
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explain increased electoral volatility and rising support for third parties. It might 
have been expected that dealignment was primarily a phenomenon related to 
younger voters. However, expectations that the older cohorts would be the least 
susceptible to dealignment trends were refuted by Crewe et aI's (1977) 
observations that the decline in partisanship in 1974 did not come from first time 
voters. Rather this arose from voters who had entered the electorate during the 
Depression in the 1930s whom it could be argued might have been expected to 
be more attuned to class based appeals. It is not possible to assume that the 
decline in class based voting only increases voter volatility amongst the youngest 
age groups. 
In contrast to the approach of studying elections through the socialisation 
of voters through shared characteristics rational choice theories have imported a 
number of concepts from the discipline of economics into political science. Basing 
theories on the assumption that individual voters always act rationally a large 
number of such theories can be traced back to what is regarded as a classic work 
namely Downs' An Economic TheoryofDemocracy(1957). Downs argued that 
voting derives from an individual's calculation of the personal costs and benefits 
of whether to vote, and then for which candidate to support. This approach 
emphasised economic performance and its relationship to party support as well 
as the question of perceived issue-proximity as a determinant in forging brand 
loyalty. 
Rational choice offers a theoretical explanation of why the age 
transformation could result in the exercise of 'grey power', particularly if older 
voters were to evolve a shared viewpoint as to what constitutes a desirable 
political platform. Voting can be argued as being more rational for a group who 
can expect to explicitly benefit more from a particular outcome than as isolated 
individuals. If older voters were to become a clearly defined group that 
demonstrated a willingness to switch allegiances this would likely influence 
politicians (Lapp 1999). This process would logically assume that the larger the 
group, and the greater likelihood of that group not having fixed partisan 
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allegiances, the greater the potential for parties to modify policy to satisfy that 
groups publicly stated wants. Of course this depends on the group having a 
shared perception of what policies would satisfy its social and economic demands 
as well as its members holding the necessary awareness of when parties adjust 
their policy product. However theory of political behaviour based on assumptions 
that voters act rationally and are fully aware of all relevant information arguably 
fails to exhibit a proper degree of critical realism of the subject matter. It is 
problematic to contend that older voters will judge their electoral options purely on 
material economic grounds. Such a cost-based assessment may explain 
contributory factors in decisions taken by a proportion of older voters, but as will 
be seen later in this chapter, theories that make claims based on these 
assumptions are highly contentious. 
Rational choice is then unsatisfactory as a primary explanation of how the 
growing ranks of older voters might impact on political campaigning. There is a 
need to combine elements of choice theory with other factors. Firstly, a thorough 
assessment is required of the environment within which voters are asked to make 
their choices. Median or spatial voter theories require that voters recognise an 
overarching bi-polarity of political scale, typically the division between left and 
right, and will act accordingly to whoever or whatever party they feel is closest to 
their own position. A median position on this scale places a party closer to 
winning a majority of grey votes than positioning on either of the polarities 
(Congleton 2002). This process of constant spatial evaluation is bolstered if there 
are increases in voters' skills and resources -such as education, media exposure 
and political awareness. Where older voters exhibit high levels of political interest, 
which have steadily improved since the 1950s, this has been labelled as a 
process of cognitive mobilisation' (Dalton, 2002). Voters may come to an 
assessment of where the parties stand on various bi-polar scales, but cannot 
know the outcome of their electoral preference. Even if the preferred candidate or 
party for older voters wins the contest there is still uncertainty regarding how well, 
or badly, the new administration will perform in terms of competence in dealing 
with ageing or other issues related to service delivery or the maintenance of clean 
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government. Voting outcomes are not risk free. Although older voters are often 
portrayed as voting for someone the calculus also includes voting against what 
might be considered the most undesired electoral outcome. To avoid a worst-
case scenario electors seek out a condition of "minimal regret" (Geys 2006). This 
helps explain why many modern political parties prefer to avoid supporters of 
opposing parties or candidates with many of their direct mail or leaflet drops 
because they assume that voters for their opponents are often motivated more by 
dislike of themselves than enthusiastic support for their rivals. 
It is a common perception that over the last fifteen years the main political 
parties in the UK are now much closer to each other in relation to the most 
important areas of policy (Clarke et al 2004; Green 2007; Quinn 2008). This 
proximity covers some of the major ageing issues such as long-term care with a 
two party consensus on means testing and on the re-linking of the state pension 
to earnings. So older voters are presented with a nuanced equation in making an 
evaluation on what kind of policy differences will result from their electoral 
choices. This problem requires further consideration of median voter theories. 
Models of behaviour that incorporate elements of sociology alongside rational 
choice have been attempted in response (Heath 1976). More recent attempts are 
based on elevating the importance of two factors; position and valence. Position 
is the notion that voters come to viewpoints on important issues such as 
economic inequality, levels of taxation and social liberalism, and make a spatial 
assessment of their own views on these issues in relation to the assumed 
variations in the stances of political parties. The party closest to the voter is more 
likely to gain their preference (Clarke et al 2004). Valence arises when there is 
broad agreement amongst voters of an issue's importance, such as educational 
standards or crime rates, and will be attracted to one party over another if they 
perceive it will perform more efficiently in these policy areas (Stokes 1992). 
Valence in turn combines with the significance of efficacy - the extent to which 
political actions and voting are perceived by voters as contributing to desired 
outcomes. So, in tune with these schools of theory, if older voters were to place 
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high value on a particular issue, and perceive significant differences between 
parties and their abilities to enact desired outcomes for these issues, then there 
would exist a potential scenario under which large numbers of older voters could 
switch preferences and accordingly influence election results. Valence issues 
arise in politics when there is broad agreement about the goals of policies, such 
as the desirability of low unemployment and inflation, high educational standards 
and freedom from fear of crime or terrorism. The majority of voters do not differ 
about desirable objectives in relation to valence issues, reducing the usefulness 
of spatial analysis. At the heart of the valence model is the idea that voters will 
support a party or candidate which offers the best chance of delivering the key 
policy objectives (Clarke et al. 2004). There are shifting variables that are 
required for a valence policy issue to significantly swing votes. Certainly voters 
must be conscious of the issue, they must care, and critically parties must be 
associated differently on the issue either through real, or perceived, differences in 
policy position or ability to enact programs of action. 
There are a number of recent international examples of how valence is an 
important variable in understanding the occasions where shifts in older voters' 
preferences have influenced national politics. The most obvious cases are in 
democracies that have seen the establishment of 'pensioner' parties, and there 
have been several examples, such as in Israel and Scotland, where these parties 
have made electoral breakthroughs. In Slovenia during 2006 the pensioner party 
was part of the governing coalition. However, the impact of issues that have the 
potential to swing the preferences of older voters go far beyond the establishment 
of niche third parties. In many democracies highly charged battles for the grey 
vote have become the norm. In the US, the Republicans are hampered in their 
desires to privatise Medicare and Social Security by the fear of reaping electoral 
retribution in senior dominated swing states such as Florida. Demonstrating 
variance in their perceptions of governmental performance older voters 
consistently gave lower approval ratings than some other age brackets for 
President George W Bush in the mid-term period before his second election 
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victory. These developments suggest that party strategists are starting to 
perceive of older voters not as fixed in their views but as ever more volatile. 
Representative Tom Davis of Virginia, a long time Republican campaign 
strategist, said, "It's stilla very fluid vote that can swing on a dime" (Toner 2003). 
Indeed, the AARP, the lead campaign organisation for older voters in the States 
has been described as a more powerful lobby than organised labour. 
Perhaps one of the strongest examples of how perceptions of valence 
have visibly changed party behaviour comes from Australia. John Howard won 
the federal election of 2004 in large part by responding with new policies and new 
money on pensions and health care, in response to the Australian Labour Party's 
concerted efforts to woo the older voters who dominated marginal seats held by 
Howard's coalition. Over the last 10 years Australia has seen a broad shift from 
parity of support from voters aged 60 and over for the main parties to a strong 
lead for the Liberal led coalition (Uren 2007). However, demographic trends in 
voting preferences lead some analysts to believe that the Liberals will do far 
worse amongst older age groups once Australia's baby boomers reach retirement 
age (Watson 2007). The high valence value of pensions reform in neighbouring 
New Zealand pressured the right of centre National Party into matching their 
Labour rivals superannuation polices. They feared the issue would mobilise 
voters against them due to widespread perceptions that state guaranteed 
pensions would disappear under National (Darwall 2003). Analysis of the results 
of the 2007 Presidential election in France suggests wide variations in 
preferences do occur through the apparently wide differences in the choices of 
the youngest and oldest French voters. Nicholas Sarkozy's victory was built upon 
very high levels of support from older voters, he won 61 % of the vote from voters 
aged 60-69 and 68% from voters aged 70 and above (IPSOS 2007). In contrast 
58% of voters aged 18-24 preferred his socialist rival Segolene Royal. Faced with 
these levels of support for Sarkozy from older voters Royal faced an impossible 
. task of finding compensating leads amongst voters of other age groups or 
sociological categories. Recent elections in the US, Australia, New Zealand and 
France therefore strongly suggest older voters do indeed place high value on 
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particular issues, and regularly perceive significant differences between parties 
and their abilities to enact desired outcomes for these issues. 
It is rational for parties to campaign on issues, or indeed the more tenuous 
act of appealing through the projection of values, where they believe they have a 
valence advantage over their competitors. However this pos'itioning is often a 
more sophisticated exercise than merely seeking to place themselves close to the 
median of all voters. These adjustments may be undertaken by a party with a 
specific demographic in mind, or in order to detach a strand of voters away from a 
rival party. A third party may place itself well away from the median of all voters if 
it believes an increased vote share is there for the taking. Petrocik (1996) 
suggested this theory of issue ownership as the driver for parties seeking to focus 
on themes where they have a reputation for greater competence, as supposed to 
realigning their policy positions along a binary scale. This area of theory has also 
been called "saliency theory" where parties and candidates frequently shy away 
from confrontational exchanges over issues in favour of a selective and pro-active 
emphasis on issues on which they believe they hold a competency advantage 
over their opponents (Klingemann et al 1994; Budge et al 2001, Van der Brug 
2001). A rational campaign strategy for a party to follow would include tactics that 
seek to build on their strengths by emphasising issues where they enjoy an 
advantage over the competitors. These strengths could be drawn from voter 
perceptions of a party as being more trustworthy, sharing the same priorities as 
the voters, or possessing higher levels of competence. Parties will potentially 
benefit if an issue on which it has such an advantage is also salient to voters. 
As the electorate moves into a position where the median voter moves 
from being typically middle aged onto the cusp of entering the life stage of a "grey 
voter", it is an intriguing question to consider how ageing issues will translate into 
the arena of inter party competition and its influence on positioning and tactics 
adopted by the strategists. The changing age profile of the electorate raises 
important questions on the nature of the kind of position and valence issues that 
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may hold the potential to sway the growing ranks of older voters. If "rational" 
behaviour is narrowly defined then it could be argued that an increasing 
proportion of older voters will translate in reduced per capital spending on early 
years and secondary education, as the older voter will not directly benefit from 
this state spending. Despite the obvious weaknesses of pure rational choice, this 
hasn't stopped some eminent voices attempting to apply the theory in attempts to 
interpret the implications of population ageing on politics and the kind of policy 
positions that will possess the highest levels of electoral impact. Indeed, rational 
choice has been used to put forward a model of voter behaviour based on one 
definition of economic self-interest and drawn the rather dramatic conclusion that 
after 2016 "Germany will be a gerontocracy". Not might, may be, could be, is 
likely, but "will be" (Sinn 2002). This argument bears a strong relationship to the 
kind of apocalyptic demography discussed in Chapter Two and further develops 
the pessimistic "time bomb" thesis outlined by neo-liberals such as Kotlikoff. The 
methodology for Sinn's research is based on the deterministic assumption that if 
a pensions reform financially benefited a voter, no matter by how little, they would 
vote for it. Conversely if a voter did not personally benefit from a reform, 
regardless of what other merits might favour the policy they would always 
oppose. The study assumed "a reform would only be feasible if the median voter 
favours it". On the face of it this is a piece of speculative research that should be 
easily ignored. But as a long time chair of economics at the University of Munich 
and a prominent member of the Council of Economic Advisors that influences 
federal ministries in Berlin Sinn is clearly a protagonist in these debates of some 
standing. 
The importance of Sinn's "gerontocracy" thesis is the way in which it 
resonates with, and indeed feeds into, a developing political narrative that 
assumes electoral futures will be determined by wholly selfish rational choice 
older voters. This is constructed as a future threat that requires swift political 
action to reduce the generosity and range of welfare spending for people in later 
life. Sinn's has work has been enthusiastically quoted by writers such as Faisal 
Islam (2007) in left of centre journals like the New Statesman which dedicated a 
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cover page feature under the emotive headline of The Great Generational 
RobbelJl(Figure 3.2). In the article Islam expresses alarm at any kind of 
accommodation to the pursuit of happiness for older people and reports that 
"Nuremberg is building swingless playgrounds for senior citizens" as evidence for 
the emergence of a "gerontocracy" in Germany. Islam also talks of a "political 
time bomb" inferring the need for political action against current levels of state 
support for older people. 
Figure 3.2: Screen grab of the web version of the New Statesman front page feature for 
March 5 2007. Headline: "The Great Generational RobberY' 
LIfE & SOCIETY 
The great generational robbery 
FaisalIslam 
P1J~lished 05 March 2007 
917 comments ! [J Print version I o(w Uslen f!1lIiliSII1 RSS 
ExPensive pensions, no hope of getting on the housing 
ladder, and tens of thousands of pounds of debt just to go 
to university. Have the under~35s been mugged by the 
baby-boom generation that went before them? 
Many of you reading this will be thieves. 
And a go()d proportion of you will be 
vii::tims. There is no mugging involved, 
bul a new form of wealth exchange. 
which economiC. observers are calling 
generational robbery: the finanaal' 
phenomenon whereby one generation-
the baby boomers - enjoyed a whole 
range Of economic benefits that are now 
unattainable 10 those growing up behind 
-"--------------"---.-------- them. 
Breyer and Craig's quantitative work that sought to test the 
correspondence of a country's underlying economic and demographic structure 
with the proportion of GNP allocated to public pension provision would appear to 
lend some support to Sinn's thesis. In particular their conclusion that: 
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"strong and significant positive effect of median voter age on program 
size. This estimate is robust and implies that an increase of median voter 
age by one year adds half a percentage point to the GNP share of social 
security benefits" (Breyer & Craig 1997) 
But Breyer and Craig's conclusions are contradicted by other studies, such 
as the inquiry into the recent pension reforms in Sweden. These reforms required 
younger citizens to put in higher contributions without receiving greater benefits. 
Under strict median voter theory they should support reform as it would reduce 
future reductions in resources, but older citizens should prefer increased higher 
contributions in order to get the short term higher benefits. Under these 
assumptions Kruse calculated that the majority would not support the Swedish 
reforms, and yet the "impossible" reforms passed with reasonable levels of public 
support (Kruse 2005). 
The assumptions of pure rational choice diverge in many important 
respects from the reality of human behaviour in the manner in which they 
discount the levels of inter-generational solidarity and altruism that exist. For 
example, one life cycle effect is the family centred inter-generational solidarity 
expressed by grand-parents who would take an active interest in the educational 
welfare of their own grand children, and so would be fully supportive of 
investment in schools. Analysis of American survey research suggests older 
voters are highly supportive of schools spending, although this support is much 
weaker amongst middle aged and older voters who don't have children (Balsdon 
& Brunner 2004). A personal finance calculus of any potential pensions reforms 
strips away the natural empathy and sense of co-operation many voters feel both 
within .their own families, and also at the wider societallevel. A younger voter 
would dislike the thought of harsh poverty in later life in the same way that an 
older voter would be dismayed by falling educational opportunities and standards 
for the young. Outside of the extend family bonds of older voters it is important to 
recognise how rare it is that a senior is a member of only one social grouping, or 
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that anyone social grouping can completely trump all others in the act electoral 
decision making. A single voter may identify with groups based on class, gender, 
life stage, ethnicity, religion or life stance, employment status or sector, caring 
responsibilities, trade union membership, strong value or single issue affinities 
The age composition of any electorate is in a constant state of change. 
Demographics and the human life span mean there is a perpetual churn in terms 
of the membership and composition of the electorate. Every year new voters 
reach the age of 18 and enter the electorate and other voters die off or 
significantly change their position in the life cycle. Butler and Stokes (1969) 
discussed the importance of the physical replacement of the electorate - the 
permanent cycle of the oldest voters dying off and new younger voters entering 
the electoral register. So, even over a short period of a few years millions of 
voters die and others come of age, furthermore many more move into different life 
stages, including from childlessness to parenthood and from the labour market 
into retirement. This raises the intriguing phenomenon of class alignments and 
other political cleavages rippling through the body of the electorate. Enduring 
prerequisites of support for parties and political movements will literally die off 
unless the factors that created the foundations endure or are recreated as lived 
experience for younger cohorts. However the renewal of the electorate may have 
to proceed for many years before a change in alignment is fully reflected in party 
support and it has been suggested that the decline in turnout in some mature 
democracies is largely due to generational replacement (Butler & Stokes 1969; 
Blais et al 2002). Within this churn and the overall trend of population ageing, 
clearly there is an important role for the impact of two factors that are often 
difficult to untangle from each other - the generations voters are born into and the 
time of life voters find themselves in at any given time. 
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3.2 My Generation ... My Life Story: The Role of Cohorts and the Life Cycle 
The relationship between birth certificates and ballot papers can be a 
surprisingly complex variable for understanding political behaviour. Age is 
simultaneously a fixed chronological value, a relative concept, a probability 
indicator of morbidity, and a shared as well as a highly individualised personal 
experience. Any given individual's attitudes and behaviours are likely to be forged 
by the dominant influences in childhood, the main political cleavages experienced 
as a young adult, and the impact of social trends during the life span. The 
significance of age as a predictor of political behaviour has been raised in recent 
years by the pronounced declines in voting at elections by younger people. This 
declihe in youth turnout has lead to a renewed interest in understanding the civic 
attitudes of younger people and a new focus on exploring measures to increase 
their participation (Kimberlee 2002; Levine & Lopez 2002; Electoral Commission 
2006). As older people have tended to have been less susceptible to variables 
that have reduced turnout their higher rates of participation alongside their 
growing numbers magnifies their potential significance. 
The Posy Simmonds cartoon at the start of the chapter provides a comedic 
expression of the kind of every day generational differences can be seen, as well 
as similarities that give different age groups varying perspectives on any given 
issue. The age-related differences that we find in political behaviour can be 
investigated through varying effects. The generationalor cohort effect arises from 
long term social trends such as the changing role of women or changes in 
educational attainment which establishes differences between neighbouring 
cohorts. For example, historical events or social changes that leave lasting 
impressions on significant sections of society. Such changes would include the 
Second World War, stark economic recessions or social movements such as 
feminism. The evolving roles and rights of women created a situation whereby in 
the 1974 general election an older female voter aged 66 would have first voted in 
74 
,1929, which was the first UK general election where women's entitlement to vote 
was equal to men's and would have been a child in the First World War, but an 
older women of 80 in 1974 would not have been entitled to first vote until she was 
35 years old and would have experienced the First World War as an adult. 
However, it is often the habit in the worlds of politics and media, then and now, to 
give these women with such differing historical experiences the same la bel of 
'pensioner'. In contrast the life-cycle effect is based upon the unique experience 
of the key stages in any individual's life story such as their education, their 
employment, personal relationships, parenthood and retirement and how 
individuals as part of the ageing process adapt their outlooks in response to the 
varying circumstances they encounter over the course of their lives (Zody 1970). 
Cohorts or generations are often used inter changeably to mean 
essentially the same thing - people who were born or in campaign terms, entered 
the electorate at the same time. To be demographically and technically accurate 
the definition of a cohort should be restricted to single year groups, but in practice 
generations are constructed, understood and discussed as groups born over 
longer periods of time. A cohort effect would cover shared experiences for the 
people within the group or category, and would involve a lasting impact on voter 
attitudes or behaviours derived from that shared experience. The effect could be 
generated by a number of factors, including social-economic periods of progress 
or crises, such as periods of high employment or unemployment, austerity, inter-
group violence, war, absence of war, or revolutions in changes of attitudes to 
personal relationships, as in the 1960s and 1970s. The impact of the effect may 
. vary depending to the receptiveness of the cohort or the drama of the events 
involved. These changes may alter political activism in many different ways. One 
of the more dramatic cohort experiences has been the end of Soviet government 
in Russia and its controlling influence over the states of central and Eastern 
Europe. These societies were instantly converted from totalitarian to more 
democratic systems of government. This in turn has transformed the opportunities 
for political expression and mobilisation and created qualitatively different 
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cleavages to those present in neighbouring democracies in Western Europe, who 
in turn have lost the influence of the Cold War on their internal politics. In these 
contexts it has been interesting to reflect on the role of political socialisation, but 
also the valence of reduced pensions incomes and how older voters in post 
communist societies such as Russia and the former DDR still vote in greater 
numbers than other age groups for the successor parties to the communists 
(White et al 2005; Doerschler & Banaszak 2007). Studies of post-communist 
elections in eight countries have also found ideological differentiation of young 
and old voters from within the same socioeconomic strata strongly suggesting an 
age cohort voting effect (Schatz 2002). 
A consistent theme in the debates on cohort effects is the notion that 
effects that take place when voters are younger tend to be profound and long 
lasting. This is because youth is seen as a formative period in a person's life 
where they are relatively more open to new ideas or receptive to attitudes, as 
supposed to middle aged and older voters who reflect new experiences through a 
much more defined prism of existing views and experiences. For example Lipset 
and Rokkan (1967) believed watershed events left an enduring influence on the 
political behaviour of those who experienced them. Some research has argued 
that the period just after the end of the Second World War made a lasting effect 
on people who experienced austerity and the formation of the National Health 
Service implanting lasting attitudes towards collective social welfare and 
community solidarity (Morgan 1990). Other researchers have investigated the 
possible impact of the industrial strife which brought down the Labour government 
in 1979 and the subsequent years of Thatcherite economics instilling a more neo-
liberal economic outlook into younger cohorts ('Thatcher's Children') in 
comparison to the immediate post-war generations (Russell et a11992; Brown, 
1992). Putnam (2000) has speculated that growing up during "popular" wars 
produces a longer standing commitment to civic engagement. The renowned 
sociologist Karl Mannheim suggested that youth is a key period of exposure to 
experiences, events and crises of the time, which result in lasting ideological 
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effects (Pilcher 1995). In this context it would appear that we have a possible 
explanation of why first time voters are a priority group for political communicators 
as the potential prize is not merely a single vote in the new voter's first election, 
but a greater prize of longer term fixed support decades of favourable voting. 
The existence of significant differences between various cohorts further 
undermines the arguments put forward by protagonists such as Sinn, who base 
their theories on the assumption that all older voters in the future will be 
economically selfish rational choice voters. This rather one dimensional view of 
older voters is challenged by other theorists who have sought to articulate a 
divide between materialist and post-materialist values in cohorts. This approach 
is based on the assertion that older voters today, because their attitudes were 
forged during times when basic material needs were less likely to be satisfied, 
show a materialist predisposition in deciding what are the most important 
governmental priorities. This is in contrast to younger cohorts today, who form the 
older voters of tomorrow and who take a comfortable level of social-economic 
provision as the norm, and as a result place more importance on issues such as 
globalisation and environmentalism (Abramson 1989; Abramson and Inglehart 
1987; Inglehart 1971, 1990). In a similar vein other studies have investigated 
changes in cohort attitudes to libertarian-authoritarian issue scales and argue that 
older voters are more authoritarian as they were socialised before the revolution 
in social attitudes in the 1970s (Tilley 2005). Voters who were young enough to 
personally experience the changes ofthe late 1960s and the 1970s are already 
starting to populate the retired community and in the next 10 to 20 years a large 
proportion of older voters will be members of these post-materialistlpost-social 
revolution cohorts. 
An important dimension to the rise of post-materialistic politics has been 
the widening of the definition of political activity to include what might be called 
consumer or life style politics. Consumer politics is not directly concerned with 
influencing which political party holds power, or often is not concerned with 
changing governmental policies or priorities at all. Instead it would include 
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activities such as boycotting certain commercial goods, or indeed positively 
discriminating in favour of certain products and seeking out items such as fair 
trade goods. These strands of activity would also include socially conscious 
changes to lifestyle such as a commitment to recycling or a switch from private 
car use to public transport. The rise of these activities serves to blur the clear 
distinction between explicit and implicit acts of political behaviour. In this context 
the apparent decline in the political participation of the young in traditional politics 
of joining organisations, publicly campaigning and voting needs careful scrutiny. 
The age related patterns of activism are open to analysis from cohort and 
lifecycle analysis alike (De Graaf 1999). 
Cohorts are regularly translated into popular discourse and consciousness 
through the development of generations. As clear differences in behaviour 
between the youngest and oldest cohorts emerge there will be great interest into 
how this might translate into an engine of social change when cohorts with a 
certain set of attitudes or characteristics dies off and is replaced with new cohorts 
with qualitatively different or even diametrically opposing characteristics. As the 
personality of a cohort begins to emerge and are broadly agreed, contested and 
discussed within research and other discursive communities they are often 
assigned a generational name tag. These tags can quickly become grammatical 
shorthand for discussing various social phenomena. In the UK alone a number of 
generations has been constructed and debated. There has been the "war 
generation", the "flower power" generation of the 1960s, "baby boomers", 
'Thatcher'S children", "Generation X", "Generation Y" and so on. According to 
White (1991) cohorts only become recognised as "actors" when they are 
positioned around historical events, in both their own self-identity and in the eyes 
of others. In this sense, we would distinguish between "cohorts" and 
"generations," in thatthe former refers to effects attributable to having been 
placed by one's birth in a particular historical period: "whereas a "generation" is "a 
joint interpretive construction which insists upon and builds among tangible 
cohorts in defining a style recognised from the outside and from within (White 
1991). Of course, that people share the same generational experiences does not 
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mean that these generational identities are uniform. To take the second Iraq war 
as a recent example the impact is likely to be different for a soldier sent to fight in 
the war, from an anti-war protester, to British residents of Arab heritage. The 
historical event may be responsible for formative experiences for different people, 
but they won't experience the event in the same manner and their attitude or 
behaviour modification will also vary. 
The media have a pivotal role in the process of converting a cohort into a 
generation. The habit of constructing and discussing generations in the media is 
partly an importation of research techniques used in commercial marketing that 
attempt to combine demographics (age, educational attainment) with 
psychographics (values and emotions). Generationallabelling didn't become a 
regular feature genre for the news weeklies such as Time until the 1980s (Kitch 
2003). When this type of feature became established there was a particular 
interest in the baby boomer generation who were often portrayed as selfish in 
comparison to their parents' service in the second world war (Kitch 2003). The 
coverage can be nostalgic and consciously strives to define key experiences and 
moments in the forging of a generational identity. For the boomers, it could be 
1968 and the late 60s in general, of Vietnam, Woodstock and the Beatles. A new 
generationallabel - Generation X-become popular in the 1990s. Sometimes 
referred to as baby busters they were portrayed as living in the shadow of the 
more numerous baby boomers lacking idealism, their own cultural heroes, as 
·slackers· - although this verdict was contradicted in other publications who 
alternatively portrayed this generation as business innovators. 
Soon after the construction of 'Generation X' the following age cohort was 
dubbed as 'Generation Y' and defined as being more materialistic than the 
boomers when they were young, and defined by their use of technology and the 
rise of consumer software and video games (Huntley 2006). The oldest cohorts 
were simultaneously portrayed in the USA as the "greatest" generation for their 
war service and role in post-war reconstruction, but also as greedy and selfish 
pulling resources away from the young by having the desire to seek personal 
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fulfilment in later life - both patriotic heroes and economic burden (Kitch 2003). By 
way of a visual demonstration of how marketing segmentation and newspaper 
constructions of generation come together. Figure 3.3 shows a chart produced for 
the New York Times by the Pew Research Centre that purports to tabulate rolling 
realignments in US party identification by cohort. (Kirkpatrick 2006) Note the 
graphical use of an IPod and a rocking chair as an attempt to contrast the cultural 
characteristics of the older cohort against younger age groups. 
Figure 3.3: Chart "how generation influences party" produced for the New York Times by 
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Established theories of political socialisation urge us to allocate great 
weight to the attitudes and behaviours picked up by older voters during their 
formative years, and it is generally considered that these political habits become 
more fixed over time and less open to change. As these formative years are open 
to different historical events depending on the cohort in consideration society is 
constantly evolving a patchwork of cohorts at variance with each other in their 
reception and engagement with politics. This interpretation has been reinforced in 
recent years by the widening gap between the youngest and oldest age cohorts in 
terms of electoral participation. 
In contrast to the main features of generational influences on voters, Life 
Cycle effects, relate to an individual's experience of changing circumstance over 
the course of their life story. Political behaviours can be expected to evolve as 
the individual leaves home for full time education, enters the labour market, 
develops adult relationships and/or start new family units, re-locates into new 
communities, retires and eventually enters later life. Each successive stage in the 
life cycle produces different networks and economic contexts (Norris 2003). Over 
the course of the life cycle voters may initially be unsure about which party they 
feel the closest proximity, but as time moves on their habits harden and party 
loyalties develop. It isn't age alone that decreases the propensity to switch 
between parties rather it is the length of one party allegiance that decreases the 
likelihood of vote switching. Of course, older voters have been in the electoral 
market for longer and have had more opportunities to develop a strong 
allegiance. Additionally younger and older voters will not only be from different 
cohorts or generations they will also be in distinctly different life stages. One life 
cycle effect that sharply differentiates the young and the old is that in most 
democracies the average retired person is on a lower income than that average 
younger worker in their 30s who is in full time employment, the incomes of the 
retired are also more likely to be fixed in the form of state or secondary pension 
payments (Blundell & Tanner 1999; Hills 2006). While older voters are often 
relatively poor in terms of income in comparison to younger voters, they can also 
be capital rich as there are significant proportion of older voters who have more 
capital wealth and lower housing costs than younger age groups. 
Later life includes not only differing social circumstances but also 
variations in the outcomes of the biological processes associated with human 
ageing. Ageist stereotypes need to be challenged, age does not equate to 
decrepitude, but it does incorporate, at widely varying rates, a process of 
progressive deterioration of cells, tissues, organs, loss of physical ability and 
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decline of the senses. A proportion of older people will be in excellent health, 
others will be living with serious long term chronic conditions. The human body is 
also prone to depreciation in sight and hearing capability in old age. In later life 
the thinning of the bones, particularly amongst women, can lead to leg and hip 
injuries that would be rare for a younger person (Coleman et a11993). Yet, in 
many ways, the 'problem' of ageing is how others start to treat an individual 
differently. According to a recent report by the Audit Commission and other 
agencies (2006), it was found that public services often fail to meet the special 
needs of older people, and evidence "of a lack of dignity and respect in the way 
older people are treated when in hospital." Older people are the biggest users of 
the NHS. Public services delivered in this manner are politically unsustainable, 
particularly bearing in mind the impending retirement of baby boomers who will 
have much higher expectations of public services than older cohorts who were 
bought up in post-war austerity. 
As with biological ageing consideration of psychological ageing needs to 
be fully conscious of avoiding ageist assumptions and stereotyping. Many 
aspects of ageing incorporate what may be considered to be beneficial 
psychological qualities of accumulated experience and learning. However, brain 
diseases such as dementia frequently account for loss of cognitive functions. 
Studies have also shown that a person's age-related health influences the 
development of the individual's identity and that older people aged over 85 are 
more likely to describe themselves in the language of their own real or perceived 
physical restrictions (Dittmann-Kohli 2005). Chronological age does hold 
biological consequences and a large proportion of older people are presented 
with different physical and psychological challenges in their daily lives in 
comparison to most younger people, but regardless of physical well being older 
people are treated differently within society, and we should expect this othering to 
be present in how the political classes consider older voters and how older voters 
experience and respond to the electoral cycle. 
Age, and a voter's position in the life cycle, has become a strong predictive 
indicator of a voter's propensity to vote and take part in civic politics. The growing 
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ranks of the retired have been apparent for some years and the changing age 
profile is seemingly bound to influence the conduct of politics, however, it has 
been the recent, and dramatic, drops in turnout amongst younger age groups 
which has served to both accelerate and exaggerate the impact of population 
ageing. Data from the British Election Study (Clarke et a1.2004) suggests the 
stark differences in voter turnout between age groups was not a factor until after 
the 1992 general election. Younger age groups in the 1970s showed lower 
turnout rates, but in subsequent elections their turnout increased bringing them 
into line with the wider electorate. But, this trend seems to have been broken in 
the 1990s, with voters that joined the electorate in this period holding onto their 
lower propensities to vote, and are considerably more susceptible to forces that 
are working to suppress electoral turnout. A natural assumption to make might 
have been that the historically low turnout rates for first-time voters in the general 
election of 2001 would increase in 2005 in line with the increase in overall turnout, 
yet it appears turnout rates for voters aged 18-24 dropped further in 2005, and 
turnout in the 25-34 age band stood still (Phelps 2005). This raises the prospect 
that these cohorts will always have participation rates below those of previous 
generations. Consequently, locking in, and accelerating, the age transition of the 
electoral market. 
These trends in turnout rates, and other measures of civic participation, 
demonstrate how age can be a vitally important variable in understanding and 
predicting voter behaviour. The geographical distribution of the changing age 
profile, of course, holds a particular resonance for the UK's First Past the Post 
voting system, and its non-proportional outcomes. There are only small age 
differences between voters when self reporting about their knowledge of politics. 
While 18 to 24 year olds filled less knowledgeable than other age groups, even 
among older age groups those who do not feel they'd know much outnumber 
those who have some confidence in their knowledge (Electoral Commission 
2005). The young are much less likely to be politically active than older age 
groups. The Electoral Commission (2005) found that only nine per cent of 18 to 
34-year-olds had taken apart in at least three activities defined by the commission 
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as indicators of political activity, this compares to 20% of 35-54 year-olds and 
24% of the 55-64-year-olds. The same study by the Electoral Commission 
attempted to measure voters perception of the efficacy of political participation as 
well as their satisfaction with the system of government in the UK. Younger age 
groups were found to be slightly more likely to feel that the system of government 
was satisfactory. This partially contradicts Rosenstone and Hansen's theory that 
voting is a life cycle effect that depends on people acquiring political knowledge 
about parties and public affairs as they grow older (Rosenstone & Hansen 1993). 
However, if younger voters are not inclined to feel less informed that older voters, 
then it may be that progress through the life course opens up voters to appeals 
for social mobilisation. 
Any analyst of age and politics needs to avoid any tendency to 
homogenise all older voters aged over 50. Receiving the carriage clock on 
retirement or picking up one's state pension book is far being the last word in a 
voter's life story. When considering the life cycle, retirement is far from being the 
last key event in a voter's life story. So, what are some ofthe key life stages or 
events for older people that will impact upon their social-economic position or 
identity as a voter? While care must be taken in allocating a shared category 
status to all older people, nonetheless, retirement and the exit from the labour 
market is hugely significant. The variation in circumstances at the time in which a 
person retires can alter its impact. For people who have held secure employment, 
with reasonable financial expectations from their occupational pensions and/or 
property investments, and who were able to exercise a good level of control and 
planning over their retirement the transition can be a positive experience. For 
people who find themselves permanently removed from work in unplanned 
circumstances such as redundancy or ill health the experience can result in a 
negative shock to their financial position and personal self-esteem. However, 
income is far from being a sole determinant of the how beneficial the change may 
be for an individual, as for many older workers in physically demanding jobs, 
retirement can be experienced as a grateful release (Barnes & Parry 2004). 
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Bereavement through the loss of a long time life partner, siblings or 
surviving parents marks another transitional landmark. According to the research 
findings of the ESRC Growing Older programme men are more likely to suffer 
from depression following the loss of their partner, while women complain of 
loneliness and isolation. In the longer term men are the more likely to re-marry 
(ESRC 2007). A large proportion of older voters live with long-standing illnesses 
and the proportion that do so rises significantly in the first two decades of 
retirement. Just under half (43.0% of men and 44.3% of women) of those aged 
between 50 and 54 say that they have a long-standing illness compared with 
68.2% of men and 67.3% of women aged 80 or over (Marmot et aI2003). Giving 
up driving a car, change in housing status, ill-health or reduced social activity due 
to fear of crime all figure within these categories of change in post-retirement. 
Citizens, of whatever age or life stage they find themselves at, do not only 
possess the means to influence electoral outcomes through the power of the 
ballot box. Although the prime concern ofthis work is voting and elections, it is 
important to incorporate a wider sense of what political participation might mean. 
In most historical research participation has been defined through the mechanics 
of democracy, such as voting, donating money, joining parties, and contacting or 
lobbying public officials (Whiteley 2005). But participation can also be analysed 
at the individual level without the need for the collective support or input from 
others, such as individualised donations or refusals to buy and/or opt into various 
consumer products i.e. boycotting a product, or opting to buy fair trade products 
(Stolla at al 2005; Della Porta & Diani 2006). Then there is the act of the 
individual seeking out political contact, where the citizen physically makes 
proactive contact or communication with a public official, elected representative 
or media organisation. This contact can be undertaken on the initiative of the 
individual or be inspired by memberships and associations with wider entities who 
encourage individuals to support collective action. This is likely to involve 
activities such as going to political meetings or community group events, and 
evidence suggests these activities tend to go together, so individuals who are 
85 
involved in type of collective action are more likely to be involved in other forms 
engagement as well (Whiteley 2005). 
In recent times, debate has focused around a perception that older people 
are more inclined to participate in citizenship orientated activities that focus on 
specific issues and policy concerns and the young more likely to be involved in 
consumer politics and direct action activities such as demonstrations and 
protests. Older age, indeed, does appear to be one of the strongest predictors of 
citizen activism, leading to an assumption that the young are more likely to be 
involved in cause based activism. The British Social Attitudes panels have found 
some evidence that reinforces this paradigm, but which can also be used to 
question the underlying assumptions. There have, indeed, been dramatic 
changes in to the extent to which young people identify with political parties. Only 
eight per cent of 12-19 year olds in 2003 said they supported a particular political 
party compared to 35% of the adult population. While it should not be surprising 
that young people who have yet to enter the adult world are less likely to have 
forged strong political identities the trend is downwards. The number of adults 
with no party attachment more than doubled from 10% in 1983 to 21 % in 2003. 
During the same period the number of 18-24 year olds with no party attachment 
rose from 15% to 41 %. The survey also suggests that interest in politics 
increases with age up until people reach their 40s, after which there are no further 
substantial rises. A "generation gap" has opened up in terms of interest in politics 
with a gap of nine percentage points in 1986 between the youngest and oldest 
these groups stretching to 28% in the most recent survey. However, the idea that 
young people are more engaged with environmental politics was knocked back by 
this study as only one in a hundred identified with the Green Party (Park 2004). 
This finding is echoed by Norris who found no correlations between membership 
of environmental organisations and younger people, in fact, the average age of 
the membership of environmental groups was higher than the overall median for 
the European Social Survey (Norris 2003). 
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Modern trends may suggest attempts to measure levels of political activity 
need to go beyond assessing electoral participation, standing for office and 
membership of formal voluntary organisations (Temple 2000a; O'Toole et al 
2003). This is an additional challenge but should not mean the downgrading of 
the significance of citizen engagement with the procedures of government and 
politics. Elections remain the pivotal event in the functioning of our parliamentary 
democracy, and it is hard to see how political participation in non-electoral spaces 
can be understood without cross-referencing trends cohort trends in formal 
democratic politics. 
Chronological age, cohorts and life stages present a complex interplay of 
variables that sometimes provide contradictory net impacts on aggregate voting 
outcomes, There is a popular folk wisdom that promotes the view that ageing 
erodes an individual's more radical tendencies in favour of increasing 
conservatism, with both small a "CH and a big "CH. In which case the parties of the 
centre-right should be expecting a handsome electoral windfall from population 
ageing, but with the ranks of the baby boomers, many of whom have experienced 
powerful formative influences from the social liberalism of the 1960s and 1970s 
about to form a significant proportion of the grey vote, this would appear to be 
another folk wisdom in need of critical review. 
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3.3 Is an Ageing Society inevitably a more Conservative Society? 
Winston Churchill is widely attributed as having said that: "If you're not a 
liberal when you're 20, you have no heart. If you're not a conservative when 
you're 40, you have no head." And it has certainly been a popular folk wisdom in 
the UK and other English speaking democracies that we shift our politics to the 
right as we age and that older people tend to lean to the right politically. Here are 
some topical examples, in an interview with The Guardian newspaper the author 
lain Banks is quoted as holding the view that "Most people become more 
conservative as they get older," (Brooks 2002). While in the Guardian's sister title 
The Observer, an article on population ageing in the UK drew the conclusion that 
"an ageing population could bring in an era of almost perpetual conservative rule" 
(Browne & Blenford 2002). In a University of California press release promoting 
new social attitudes research the selected news "peg" was the surprise at finding 
greater support amongst younger people for aspects of the US right's 
"conservative cultural agenda" (Gilmore 2002). 
The continuation of this truism about the net impact of the life cycle 
requires some consideration. The view that citizens grow more conservative as 
they age is another uncomfortably deterministic narrative on the implications of 
population ageing. It is considerably less wide spread than the "time bomb" 
framing, and certainly presents an apparently contradictory clash of deterministic 
assumptions of the implications of ever more older voters, they will be more right 
wing, but they will also electorally veto any neo-liberal scaling down of welfare 
states. 
Any inquiry into conservatism and older voters that is restricted to the 
statistics based on recent general elections will find that the Conservative Party 
scores above its average national vote share with the oldest age groups. Figure 
3.4 details responses to a regular question from the British Election Survey 
('Generally speaking, do you usually think of yourself as Conservative, Labour, 
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Liberal, or what?) on party identification and shows strong support for the 
Conservative Party amongst the oldest age groups over the period from 1964 to 
1997. In fact, with the exceptions of 1979 and 1997 the over 70 age group 
delivers the highest levels of support for the Conservatives. That there is 
something inherently conservative about older voters would also have appeared 
to have been the settled view of senior figures within the Labour Party during the 
early years of the Blair administration. Peter Mandelson and Lord Soley have 
both been quoted quite controversially expressing frustration or dismissive 
viewpoints over what are perceived conservative attitudes and behaviours of 
pensioners. According to a Sunday Times report - the contents of which were 
certainly disputed by Mandelson at the time - Labour was sceptical of the value of 
campaigning for votes with many pensioners because they, according to Soley, 
who was then PLP chair, they were conservative 'and often racist, and that 
Mandelson was of the view that there was "no mileage" in older voters (Brown 
2000, Phillips 2000). 
Does this mean that there is something inherent about the later stages of 
life that means people find the Conservative party more attractive? For this to be 
true we would need to find longitudinal evidence of cohorts drifting political 
rightwards during their life course. Unfortunately this kind of research is 
expensive and in short supply. 
Figure 3.4: British Election Study; Percentage of respondents giving a Conservative 
identification at general elections 1964-1997. From Tillel 12002) 
Age % giving a Conservatl"e identification ut the following times: 
()'rars) 
1964 1966 1970 February October 1979 1983 1987 1992 
1974 1974 
18-29 38.2 33.6 36.6 27.5 28.1 36.2 39.6 35.8 47.8 
30-39 38.7 34.7 38.2 39.2 39.0 42.8 40.6 39.1 42.2 
40-49 35.5 34.8 40.6 37.8 33.2 46.7 44.8 47.4 51.3 
SO-59 47.8 42.8 45.5 41.1 41.9 41.4 40.3 47.2 52.4 
60-69 43.0 42.9 48.2 41.0 41.5 45.4 40.2 46.3 44.8 
.. 70 51.2 48.9 56.5 54.4 49.4 43.3 51.2 50.6 51.7 
89 
1997 
26.9 
29.6 
28.6 
33.0 
41.2 
39.7 
There is certainly some evidence to suggest the absence of a straight line 
relationship between cohorts and political conservatism. For example, cohort 
studies in Norway suggest the "1968" cohort who entered the electorate in the 
late 1960s are more attracted to radical politics than older and younger cohorts of 
voters (Hellevik 2002). Butler & Stokes argued that conservation of established 
tendencies, rather than conservatism as such, is what increases with age. In this 
sense they argued argue older voters are more conservative with a small c, in 
that they are more resistant to political change, rather than older voters being 
conservative with a capital C (Butler & Stokes 1969). However, more recent data 
makes it increasingly hard to account for the viewpoint that older voters are fixed 
in their allegiances and in some way immune to the levels of influence that can be 
exercised by political campaigning. Quantitative surveys consistently record a 
high, and critically with an eye to future trends, increasing proportion of older 
voters who switch their vote, but also switch their preferences between different 
parties depending on whether it is a local or national level contest. A growing 
number also only make up their minds on who to vote for in the last few days of 
the campaign (Railings & Thrasher 2003). One example of this body of 
quantitative work comes from Saga Magazine, whose readers are traditionally 
strongly inclined to voting Conservative, but polling data from MORI (2000) found 
a swing of 10.5% away from the Tories to Labour amongst a sample of 1,002 
Saga readers, a figure broadly in line with the national swing across all age 
groups between the two parties in the general election of 1997. 
Q15 Which party did you vote for at the last General Election in May 1997? If you 
are not sure, or did not vote, please say so? 
Conservative 41 % 
Labour 29% 
Q16 Which party did you vote for at the previous General Election in April 1992? 
If you are not sure, or did not vote, please say so? 
Conservative 52% 
Labour 19% 
Source: MORI (2000) 
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Despite the trend towards increasing volatility, on average older voters do 
possess higher levels of party identification and are more likely to make up their 
mind who to vote for in a general election earlier than younger age groups. This 
may account for older voters being accorded a lower target status in parties' 
campaigning strategies in the past, but as the proportion of the electorate 
. comprised of the over 50s marches towards near majority status, even if they 
continue to switch party preferences at slightly lower rates than younger age 
groups, the volume of switching, sometimes referred to as "churn", within such a 
large bloc of voters potentially represents millions of votes open to persuasion 
from well targeted campaigns. So much so,that it is hard to imagine today's 
political strategist ignoring the significance of the grey vote. 
Another factor in the older equates to higher levels of political 
conservatism thesis that may also be worth considering how the average 
Conservative Party voter has a higher life expectancy than the average Labour 
voter. In 1969 Butler and Stokes calculated the average ConserVative voter 
would vote in 13 general elections in their lifetime, compared to 12 for the 
average Labour voter (Butler & Stokes 1969). These health inequalities remain 
and are strongest between men in professional occupations and those in 
unskilled manual jobs. Take, for example, the relatively poor life expectancy of 
male manual workers in Glasgow. In the mid-1990s the average life expectancy 
gap between men in these groups was 9.5 years, these differences are 
accentuated by geography with average life expectancy for men in Glasgow City 
still as low as 68.4 years (Shaw et aI2001). This gap shows that still today that 
many middle class voters can expect, by this author's calculations to cast their 
vote in at least 2 more general elections than manual working class voters. There 
is an apparently big advantage in any political cleavages that emerge for any 
party that is on the same side of this dividing line as any sub-groups of the 
electorate who tend to lead longer healthier lives - they will stay politically active 
for longer and will physically vote in more elections. In short, whilst stark health 
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inequalities remain, a party that commands a high degree of support from the 
middle classes will enjoy a natural electoral advantage. 
It is reasonable to speculate about the political propensities of older voters 
in the future and whether they will continue to broadly give majority support to the 
Conservative Party. Yet, sometimes in these debates there seems to be little 
sense that tomorrow's grey voters are already socially active and available for 
study. They include the baby boomers who are currently in their 50s and early 
60s, and who are far more likely to be socially liberal than the older voters of 
today (Huber & Skid more 2003). It seems highly unlikely that boomers who are 
currently supportive of liberal positions such as viewing unmarried couples as 
holding equal legitimacy to married family units, will reverse their views on such 
issues upon retirement. This is at least partially confirmed by Tilley's research 
using cross-sectional panel data which concluded that social ageing processes 
look unlikely to be responsible for the age variations in libertarian-authoritarian 
values (Tilley 2005). This strongly suggests new generations are more libertarian 
than older generations born before the Second World War, and not that older 
generations began early adult life leaning towards libertarian values only to adopt 
authoritarian positions in later life. Additionally, any assertions that society as it 
ages will naturally become more conservative and less flexible in its outlook, tend 
to overlook how population ageing has not only just started, but has been present 
over the last few decades of great social and political change where attitudes 
towards issues such gender roles, work force participation, the environment in the 
US civil rights have all taken place. 
Broad brush predictions such as the ones discussed in this section of how 
groups in society will vote are an unsatisfactory device for any researcher into 
trends of political behaviour of older people, and mass communications are often, 
by definition, unsubtle devices for campaigning. In recent years political 
strategists have sought to evolve the methods of working by incorporating 
elements of marketing and management science into the cycle of researching the 
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electorate and campaigning for its endorsement. The rise of political marketing 
implies a electoral system that will be more receptive to the demands of older 
voters, but the manner in which voters are researched, segmented and targeted 
also presents new barriers to the promise of responsive political parties. 
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3.4 Segmenting the Grey Vote: The Rise of Political Marketing 
Mass political parties will always ruthlessly search for competitive 
advantages over their rivals. One recent consequence of this search as we have 
already noted in Section 3.1 is the perceived narrowing of the gap between major 
parties in terms of their policy programmes. In addition to spatial median voter 
theories, another contributory factor in this trend is the shared adoption of 
marketing methods by the main parties which has helped shape how they 
research voters' wants and needs, as well as how they adapt their political 
product in response. If the rise of political marketing were to lead to political 
parties that are highly responsive to the expressed desires of older voters it could 
be seen as the vehicle for the evolution of a dominant grey vote. However, it 
could equally be charged with representing a new factor that results in the 
marginalisation of older voters, particularly if they fail to meet the criteria for 
priority action resulting from the segmentation of the political "market". 
Political marketing as an academic subject is specifically interested in how 
political organisations have adopted, and adapted, management science and 
marketing concepts in order to achieve their strategic objectives. It incorporates 
marketing language into politics, substituting policy or ideology for product and 
the electorate and voters to markets and customers. Although no sensible 
researcher should accept that political parties are entirely exchangeable with 
commercial business in their essential nature. Within the political marketing field 
Lees-Marshment is known as an advocate of what she sees as many positive 
aspects of the incorporating of marketing into politics. Lees-Marshment (2001) 
sets out a framework of steps and stages that involve marketing concepts in 
political activity. The first step is self-reflective research that reviews the party's 
goals and then examines the market come political situation the party finds itself 
in. The third step is to then define the product the party offers to its prime markets 
be they members, donors or voters. Once defined a marketing approach would 
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involve further research of the needs and wants of the voters, internal strategic 
deliberation of what the party wants to offer the voters, the product is then 
adjusted, the "new" product is communicated, at which stage the voters buy 
into/vote for the product and if successful the party moves into delivery mode to 
seal the satisfaction of its voters. 
In practical terms, it is doubtful that any political party in the real world 
makes the writing of its policy manifestos a blank page exercise dependent on the 
results of market research into voter attitudes and wants. Individual policies or 
indeed senior political figures may well be dropped, but there is a tipping point 
beyond even the most power hungry of parties cannot go without placing 
unbearable tensions on the internal cohesion of its membership. A party may well 
go through all the stages of the marketing cycle, but it is unlikely that they could 
ever adjust their policy product to fully meet the results of market research. Voter 
opinions are proactively sought, but it is frequently the case that parties are less 
interested in finding out what voters want as a blank page exercise, and more 
concerned with assessing voter reception and reaction to policies or imagery they 
have already decided as the way they want to go (Bruce 1992). If research is 
primarily addressed to developing and testing messages based on already 
existing ideology, then the parties are not fully adopting marketing, but rather 
engaging in increasingly sophisticated selling. 
The adoption of marketing methods into modern political campaigning is 
widely acknowledged as an important driver of change in recent elections. 
However, one note of caution, marketing methods did not explode onto the 
political scene at some point in the 1980s or 1990s, but rather have evolved from 
as far back as the early 20th Century (the Conservatives employed their first press 
officer in 1910), took deeper root in the 1950s but only in the 1980s did marketing 
become an openly acceptable organising principle (Wring 1996). 
There is a normative attraction to the increased use of market research 
and customer focus in the manner in which political parties interact with voters, in 
95 
that an ageing soCiety would be met in a deliberative and responsive manner by 
the parties who would strive to meet the aspirations of the growing electoral ranks 
of older people. Yet, political marketing as a process allocates varying levels of 
priority on exactly which groups of voters need urgent political satisfaction 
depending on political geography, demographics and voter behaviour. In short, in 
elections some votes carry more weight than others. This censure that political 
marketing does not match up to its own aspirations is based around criticism of 
the use of qualitative research methods, particularly focus groups, as a tool 
during the re-branding exercises, such as that of the Labour Party in the 1990s 
under the political leadership of Tony Blair and the strategic guidance of Philip 
Gould (Wring 2005).The focus of Gould's research was voters who were doubly 
valued because they had switched parties in the recent past. Their 
preoccupations and attitudes were then privileged over the wants and needs of 
others. Sub-groups of the population of who do not switch their votes and/or live 
in safe seats that are unlikely to change political hands become a low priority in 
the market research process, and accordingly less likely to see their social needs 
prioritised in the resulting party campaigns and policy adjustments. As has 
already been seen older voters are widely perceived to be less volatile which 
damages their potential of being made a policy priority under this process. 
Segmentation - the process of defining and targeting markets - is one 
element in the wider adoption of marketing principles and techniques into the 
political process. The incorporation of marketing into the electoral cycle has been 
well documented (Kavanagh (1995; Newman 1999; Wring 2005), and the practise 
of political marketing has now been observed to have entered a new stage, 
growing in sophistication and integrating beyond electioneering to range across 
the governmental and policy making processes (Smith & Hirst 2001). Parties use 
market segmentation in their search for competitive advantages over their 
opponents. Other benefits of the process include the identification of opportunities 
and threats within the campaign environment, an incentive to develop their 
"product" and the tailoring of communications to reach target audiences with 
increased effeciiveness (Bannon 2004). But, adopting this approach is not a 
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guarantee of electoral success, and political strategists are faced with the 
challenge of executing a research strategy that robustly defines target 
consumers, and the elements of the policies and values they offer, that matter to 
them, as well as evolving the use of language which resonates with target voters 
(Sparrow & Turner 2001). 
As part of this process political parties in the UK have demonstrated a 
growing interest in finding effective strategies for segmenting the electoral 
market. One important element has been attempts to segment the electorate 
according to their position within the life cycle. Age is an increasingly 
unsatisfactory variable in understanding the needs of any given consumer or 
market. Someone in their 70s could be working full time and be fit and healthy, 
another person in their early 50s could be living with a long term chronic condition 
and forced out of the labour market. It was this kind of inconsistency that led 
Peter Laslett (1991) to develop the concept of the "stage". Today three broad 
stages have been widely adopted in gerontological research and debate, the First 
Age (socialisation), the Second Age (work and child rearing) and the Third Age 
(independent post-work). 
The logic of stages assists the process of segmentation in moving away 
from the over-simplified use of age as a variable. But, three ages is still unfeasibly 
broad to be useful for practical application in campaigns, although there has been 
debate on the need for a "Fourth Age" of older dependence (Midwinter 2005). 
Demographic, psychographic and life cycle variables can be, and have been, 
combined in a multitude of ways in marketing research and strategy. A good 
example is the Mosaic tool for segmentation that has been used by the Labour 
Party, it classifies all consumers in the UK into 61 types aggregated into 11 
groups. Older types include "Low Income Elderly", "Childfree Serenity" and "Small 
Town Seniors". Within marketing there has also been the growing use of 
combining variables to develop the concept of "generations", such as the baby 
boomers or generations X or Y - each believed to possess unique ideas about the 
lifestyles to which it aspires. 
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However, for any political strategist the key criteria for incorporating these 
approaches is the assessment as to whether any given sub-group will actually 
respond to alterations in policy and tailored communications. The ultimate 
measure for judging the response will be changes in voting behaviour. It is within 
this rationale that historically a lower campaigning priority has been given to older 
voters, despite the apparent growth in this "sector" of the political market. 
However, .in the election of 2005 the main British parties strove, with varying 
degrees of sophistication and success, to benefit from the demographic age shift 
in the UK electorate. 
This project takes the position that the behaviour of political parties in 
democracies can be better understood through the study of the interaction 
between policy, elections, media and public opinion. It contends that the study of 
any aspect of change on key ageing issues such as pensions will only be partially 
understood if the inquiry is limited purely to tracking social policy, analysing 
media content or evaluating social attitudes. Even when combined there will, of 
course, be more that could be done, but it is a more realistic take on politics as 
practised by political elites. There is the popular opinion that political parties 
obsess with the media and allow it to dictate policy agenda, and yes it is true, 
politicians believe in media effects, and it is certainly true that parties pay the 
media a lot of attention, but media frequently don't get their own way. There is a 
popular opinion that parties are obsessed with focus group and opinion polls and 
do nothing which goes against the polls, and yes the parties invest resources and 
attention to opinion research, and modify policy in response, but there are also 
examples of defying opinion research. In reality, political leaders are engaged in a 
daily act of balancing their own objectives against the shifting media and public 
opinion responses. 
98 
Section 3.5 - Ageing Issues under New Labour 
Before later chapters investigate the 2005 general election campaign as a 
case study it is useful to establish and consider the policy and political contexts of 
how ageing issues had been handled by the incumbent Labour government. 
There was little in the way of explicit initiatives aimed at older voters in the 
first two years following the election of the new Labour government in 1997, with 
the exception of the introduction of annual £100 Winter Fuel Payments. The 
relative inactivity of the first two years was largely due to the self-imposed 
constraints of the decision to adopt the spending limits of the outgoing Major 
administration. This voluntary straight jacket was a tactical device to neutralise the 
1997 general election from being dominated by accusations that Labour intended 
to implement considerable increases in income tax (Coates & Lawler 2000). The 
Conservatives' desire during their 18 years of government to "roll back" the state 
translated into policies that encouraged the growth of the private sector in 
delivering services in parallel to established public provision. Incentives were 
introduced to develop the extent of private provision through making items such 
as private pensions and private health insurance more attractive, this took place 
alongside the suppressing of long-term public spending commitments with 
measures such as linking the state pension to prices rather than earnings (Powell 
1999). 
Initially the new Labour government's approach to pension reform was a 
technocratic management of the infrastructure inherited from the Conservatives 
(Cunning ham 2006). The 1998 Green Paper on welfare reform aimed to introduce 
'a public-private partnership in pensions' and reaffirmed the Conservatives' 
emphasis on increasing the private sector's role in pension provision. The green 
paper proclaimed occupational pensions as a great historical welfare success 
and set a symbolic target of changing the ratio of state to private pension 
provision from the then 60:40 to 40:60. Attention was devoted to improving the 
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performance of second-tier pensions for people on low incomes with the 
introduction of Stakeholder pensions and the replacement of Barbara Castle's 
SERPS scheme with a new State Second Pension. However, the technocratic, 
somewhat politically uneventful pension reforms of the late 1990s were to be 
swept away by the emergence in the next five years of pensions as politically 
charged issue that was widely proclaimed as a 'crisis' by the news media and 
generated genuine public concern and debate - starting in 2000 with the 
pensioner revolt over the 75 pence increase to the state pension for a single 
person. 
In his 1999 Budget Gordon Brown announced the re-branding of income. 
support for pensioners as the 'Minimum Income Guarantee' (MIG) alongside 
above inflation increases and a commitment to link MIG, unlike the state pension, 
to average earnings. In 2003 MIG was re-branded again, this time as the 
guaranteed component of the Pension Credit. One key government argument for 
increasing the value of Pension Credit faster than the level of the state pension 
was the targeting of resources on people with lower income through means 
testing rather than through universal mechanisms such as the state pension, 
where increases go to all citizens regardless of their income and assets (Brewer 
et aI2002). However, the rigour of this argument was undermined by the 
introduction of new universal entitlements such as free TV licences for people 
aged over 75 and the annual winter fuel payments. 
The decision to keep the state pension linked to prices and the particularly 
low inflation rate of 1.1 % in the Autumn of 1999 led the Treasury to accordingly 
announce a rise in the state pension for single people for 2000 as a mere 75 
pence per week. The minimal increase in state pensions energised the National 
Pensioners Convention (NPC) and local pensioner action groups across the 
country. Tony Blair's father-in-law, the actor Tony Booth, joined the protests and 
handed back his 75 pence to the Prime Minister and told him to 'keep it' (Abrams 
2000). The protests against low increases to the state pension rallied around new 
demands to reinstate the state pension's link with increases in earnings and came 
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to a head at Labour's 2000 annual conference. The trade unions supported 
motions to reinstate the earnings link and the media placed considerable 
attention on the NPC organised rallies and demonstrations outside the 
conference hall. The debate on state pensions began in chaotic fashion with no 
finalised wording for the motion as frenetic negotiations between trade union 
leaders, particularly Rodney Bickerstaffe, general secretary of the public service 
union Unison (who later retired from Unison to take up the post of NPC leader) 
and the offices of Tony Blair and Gordon Brown. No compromise could be found. 
Blair was willing to back down but Brown stuck to a furious defence of his means 
tests and credits strategy.1 With no compromise in sight delegates supported re-
establishing the link and inflicted on Blair his first ever conference defeat. The 
public, and internal Labour movement opposition, did not succeed, initially, but 
the government did respond with higher than inflation increases to the state 
pension the next year and increased spending on concessions such as winter fuel 
and council tax payments. 
The debates on the role and value of the state pension became intertwined 
with disagreements on the continued expansion of means testing. Means testing 
has certainly been a controversial vehicle for delivering retirement incomes and 
has been criticised by voices on all wings of British politics in recent times. 
Criticism of means testing draws on what is sometimes diametrically opposing 
ideological grounds. For some Conservatives rejection of means testing is 
bundled together with a desire to reduce, or indeed end, the state's financial 
obligations to the retired. For them the loss of dignity comes as a result of having 
to rely on the state for one's income, not the process of allocating that income, but 
that it is inherently inferior to income earned through private institutions and 
mechanisms. The rejection of means testing by some campaigners on the left, 
such as the associations of retired trade union members is based on a dissent 
from for the necessity of means testing as a mechanism, drawing upon a different 
ideological understanding of the role of the state. In their view the state should 
1 (Source: Notes by author from private conversations with senior trade union representatives who were 
witnesses to the last minute negotiations.) 
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provide all retired persons a decent income as of right. The value of the basic 
state pension, in their view, should be of a level high enough to make redundant 
the need for many retired persons to seek additional income assistance from the 
state. 
The substance of the issues raised by means testing and the associated 
language used to engage in related debates frequently incorporated elements of 
the contributory principle. This discourse functions, in part, on the likelihood that 
voters, and campaigners, particularly from older cohorts are more' attached to 
discussing pensions policy through the paradigm of the contributory principle. The 
contributory principle has been a key element in the development of the UK's 
post-war National Insurance (NI) system - with eligibility for and funding of 
benefits based on NI contributions - and popular understanding of that system as 
a collective 'pot' or fund which would provide social protection for all. As noted by 
the House of Commons select committee on Social Security's inquiry into the 
contributory principle (2000) Beveridge's original intentions were to provide 
contributory benefits that were to be of a higher monetary value than means-
tested 'national assistance', which he felt should be less desirable than insurance 
benefits to in order to ensure the insured person felt their contributions to be 
worthwhile. Means tested benefits were expected to be a minor vehicle in 
delivering retirement incomes. However, in modern UK politics the National 
Insurance fund has never been intended or viewed by the parties or the civil 
service as hypothecated funding mechanism for retirement pensions, and this 
partly explains why governments and pensioner campaign groups often appear to 
be talking at cross-purposes in debating retirement incomes. 
The intensity of the state pension campaigns receded, but the government 
was unable to pacify public concern over the sustainability and inequalities 
inherited from the Conservatives' pensions architecture, all be it with vastly more 
generous levels of income support through the Pension Credit and other 
measures announced in successive Gordon Brown budgets. The reduction in 
scale and generosity of occupational pensions fuelled the sense of crisis in the 
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system and a new consensus had emerged across the trade unions, groups 
representing older people, private providers and academics that the current 
system needed simplification and that new life needed to be breathed into the 
state's first tier pension. Eventually, Labour abandoned the defence of its initial 
1997-2001 pensions strategy by establishing the Turner Commission in 2002 to 
bring forward recommendations for new long-term reforms. The Commission 
published its final report after the general election in 2005 recommending that the 
state pension should be made more generous and less means-tested but 
available at a gradually rising age, as well as endorsing automatic enrolment into 
a National Pensions Saving Scheme with minimum employer contributions 
(Pensions Commission 2005). 
The Labour Party in the second half of its second term switched from 
managerial administration of the structures and principles of the Conservative 
pension reforms, and away from the narratives of private-public partnerships 
towards more explicitly social democratic reforms based around gender equality, 
reduction of poverty, an element of compulsion on the private sector and 
employers and the shift to residency/citizenship as the basis of state pension 
entitlement. The political, and linguistic, ease through which these changes in 
strategic direction were made indicates the kind of 'third way' pragmatism and 
attachment to the "best way to achieve the goal" outlined by Temple (2000b). 
Labour's default position was to endorse the reduction of the state's role in 
delivering income in later life, but its legacy of social democratic values enabled 
the activation of more statist and redistributive solutions, albeit, applied on a 
pragmatic, perhaps opportunistic, basis. 
In health and social care policy Labour consciously challenged ageism and 
the social exclusion of older people, but ran into political problems which resulted 
in the Welsh and Scottish Labour parties rejecting the Westminster Labour 
government's rejection of 'free' long term social care. In 1998 Labour's first NHS 
reforms included the introduction of National Service Frameworks for different 
patient and disease groups. A framework for older people was published in 2001 
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and outlined standards of care, models of good practice, but also committed NHS 
trusts to internal policy reviews aimed at rooting out age discriminatory practices. 
As the majority of NHS patients are older people, the increases in NHS spending 
could also be considered as particularly beneficial for older voters. Policy on 
long-term social care for older people was more problematic for the Labour 
government. In 1997 it set up the Royal Commission on Long Term Care for the 
Elderly. In its report the Commission drew careful distinctions between personal 
and nursing care, but its members disagreed about how each element should be 
financed with the majority of members backing a report that recommended that 
both nursing and social care should be financed by the state, but a minority of 
members publishing a dissenting report that argued that the state should only 
fund nursing care. To some surprise Blair decided to reject the majority report 
and instead adopted the recommendations of the minority. In Scotland, this led 
the Labour coalition in the Scottish Parliament to use its devolved powers to 
introduce in 2002 free nursing care. This was followed by the Labour Party in the 
National Assembly for Wales using its more limited powers to introduce more 
generous arrangements than those in force in England. 
The combination of raised expectations alongside declining levels of public 
trust in politics and the motivations of governments as discussed by figures such 
as Whiteley (2003) Dermody & Hanmer-Lloyd (2004) and Dalton (2004) may 
explain the higher public profile of Labour's problems over pensions and long-
term care than the steadier incremental improvements made in the value of 
welfare benefits and moves against age discrimination in the NHS and by 
employers. The sense that 'pensioner issues' may, on net balance, be an 
electoral problem for Labour was compounded in 2004 by the media's interest in 
grassroots older voter organisations who were campaigning as 'council tax 
martyrs'. Average band Council Tax rates since 1993 had been growing at a 
much faster rate than inflation or earnings, these increases have had a 
disproportionate impact on older people as Council tax accounts for a higher 
proportion of spending in pensioner households (Pensions Policy Institute 2003). 
Across the country pensioner action groups began to organise campaigns of 
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protest and civil disobedience. In Devon a pensioners action forum organised 
around 100 older people who were withholding some of their council tax 
payments and gearing up for planned court appearances and battles with bailiffs 
(MacErlean 2003). With imprisonment part of the strategy, the kind of direct 
action more usually attributed to being the sole preserve of younger protestors, 
similar campaigns sprung up across the country and cases such as Sylvia Hardy 
from Exeter who was jailed for seven days after refusing to pay arrears received 
prominent coverage across press and broadcast media. Labour would be able to 
campaign in 2005 on a record that included a number of initiatives that increased 
the incomes of older people and tackled many of the causes of social exclusion 
and discrimination. However, the 'crises' over the 75p pensions rise, the decline 
of final-salary based occupational pensions and the issues and imagery 
associated with the 'council tax martyrs' allowed many potential opportunities for 
the opposition parties to raise ageing issues in the 2005 campaign and, indeed, 
as will be seen later in Chapter Seven council tax and the general living 
standards of older people in Britain featured heavily in the early election 
exchanges. 
Figure 7.1: Images of the 'council tax martyrs' 
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In the previous two chapters the manner in which old age as a social 
phenomenon can be both celebrated and feared has been discussed. It has also 
been seen how relatively poor attention given to population ageing as a variable 
that may change political communications, social policy, and their interaction. It's 
now time to analyse in detail the changing electoral demographics, the media's 
framing of population ageing and how political parties have themselves framed 
and campaigned for the grey vote. 
The core components of the original research conducted for this research 
begins with a content analysis of mass media coverage in Britain of population 
ageing over a three month period in 2004. The research also produced a large 
scale model of the changing electoral demographics of parliamentary 
constituencies in Britain up until the year 2025. The changing age structure of the 
British electorate is complemented by an analysis of the application of political 
marketing techniques, primarily age segmentation, by the major political parties in 
the 2005 general election. The 2005 election was also used an opportunity to 
conduct a content analysis of the materials produced by the major political parties 
for the 2005 general election and of media coverage of older voters. 
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Chapter 4 - Researching the Mediation of Demographic Change 
This chapter will explain and review the methods used in the research that 
has been conducted in support of this thesis. Overall, this project has deployed a 
range of varying instruments for gathering new quantitative and qualitative data 
on the political consequences of population ageing and the manner in which 
demographic change has been mediated. Firstly, this research will map and 
project the current and future age composition of parliamentary seats. When 
evaluating electoral change in the UK a key consideration is the UK's non-
proportional voting system for allocating seats to parties. The 646 seats in the 
House of Commons are allocated into geographical units with approximately an 
average 68,500 voters who elect members on the First Past the Post system. 
Therefore, it should not expected that a uniform national change in the age 
structure of parliamentary seats will occur, instead there will be geographical 
variations in how the demographic transformation impacts. These variations are 
potentially highly significant in the age of voter segmentation that was outlined in 
Section 3.4. Once firmly establishing the electoral environment of an ageing 
society the project then turns its attention to looking closely at how the British 
media is covering and framing the meaning of population ageing and the 
consequences of the growth of the grey vote. Finally, there is an examination of 
how political parties are accommodating the age transformation into campaigning 
strategies and analysis of how the parties themselves are framing the meaning of 
societal ageing, their portrayals of older people and contrasting these narratives 
with the media content. 
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4.1 Content Analysis of the National UK Press' Treatment of Population Ageing 
As has been seen from previous chapters, although research in this 
specific topic field is rare, where it has been done, and by authoritative teams 
content analysis has been at the heart of the data collection (Midwinter 1991; 
Groombridge 1999). Content analysis' role in tracking mass media projections of 
stereotypes and coverage of discrimination debates is well established (Hakim 
2000). 
Content analysis brings with it a methodological rigour in which to enhance 
theoretical frameworks built up by some more qualitative approaches (Hansen at 
al 1998). In recent years mass media content analysis .has made important 
contributions to debates surrounding ethnic minority representation 
(Cumberbatch et al 2001) and tackling negative attitudes towards disability 
(Sancho 2003). It is clear that content analysis has a good academic research 
pedigree in tackling issues of representation, stereotyping and agenda-setting on 
"minority" issues. This dissertation seeks to locate itself within the credibility and 
effectiveness of the methodology, recognising its undoubted strengths, as well as 
its weakness, which are discussed in a later section. 
Content analysis is a methodological approach which has been widely 
deployed in mass communications research, and can be briefly defined as the 
systematic, objective and quantitative study of media messages (Neuendorf 
2002), However, Deacon et al (1999) complain that the term is used 
inconsistently in academic literature, and critically examine the widely quoted 
definition given by Berelson in 1952, as a: 
• ... research technique for the objective, systematic and 
quantitative description of the manifest content of 
communication". Berelson (1952) 
As far back as 1910 content analysis was being used to examine political 
press coverage in Germany by Max Weber. In the United States Harold Lasswell 
applied the approach to analyse propaganda outputs in the 1930s and beyond 
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(Reis & Judd 2000). The discipline since then has been developed further and 
given added momentum by the developments in information technology. Hakim 
(2000) advocates content analysis by drawing attention to its successes, such as 
the assessment of political bias in the press, and of special significance for this 
thesis, its use in exposing gender and racial stereotyping. Hansen et al (1998) 
have noted how the study of media content has branched out into consideration 
of the content's relationship with the formation of social attitudes. 
The credibility of content analysis within the academic community is further 
established by it widespread use. In 1995 34.8% of articles in the Journal of Mass 
Communications Ouarterlywere based on content analyses (Neuendorf 2002). It 
is particularly used by researchers who are keen to note trends in media 
coverage and benefits from the transparency of the coding the potential for 
developing longitudinal data (Bryman 2001). A more recent survey of research 
methods used for articles published in political communications journals 
undertaken in 2001, found that surveys were the most frequent at 48%, but that 
content analysis was the second most frequent methodology deployed (20%) 
(Graber 2004). 
The main focus of the content analysis of media coverage of population 
ageing is the UK's national press complemented by a qualitative content analysiS 
of a flagship BBC drama documentary on the impact of an ageing society. There 
are two main factors behind this decision. Firstly, the existing body of research is 
biased towards studies of visual media such as television and advertising, and as 
such the print media has been relatively neglected. Secondly, in recognition of the 
special role that the national press holds in setting the public policy and 
governmental agenda, as well as the influence on the editorial agenda of the 
broadcast media. This agenda setting ability has been noted in a number of 
publications, such as Franklin (1994) and his notion of "media democracy, as well 
as McQuail (2000) and Eldridge et al (1997). 
109 
Even if it is recognised that the agenda setting power of the press, and the 
ability of the media to influence social attitudes may be hotly debated issues in 
academic research, this in no way invalidates the focus on newspapers because 
of their agenda setting roles. Because in many ways, the weight and direction of 
academic opinion does not matter, political elites believe that newspapers 
influence public attitudes and modify their behaviours and strategies accordingly 
(Gould 1998; Jones 2000; Rawnsley 2000),. 
The focus for both the general investigation into the treatment of 
population ageing and the study of the coverage of the 2005 general election was 
the content of national newspapers. The prime criterion for inclusion was any 
title's national coverage and circulation. Although local and regional newspapers 
are still important players, restricting the sample to national newspapers allowed 
for collecting data from a longer time period. The research did not filter articles on 
the basis of where they might have appeared within that day's paper. Any article 
that appeared in a newspaper during the time period in question, and came up 
using the search terms provided, was deemed worthy of data collection. 
For the ana lysis of the treatment of population ageing the time period 
selected ranged from February 1 2004 until April 30 2004 - three calendar 
months. The project was keen to ensure that the sample covered a recent period, 
and so represented current debate and trends. In selecting the time period care 
was taken to ensure as far as possible that the period had not been unduly 
dominated by any particular event with population ageing implications. The 
sample sought to take the pulse of the regular flow of news, as supposed to any 
kind of in-depth analysis of one big story. 
Figure 4.1: Summary of Lexis Nexis Search Criteria 
rSam(pIe('S~~fu'mary":''Y:!1~C0F''()(')()W'~'>:jJ~r!;:r::r:w)'0/,;«"(:;:~m!1G!~~("V'(''''(:~'''P:;D~!tFF:1';''Y," '('(~?\'(tM!n;)(j",,"('" 
Search Engine - Lexis Nexis 
Search Terms - Any article that included "ageing" AND. "population" OR "society" 
(TItles IIl~lllded inse:irch - .... .. :::§,>L 
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Daily Tdegraph 
The Times 
The Guardian 
The Independent 
The Daily Mail 
The Express 
The Mirror 
,The Sun .• 
!The Star 
Financial Times 
The Observer 
.The SundayTimes ..... 
,The Sunday Telegraph.,: ..••• 
,The Independent on SWl'day 
The Business .. 
The Mail on Sunday 
The Express on Sunday 
The Sunday Mirror 
The People 
The News of the World·· 
Daily Star Sunday 
Time Period selected: February I 2004 to April 30 2004 inclusive 
Total Number of Articles retrieved: 390 
(Of\yhic:H150 in February,.110 in Marchand130 in. April) 
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. For a detailed account on the development of the variable for the dataset, their 
rationale and the process of coding see the attached appendices Two and Three. The 
following figures (4.2 and 4.3) are intended to help readers of this research 
understand the criteria used in coding articles which could appear to be borderline in 
how they should have been allocated. 
Figure 4.2: Criteria for categorising articles 
Figure 4.2: Case study 
:Categorisi~~~~ticles as J)~i~~primarilY~6.j'~erned 
·Independenton Sunday February 8, 2004 
BYLlNE: LESLEY MCDOWELL 
'iHi~>;;>::'" ':::y:;:;>:: !f!~ad1ine : ,'Make sur~mTh~ 
Policy; These Foolish Things By Deborah Moggach 
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'rnthlircase;'the artiCIc:tis'act1laIIy a hook review, ail.don'the faceofTrnotanaturaicontender'for 
inc1usi~n as press cov~rage PrimariI~:8§l1cemed witl!~~puIation agei:i~.Il:Owever,()~8arefuI rea.dinlg 
:ofthe'C()py we can se~ihat the wh~f~;~g~;ew is pit~~l'~~t radical or ~usual SOlutio:J;:~~'~~oblems 
some people associate with population ageing. 
eXlltnlJle, the ftrst line in the review reads: "Deborah Moggach may want to patent her solution to 
Britain's imminent old-age crisis", continues in the ftrst paragraph, " .... the transforming powers of 
rndia~~rk their magic and we Brit~dgh'thave to P~t~~~ith our b~I~~t1~ome OAP~'l,llii;,!ji 
The second paragraph ponders how far the novel's central scenario should be considered a "real 
solu{ibWt~ oui ag~hl~':~&pulation ". The rest of the re~A~~ is more co;;2~fued Withth~~iierary 'tu,u",,,,, 
of the book. 
Altil~~gh this is a !H)i:'L:;",::::' two paragraphs, the only review, the tJ~~l~et by the h~~Jiine and the 
sections most people would actually read, couch population ageing as the dominant theme. On that 
basis, and recognising other researcher~may differ in interpretation. this 
''''I; '" ph__ ,_",<,,,,,,,,, ',.,,,,. p. 
was co<;I.~das being 
prim:ri'i1yconcemed with popUlation ;g~ing 
,Thet9DElof this artiRI~.was COded;~:being "fairl}'l~~gative" ab9~tpoPulatiOn<l~~ing. An,.inn 
Figure 4.3: Criteria of allocating articles into topics 
FIgure'4"."3Case·SiudY·XUocaiionofartlCles·lnto·'generaj··ioplcareacategorles···· .••••..... 
April 08, 2004 
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'~Ylin~: Gar'y Parkinso~ 
([his story was placed as clearly being primarily.concemed about population ageing, however, 
~j,>o" "" ' '" ' ; 
allocation of the story into a general topic area was not so straight forward. In the end 
place th~~tory in the "family dependency" category. 
,'['!,e sto!")';5ould have been place in the ."economics" category because of its derivationfrom human 
resources research, or into "demographics", from it discussion of demographic trends. However, the 
~terprc~iion otihe central concern of this piece was its concern about changing family struct!es and 
'tIie notiotiof do~tiward(jependehcy behveen different gbnerati6rts. 
Although the implications of the research which prompted the story are not entirely positive, the way 
i~\Vhich'ihey were rep;~~d led t() categorise th{istory as being "neutral" about popul~~ion ag;!~g. 
Lexis-Nexis is a valuable, and widely utilised, electronic data archive of 
newspaper content, not least for its fast access that bypasses time consuming, often 
speculative, trawls through old boxes of newspapers. Lexis-Nexis, however, is a tool 
that should be deployed in the full awareness of its limitations, not least that it 
encourages a wholly text based sampling of newspaper content, when most readers 
of the content also experience visual dimensions through the use of photography, 
graphical illustrations and juxtapositions with other topical stories in the page layout. 
Most readers come to the text through a physical purchase of the newspaper, 
although a growing proportion of the readership is coming to articles through 
newspaper web sites or through RSS feeds. These caveats are endorsed by Deacon 
(2007) who also sought to test the reliability of Lexis-Nexis by comparing Lexis search 
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results with identical searches of CD-Rom archives of newspaper content. The tests 
found a strong correlation between the search results for the Guardian newspaper, 
but some significant differences in results for the Times in some years, as well as 
noting that an important title like the Telegraph is now unavailable pre-2000. Deacon 
also uncovered within a small sample a consistent pattern of Iow-level omissions from 
a title's full content on any given date. For example, 12% of news space was missing 
from the Daily MiIToredition of April 1 2006, but on other days there was 100% 
coverage of that day's content. 
The gaps in the Lexis Nexis database uncovered by Deacon is accepted as an 
explanation for the less than entirely comprehensive results for any search inquiry. 
The content analysis for this project takes a sample of coverage in time and searches 
for articles that contain key phrases. This research recognizes that within this sample 
it is a statistical probability that the Lexis database will not include 100% of the articles 
published within this time frame that could have been considered for inclusion into the 
sample. But, as with all research of this nature, it is by definition not an exercise in 
comprehensive counting of content as this would involve an impractically huge 
undertaking. Instead, it relies on the taking of a representative sample of coverage to 
allow analysis. 
In addition to collecting and analysing the quantitative data, an in-depth 
qualitative analysis was undertaken on a selection of articles in the coverage which 
appeared as representative of central discourses found in the media coverage. The 
research also analysed a transcript (see appendix for full transcript) of the BBC docu-
drama If. ... the generations fall out- which was broadcast within the same time frame 
as the sample of newspaper coverage, and provided a unique opportunity for 
analysis, in the same time frame, across media formats. For this case study a mixture 
of quantitative and qualitative methods were deployed. 
The doom-ridden scenario for If...the Generations Fall Out is that in 2024 
"young" people will be organising violent demonstrations against rises in NHS and 
state pension spending. The "young" are disenfranchised feeling that their lives have 
been sacrificed for the "old". The overall theme was that the "costs" of "supporting" an 
115 
ageing population will push public finances to a "breaking point" in around 20 years 
time. Governments of the day will be unwilling and/or unable to tackle the "crisis" 
because electoral politics will be dominated by the interests of the baby boomers, who 
have now retired and are asserting their desires for personal fulfilment. As such, it 
represented a rare, for UK current affairs programming, in-depth look at the issue of 
population ageing. Furthermore, the programme received significant investment from 
the BBC and was broadcast in a prime time slot as part a concerted effort to improve 
audience figures for its current affairs output. Additionally, it was a rare opportunity to 
sample an in-depth mediation of population ageing from an organisation with an 
important public service remit. All these factors were highly persuasive in the decision 
to include the programme's content into the project. 
For the qualitative aspects of the investigation the project chose to use 
thematic analysis of the programme transcript and selected articles of interest from 
the sample. Thematic analysis focuses on identifiable patterns and themes in the text 
(Aronson 1994), it goes beyond a quantitative counting of phrases and words, but 
involves fewer levels of analysis, and returns to fieldwork, than traditionally associated 
with grounded analysis (Stone 1997; Boyatzis 1998). 
In policy research areas such as health, thematic analysis has been codified 
into Framework Analysis - which is an attempt at modifying thematic analysis to meet 
the requirements of publicly funded policy research (Ritchie & Spencer 1994). The 
benefits of this approach is the transparency for stakeholders on the methodology by 
which the results have been obtained, and it allows for both existing concerns, as well 
as emerging concepts in the coding (Lacey & Luff 2001). This project is driven by an 
interest in the coverage of a key public policy challenge, and the thematic approach, 
or variations upon it, is frequently used hi qualitative policy research. This was 
confirmed by two telephone interviews conducted with researchers at MORI and ICM 
Research, they both explained that they normally use a thematic or framework 
analysis when conducting policy related research. 
In terms of the physical process a first analysis was undertaken of the texts by 
circling and highlighting quotes and words of interest, and made notes in the margins. 
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The next stage was then to group together and code emergent themes within 
individual interviews. Finally, there was a search for themes that were common in two 
or more articles. 
Throughout the conduct of this content analysis the research was conscious of 
the need at each stage to reflect on the methodology to ensure the quality of the 
research and ensure the credibility of the data and any conclusions drawn from the 
analysis. 
As already noted the choice of this methodology brings with it a host of benefits 
associated with the ways in which content analysis has been developed and matured 
by a large number of researchers over the years. The approach deployed, and the 
detail of how the data has been analysed is open and accessible. This means this 
project holds the positive value of being easy to replicate, on either a parallel or 
longitudinal basis. Of course, as with any other methodological approach, content 
analysis bears inherent weaknesses alongside the strengths. Although the collection 
of data has been, in large part, an uncontroversial gathering of factual material such 
as dates, headline and original location of an articles, it must be recognised that key 
strands of the project have boiled down to the author's own interpretations of the 
impact of the copy. 
It has been necessary to use personalised judgements, in reading and 
interpreting the tone and focus of the newspapers articles in the sample. This process 
is most certainly not about guessing how the original producers intended that their 
copy should be understood - but how in the researcher's own reading the article came 
across. To ameliorate this problem the study has been open about the criteria and 
processes that have been used. In this section, examples have been outlined of how 
and why the research has categorised certain articles in the way it did. Furthermore, 
anyone who wants to pursue the way the analysis has interpreted the sample can do 
so by cross-referencing the data in the SPSS data file and the original newspaper 
articles. Another potential criticism is this kind of counting of media output may in 
some way represent measurement for measurement's sake. However, as outlined in 
earlier sections attempts have been made to draw a direct link between the data 
collected, and the way it has been analysed, with current debates and wider 
theoretical concerns. 
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4.2 Projecting the Rise of the Grey Vote in Parliamentary Seats 
The data used in this thesis is based upon research conducted by the author 
that uses statistics on electoral behaviour and population changes to estimate the age 
breakdown of turnout across constituencies and regions for current and future 
elections. Projections of population change were applied to parliamentary 
constituencies. Current turnout rates for different age groups were then applied to the 
electorates for possible general election dates in the future. 
The electoral register is ageing. From the headline numbers the impact is 
apparent, the retired already account for roughly one fifth of eligible voters in the UK. 
Yet, it is only when the higher propensity for older voters to vote is taken into account 
that it becomes fully apparent the scale of the age shift in British electoral politics. 
These trends in turnout rates, and other measures of civic participation, demonstrate 
how age can be a vitally important variable in understanding and predicting voter 
behaviour. The geographical distribution of the changing age profile, of course, holds 
a particular resonance for the UK's First Past the Post voting system, and its non-
·proportionaloutcomes. There is a crucial interaction between the division of territory 
into constituencies and the distribution of different categories of voters and their 
electoral choices. This interaction frequently leads to campaign results that are both 
disproportional and biased-with the allocation of seats being unequal to the 
distribution of votes across parties (Johnson 2002). Demographic projections are a 
valued and established research tool that have been used to explain patterns in the 
expansion of the Liberal Democrat's parliamentary representation (MacAllister et al 
2002), the electoral distribution of morbidity in later life (Thomas & Dorling 2007) and 
the spatial impact on voting of council house sales in the 1980s (Field 1997). 
However, there is a research gap in translating the age shift in society into electoral 
demographics. This thesis is an attempt to partially fill that gap. 
In order to model the changing age structures of the British electorate right 
down to constituency level the official projections for population change and migration 
were married up with age-related turnout out rates. All models work on presumptions, 
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and the key assumptions behind this model were firstly, that the projections produced 
by the Office for National Statistics and the Government Actuary Department are 
robust and reliable, and secondly that the age difference in turnout rates does not 
change significantly. A second modelling scenario was used that looked at the 
consequences of the current trends in age-related turnout - namely, a widening gap 
between the youngest and the oldest. 
The base data for the model is the 2001 Census population figures for 
Westminster constituencies. It utilises sub-national future population projections 
produced by the Office for National Statistics, (and the General Register Office for 
Scotland, the Statistical Directorate of the National Assembly for Wales and the 
Northern Ireland Statistics and Research Agency) to estimate the future age profile of 
the electorate for each region and constituency. The model currently runs on the 2005 
parliamentary boundaries, although these have been recently revised and many seats 
will operate under new boundaries in any election after 2007. This poses one potential 
problem for the model, boundaries are changing and are likely to change again in the 
period between now and 2025. These changes are tolerable for the analysis as the 
resulting data allows a comparison of today's electoral demographics with those of the 
near and medium term future. If the future projected seats were based on differing 
boundaries to those of 2005 and 2001 the comparisons would have been less 
valuable. There was the also the practical issue of conducting the bulk of the data 
input, and analysis in the period before the Boundary Commission concluded its 
programme of investigation into current boundaries and made recommendations for 
changes. To wait until the conclusion of this process would have made this section of 
the thesis undeliverable within the time constraints. The data that was produced and 
analysed at the regional and national levels, of course, was not affected by these 
concerns. 
In the UK there is no official data for turnout by age. One widely accepted 
estimate for turnout by age is the one produced by MORI (2005) through their 
aggregate analysis of the election. These figures have been used by the Electoral 
Commission. Based on these estimates the model uses these turnout rates for the 
2005 election: 
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Scenario: The Age Gap Remains Constant at 2005 Levels. Estimated Turnout by Age 
in the 2005 General Election. 
18-24 37% 
25-34 49% 
35-44 61% 
45-54 65% 
55-64 71% 
65+ 75% 
The size of the eligible electorate is estimated through the simple calculation 
and inclusion of all people aged 18 or over. The estimates for the 2005 general 
election are also based on the 2001 data. For data on the size of future electorates 
i.e. from 2009 onwards - at national level GAD and the General Register Office for 
Scotland projections are used. For Westminster constituencies in England post-2005, 
the baseline Census data is modified according to the sub-national population 
projections produced by the Office for National Statistics (ONS). As the ONS only 
produces these projections by local authority units, the percentage change in each 
age band was calculated and applied to the geographically corresponding 
constituencies. Where a constituency boundary overlapped with more than one local 
authority, the percentage change in each age band was weighted according to the 
proportion each constituency was co-terminus with each local authority. For 
constituencies in Wales projections produced by the Statistical Directorate of the 
National Assembly for Wales were used. 
For constituency projections, the model runs on the 2005 parliamentary 
boundaries. The Boundary Commission recommendations for changes in the future 
have not at this stage been incorporated into the model. Looking beyond the period in 
question, the overall population of the country is growing, so the size of the average 
population per seat rises to higher levels. It may be the case that at some point in the 
future parliament will respond to the increasing size of the electorate, these future 
changes cannot be second guessed, but it is a methodological issue worth noting. 
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The projections as they stand have not taken into account differing rates of electoral 
registration, by age or by type of constituency. The Electoral Commission (2005) has 
produced data on the extent of non-registration in Britain. This work estimates 16% of 
people aged 18-24 are not on the electoral register, in contrast, only two per cent of 
people aged over 65, were not on the register. It is clear that if the electoral 
registration rates were to be incorporated into the projections - a serious consideration 
for future work - the age gap in the results would widen further 
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4.3 The content analysis of the materials produced by the major political parties for 
the 2005 general election and of media coverage of older voters. 
Following the content analysis of general press coverage of population ageing, 
a similar process was used for the collection and analysis of media content covering 
the 2005 general election. 
The same Lexis Nexis database with the same set of newspaper titles and 
content as the earlier population ageing analysis was searched for all articles that 
included either the phrase 'older voters' or 'grey vote' over a period stretching from 
just before the launch of the campaign proper on March 1 sI until a week after the 
election date May 121h, in order to capture both the pre-formal campaign assessments 
in the press of party strategies and any post-mortems in the immediate aftermath. A 
further search of 'pensioners' and 'election' was also undertaken 
Included in the analysis was a transcript of a BBC Newsnightin-depth report on 
the political party's attempts to 'woo' grey voters. As a flagship news programme this 
episode presented a welcome opportunity to look in more depth at a longer piece of 
media narrative on the issues. 
The method of analysis was broadly similar to the population ageing content 
analysis, except there was a bigger emphasis on qualitative analysis in the general 
election sample. For the analysis of the political communications outputs during the 
2005 election campaign the project undertook to monitor and collect all relevant 
materials over the course of the campaign. A representative sample of material that in 
some way covered older people and/or ageing issues was used for analysis. This 
sample included: 
The Labour Party 
New opportunities for later life manifesto 
The Full election manifesto 
Web site Article: "What is Labour doing for older people?" 
March health policy document 
February council tax briefing 
Attack document: "Tory quotes on pensions" 
Rebuttal statement of Conservative pensions plans Feb 22 
Web site: Statement by Alan Milburn on pensions 
Web site: Statement by Patricia Hewitt on pensions 
Web site: Statement by Alan Johnson launching pensioners' manifesto 
The Activists Guidebook 
Sunday Times story - "Blair's pension offer to mothers" - (evidence of placed story) 
The Conservative Party 
The full election manifesto 
Older People Manifesto 
Press ad February 2005. 
Action for pensioners leaflet 
Web site attack document: "Labour's secret pensions "tax" agenda" 
Full text of Michael Howard's Northampton speech 
The Liberal Democrats 
The full election manifesto 
The Liberal Democrat Women's manifesto 
Pre-election manifesto 
The Liberal Democrat Older People manifesto 
February pensions policy brief 
Autumn 2004 pensions policy paper 
Press release launching older people manifesto 
'We oppose we propose' poster on ageing issues 
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The analysis aimed to go beyond any mere counting of phrases and words and 
develop an appreciation of the themes and narratives contained within the content. It 
was highly likely that pensions would appear as an issue with high frequency, but the 
question was in what context and with what kind of narratives would pensions become 
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an election issue. The analysis sought to understand the type of stories that were 
being deployed by the protagonists to explain, in the case of political parties, their 
calls to action. The analysis was also open to consideration of the "motive" of the 
narratives and themes deployed, recognising stories and frames are developed for a 
reason. With regard to news content, journalists habitually refer to their submissions, 
their narrations of chronological events, for print or broadcast as "stories" (Johnson-
Cartee 2005). 
One potential pitfall is the allocation of equal importance to all items within the 
content analysis sample - regardless of how significant each item may have been in 
terms of audience exposure or impact (Prior 2001). Impact is a tough element to add 
to a study of this size as there would be large costs in conducting a large survey of 
voters to assess their recall of political communications initiatives and setting up 
experiments to assess the impact on attitudes or voter behaviour. The efficacy of the 
campaigning materials is necessarily outside the practical scope of this study. 
Audience exposure to political communications outputs is another weighting 
factor worthy of consideration. In a straight forward content analysis the appearance 
of a theme, or counting of phrases or words is taken on fact value, that is to say if a 
phrase appears ten times, it will be recorded as appearing ten times. Each of those 
ten appearances is attributed the same value within the data of one unit. This raises 
some potential problems in how the data is analysed and places limitations on the 
kind of conclusions that can be drawn. Not least the audience exposure to each item 
within the analysis. For example; how many copies of a leaflet were printed; how 
many were then distributed; on how many billboards was a poster reproduced, how 
many visitors looked at on line poster or short video; how many people watched a 
party election broadcast; how much "free editorial" did any particular poster or film 
generate in the news media. All of these factors will influence the audience impact of 
anyone item of communication, with the political parties chasing campaigning ideal of 
effective output that is widely distributed and/or generates and influences the terms of 
issue debate in the ensuing media coverage. The obvious danger for any researcher 
is to place undue weight on the content of obscure, poorly disseminated material, over 
and above the content that was more likely to have been consumed by the target 
audience. 
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A weighted content analysis has been attempted by Prior (2001) in analysing 
television adverts produced by candidates in the 1996 US presidential election. In this 
study the costs of placing an advert on any particular TV station was used to weight 
the analysis, on the logic that the more expensive the time slot the more likely there 
was a larger audience and/or an audience of particular strategic importance for the 
campaigners. Clearly, this is a bigger factor in research that seeks to draw specific 
conclusions on the impact, if any, the communications output has on its audience, 
either through audience exposure or audience reach. However, this research project 
does not seek to draw conclusions on media effects. This project's aim is 
concentrated on the target producers of communications output, in this case political 
parties and the news media, in order to better understand the producers' own 
constructions and framing of ageing issues and of older voters as well as to analyse 
the choice of language. 
The subject matter of this thesis is under-researched, but the methods 
deployed for this thesis are not experimental, or breaking any new ground. It uses 
approaches that are widely accepted and deployed in the study of similar topics or 
issues. This research focuses on the text and imagery used by the news media, and 
by political parties through their published communications materials working on the 
assumption that this body of media and political communicative outputs will contain a 
number of cues and other resources required for the development of plausible 
explanation. The journalists or party workers who produce these materials need not 
be necessarily intentionally deploying every single cue contained within an article or 
leaflet, it is enough to recognise that they produced their work within the context of the 
institutions for whom they are employed and wrote with the intention that their 
audiences would understand well the key information points of their work. Willams et 
al (2007) used social semiotics and visual semantics to interpret the images and texts 
of older people used in food advertising, and assumed images produced by 
advertisers were social constructions derived from processes located within a 
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common culture within which the intended audience, and researchers, also reside. 
The adverts were taken as up-to-date discursive representations of older people. 
Kress and Van Leeuwen (1999) support the notion that audiences, which must also 
include researchers, will at least recognise when considering advertising some of the 
communicative intentions of the original creators and the value reference points for 
what they are, even if they ultimately do not accept the premises behind the reference 
points on the invitation to share the conclusions of the overall message. 
A rejection of the underlying values or stereotypes contained within any given 
text or image should not represent any major barrier to analysis for the researcher, as 
long at they remain reflective about their practice. This may be slightly more 
problematic for research that seeks to measure the impact of advertising, but this 
project does not venture into this territory. There are good examples of where other 
researchers have adopted similar approaches to investigate elements of ageing and 
media content. Kitch (2003) examined the construction of generational identities in 
news magazines by searching for "common threads" in cover stories through a 
narrative and rhetorical analysis, examining what elements within a story were 
exaggerated, and which were ignored. Sedlakova (2005) pursued concern over 
stereotyping of older people and used a "message" content analysis of Czech 
newspapers and broadcast news to explore narratives about old age in the Czech 
media. Unlike this project, no qualitative analysis was undertaken to complement the 
quantitative findings. The sampling and comparative evaluation of both media and 
election campaigns has also been effectively deployed by other researchers. For 
example Harris et al (2001) used content analysis to study agenda setting differences 
between the political parties and the press during the 1999 European Parliamentary 
elections in Greece. They analysed the content of six newspapers overthe full 
campaign period, plus the manifestos of six parties. These results were compared 
with the public perceptions of the issue priorities identified in a public opinion survey 
immediately prior to the election campaign. This enabled comparison of the agendas 
of the press and the parties. The authors believed the sample period was sufficient to 
allow an assessment of the agenda setting role of the Greek press. The campaign 
agenda of each party was researched through content analysis of party manifestos 
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and changes in the party agenda of the two major parties (NO and PASOK) was 
monitored through the press releases issued by them during the election campaign. 
The evidence indicates strongly that where academic writers have taken an 
overview of media or political content activity within the field of study, such as Oearing 
and Rogers (1996) and Semetko et al (1991), it has been found that content analysis 
was the only methodological tool used to investigate agenda setting in the press and 
broadcast media. Waiters et al (1996) endorse the use of party press releases within 
a sample as they form an important element of a party's integrated political strategy, 
pro-actively pushing campaign themes and images and seeking to generate media 
coverage. This project does not defer from this body of knowledge, but has instead 
sought to work within its established frameworks. 
128 . 
Chapter 5 - Population Ageing in the UK National Press 
A core assumption of this thesis is that in order to understand political 
responses to population ageing there must be a comprehension of how the media 
portray and frame its implications. This is because political decision making, from the 
micro day-to-day level, to the conduct of election campaigns and higher level strategic 
decisions are influenced to a certain degree by the media's treatment of the issues at 
hand. The extent to which political strategists and governments allow themselves to 
be swayed by the press will always remain a contentious issue, but no serious 
contributors to these debates argue that politics takes no notice of the media. As part 
of the desire to understand the direction of media pressure on population ageing this 
chapter details the statistical breakdown and analysis of the data recovered from the 
three months of press coverage which was analysed for this thesis. 
As has been seen from Chapter Two from the second half of the 20th Century 
the predominant social attitude expressed towards older people is that of negative 
stereotyping, and that societal ageism, unsurprisingly, has resulted in the incidence of 
age discrimination in the delivery of private goods and public services. In this context 
it has also been noted the relative absence of research into how the media cover 
ageing issues. With the work that has been done primarily focusing more on the 
portrayal of older people in terms of character stereotyping, and rather less on the key 
ageing issues. The balance of work has also tended towards television rather than 
newspaper portrayals. This is despite the broad consensus that older people, 
although the biggest consumers of media, and particularly news media, are under-
represented in the media, and where they are not ignored they are often portrayed 
using negative stereotypes. 
This dearth of research leaves us with limited data and analysis onto what 
extent the news media replicate societal ageism, or the kind of neo-liberal apocalyptic 
demography, found in wider society for the former and in elite circles for the latter. On 
the media's role to inform there have been voices (Pollack 1989) who have argued 
that the media fail in this regard as the associated issues are deemed too boring or 
depressing in the age of infotainment. Some of the copy that attempts to present 
ageing in a more positive light falls into the abseiling granny trap-a variation of the 
man bites dog metaphor for confounding our expectations - where a story seeks to 
endorse active ageing, but in the process reinforces negative stereotypes of the 
socially active old as the exception rather than the rule. 
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Chapter Two gave special attention to the contributions of three writers who 
have specifically considered how the press covers population ageing in the shape of 
Groombridge, Midwinter and Bergstrom. Midwinter (1991) concluded only a few 
journalists specifically write about age as a primary topic, but that age is ubiquitous in 
the press as shorthand index for providing quick descriptions of people in the news. 
He also observed from his data that the idea that a great proportion of retired people 
were active and well was "not well represented". In 1991 Groombridge concluded that 
ageing issues were given "medium prominence", in that there was a considerable 
body of coverage, but it was rare for the topic to hit the front pages. Groombridge was 
disappointed by the ways in which older people featured in the role of victims, 
particularly in crime stories, and observed what he called the "sadly predictable" use 
of patronising and ageist language such as "bed blockers", "sprightly", "vulnerable" 
and "remarkably fit and well for a seventy year old". 
More recently Bergstrom (2001) sought to test the changing prominence of 
ageing stories in selected press titles. He found there was a mild, if erratic, tendency 
for the amount of coverage to increase over the time period. Bergstrom investigated 
the tone of the press reports by constructing what he called a "gloom index" seeking 
to categorise stories on the basis of whether they framed ageing as being in some 
way a cost or a problem - or if content alternatively saw ageing as a sign of progress 
or holding some opportunities. Bergstrom's analysis found that negative articles on 
ageing outnumbered positive associations by a ratio of three to one, but that reporting 
had become marginally "less gloomy" over time. He also made some important 
observations on the contexts in which ageing appeared in print in that few articles 
within his sample directly focused on issues pertaining to an ageing society. He 
speculated that ageing was an adjunct of other stories because ageing and the 
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generational transformation is not at the heart of what the press want its readers to 
see. Instead ageing is incorporated into other issues such business's attempts to 
understand emerging boomer markets·, or trends in jobs market often wrapped up in 
specialist sections (Le. motoring or gardening) on the motivation of providing stories 
that attract advertisers seeking out the grey pound or dollar. In turn, this apparent 
trend could be explained by the economic influence of advertisers who placed higher 
premium on the delivery of younger readers in conjunction with the strategic 
commercial fear within news dailies that young, "high-tech" readers aged 24-40 were 
more likely to defect from newspapers to sourcing news on line than other segments of 
their regular readerships. 
By sampling press coverage and directly recording and analysing content that 
covered aspects of population ageing, this project was enabled to both generate 
some insights into the kind of directions and conclusions press content would push 
political audiences, as well as allowing some comparisons with the conclusions drawn 
Groombridge, Midwinter and Bergstrom when looking at older samples of press 
coverage. 
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5.1 Sampling Press Coverage in April 2004 
The Lexis Nexis database of press copy was selected for searching the chosen 
sampling period. Lexis is a near comprehensive database, although clearly not a fully 
comprehensive one as detailed in Chapter Four (Deacon 2007). The search of all 
articles that included the terms "ageing" and "population" or "society" produced by 
national newspapers over the three month period of February-April 2004 produced a 
total of 390 separate items which met the search terms submitted to the Lexis 
database. This sampling period replicated the methodology used by the great 
proportion of research that used content analysis for publication in journals 
(Neuendorf 2002). Of the 390 a number had to be rejected on the grounds that they 
were too tangential to the purpose of the study i.e. texts the mentioned the ageing of 
inanimate objects such trees, buildings and the squad composition of certain football 
clubs. Once these had been filtered out, a total of 235 articles were left for data entry 
and analysis. 
Search Summary 
:l Search Engine: Lexis Nexis 
:l Search Terms: Any article that included "ageing" AND "population" OR 
"society" 
:l Time Period selected: February 1 2004 to April 30 2004 inclusive 
:l Total Number of Articles retrieved: 390 
:l Total Number of Articles assessed as suitable for further analysis: 235 
When the total number of articles assessed as suitable for further analysis are 
broken down by newspaper title we can see (Table 3.1) that the coverage is spread 
widely across the titles. There were four titles which produced no articles for analysis 
underthe search terms. Perhaps unsurprisingly, these included three entertainment 
orientated popular titles; The People, the Star and the News of the World Less 
predictably the Financial Times also produced no articles which matched the search 
terms, the search was re-submitted on several occasions to confirm this omission and 
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returned the same results possibly confirming Deacon's warning over the less than 
fully comprehensive nature of the database (Deacon 2007). Nonetheless, the search 
produced a robust sample of both quality and popular press content. While analysis 
beyond the original scope of this project would be required of the content of each of 
these titles if we wanted to understand how ageing issues do appear in their output, 
we can at this point note that these popular and financial titles do vary from the 
"median style" of news content familiar across the majority of titles. 
The quality titles dominate the sample. Nearly three quarters (71.6%) of the 
articles in the sample come from the qualities, and three quality titles - Guardian, 
Times and Te/egraph- account for approaching half (46%) of all the articles analysed. 
Perhaps with a serious minded issue such as population ageing, some people would 
not be surprised to see lower levels of coverage in the popular titles. However, it 
should be noted that the search terms are probably biased towards the qualities style 
of discourse. As noted by Midwinter (1991), tabloids do devote significant space to 
"pensioner issues", particularly in stories that feature older people as the victims of 
crime. This genre of story is out of the remit of this inquiry, but we should not conclude 
that tabloids largely ignore ageing issues, but rather judge that they are less likely 
than the qualities to be couched in the language of public policy debate. 
Figure 5.1: Total number of articles analysed by newspaper title 
Total Number of Articles Analysed by Newspaper Title 
Frequency Percent 
Valid The Guardian 46 19.6 
The Times 35 14.9 
The Telegraph 27 11.5 
The Express 23 9.8 
The Independent 21 8.9 
Daily Mail 21 8.9 
The Observer 11 4.7 
The Sunday Times 11 4.7 
Sunday Telegraph 10 4.3 
Express (on Sunday- 8 3.4 
The Sun 6 2.6 
Independenl on Sunday 5 2.1 
Mail on Sunday 5 2.1 
The Mirror 3 1.3 
The Business a 2 .9 
Sunday Mirror 1 .4 
Total 235 100.0 
a. Footnote: A Frequency of zero was recorded for the 
Financial Times, News of the World, the Star and 
The People 
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The articles that matched the criteria for analysis were spread widely across 
the different sections of the papers (Figure 5.1). There was a fairly even split between 
articles which focused on current events - 51 % in the "news" "other", "comment" and 
"editorial" categories - and those that ranged wider, centring around features and 
specialised pieces, found in the supplementary sections (44.3%). As we shall see this· 
pattern - the lack of any kind of ring fenCing or boxing off population ageing into one 
category fits with Bergstrom's 2001 study and is found elsewhere in the analysis. The 
Category "News Other" included all articles in the main news sections that were not a 
front page lead story. In a replication of Groombridge's (1999) findings, there were no 
front page headline stories in this survey. 
Figure 5.2: Articles in sample broken down by which section they appeared. 
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It was feasible at the outset that the research may have found coverage of 
population ageing was dominated by high profile flagship issues such as pensions. As 
can be seen from Figure 5.3 when articles were categorised into principal focus areas 
there is a generous spread across the categories. Although "economic" and "political" 
were the two largest categories, both accounting for 22.2% each, it is not possible to 
describe the nature of the sample as in any way being dominated by political or 
economic debate over population, rather as with some of the findings by both 
Groombridge and Bergstrom, ageing slotted into wider political or economic topics. 
"Health" and "personal social services' taken together account for 24.7%, and 
categories such as "housing" and "consumer" also make significant contributions 
(3.4% and 7.7%). 
Categorisation into secondary issue focus involved a more detailed 
assessment of any given article's main concerns. For example, the "health" category 
included important sub-strands which during data collection required identification, 
perhaps the most obvious of these was news and comment on issues concerning the 
UK's National Health Service. Topics were diffuse and the analysis produced no 
single dominant category. Table 5.4 demonstrates the wide spread of issues that 
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were found within the coverage. Only nine of these categories accounted for ten or 
more items in the sample. However, if the nine top categories which scored ten or 
more items are added together with the three pensions related categories, we find 
that ten secondary issue categories accounted for 69.1 % of all the articles in the 
sample. This is a large proportion, but additional sampling would be required before 
any conclusions could be drawn on whether the phenomenon of population ageing is 
being distil/ed by the press into 10 key debates. Furthermore, the largest secondary 
category is "migration", this was mainly down to the Government's defence, during the 
sample period, against attacks on its policies and assertion that migration will supply 
younger workers in an ageing economy. This is given critical attention by the press, 
and 14 of the articles associated with "migration" come in the form of editorial or 
comment. It is debatable whether migration would figure so highly in previous periods, 
but immigration has maintained a high news profile since 2004, so it is possible that 
flurries of similar debate have occurred in the last couple of years. 
Although it was a possible outcome, the analysis has concluded that the 
sample has not been unduly dominated by anyone newspaper title, or any principal 
or secondary issue focus. 
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Figure 5.3: Survey Sample Broken Down by Principal Issue Focus 
Survey Sample by Principal Issue Focus 
30~------------------------------------, 
20 
10 
Principal Issue Focus 
Note: Principal Issues were aggregated categories from a larger number of "secondary" issues. Each 
story was allocated a primary and secondary issue focus on a case by case basis rather than being 
automatically allocated. The Principal Issues categories are comprised of stories from within the 
following secondary categories: 
Pensions (Occupational pensions; personal finance; private pensions/regulation; state pension reform) 
Family Dependency (Long term care; inheritance issues; family structure; social isolate/exclusion; 
prison policy; housing demand; company news) 
Personal Social Services (Long term care; family structure; elder abuse; multicultural society) 
Health Care (NHS funding/services; personal health; science policy and ethics) 
Economic (Personal finance; company news; migration; EU reform; careers; trends in popular culture; 
housing demand; public finances' company relocations; labour markets; economic outlook) 
Political (Migration; Conservative Party; importance of older voters/consumers; trends in popular 
culture; long term care; NHS funding; obituary; multicultural society; political situation in Germany; US 
political situation; personal finance; public finances; Budget 2004; social isolation and exclusion; 
administration of welfare; prison policy; EU reform; family structure; elder abuse) 
Consumer (Company news; travel; cosmetics; personal finance; trends in popular culture; IT and older 
people; public transport; design issues; personal health; importance of older voters/consumers; media 
industry and trends; housing demand) 
Demographic (Migration; family structure; religion; trends in popular culture; labour markets; social 
isolation/exclusion; multicultural society; BBC If ... reviews) 
Figure 5.4: Survey sample broken down by secondary issue focus 
Survey Sample by Secondary Issue Focus (categories 
with less than 3 articles omitted) 
Frequency Percent 
Migration 27 11.5 
Long Term Care 25 10.6 
Company News 24 10.2 
NHS Funding/Services 19 8.1 
Personal Finance 12 5.1 
Family Structure 11 4.7 
Personal Health 11 4.7 
Trends in Popular Culture 10 4.3 
Elder Abuse 10 4.3 
Labour Markets 9 3.8 
Importance of older 
7 3.0 voters/consumers 
Occupational Pensions 6 2.6 
Housing Demand 5 2.1 
EU Reform 5 2.1 
State Pension Reform 4 1.7 
Multicultural Society 4 1.7 
Public Finances 3 1.3 
Social Isolation/Exclusion 3 1.3 
Economic Outlook 3 1.3 
Budget 2004 3 1.3 
Television ReviewS' 3 1.3 
Private 3 1.3 Pensions/Regulation 
a. Footnote - "Television Reviews" - All members of 
this category were reviews of the BBC drama 
documentary If...the generations fell apart 
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Although the analysis concludes that no single issue or newspaper has 
dominated the sample, from table 3.5 it can be seen that population ageing came up 
in a predominantly domestic context with just under 84% of articles geographically 
located on the UK. However, the analysis found the coverage of population ageing 
internationally to be a source of what appeared to be a significant political discourse 
on ageing, particularly around the EU and some of its member countries, such as 
Germany(accounting for 7.2% of the overall survey sample) - we have seen in 
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Chapter 3 how Germany been cited as a "gerontocracy" unable to pursue neo-liberal 
solutions. 
Figure 5.5: Survey broken down by country of principal focus 
Survey Sample by Country of Principal Focus 
Freauencv Percent 
UK 197 83.8 
Germany 4 1.7 
Italy 1 .4 
France 1 .4 
USA 10 4.3 
Australia 2 .9 
Japan 1 .4 
EU 11 4.7 
Global 6 2.6 
Kosovo 1 .4 
China 1 .4 
Total 235 100.0 
It was important to ascertain how much of the coverage was primarily 
concerned with population ageing as the main topic of focus. Population ageing 
accounted for 11.5% of the articles analysed in the sample. Considering that the 
search terms were designed to seek out articles about population this can viewed as a 
low percentage of the sample. But, it is further evidence to suggest that population 
ageing is more likely to appear "mainstreamed" into repertoires from other areas of 
policy debates, than be a headline issue on its own. However, the fact that population 
ageing came up as a factor in varying degrees in 206 other articles over the three-
month period suggests the issue is a significant factor that is being taken into account 
across a wide range of topical debates. 
Figure 5.6: Number of articles in the survey where population ageing was the principal theme 
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Population Principal Theme? 
Frequency Percent 
Valid yes 27 11.5 
no 206 87.7 
Oblique 2 .9 
Total 235 100.0 
The data suggests that population ageing is indeed an issue which generates 
significant amounts of press coverage - either directly, or integrated into discourses on 
other topic areas - however, this immediately leads onto investigating the nature of 
that coverage, and specifically, whether the negativity about the implications of 
population ageing identified in the literature review is reflected in the newspaper 
coverage. If the sample is taking as a whole we can see that the great majority of 
coverage was coded as being "neutral". These articles may have included negative 
sentiments but if any negativity was balanced in broadly equal measures by positive 
comment within the same piece it would have been coded as "neutral". So it is 
important to bear in mind that a "neutral" coding will include article that contained both 
positive and negative sentiments as well as articles that were broadly neutral in tone 
throughout the length of the piece. Only a minority of articles were coded as being 
negative or positive, however, of these there are around three times as many coded 
"fairly" or "strongly negative" (35) compared to those coded "fairly" or "strongly 
positive" (11) (Figure 5.7). The analysis then investigated whether the length of the 
articles coded negative or positive were an important factor i.e. were the column 
inches devoted to positive or negative articles magnifying their impact? It was found 
that there was some difference in the balance between positive and negative when 
the total number of words in each category was used instead of the number of 
articles. For example, 4.7% of the articles were coded positive and 3.8% of the total 
words, 80.4% of the articles and 81% of the words were coded neutral, and 14.9% of 
the articles and 15.2% of the words were coded in negative categories. By looking at 
the total number of words, instead of the total number of articles, it can be seen that 
there is a small shift in the balance of coverage towards the negative, however, this 
change is only small. 
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The scale used for judging tone ranged from 1 for "strongly positive" to 5 for 
"strongly negative". By averaging out the results for all the articles we get an, average 
score of 3.11. So, taken as a whole the sample averages close to the "neutral" value 
of 3, but with a slight tendency towards the negative. 
Figure 5.7: Number of articles coded as positive or negative on the implications of population 
ageing 
Negative/Positive tone on Agei~g 
Frequency_ Percent 
strongly positive 2 .9 
fairty positive 9 3.8 
neutral 189 8004 
fairty negative 30 12.8 
strongly negative 5 2.1 
Total 235 100.0 
However, once the analysis started to break down the sample into sub-sections 
the overall picture of neutrality with a subtle hint of negativity changes. Within the 
sample there was a great deal of variation in how the subject was treated depending 
on the interplay between different categories. Firstly, if the sample is divided between 
articles in which population was the principal theme and those where it was 
secondary, we can see important differences. Seven of the 27 articles with population 
as the principal theme, over a quarter, were ranked as being positive in tone. This 
contrasts strongly with only 4 articles out of 206 being ranked as positive in tone 
where it was judged that population was not the principal theme. (Figure 5.5). Where 
an article had been coded as having population ageing as its principal theme, it was 
much more likely to be coded as being positive in tone. 
Only a relatively small amount of the sample was categorised as principally 
concerned with ageing, but within that sub-sample it appears that the copy brings out 
a more balanced picture of the implications of ageing for society, including some of 
the benefits, or by critically engaging with some of the negative stereotypes found 
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elsewhere in the sample. However, this is in no way represents any kind of simplistic 
correlation between subject focus and positivity. Nine of the articles in the sub-sample 
were also coded as being in some degree negative - two more than were coded 
positive. What appears to be happening is that where the focus of a story is 
specifically on ageing there is a broader spectrum of views articulated within the copy. 
The majority of articles in the sample were coded as not being primarily 
concerned with ageing and as being neutral in tone. However, while there may be 
neutrality there is also a striking absence of positivity, and the analysis detected what 
appears to be a sophisticated discourse, based on negative stereotyping of ageing, 
which is drawn upon by the producers of news copy. Further effort would be required 
to estimate more accurately whether there are explicitly ageist assumptions behind 
this apparently everyday discourse. This context further underlined the incorporation 
of qualitative analysis, and the qualitative analysis provided by this research proved to 
be extremely valuable. 
Figure 5.8: Cross tabulation of tone set against whether articles were coded with population as 
the principal theme or not. 
Negative/Positive tone on Ageing· Population Principal Theme? Crosstabulation 
Count 
POJ1lllation Princjpal Theme? 
yes no Oblique Total 
Negative/Positive strongly positive 2 2 
tone on Ageing fairly positive 5 4 9 
neutral 11 176 2 189 
fairly negative 8 22 30 
strongly negative 1 4 5 
Total 27 206 2 235 
The national press in the UK is well known for its ability to divide up into highly 
partisan camps on a variety of issues (Anderson & Weymouth 1999). Might we also 
expect to see divergent approaches to the issues raised by population ageing? Eight 
out of the nine articles coded as being positive come from two "camps· - Six from the 
Guardian/Observerand four from the Times/Sunday Times. Although overall both the 
Times and Guardian produced more negative than positive stories. Figures 5.9 and 
5.10 show the balance of coverage between the titles, when the negative/positive 
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tone variable is presented as a mean score the Observerand the Business come out 
as the most positive and negative respectively, however, this is based on a very small 
number of stories. On the limited occasions that an article could be coded as being in 
some way positive about population ageing, it was always based on an item which 
was published in one of the quality titles. Titles which are known to have a large 
proportion of older readers, such as the Telegraph titles and the Mail, did not produce 
in this time period any articles that be coded as being positive about ageing. This 
apparent conundrum of failing to celebrate the life stage of a core section of readers 
may be explained by Bergstrom's (2001) research into the economic and cultural 
assumptions behind press marketing strategies, and in particular a fear that younger 
readers are more likely to defect to web based news sources, in contrast to older 
readers who, by and large, whose loyalties were taken for granted. 
Count 
Figure 5.9: The number of articles coded positive or negative by each newspaper title 
Newspaper TIUe • Negative/Positive tone on Ageing Crosstabulatlon 
Neaative/Pasitive tone on Aaeina 
strongly strongly 
positive fairly Dasitive neutral airlv neaatlve neQative Total 
Newspaper The Guardian 4 37 4 1 46 
Title The Telegraph 21 6 27 
The Times 3 27 4 1 35 
The Independent 1 15 4 1 21 
Daily Mail 19 2 21 
The Express 19 3 1 23 
The Sun 4 2 6 
The Mirror 3 3 
The Business 1 1 2 
The Observer 2 9 11 
Sunday Telegraph 10 10 
Independent on Sund 3 2 5 
The Sunday Times 1 9 . 1 11 
Mail on Sunday 5 5 
Express (on Sunday_ 6 2 8 
Sunday Mirror 1 1 
Total 2 9 189 30 5 235 
Figure 5.10: The mean scores for articles coded positive or negative by each newspaper title 
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Negative/Positive tone on Ageing • Newspaper Title 
Negative/Positive tone on Ageing 
Newspaper Title Mean N Std. Deviation 
The Guardian 3.04 46 .515 
The Telegraph 3.22 27 .424 
The Times 3.09 35 .562 
The Independent 3.24 21 .625 
Daily Mail 3.10 21 .301 
The Express 3.22 23 .518 
The Sun 3.33 6 .516 
The Mirror 3.00 3 .000 
The Business 3.50 2 .707 
The Observer 2.64 11 .809 
Sunday Telegraph 3.00 10 .000 
Independent on Sunday 3.40 5 .548 
The Sunday Times 3.09 11 .701 
Mail on Sunday 3.00 5 .000 
Express (on Sunday_ 3.25 8 .463 
Sunday Mirror 3.00 1 
Total 3.11 235 .523 
There is a clearer difference between the tone taken between the quality and populist 
titles. Overall, only 7.5% of tabloid articles were coded as primarily concerned with 
population ageing, compared to 13.1% of broadsheet articles. From Figure 5.11 it can 
be seen that all articles that were coded as being positive came from the broadsheets. 
However, while the populars produced no positive coverage, the proportion of the 
populars' articles coded as negative, was by coincidence identical to the quality titles 
at 14.9%. The popular titles generated proportionately less coverage that was 
primarily concerned with population ageing, however, within that coverage the 
tabloids appear more likely to include negative attitudes when population ageing 
comes up in the context of another subject, and were less likely, within the time period 
of this sample to give editorial space for more divergent perspectives. On balance, it 
was the popular press who more likely to dip into the negative cues on age identified 
in the Midwinter and Groombridge studies discussed in Chapter Two. 
Figure 5.11: The number of articles coded positive or negative broken down into broadsheets 
and tabloids. 
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Tabloid or Broadsheet * Negative/Positive tone on AgeIng Crosstabulatlon 
Count 
Neaative/Posltive tone on Aaeinc 
strongly strongly 
positive fairlv positive neutral fairly neaativ9 neaalive Total 
Tabloid or Broadsheet Broadsheet 2 9 132 21 4 168 
Tabloid 57 9 1 67 
Total 2 9 189 30 5 235 
The research also coded the main geographic setting for each story. As might 
be expected a large majority of article were principally focused on stories located in 
the UK. However, the analysis this data also found that a small, but steady, stream of 
articles that were negative about the implications of population ageing for countries 
outside of the UK. Generally, this negativity was aimed at welfare policies in EU 
member countries, with Germany the subject of most of the criticism. The Figure 5.13 
shows the mean scores on the scale which ranked articles tone ranging from strongly 
positive to strongly negative for each geographic category. A score of four equals 
"fairly negative" and although the coverage as a whole tended to the neutral, the 
scores for Germany and for the EU are 3.75 and 3.73 respectively, putting them 
closer to a negative rather than neutral score. Coverage of Australia at 3.5 borders on 
being negative overall. 
The negative tone of coverage for Britain's EU partners is often based upon the 
kind of assumptions used by Sinn (2002) that generous welfare arrangements, in 
health and pensions, for retired people will have to be cut in the light of population 
ageing in order to enable the desired policy outcome of lower personal taxes. A strand 
of opinion in the UK press appears insistent that countries such as Germany must 
address population ageing by reducing state spending, and the role of the state in 
providing incomes and services in the welfare of older people. As such the criticism 
comes over as being ideologically driven, older people in the EU may enjoy higher 
living standards, but it is they who are in crisis, in contrast to the more neutral 
coverage enjoyed by the USA. 
Figure 5.13: The variations in reporting tone depending on the country of principal focus. 
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Negative/Positive tone on Ageing * Country of Principal Focus 
Negative/Positive tone on Ageing 
Country of Mean N Std. Deviation 
UK 3.07 197 .490 
Germany 3.75 4 .500 
Italy 3.00 1 
France 3.00 1 
USA 3.00 10 .000 
Australia 3.50 2 .707 
Japan 3.00 1 
EU 3.73 11 .905 
Global 3.17 6 .408 
Kosovo 3.00 1 
China 3.00 1 
Total 3.11 235 .523 
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Section 5.2 Qualitative analysis of the Press Coverage 
To deepen the insights developed from the data generated by the content 
analysis it was decided to take an in-depth look at a selection of outputs which focus 
more directly on population ageing. An examination was made of a BBC "docudrama" 
and a further qualitative analysis of articles from the sample was conducted. The 
material was investigated using a thematic analysis as explained in Chapter Four. The 
thematic analysis of the articles within the sample produced results which enabled an 
in-depth contextualisation ofthe results from the quantitative analysis. In relation to 
population ageing, the analysis found several themes that repeatedly came up across 
diverse articles. 
The content analysis found an absence of any positive agenda on the 
implications of population ageing. Although most of the coverage leant to a neutral 
position, the overall balance was lent toward the negative, with higher concentrations 
of negativity in the opinion and comment sections. The qualitative analysis was able 
to detect a distinct narrative of why population ageing is perceived as a threatening 
development for society, and some evidence of a language repertoire in which that 
negativity could be expressed and quickly understood. In everyday copy writing terms 
like 'burgeoning' were used to signify the drain on public resources population ageing 
is taken to represent, especially when combined with the use of 'elderly' and its 
implications of decay and dependence. For example: 
We ask the Burton family from Carlton-in-Lindrick, Nottinghamshire, 
what they think about the burgeoning population of elderly people in 
the UK ~ The ObselVerMagazine April 18, 2004 p54. 
In many ways the negative language used to couch the claimed implications of 
population ageing is deployed within a sense of chronological time. This fits with the 
narrative of the "time bomb". Indeed, within this sample of press coverage there were 
examples of the kind of "apocalyptic demography" identified by Robertson (1997). In 
this example from the Daily Telegraph we can see how the language used can be 
quite dramatic, indeed, going as far as to describe ageing as one of the four 
horsemen of impending doom: 
"For most serious people in politics are agreed: the principal question 
the country faces is how to deal with the 21st century's four horses of 
the apocalypse: the war on terror; the ageing population; the rise of 
China and India as economic superpowers; and the demands of an 
electorate that is increasingly consumerist and fickle." The Daily 
Telegraph March 18,2004 p64. 
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The concept of a time bomb is a regular feature, and core concept in writing 
which wished to ascribe negative translations of the implications of ageing. Despite 
the fact that population ageing has been evolving over decades, the time bomb 
presents a picture that associates ageing with dramatic consequences detonated in a 
matter of seconds. In the example from the Express below the pre-devolution minister 
for health in Scotland, Sam Galbraith, a persistent opponent of free long term care for 
older people, deploy the "time bomb" metaphor as ground for rolling back state 
funding of social care: 
"Former minister Sam Galbraith claims that free care is too costly, and 
as the elderly population grows the issued will become "a ticking time 
bomb"." The Express February 9, 2004 P2. 
Intriguingly, where articles were partially, or wholly, more upbeat about the 
prospects of ageing they also used for reference points the repertoire of negatives 
discourses on ageing. There was no evidence of an alternative discourse on ageing, 
but rather the occasional responses which took the negative agenda as their starting 
point. For example the economist Ruth Lea in a comment piece for the Telegraph 
takes the negative narratives as a starting reference point by stating ' ... contrary to the 
views of some doom-mongers, there is no demographic "time bomb".'2 Graham 
Searjeant, then financial editor of the Times, writing on the issue of sustainability in 
pensions spending declared 'The climate of ideas has since been transformed. That 
time bomb was, it turns out, a statistical scare.'3 The Ruth Lea and Graham Searjeant 
2 The Daily Te/egraph Apri119, 2004 p32 
3 The Times March 12, 2004 p34 
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quotes are examples of specialist writers rejecting the "time bomb" hypothesis. It also 
appears that where this counter, or rather countering, discourse occurs, it is often the 
result of proactive public relations from specialist or campaigning organisations. As 
such, it is a construct generated from organisations which have vested interests in the 
policy issues associated with population ageing. In this way, we can see the 
competing rhetoric as the shifting sands of power between competing claims on public 
policy choices. In the example below from the Guardian it is Age Concern who are the 
NGO instigators of the countering discourse: 
'The charity Age Concern says recent research has debunked the myth 
that the ageing of Britain's population is a "demographic time bomb" 
threatening to wreck the economy.' The Guardian February 10, 2004 
p8 
The analysis found a recurring theme of pessimism over economic prospects 
with low growth and poor stock market returns in the future entirely, or partly, down to 
the impact of population ageing. These themes resonated with Mullan's (2000) 
observation that problems and traits which are stereotypically associated with older 
people at the level of the individual, such as dependency, conservatism, low 
productivity, and an absence of dynamism and innovation, are grafted onto the future 
traits of society as a whole. One article in the Independent described population 
ageing as contributing towards 20 years of poor stock market returns 4 and another in 
the same month directly linked 'sluggish growth' to ageing populations.5 The Times 
discussed ageing under the headline of 'a burden that all of us will have to share' and 
stated that the 'most important' long-term economic issue in every advanced economy 
'is how to come to grips with the realities of an ageing population:6 
Although rare, some articles provided intriguing insights into some of the 
apparently ageist attitudes which underpin this strand of economic pessimism, 
suggesting that, for some writers, these assertions are based less on economic data, 
4 The Independent April 24, 2004 piS. 
, The Independent April 2, 2004 p47 
6 The Times March 2S, 2004 p29 
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and more on the stereotyping of age. It's hard to imagine an article in the mainstream 
media which would have expressed distaste at the idea of working with mostly female, 
gay or minority ethnic colleagues, but we can see prejudice against older workers is 
still considered acceptable. 
'Rowley is an enthusiast - not least for the fact that she has spent her 
life in the public sector. Is there a downside? "It does have an ageing 
workforce - only 6% is under 25 - so graduates will be faced with much 
older colleagues.' The Guardian Special Supplement, February 16, 
2004 P18. 
The causal link between poor economic performance and population ageing is 
mostly clearly applied to the affairs of continental Europe, and is often couched within 
an ideologically neo-liberal narrative that dislikes what is perceived to be overly 
generous welfare states in Europe. Amidst what accounts for an unchallenged 
consensus in the press about the problems apparently facing Europe, Germany 
frequently receives special attention. In the examples from the Sunday Times and 
Telegraph below we see an attempt to create a dichotomy between the continuation 
of universal free healthcare and practical rates of personal taxation: 
'But this will clearly not suffice to mitigate the dire economic 
consequences of ageing populations ... the welfare states created in the 
wake of the second world war require drastic reform. Either today's 
newborn Europeans will spend their working lives paying 75% tax rates 
or retirement and "free" healthcare will simply have to be abolished.' 
Sunday Times News Review. April 11, 2004 p4. 
"Germany has a shrinking economy, an ageing and shrivelling 
population, and potentially catastrophic welfare liabilities." The Daily 
Telegraph. March 30, 2004 p20. 
The construction of current levels of social spending and provision as evolving 
into a practical impossibility due to population ageing, was applied within the sample 
to more specific areas of public policy such as health spending. In the Telegraph 
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health care was described as 'crumbling under the costs of our ageing society,7 while 
one article in the news section of the Guardian stated there are growing signs that 
with an ageing population 'the state is not going to be able to provide all the care, or 
even the necessary funding'. 8 The caring responsibilities of 'working parents' who 
may be squeezed between caring needs for both their own children as well as their 
parents was also cited as a 'demographic tidal wave' affecting the future of social 
provision: 
' ... employers face a demographic tidal wave that is already affecting 
one in four working parents in the US, and says that by 2020 caring for 
elderly relatives will replace looking after children as the dominant 
issue affecting the work-home relationship.' The Daily Telegraph. April 
08,2004 p1. 
The political consequences of population ageing were present as an underlying 
theme in some of the articles analysed. Within the sample, there emerged some 
evidence of a portrayal of older people that run across the popular titles. These stories 
and their use of language, portrayed older people as what might be termed the 
deserving poor, worthy of empathy. There were examples of this genre of story within 
the popular press items within the sample, and in many ways these stories share 
elements of compassionate ageism of the abseiling grannies examples discussed in 
Chapter Two, by the way in which they enfeeble older people as passive victims. 
There are two examples from the Mailand Mail on Sunday below, plus a quote from 
the Express in which the copy speaks of their 'crusade to improve the lives of the 
elderly': 
'They have worked and paid taxes all their lives and now they are 
among the most deprived of the population.' Mail on Sunday February 
22,2004 p27. 
'Pensioners thrown out of care home to make way for criminals'. Daily 
MailMarch 10,2004 p37. 
7 The Daily Telegraph March 22, 2004 pl8 
8 The Guardian April 23, 2004 pS. 
' ... an Express crusade to improve the lives of the elderly. Our aim is 
simple: to ensure that, by the end of the decade, every older person in 
the UK has daily human contact. ' The Express March 15, 2004 p27 
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While 'pensioners' or the 'elderly' may often be victims that deserve compassion, 
the press, perhaps now more aware of the higher levels of political engagement from 
older people, has also started to portray older people as possessing significant levels 
of political influence. The Independent on Sunday proclaimed in one headline 'Why 
Brown is in the Grip of Grey Power' 9 while the Guardian, used 'grey power' the 
impending retirement of '11 million baby boomers', as the explanatory contexts for 
understanding decisions and strategy pursued by senior political figures in the shape 
of Gordon Brown and Charles Kennedy. 10 As is already apparent, some of this power 
is given in recognition of impact of boomers cohort who are about to swell ranks of the 
retired. But, while the boomers are considered to increase the levels of grey power, 
there is some evidence that the press is constructing a different identity for tomorrow's 
'elderly', and considers the boomers to represent a less deserving and more selfish 
older person. These constructions are formulating through new media narratives that 
attempt to generate a perception that the boomers hold the required traits that could 
facilitate the kind of inter-generational conflict envisaged by Kotlikoff or the extreme 
rational choice voting posited by Sinn in order to meet his predictions of selfish 
'gerontocracy': 
'They were the first teenagers and created a bow wave of social 
change through every decade of their lives. At 40, they looked 50. 
And at 50 they invented the facelift. Now, as they hit 60, they are 
about to become a critical force in politics.' The Sun. February 17, 
2004 
'Today's 49 to 55-year-olds represent a "golden" generation with 
more accumulated wealth than any previous age group and a 
greater determination to spend it themselves on retirement rather 
than leave it to their children, according to research.' The Times. 
February 18, 2004 p9. 
9 Independent on Sunday. April4, 2004 p14. 
10 The Guardian. February 19, 2004 p8. 
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Within this theme The Times' Anatole Kaletsky develops an argument that 
directly links with Dalton's 'cognitive mobilisation' and Sinn's selfish rational choice 
older voter discussed in Chapter Three (Dalton 2002; Sinn 2002). Kaletsky does this 
by portraying older people as 'understandably more interested in preserving their 
comfortable lifestyles" than creating the conditions for 'dynamic economies': 
'The quality of life remains pretty good in most of Europe ... especially 
for the older people who ... now dominate politics ... Older Europeans 
are understand- ably more interested in preserving their comfortable 
lifestyles and living off the fat accumulated in the golden years of 
post war growth, rather than creating the conditions for dynamic 
economies in the future ... even if this means saddling future 
generations of taxpayers with unsupportable debts: The Times 
April 1, 2004 p22. 
There was one feature article within the sample that confirmed the kind of 
strategic economic pressures identified by Bergstrom (2001) that is put on press titles 
by the demands of advertisers. In this instance from the Guardian we see some self-
awareness within journalism of the pressures on newspapers and broadcasters to 
meet the needs of advertisers, and in particular, deliver younger more affluent 
readers. Under the headline 'they are wealthy, well educated and watch more 
television than anyone else yet older people are marginalised by most advertisers, 
broadcasters and papers' this story explains strategic decisions taken by Channel4 
and the BBC's digital broadcast outputs in this context of the lower value advertisers 
place on older audiences. It is easy to understand, in these circumstances, how the 
style of writing and editorial content will tend to avoid positive celebrations of ageing, 
especially if this is felt in any way to alienate younger readers: 
'Yet Channel 4, a public service broadcaster, insists on clinging 
desperately to its commercial lifeline by styling itself as a channel for 
the under-50s. More pertinently, the BBC is pouring money into its 
youth network BBC3, when some think a service tailored towards 
converting digital sceptics - older people - would be more appropriate. 
National broadsheet newspapers play down their appeal to older 
people in their dealings with advertisers by stressing their appeal to the 
under-34s: The Guardian Media Section April 12, 2004 p2. 
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Finally, there was some limited evidence of stories that originated from the pro-
active public relations activity of the private sector, which used population ageing as 
the hook for a story, and the rationale for consumers or investors to buy into their 
products. In one example a spokesperson for Virgin Money is quoted as citing an 
'ageing population' with 'no state safety net to fall back on' as a reason to purchase 
some of their financial products. 11 In another example a private healthcare provider 
argues that the NHS is unsustainably 'labouring' under 'an ageing population' as a 
pretext for selling investment prospects in the private sector. 12 
The qualitative analysis provided insightful depth to the quantitative data derived 
from the sample. It demonstrated the presence of the "time bomb" narrative, but also 
some countering discourses that attempted to refute apocalyptic demography. Yet, 
these countering discourses also took the "time bomb" metaphor as a starting point, 
enforcing its success as a frame though which the meanings of ageing are to be 
debated. By 2004 the press had started to portray older voters as holding some 
influence over the conduct of party politics and the electoral implications of the 
impending retirement of the baby boomers was beginning to be contemplated. There 
was an absence of any attempted portrayals of today's retired along the lines of the 
"greedy geezers are taking your inheritance" found in US magazines in the early 
1990s (Walker 1996). However, the existence of narratives which portray the attitudes 
and size of the boom er cohorts as the drivers of inter-generational conflict were 
present in this sample and was showcased by the BBC on prime time television 
during the same period covered by this study. The next section analyses the BBC's 
drama-documentary on inter-generational conflict in more detail. 
11 Sunday Mirror March 7, 2004 p74 
12 Sunday Times Business Section April 4, 2004 pl3 
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Section 5.3 Case Study Analysis - The BSC: Making a Drama Out of a ·Crisis"? 
The BBC programme Il .. The Generations Fall Outwhich was first transmitted 
on March 24 2004 is highly significant as it provided an exceedingly rare flagship 
mass media event devoted to this issue of population ageing - which was broadcast 
during the same time frame as the newspaper sample. As such it provides invaluable 
material for analysis. For this case study a mixture of quantitative and qualitative 
methods were deployed. 
Broadcast on BBC 2 in March and April 2004 - during the same time period as 
the sample of newspaper coverage - 'If' was a five feature series of drama-
documentaries, which was developed, partly, in response to accusations that the BBC 
had been 'dumbing down' its current affairs output. The then director general, Greg 
Dyke, sensitive to this charge that the BBC was failing in its public service duties, 
directed generous financial support towards peak hour viewing that would look at the 
big issues of the day. According to Cox (2004), in an ironic twist, BBC 2' controller, 
Jane Root, only reluctantly agreed to schedule the series at peak viewing time on 
reassurances that the format would not drive away 'women and young' viewers. 
The format chosen for the series was drama-documentary, with a dramatised story 
edited together with factual talking head contributions from various experts. The BBC 
felt previous drama-documentaries based around fictional scenarios to highlight 
potential issues facing society - such as Silent Weapon based on a smallpox epidemic 
- were successful in generating new audiences for current affairs output. Other topics 
in the series were focused on energy shortages (It. .. the lights go out), atu" reversal of 
gender roles (ff... women ruled the world), the consequences of a widening gap 
between rich and poor (ft. .. things don't get better) and how Britain would cope in an 
obesity crisis (/l .. we don't stop eating). 
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The doom-ridden scenario for It .. the Generations Fall Out is that in 2024 'young' 
people will be organising violent demonstrations against rises in NHS and state 
pension spending. The 'young' are disenfranchised feeling that their lives have been 
sacrificed for the 'old'. The overall theme was that the 'costs' of 'supporting' an ageing 
population will push public finances to a 'breaking point' in around 20 years time. 
Governments of the day will be unwilling and/or unable to tackle the 'crisis' because 
electoral politics will be dominated by the interests of the baby boomers, who have 
now retired and are asserting their desires for personal fulfilment. The key issues 
which will be driving up the levels of public spending will be pensions, NHS and other 
long-term care spending. In this scenario, increased spending will almost be entirely 
met by increases in personal taxation. 
For the 'factual' content within the programme a series of 'experts' were used as 
talking heads whose contributions were dipped into in short bursts in-between scenes 
from the drama element. The key contributor was Laurence Kotlikoff. This was 
because the programme was largely based on the paradigm from his 2004 book The 
Coming Generational Storm for looking at the impact of population ageing (Kotlikoff & 
Burns 2004). Kotlikoff is a former economics adviser to the Reagan presidency and a 
conservative Republican. As one of the originators on the concept of generational 
accounting - the calculation of revenue and expenditure by the state for an average 
member of a generation over the life span - he is a legitimate, if highly partisan, 
contributor to a debate of this nature. 
The film gave the viewer scant background detail on the contributors, so additional 
research was required for this project in order to contextualise the editorial selection 
of contributors. The other contributors were: 
:> Professor James Sefton, whose main published work in this field is on 
generational accounting and joint authored with Kotlikoff. 
:> Chet Tremmel from the Foundation for the Rights of Future Generations, an 
organisation primarily based in Germany and concerned with what they call 
. "generational justice". 
156 
:> Paul Wallace, a former journalist on the Economist and the author of Agequake 
a book that tries to predict future ageing trends. 
:> Tom Kirkwood, whose main interests are the evolution and genetics of ageing. 
:> Adair Turner, as chair of the UK Pensions Commission he is a heavy weight 
figure in the current debate on the future shape of the pensions system. 
:> Rosie Boycott, former editor of the Independent, was billed by the programme 
as "writer a nd broadcaster". 
:> Martin Raymond, Part of the Future Laboratory consultancy and author of 
Tomorrow People: Mapping the Needs And Desires Of Tomorrows Customers 
Now. 
:> John Swinburne, elected to the Scottish Parliament standing on the Scottish 
Senior Citizens Unity Party list. 
:> Phil Mullan, a former activist with the idiosyncratic Revolutionary Communist 
Party (RCP) and the author of the Imaginary Time Bomb. 
A core concept which runs through the programme is generational accounting -
very simply a procedure of adding up future spending commitments to future tax 
revenues and seeking out discrepancies. Alongside the accounting was the concept 
of generational fraud - that future public spending cannot be reasonably meet through 
personal taxation of younger workers. 
As would be expected the drama characters are cliche personalities that enable 
the viewer to quickly take on board meaning, without the interference of complexity. 
The NHS consultant is arrogant and egotistical. Indeed, the hospital consultant 
character, who is used to drive the story line on rising NHS costs, is so powerful the 
commentary informs us 'he's making rejuvenate (a new anti-ageing 
treatment)available on the NHS' (paragraph 143). 
The central older person is 'Caroline', she is well-spoken, smartly dressed, healthy 
looking, and mostly obsessing about her appearance whilst looking in a mirror. She is 
a one-dimensional character who revolves around her own personal fulfilment and 
shows little or no emotional intelligence. Caroline's angry young son 'Jack' is the 
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central figure in the young persons' tax rebellion. In a balance of sorts, he is also one-
dimensional and obsessive. However, the audience is clearly invited to sympathise 
with the oppressed younger characters - they may hang out in loft apartments, 
normally a symbol associated with affluence, but in this story, they are exploited and 
downtrodden: 
Narrator: 'In 2024, the young are mobilising. Many grievances are 
driving them to rebel. But one issue overshadows all the others. 
Pensions.' (Appendix One paragraph 85) 
It's possible to reduce this documentary's themes down to a central concern. 
Running throughout is a narrative of finite economic resources and the competing 
claims, in this context from age-based groups in society, for resources. The overall 
impression given by the programme is that in only 20 years time the retired are going 
to be more than just comfortably off. The programme sets this scenario out as 
representing a one-way burden on public spending, but fails to incorporate any of the 
complexity of the wide ranging sources of income for retired people. 
The programme, perhaps naively, focuses heavily on the state pension. In the 
programme synopsis political tensions are increased by a decision to re-link the state 
pension to earnings. A full state pension is already worth much less, around £30 per 
week less for a single retired person, than income support - currently working under 
the title of Pension Credit. Anyone depending solely on their state pension would 
qualify for state benefits, many fail to see any increased income from rises in the state 
pension as it is deduced pound for pound from their benefits entitlement. Furthermore, 
as in the synopsis, the state pension's link to earning is restored in 2024. That would 
mean another 20 years of increases in line with inflation, and 20 further years of the 
state pension declining in relative value. 
A key element in the debate is the use of the Treasury's projections of the 
proportion of GDP allocated to state pension spending. Their projections include a fall 
in costs for short periods, but overall fluctuating around the current 5% of GDP mark. 
The IFS have calculated that Pension Credit will add to this bill and possibly take 
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spending up to 6-7% of GDP by around 2040 (Dornan 2006). These forecasts directly 
contradict the programme synopsis, and they do so because on current policies 
anyone planning to totally rely on state provided income in retirement can only expect 
a very modest lifestyle. Unfortunately, the programme only mentions this forecast 
briefly for it to be knocked down by one of the contributors, Paul Wall ace, who uses 
the argument that governments will always underestimate costs; 'many people looking 
at this just think that the sums don't add up, and that the bill will be much more 
expensive' (paragraph 96). At a stroke the programme privileges the integrity of 
journalists above that of the Treasury and fiscal policy think tanks. It is weaknesses· 
such as these which leads one to suspect that editorially the programme makers were 
interested in big ideas on societal conflicts - even if the scenario was very hard to 
back up with hard facts. 
Another criticism is the programme's failure to incorporate the likely diversity of 
experience in later-life. Future cohorts, are likely to show high levels of income 
inequality, they will also be diverse in attitudes and ethnic or cultural backgrounds. 
The white middle-class consumer orientated boomers that are the focus of the 
programme will be but only one sub section of the retired population. 
A further theme which comes through, although is not explained in any detail, is 
that an ageing country will have a less dynamic economy. One contributor, Phil 
Mullan, is allowed to argue that today it can be seen how increases in productivity can 
potentially soak up a large proportion of any rising costs, Wallace counters this point 
by arguing that an ageing population 'tends to be less enterprising' (paragraph 177) 
and therefore the productivity gains will not be available. 
When considering health and social care the programme develops another 
narrative in which to problematise population ageing. In this narrative an older 
population means rising NHS costs and associated rising social care costs, which are 
exacerbated by changes in family structures and the increase in lone retiree 
households. Furthermore, due to political power of the now retired baby boomers, 
. new anti-ageing, essentially cosmetic products, will be made freely available on the 
NHS. 
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Within the development of this narrative, there is only a stunted discussion of the 
potential impact of the compression of morbidity - that in the future people will live 
longer but have fewer years of chronic illness before death - this issue is raised by 
Mullan, but as elsewhere, this dissenting narrative is dismissed by programme 
commentary (paragraphs 148 and 151) . Disappointingly, for a flagship documentary 
from a public service broadcaster, there is only the bare minimum of diversity of 
perspective is tolerated across nearly an hour of prime-time current affairs output. 
There is no discussion of the possible implication of advance in genetics, or 
alternative scenarios arising out trends already visible today, such a future NHS 
based on means-testing and the rationing of all non-emergency treatments. 
A final, but essential narrative, built up in order to make the plot more believable, 
is the dominant political influence of older voters. In recent times, it can be argued that 
there has been a retreat from the universal welfare state and a belief in the electoral 
popularity oftax cutting agendas. Yet, the programme makers needed to make 
viewers go along with a synopsis where all major parties stood for election on 
platforms which included large increases in welfare spending and income tax rates. 
They did this by creating a scenario where the parties had taved in' (paragraph 164) 
to the interests of the old. 
A wider gap in the programme, and not discussed, or rather quickly dismissed, is 
patterns of inter-generational solidarity. Currently, it can be argued there is a 
reciprocal solidarity of different age-based needs. For example, in surveys younger 
people show high levels of support for increased spending on pensions, something 
they will not benefit from themselves in the short-term. Likewise, older people show 
high levels of support for increased spending on education, again, something they are 
not likely to benefit from directly. An underlying assumption of the programme is that 
this solidarity will melt away 
To better appreciate the tone and messages that the programme delivers, it is 
worthwhile considering the role each contributor is given as the story unfurls. 
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Kotlikoff, Tremmel and Sefton are allowed to set out an ominous scenario, making 
predictions of conflict, and taking a high moral ground in their comments on 
generational justice. Swinburne and Boycott were used in an almost unique way. 
Swinburne was representing pensioner activism, and Boycott was deployed as what 
appeared to be an example of the programme's characterisation of assertive 
boomers. Taken in combination, their contributions were primarily used to back up the 
notion that politically active boomers would wield considerable political power once 
they had retired. 
Kirkwood's contributions, in the analysis of this author, were the most factually 
neutral, and mainly confined to possible trends in human morbidity and mortality. 
Adair Turner's contributions were on the face of it quite measured, but they were 
edited in such a way as to never really contradict the Kotlikoff thesis. The 
contributions from Wallace and Raymond's could be classified as overall neutral, but 
leaning towards 'shockand awe' of the implications of an ageing society, so while 
they were not used in support of the political conclusions drawn by the programme 
, their contributions did reinforce the profound significance of the demographic changes 
. They used dramatic language, for example, from Wallace we get 'seismic', 'quakes', 
'revolution' (paragraphs 6 and 29). From Raymond the viewer received marketing 
industry concepts and hyperbole such as 'in the future ... (the) old (will) be looking bright 
and blonde .. .' (paragraph 63). Mullan, is the only participant whose contributions are 
used to directly challenge the Kotlikoff thesis. 
Figure 5:14 demonstrate the distribution of speaking time between the expert 
pa rtici pa nts. 
Figure 5.14: If. .. The Generations Fall Out Time allocated to each contributor (listed in order of 
appearance). 
Contributor Time Number of Speaking Contributions 
Kotlikoff 2.30 10 
Wallace 3.31 12 
Sefton 1.33 4 
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Tremmel 1.13 5 
Kirkwood 0.29 5 
Turner 2.43 9 
Boycott 0.55 6 
Raymond 2.21 9 
Swinburne 0.44 3 
Mullan 1.00 4 
As a viewer of the programme it was difficult not to receive a persistent and 
strong negative tone regarding the implications of population ageing. To try and 
quantify this assessment the time allocated to each contributor was recorded, and the 
contributors divided into five distinct themes for their contributions. The apocalyptic 
demography of Kotlikoff, Tremmel and Sefton was allocated 5 minutes 16 seconds. 
The more neutral contributions of Wallace, Raymond, Turner and Kirkwood were 
given 9 minutes 4 seconds. The assertive boom er and pensioner in the guise of 
Boycott and Swinburne spoke for a combined 1 minute and 39 seconds. The only 
dissenting voice which rejected the programme's synopsis, Mullan, was allocated a 
mere 1 minute of speaking time - even then Mullan within this allocated 1 minute he is 
put down by the narrator in comments immediately before his first contribution 
'in 2004 not everyone had been so pessimistic. Back then ... one view 
was (author emphasis) that an ageing society could save the NHS 
money'. (paragraph 147) 
Mullan's next contribution is also immediately contradicted by the narrator 
(paragraph 176). In contrast, Kotlikoff's contributions are never contradicted or 
undermined. 
The prominence given to Chet Tremmel, representing what can at best be called 
a fringe political organisation, perhaps tells us more about the editorial agenda of the 
programme than any true reflection of public opinion. Tremmel is allowed to advance 
controversial propositions revolving around 'pampered pensioners' 'stealing the 
future' (paragraph 242). Significantly, Tremmel's contributions can be seen as 
162 
evidence and representative of a mass media discourse, which appeared in the 
content analysis, that continental Europe and Germany in particular, are heading for 
serious political crisis because their welfare states are unsustainable under future 
demographics 
The programmes transmission time was 57 minutes, all the factual contributions 
taken together only come to around 17 minutes. The majority of the content, 40 
minutes, is taken up by the drama component. Although in the analysis the factual 
section was found to be editorially slanted, the drama content is almost one way traffic 
in supporting the Kotlikoff thesis. There are no dissenting fictional characters, they are 
all used to build up a story narrative which supports the notion of a coming 
generational clash. 
Although much of the tone of this programme resonates with some of the articles 
in the newspaper sample, there was only minimal press coverage or comment 
generated by the transmission of this programme. A Lexis search of regional and 
national titles in the period before and after broadcast, produced only 16 hits. Much of 
the coverage was straight recounting of programme synopsis, usually in TV guide 
pages. There were also a small number of reviews which were almost uniformly 
sceptical and targeted the synopsis with sarcastic humour; 'an ugly and diminishing 
programme based on an utterly false idea about the future' (Belfast Telegraph). The 
Times contrasted the programme's vision of retirement as a one long 'golden gap 
year' with unlikely poverty figures in the future. The Glasgow Herald branded the 
programme a; 'crisis out of a tiny drama' and the Guardian an 'Implausible vision of 
2024'. However, although the programme may have been badly received by the TV 
reviewers, it still stands as a bold statement on how to frame an editorial agenda 
around population ageing which other producers and writers can tap into. 
Taken together, the quantitative and qualitative data indicate that population 
ageing infrequently appeared as a lead story, instead it was more usual to see ageing 
incorporated into stories on other areas of public policy. Where population ageing was 
the main theme, the narrative of the 'time bomb' was a central reference point. Some 
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of the neo-liberal interpretations of what population ageing means for politics and 
economics - inter-generational conflicts partly due to constrained opportunities for 
cutting public welfare - have found their way into mainstream broadcasting, such as 
the uncritical acceptance of apocalyptic demography in the BBC It. .. drama 
documentary. As such the programme offered an invaluable snap shot of the kind of 
assumptions that are accepted by opinion forming senior journalists. In the next 
chapters this project investigates how the political parties have interpreted and 
responded to population ageing, including an analysis of the content and narratives 
found in party election materials. 
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Chapter 6 - Charting the Rise and Distribution of the Grey Vote 
6.1 Translating Demographic Change onto the Electoral Map 
This chapter details and analyses the future changes to the electoral map of 
Great Britain that will be generated by population ageing, and represents the first time 
this challenge has been attempted within academic networks. Despite the growing 
interest in this societal transition across public policy and media networks, and its 
implications for the conduct of policy and the democratic process, until now, there 
have been no projective quantitative statistical models available on which to base the 
current debate. 
The political imagination is often infused with impressions of the defining 
demographic characteristics of the parliamentary seats that are contested so keenly 
by the parties seeking power. Currently, these impressions when applied to 
constituencies such as Scarborough or Torbay may elicit images of pleasant coastal 
towns, but they are just as likely to be along the lines of The Guardians online 
constituency single line profile of Torbay ' ... sunny southwest coast resort with many 
pensioners,.13 Scarborough or Torbay may often be defined by their large retired 
populations, but in 20 years time seats in the Rhondda, Bootle, Basildon and 
Sunderland will have the same, or indeed, older, age profiles than the Torbay of 
today. The next general election in 2009 or 2010 will take place in the middle of an 
age transformation of British society, and by 2025 the electoral destiny of most 
parliamentary seats will be settled by older voters who will cast as this research will 
demonstrate over 50% of votes on polling day. 
Demographic changes are transforming the age structure of our society, Britain 
will soon possess an age profile never seen before in its history. According to the 
2001 Census, for the first time ever, there are more people aged over 60 than there 
are children aged under 16. As the population profile ages so does the electoral 
13 (politics.guardian.co.uklhoc/constituency/0,9338,-1374,00.html. Accessed February 2006). 
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register. From the headline numbers the impact is apparent, the retired already 
account for roughly one fifth of eligible voters in the UK. Yet, it is only when the higher 
propensity for older voters to vote is taken into account that it becomes fully apparent 
the scale of the age shift in British electoral politics. The growing ranks of the retired 
have been apparent for some years and the changing age profile was bound to 
influence the conduct of politics, however, it has been the recent, and dramatic, drops 
in turnout amongst younger age groups which has served to both accelerate and 
exaggerate the impact of population ageing. Data from the British Election Study 
(BES) suggests the stark differences in voter turnout between age groups has not 
been a factor until after the 1992 general election. Younger age groups in the 1970s 
showed lower turnout rates, but in subsequent elections their turnout increased 
bringing them into line with the wider electorate. But, this trend seems to have been 
broken in the 1990s, with voters that joined the electorate in this period holding onto 
their lower propensities to vote, and are considerably more susceptible to forces that 
are working to suppress electoral turnout (Clarke at aI2004). 
Much of the analysis in the section refers to the Grey Vote. The definition used 
for the Grey Vote is not restricted to only people who are eligible for state retirement 
benefits, but to all voters aged 55 and over. Work on age and voter behaviour often 
focuses on the post-state-retirement electorate, entirely justified and understandable 
considering the profound social and economic implications of retirement. However, 
ageing, and associated ageing issues do not begin to effect voters the'day after 
retirement. They are, arguably, of life-long concern, however, in the final decade 
approaching state retirement age these issues become increasingly pertinent to the 
concerns and standard of living for voters. For voters aged over 55, ageing issues 
such as retirement income, age discrimination, the quality of health services, long-
term care (particularly for their older parents and relatives) become increasingly 
important. Older age is also a category that is assigned to the individual by others. 
One cross cultural study of young people from 11 nations which asked respondents to 
classify people into "young", 'middle age' and 'older' groups found that Western 
respondents classified people aged 51 and above as 'older' and eastern respondents 
from the age of 52 (Williams & Harwood 2004). 
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The aim of this investigation was to quantify and analyse the changing age 
profile of Parliamentary Constituencies in England, Wales and Scotland. Working on 
the assumption that population ageing would apply unevenly across the geographical 
spread of Westminster seats, this research sought to generate new data on the 
distribution of ageing constituencies. This research is based on a model which utilises 
data on electoral behaviour and population changes to estimate the age breakdown of 
turnout across constituencies and regions for current and future elections. The base 
data for the model is the 2001 Census population figures for Westminster 
constituencies. It utilises sub-national future population projections produced by the 
Office for National Statistics (and the General Register Office for Scotland) to estimate 
the future age profile of the electorate for each region and constituency. The model 
runs on the current 2005 parliamentary boundaries. 
In the UK there is no official data for turnout by age. The most widely accepted 
estimates for turnout by age are the ones produced by MORI's aggregate analysis of 
the election. These figures have been widely used by the Electoral Commission. 
Based on these estimates the model uses these turnout rates for the 2005 election, 
and for key assumptions Le. age differences in turnout remain the same as 2005: 
Scenario Assumption: The Age Gap Remains Constant at 2005 Levels. Estimated 
Turnout by Age in the 2005 General Election: 
18-24 37% 
25-34 49% 
35-44 61% 
45-54 65% 
55-64 71% 
65+ 75% 
The size of the eligible electorate was estimated through the simple calculation 
and inclusion of all people aged 18 or over. The estimates for the 2005 general 
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election are also based on the 2001 data. For data on the size of future electorates 
from 2009 onwards - at national levels GAD and the General Register Office for 
Scotland projections are used. For Westminster constituencies in England, the 
baseline Census data is modified according to the sUb-national population projections 
produced by the Office for National Statistics (ONS). As the ONS only produces 
these projections by local authority units, the percentage change in each age band 
was calculated and applied to the geographically corresponding constituencies. 
Where a constituency boundary overlapped with more than one local authority, the 
percentage change in each age band was weighted according to the proportion each 
constituency was co-terminus with each local authority. For constituencies in Wales 
projections produced. The Statistical Directorate of the National Assembly for Wales 
were used. 
For constituency projections, the model runs on the 2005 parliamentary 
boundaries. The Boundary Commission recommendations for changes in the future 
cannot at this stage be incorporated into the model. During the period in question, the 
overall population of the country will continue to grow, so the size of the average 
population per seat will expand to higher levels than exist at the moment. It may be 
the case that at some point in the future parliament will respond to the increasing size 
of the electorate, these future changes cannot be second guessed, but it is a 
methodological issue worth noting. 
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6.2 Analysis of Results - The 2005 General Election 
The analysis first considered the age breakdown of the turnout in the general 
election of 2005 in order both to assess the current situation and as a baseline in 
which to compare the estimated changes for future elections. 
Turnout and civic participation have emerged as issues of deep political 
concern over the last ten years. Turnout at the last two general elections in 2001 and 
2005 have nose-dived from the levels associated with Britain's post-war democracy. 
The election of 2001 saw a historically low turnout of 59.4%, and the 2005 campaign 
only saw a marginal improvement with turnout rising to 61.3% (Curtice 2005). 
Common to both the 2001 and 2005 elections has been the wide differences in 
turnout rates between younger and older voters. These differences have been long 
established, but at much smaller margins, until the mid-1990s where an age gap in 
participation rates began to be identified (Phelps 2005). 
In recent decades the population of the country has grown, and it is well 
established that a great proportion of this growth has been due to increased longevity. 
According to the Office for National Statistics in the period from 1971 to 2004 the 
percentage of the population aged 65 and over increased from 13 per cent to 16 per 
cent (ONS 2005), but the impact of this growth on the changing electorate is 
magnified by the age differences in electoral participation. So, in 2001 the number of 
people aged over 65 had risen to over 21 % of the eligible voting public, their higher 
turnout levels meant they are estimated to have accounted for 25% of the votes cast 
in England and Wales. Further population ageing, and the widening gap in electoral 
participation rates have ensured a further greying of the active British electorate. 
. The age differences in electoral participation have become part of a growing 
interest in how age and any given voter's position in the life cycle may influence 
behaviour. The campaign of 2005 witnessed much debate on the impact of the Grey 
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Vote, but also consideration of other life stage concepts such as 'School Gate Mums' 
and 'Generation Jones' in segmenting and understanding voter behaviour. 
In the General Election of 2005 this project found that the estimated proportion 
ofturnout made up of voters aged 65 and over is now over a quarter (25.3%) of votes 
cast in England and Wales (See Figure 6.1) The 'Grey Vote'- all voters aged over 55-
accounted for 41.2% of all votes cast. In England and Wales, in contrast, the "youth 
vote" i.e. those aged 18-24 only accounted for 6.6% of the turnout (See Figure 6.2). 
Figure 6.1: Estimated % Age Breakdown of Turnout in the General Election of 2005 in England. 
and Wales . 
Election 2005: Estimated % Age Breakdown of Tumoul in England and Wales 
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Figure 6.2: Estimated % Age Breakdown of Turnout in the General Election of 2005 in England 
and Wales. Shows All Voters age 55+ as single category. 
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The numbers are already quite clear. Even by the last election of 2005 the 
combination of population ageing, allied to the higher turnout levels for older voters 
had already transformed the age structure of the UK electorate. In 2005, there were 
more voters aged over 65 than there were aged under 35. In gross numbers, there 
were an estimated 1.6 million votes cast by the 'Youth Vote' - ages 18-24, a figure 
that pales in comparison to the estimated 10.1 million votes cast bl' Grey Voters. The 
strongest regional variations in the age structure of the turnout came in the South 
West, which had the highest proportion of older voters - 45.3% of the turnout coming 
from the Grey Vote - to London which had the lowest proportion. However, even in 
London approaching one third (32.5%) of the turnout was made by Grey Votes. 
The national and regional data already strongly suggest the numerical 
importance of older voters. The data for parliamentary constituencies shows wide 
local and regional variations within the national picture, and the early emergence of 
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constituencies where older voters formed a majority of votes cast. It is already the 
case in the last general election in 2005, for a significant, and growing, number of 
seats, that the Grey Vote is estimated to account for the majority of votes cast. Figure 
6.3 shows the 24 seats in England and Wales where the Grey Vote accounted for at 
least half all the votes cast - a 'Grey Majority'. Prior to the 2005 election 16 of these 
seats were Conservative and the other eight shared between Labour, the Liberal 
Democrats and Plaid Cymru. 
Figure 6.3: Grey Majority Seats in 2005. Estimated Percentage of Votes Cast by People Aged 55+ in 
the 2005 General Election. The Table shows the 24 seats where the "Grey Vote" was estimated to be 
50% or higher. 
Grey Vote 
Constituency Region 2005 Result 2005 
Christchurch South West Conservative Hold 59.3 
East Devon South West Conservative Hold 58.5 
Conservative gain from 
Harwich East Labour 57.9 
Bexhill & Battle South East Conservative Hold 57.1 
New Forest West South East Conservative Hold 56.8 
North Norfolk East Lib Dem Hold 55.2 
Worthing West South East Conservative Hold 55.2 
West Dorset South West Conservative Hold 53.7 
Eastbourne South East Conservative Hold 52.6 
Totnes South West Conservative Hold 52.4 
Louth & Horncastle East Midlands· Conservative Hold 52.4 
Lewes South East Lib Dem Hold 52.4 
Bognor Regis & 
Littlehampton South East Conservative Hold 52.2 
Chichester South East Conservative Hold 51.7 
Isle of Wight South East Conservative Hold 51.6 
Conservative gain from 
Clwyd West Wales Labour 51.6 
Meirionnydd Nant 
Conwy Wales PC Hold 51.5 
Torbay South West Lib Dem Hold 50.9 
North Thanet South East Conservative Hold 50.9 
Blackpool North & 
Fleetwood North West Labour Hold 50.8 
Suffolk Coastal East Conservative Hold 50.7 
Teignbridge South West Lib Dem Hold 50.5 
Ryedale Yorks and Conservative Hold 50.1 
North West Norfolk 
Humber 
East 
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Conservative Hold 50.1 
A further analysis of the 70 seats with the highest proportion of older voters 
suggests the image of constituencies with the highest number of older voters as being 
predominantly in southern England and Conservative voting, as being not true. 
Geographically, 29 of the 70, approaching half the seats are to be found outside of the 
South/South EasVSouth WesVEast Anglia regions of Southern England. Politically, 
prior to the 2005 election the Conservative party held less than half (32) of these 
seats. Indeed, 20 of these seats were held by Labour before the election. The other 
seats being held by either Plaid Cymru or the Liberal Democrats. So, before the 
campaign of 2005 the majority of seats where the Grey Vote was predominant were 
held by centre/centre left parties. Factual evidence which contradicts the received 
wisdom discussed in Section 3.3 that these seats, because of their older age profile, 
would mainly lean to the right. However, the Conservatives were able to make solid 
advances in these seats in 2005 and made eight gains (five from Labour, three from 
the Liberal Democrats) and now hold 40 of the 70 seats. Although they lost two seats 
in this group to the Conservatives, the Liberal Democrats also gained two, one from 
Labour and one from the Conservatives. 
Figure 6.4: The 70 Oldest Seats in 2005. Estimated Percentage of Votes Cast by People Aged 
55+ in the 2005 General Election. The Table shows the 70 Seats where the "Grey Vote" was 
estimated to be highest. 
Grey 
Vote 
Constituency 2005 2005 Result Region 
Christchurch 59.3 Conservative Hold South West 
East Devon 58.5 Conservative Hold SouthWest 
Conservative gain from 
Harwich 57.9 Labour East 
Bexhill & Battle 57.1 Conservative Hold South East 
New Forest West 56.8 Conservative Hold South East 
North Norfolk 55.2 Lib Dem Hold East 
Worthing West 55.2 Conservative Hold South East 
West Dorset 53.7 Conservative Hold South West 
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Eastbourne 52.6 Conservative Hold South East 
Totnes 52.4 Conservative Hold South West 
East 
Louth & Horncastie 52.4 Conservative Hold Midlands 
Lewes 52.4 LibDem Hold South East 
Bognor Regis & Littlehampton 52.2 Conservative Hold South East 
Chichester 51.7 Conservative Hold South East 
Isle of Wight 51.6 Conservative Hold South East 
Conservative gain from 
Clwyd West 51.6 Labour Wales 
Meirionnydd Nant Conwy 51.5 PC Hold Wales 
Torbay 50.9 Lib Dem Hold South West 
North Thanet 50.9 Conservative Hold South East 
Blackpool North & Fleetwood 50.8 Labour Hold North West 
Suffolk Coastal 50.7 Conservative Hold East 
Teignbridge 50.5 Lib Dem Hold South West 
Yorks and 
Ryedale 50.1 Conservative Hold Humber 
North West Norfolk 50.1 Conservative Hold East 
West 
West Worcestershire 49.7 Conservative Hold Midlands 
St.lves 49.7 Lib Dem Hold South West 
Brecon & Radnorshire 49.7 Lib Dem Hold Wales 
Truro & SI. Austell 49.6 LibDem Hold South West 
Lib Dem gain from 
Westmorland & Lonsdale 49.5 Conservative North West 
Poole 49.5 Conservative Hold South West 
East 
Boston & Skegness 49.4 Conservative Hold Midlands 
Conservative gain from 
Torridge & West Devon 49.3 Lib Dem South West 
Conservative gain from West 
Ludlow 49.2 LibDem Midlands 
South port 49.1 LibDem Hold North West 
South Thanet 49.1 Labour Hold South East 
North Cornwall 49.0 Lib Dem Hold South West 
Carmarthen East &'Dinefwr 49.0 PC Hold Wales 
Waveney 48.9 Labour Hold East 
West 
Leominster 48.8 Conservative Hold Midlands 
North Devon 48.8 Lib Dem Hold South West 
Yorks and 
East Yorkshire 48.7 Conservative Hold Humber 
Conservative gain from Yorks and 
Scarborough & Whitby 48.7 Labour Humber 
Arundel & South Downs 48.7 Conservative Hold South East 
Fylde 48.7 Conservative Hold North West 
South Dorset 48.5 Labour Hold South West 
Vale of Clwyd 48.5 Labour Hold Wales 
Conservative gain from 
Monmouth 48.5 Labour Wales 
North Dorset 48.4 Labour Hold South West 
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Carmarthen West & South 
Pembrokeshire 48.4 Labour Hold Wales 
South East Cornwall 48.3 Lib Dem Hold South West 
Bridgwater 48.1 Conservative Hold South West 
Caernarfon 48.1 PC Hold Wales 
East Worthing & Shoreham 48.1 Conservative Hold South East 
Ynys Mon 48.0 Labour Hold Wales 
Wells 47.9 Conservative Hold South West 
Wirral South 47.9 Labour Hold North West 
Great Yarmouth 47.8 Labour Hold East 
East 
South Holland & the Deepings 47.8 Conservative Hold Midlands 
Morecarnbe & Lunesdale 47.7 Labour Hold North West 
Folkestone & Hythe 47.7 Conservative Hold South East 
Falmouth & Camborne 47.7 Lib Dem gain from Labour South West 
Conservative gain from 
Preseli Pembrokeshire 47.7 Labour Wales 
Conservative gain from 
Weston-Super-Mare 47.6 Lib Dem South West 
Conwy 47.4 Labour Hold Wales 
Bournemouth West 47.4 Conservative Hold South West 
West 
Aldridge-Brownhills 47.3 Conservative Hold Midlands 
Gower 47.3 Labour Hold Wales 
Llanelli 47.3 Labour Hold Wales 
South West Norfolk 47.2 Conservative Hold East 
South Norfolk 47.2 Conservative Hold East 
While some seats are already characterised by a predominance of older 
voters, the Grey Vote has reached significant levels in the majority seats in Britain. 
For the election of 2005, the data estimates that the Grey Vote accounted for at least 
one third of the votes cast in all but 53 seats, and voters aged 65+ accounted for at 
least a quarter of the turnout in 311 seats in England and Wales. As would be 
expected the table below, which lists the 50 seats with the highest estimated numbers 
of voters aged 65+ is broadly similar to the table ranking seats by voters aged 55+. In 
18 of these seats the "pensioner" vote accounts for one third or more ofthe votes 
cast. 
Figure 6.5: Seats in 2005 with the most "pensioner" voters. Estimated Percentage of Votes 
Cast by People Aged 65+ in the 2005 General Election. The Table shows the 20 Seats where 
the proportion was estimated to be highest. 
I Constituency I Turnout I Region I 2005 Result 
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2005-
Voters aged 
65+ 
Christchurch 41.5 South West Conservative Hold 
East Devon 40.6 South West Conservative Hold 
Harwich 40.4 East Conservative gain from 
Labour 
Worthing West 40.1 South East Conservative Hold 
Bexhill & Battle 39.9 South East Conservative Hold 
New Forest West 39.2 South East Conservative Hold 
Eastbourne 37.4 South East Conservative Hold 
North Norfolk 36.1 East Lib Dem Hold 
Bognor Regis & 35.9 South East Conservative Hold 
Littleham[lton 
West Dorset 35.8 South West Conservative Hold 
Lewes 35.3 South East Lib Dem Hold 
North Thanet 34.6 South East Conservative Hold 
Chichester 34.4 South East Conservative Hold 
Clwyd West 33.8 Wales Conservative gain from 
Labour 
Totnes 33.7 South West Conservative Hold 
Suffolk Coastal 33.6 East Conservative Hold 
Torbay 33.6 South West Lib Dem Hold 
Blackpool North & 33.4 North West Labour Hold 
Fleetwood 
Poole 33.2 South West Conservative Hold 
Isle of WiQht 33.1 South East Conservative Hold 
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6.3 Analysis of Results - Projecting Future Elections 
As expected the data produced for the next 20 years showed further step 
increases in the size of the Grey Vote as the first baby boomer cohorts start to reach 
retirement age. As we shall see the rate of growth is unevenly distributed with faster 
increases in parts of the midlands and north not currently associated with older 
populations and in the Celtic nations. In contrast some inner-city areas are projected 
to go in the other direction and hold smaller proportions of older voters. 
For 2009, in England and Wales, the key headline Grey Vote figure, or all votes 
cast by people aged 55 and over, is estimated to rise a further 2.1 % in 2009 to 43.3%. 
This represents an additional 1.2m votes to be cast by older voters if a general 
election were to take place in 2009. This figure is estimated to rise to nearly half of all 
votes cast by 2025 at 49.9%, or an additional 4.4m votes - roughly the current total 
population of Norway - cast by older voters. (See Figure 6.6) 
Figure 6.6: The Rising Proportion of Older Voters in England and Wales. Estimated % Age 
Breakdown of Turnout in General Elections from 2001 to 2025 in England and Wales. 
England & Wales: Estimated Age Breakdown of Voter Turnout 
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For Scotland, the pace of change is a little quicker. There were slightly fewer 
voters, in comparison to England and Wales, aged 65+ in 2005 (24.9%) but this figure 
rises to 33.7% in 2025. In 2005 the Grey Vote in Scotland represented 44.2% of the 
turnout, but by 2025 this figure is projected to rise to 53.9%. 
Overall, the impact of the further growth of the Grey Vote in 2009 is partially 
offset by an increase in the number of eligible voters aged 18-24 - an additional 
700,000 potential young voters in England and Wales. However, future ONS 
projections suggest the size of new voter cohorts will reduce again further into the 
data's time scale. 
After 2009, the proportion of older voters takes a step increase of around 2% at each 
staging post through to 2025. By 2025, assuming 2005's turnout rates, the estimated 
number of voters aged 65+ comprise about one third of the voting public. A little lower 
in England (30.9%), but more than a third in Scotland (33.7%) and Wales (34.4%). 
Taking all voters aged 55+, by 2025 the Grey Vote is estimated to make up one half of 
all the votes cast, 49.9% in England, and up beyond half of all votes to 53.9% in 
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Scotland. The Grey Vote in Scotland and Wales is predicted to become a Grey 
Majority by passing 50% of votes cast by 2020. The accelerated age shift in Scotland 
is partly explained by the relatively larger decreases in the number of voters aged 
between 35 and 54, starting in the decade between 2010 and 2020. 
Figure 6.7: Changes in the Age Profile of Voter Turnout: Scenario One: Age Gap in Turnout 
Remains Constant at 2005 Levels 
England and Wales 
2005 2009 2013 2020 2025 
18-24 6.6 7.1 6.9 6.1 5.8 
25-34 14.8 12.8 13.2 13.3 12.6 
35-44 19.2 18.6 16.5 15.3 15.9 
45-54 18.2 18.2 19.1 17.8 15.7 
55-64 15.9 17.6 16.8 18.1 18.8 
65+ 25.3 25.7 27.5 29.5 31.1 
55+ 41.2 43.3 44.3 47.6 49.9 
England 
2005 2009 2013 2020 2025 
18-24 6.6 7.1 6.9 6.1 5.8 
25-34 14.9 12.9 13.3 13.4 12.6 
35-44 19.3 18.7 16.7 15.3 16.0 
45-54 18.2 18.3 19.1 17.8 15.8 
55-64 15.8 17.6 16.7 18.1 18.8 
65+ 25.2 25.5 27.3 29.3 30.9 
55+ 41.3 43.1 44.0 47.4 49.7 
Wales 
2005 2009 2013 2020 2025 
18-24 6.4 7.2 6.9 6.0 5.6 
25-34 12.9 11.3 12.1 12.2 11.4 
35-44 18.0 16.7 14.6 13.9 15.0 
45-54 18.4 17.9 18.3 16.6 14.6 
55-64 16.9 19.0 18.0 18.7 19.0 
65+ 27.3 28.0 30.0 32.6 34.4 
55+ 44.2 47.0 48.0 51.3 53.4 
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Scotland 
2005 2009 2013 2020 2025 
18-24 6.7 7.0 6.7 5.8 5.5 
25-34 14.1 11.7 12.1 12.0 11.2 
35-44 19.7 17.8 15.3 13.9 14.5 
45-54 18.5 19.4 19.8 17.4 14.9 
55-64 16.1 18.1 18.2 19.9 20.2 
65+ 24.9 26.0 27.9 30.9 33.7 
55+ 41.0 44.1 46.1 50.8 53.9 
The data reveals variations in the changing age profile of the English regions. 
In 2009, a possible date for the next general election, all regions with the exception of 
London are estimated to have a larger Grey Vote than the national figure. The Grey 
Vote in the North East and East regions is around 2% higher than the national 
average, however with a projected Grey Vote of 48.2% by the next election, the South 
West region stands out as the earliest to experience the transition to the kind of age 
structure which will be the norm in much of the country in future elections. 
By the year 2025, if the age gap in turnout remains at 2005 levels, every region 
in England, with the exception of London, is projected to have a Grey Majority. 
Indeed, by 2025 the South West and North East are projected to have more than one 
third of votes cast by voters aged 65 and over. The East and East Midlands are within 
touching distance of this one third milestone at 33.1 and 32.9%. (See Figure 6.10) 
Figure 6.10: Regional Variations on the Future Grey Vote: Changes in the Age Profile of Voter 
Turnout in the regions of England. 
North East 
65+ 
55+ 
North West 
Age Gap Remains 
Same 
2009 2025 
26.7 
45.3 
34.2 
54.1 
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65+ 25.9 31.6 
55+ 43.9 51.0 
Yorkshire & the Humber 
65+ 26.0 31.7 
55+ 43.9 50.8 
East Midlands 
65+ 26.2 32.9 
55+ 44.7 52.6 
West Midlands 
65+ 26.4 31.7 
55+ 44.2 51.0 
East 
65+ 26.9 33.1 
55+ 45.2 52.0 
London 
65+ 18.7 20.7 
55+ 32.5 37.3 
South East 
65+ 26.6 31.9 
55+ 44.2 50.7 
SouthWest 
65+ 29.3 35.6 
55+ 48.2 54.9 
As already reported, in 2009, the most likely year for the next general election, 
there is a small incremental increase in the number of older voters aged 65+, with a 
bigger increase in the number of voters aged 55-64. The small increase is partly 
accounted for by the increase in new and first time voters aged 18-24. The model 
calculates that there will be over 670,000 additional voters aged 65+ eligible to vote in 
2009 in England and Wales, in comparison to the 2001 census figures. There will be 
close to an additional1.7m voters aged 55+. Taking into account turnout levels these 
figures translate into an estimated additional1.25m Grey Votes that will be cast in an 
election in 2009. 
Behind the national picture of a small incremental increase in the Grey Vote, 
there are pronounced local variations. In 448 seats the Grey Vote increases. In 61 
seats the Grey Vote remains unchanged from 2005 or decreases by a small degree of 
around of one per cent or less. In 59 seats the Grey Vote decreases by more than one 
percent. 
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Within the overall picture of population ageing, it is worth noting changes in 
some inner city seats where the Office for National Statistics forecasts some quite 
profound shifts in age composition. The London Borough of Barking is a good 
example of where an increase in young and first time voters makes a significant 
impact. There is an increase from 7822 eligible voters in the 18-24 age bracket from 
the 2001 census to 8917 on the 2009 population projections. There is also a decrease 
in the eligible voters aged 65+ from 10745 in 2001 to 9348 in 2009. The London 
Borough of Tower Hamlets is an example of another urban change predicted by the 
ONS. For this borough they project a decline in both the number of young and retired 
voters, but project a big increase in middle age ranges. Therefore the data estimates 
that the seat of Bethnal Green and Bow in 2009 will see falls of around 1,000 voters 
in both the 18-24 and 65+ age brackets, and a increase of 8,000 more eligible voters 
in the 35-44 age bracket. 
Figure 6.11: Estimated Changes in the age structure of the seats of Bethnal Green and Bow 
and Barking 2005-2009. 
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Urban constituencies also figure prominently in the list of the 20 seats where 
the Grey Vote decreases by the greatest amount in the period between 2005 and 
2009. (See Figure 6.12) 
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Figure 6.12: Constituencies with the largest decreases in the number of voters aged 55+ 2005-
2009. 
Constituency 
Cities of London & 
Westminster 
Bethnal Green & Bow 
Cambridge 
Regenfs Park & North 
Kensington 
Dagenham 
Barking 
Manchester Withington 
Islington South & Finsbury 
Park 
Manchester Blackley 
Islington North 
Hove 
Eltham 
Manchester Central 
Nottingham South 
Manchester Gorton 
Kensington & Chelsea 
Hampstead & Highgate 
Brighton Pavilion 
Putney 
Greenwich & Woolwich 
Change in 
Grey Vote 
2005-2009 
-5.3 
-5.3 
-4.8 
-4.3 
-3.9 
-3.6 
-3.5 
-3.5 
-3.4 
-3.4 
-3.3 
-3.3 
-3.3 
-3.2 
-3.2 
-3.2 
-3.1 
-3.0 
-3.0 
-2.9 
In contrast to the changes for some inner city seats, elsewhere in the country 
the ageing of the electorate is set to continue at a rapid pace. Harwich, on the Essex 
coast, is a highly marginal seat that the Conservatives gained from Labour in the 2005 
election. In the 2005 election it is estimated that voters aged 65 and over already 
account for 40.4% of the turnout, in 2009 this is set to rise moderately to 40.9%, but 
by 2025 the figure is projected to jump to 47.9% of the electorate - with all voters aged 
55+ projected to account for a huge 68.1 % of votes cast in a 2025 general election. 
Figure 6.13 below visually presents the size and growth of the Grey Vote in Harwich. 
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Figure 6.13: "Super" Grey Seats: Estimated % Age Breakdown of Turnout in General Elections from 2005, 
2009 and 2025 in the constituency of Harwich. 
Changing Age Structure of Turnout in Marginal Harwich 2005-2009-2025 
Harwich Total 65+ 
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There are 29 seats in England and Wales which are projected to see increases 
of over five per cent in the size of the Grey Vote between this year and an election 
year of 2009. These are widely distributed across the regions. However, it is worth 
noting the rapid growth in many northern seats, and in seats away from the traditional 
coastal retirement towns (Figure 6.14). 
Figure 6.14: Constituencies with the largest increases in the number of voters aged 55+ 2005-
2009. 
Constituency 
Castle Point 
South Staffordshire 
Redditch 
Grey Vote 
Increase 
2005-2009 
6.8 
6.8 
6.7 
Grey 
Vote 
2009 
52.0 
50.8 
42.7 
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Blyth Valley 6.4 45.8 
Tamworth 6.4 43.5 
Berwick Upon Tweed 6.3 53.8 
Wyre Forest 6.2 50.5 
Torridge & West Devon 6.1 55.4 
Hexham 6.0 52.9 
Maldon & East 
Chelmsford 5.9 49.6 
Westmorland & 
Lonsdale 5.7 55.2 
Bosworth 5.7 47.6 
Mid Worcestershire 5.6 49.1 
Congleton 5.5 47.8 
Totnes 5.4 57.8 
West Derbyshire 5.3 51.0 
East Hampshire 5.3 49.7 
South West Devon 5.3 49.3 
Vale of York 5.3 48.8 
Staffordshire 
Moorlands 5.3 49.1 
Huntingdon 5.3 43.1 
Hereford 5.2 50.6 
Skipton & Ripon 5.2 51.6 
South Suffolk 5.1 51.8 
Grantham & Stamford 5.1 48.5 
Stafford 5.1 47.6 
Barrow & Furness 5.0 49.5 
Redcar 5.0 49.3 
High Peak 5.0 46.5 
Suffolk Coastal 4.9 55.6 
Louth & Horncastle 4.9 57.3 
Scarborough & Whitby 4.9 53.6 
Ludlow 4.9 54.1 
Forest of Dean 4.9 49.5 
Welling borough 4.9 45.2 
Chorley 4.9 44.7 
East Yorkshire 4.8 53.5 
Leominster 4.8 53.6 
Halton 4.8 45.4 
Brigg & Goole 4.7 49.3 
Rutland & Melton 4.7 48.2 
North Warwickshire 4.7 46.4 
North Norfolk 4.6 59.8 
Harrogate-& 
Knaresborough 4.6 48.5 
Workington 4.6 50.1 
Witney 4.6 46.0 
Rayleigh 4.6 46.7 
Devizes 4.6 45.4 
TheWrekin 4.6 44.1 
North East Hampshire 4.6 43.5 
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Figure 6.15 lists the 50 constituencies projected to have the largest proportion 
of Grey Voters in an election held in 2009. In the section on the 2005 election it was 
noted that 24 seats were estimated to have passed the landmark of having over 50% 
of the turnout made up of Grey Voters. All 50 seats will comfortably have more than 
one half of votes cast by older voters, with a total of 76 parliamentary seats projected 
to hold Grey Majorities by 2009. East Devon and Christchurch have the highest 
proportions at 61.9% and 61.4% respectively putting these constituencies in the 
position of moving towards a striking two thirds of turnout comprised of Grey Voters. 
Figure 6.15: Grey Majority Seats in 2009. The 50 Constituencies projected with the highest 
number of Grey Voters in 2009. 
Constituency Grey Vote 
2009 
East Devon 61.9 
Christchurch 61.4 
Harwich 60.7 
New Forest West 60.7 
Bexhill & Battle 60.0 
North Norfolk 59.8 
West Dorset 58.1 
Totnes 57.8 
Louth & Horncastle 57.3 
Worthina West 55.7 
Suffolk Coastal 55.6 
Torridae & West Devon 55.4 
Westmorland & Lonsdale 55.2 
Lewes 55.1 
Bognor Regis & 54.7 
Littlehamoton 
Chichester 54.6 
Teianbridae 54.5 
Ryedale 54.2 
Ludlow 54.1 
North West Norfolk 54.1 
Eastbourne 53.8 
Isle of WiQht 53.6 
Leominster 53.6 
Boston & Skeaness 53.6 
Scarborough & Whitby 53.6 
East Yorkshire 53.5 
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Clwyd West 53.4 
Torbay 53.4 
Poole 53.4 
Meirionnydd Nant Conwy 53.2 
Stlves 53.2 
West Worcestershire 53.1 
North Devon 53.0 
Waveney 52.9 
North Dorset 52.9 
Hexham 52.9 
South Dorset 52.7 
South East Cornwall 52.6 
North Thanet 52.4 
North Cornwall 52.4 
Truro & St. Austell 52.3 
Bridgwater 52.3 
Arundel & South Downs 52.2 
Great Yarmouth 52.1 
Castle Point 52.0 
Wells 51.8 
South Suffolk 51.8 
Sout~ort 51.6 
South West Norfolk 51.6 
Mid Norfolk 51.6 
As would be expected, demographic data shows a further ageing of the 
electorate in the period from 2005 to - a highly possible date for the next general 
election - 2009. The increase in the proportion of older voters is slightly offset by a 
larger than normal intake of first time voters. But, none the less, another significant 
ageing of the electorate is taking place. In terms of net numbers, the data estimates, 
if voters aged over 55 maintain the 2005 turnout rate, there will be an additional 1.3 
million votes cast by Grey Voters in a 2009 election in comparison to 2005. Over Y, a 
million of these votes will be 'new' pensioners (Figure 6.16). 
Figure 6.16: Estimated age breakdown of turnout in a 2009 general election. 
2009 Turnout % 
Age Gap Remains· 
Britain (Not Ine NI) 
Constant (Change 
from 2005) 
Total 18-24 7.1 (+0.5%) 
Total 25-34 12.7 (-2.0%) 
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Total 35-44 18.5 (-0.8%) 
Total 45-54 18.3 (-0.1%) 
Total 55-64 17.7 (+1.8%) 
Total 65+ 25.7 (+0.4%) 
Total 55+ 43.4 (+2.2%) 
Appendix Four shows that the very 'oldest" seats are currently more likely to 
represented by the Conservative Party. However, Figure 6.17 shows the rapid age 
transformation of constituencies in regions away from the south coasts of England. 
Half of the ten seats with the largest projected rises in the size of the Grey Vote are 
currently Conservative held. It is also worth noting some of the seats that are ageing 
the quickest are located in North East or the Midlands. 
Figure 6.17: The 10 seats estimated to have the fastest growing Grey Votes in the period 2005-
2009. 
Rise in Grey Vote 
from 2005 to 2009. 
Constituency 2005 Status Age Gap Constant. 
Castle Point Conservative Hold 6.8 
Redditch Labour Hold 6.7 
South Staffordshire Conservative Hold 6.8 
Tamworth Labour Hold 6.4 
Blyth Valley Labour Hold 6.4 
Wyre Forest Others Hold 6.2 
Berwick Upon 
Tweed Lib Dem Hold 6.3 
Torridge & West Conservative gain from 
Devon Lib Dem 6.1 
Maldon & East 
Chelmsford Conservative Hold 5.9 
Hexham Conservative Hold 6.0 
The model shows that by 2025 the ageing of the electorate is set to be 
dramatic. The number of votes cast by people aged 65+ is set to increase by 5.8%, 
and the size of the Grey Vote will rise by 8.7%. In 2025 it is estimated that 295 of the 
seats in England and Wales will have a Grey Majority i.e. where voters aged 55+ 
account for 50% or more of the votes cast. This means most seats (52%) will have a 
Grey Majority. 
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One noticeable trend in the constituency level data is what might be called the 
'age stretch'. In 2005 the there is a 34% difference between the constituencies with 
the highest and lowest levels of older voters. By 2025 this figure stretches to 46%. It 
appears the age differences between different constituencies is widening, and may be 
worth further consideration of the implications. By the year 2025 the rise in the Grey 
Vote is having a dramatic impact on the electoral personality of a number of seats. 
The seats with the highest number of older voters, see Table Eleven, are now pushing 
towards nearly 7 out of 10 votes cast coming from voters aged 55+. 
Figure 6.18: The 50 seats with the highest estimated proportion of votes cast by people aged 
55+ in 2025. 
Constituency Estimated Grey 
Vote % in 2025 
1 East Devon 69.4 
2 North Norfolk 68.8 
3 New Forest West 68.5 
4 Harwich . 68.1 
5 Christchurch 68.1 
6 West Dorset 67.4 
7 Bexhill & Battle 67.4 
8 Totnes 66.6 
9 Louth & Horncastle 66.2 
10 Westmorland & Lonsdale 65.7 
11 TorridQe & West Devon 64.5 
12 Suffolk Coastal 64.1 
13 Hexham 63.3 
14 Ludlow 63.3 
15 Teignbridge 63.3 
16 East Yorkshire 63.2 
17 Leominster 63.0 
18 Scarborough & Whitby 62.9 
19 Ryedale 62.7 
20 Bognor Regis & Littlehampton 62.7 
21 Boston & Skegness 62.5 
22 North West Norfolk 62.1 
23 Worthing West 62.0 
24 South Staffordshire 61.9 
25 Chichester 61.9 
26 South East Cornwall 61.7 
27 South Dorset 61.6 
28 Lewes 61.6 
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29 North Dorset 61.3 
30 Isle of Wight 61.3 
31 Bridgwater 61.1 
32 Eastbourne 61.1 
33 Gainsborough 61.0 
34 Torbay 60.9 
35 Great Yarmouth 60.7 
36 North Devon 60.7 
37 Haltemprice & Howden 60.5 
38 Hereford 60.5 
39 West Worcestershire 60.4 
40 West Derbyshire 60.2 
41 Waveney 60.2 
42 South port 60.0 
43 Skipton & Ripon 60.0 
44 Stone 59.9 
45 Mid Norfolk 59.9 
46 St.lves 59.9 
47 Arundel & South Downs 59.8 
48 Redcar 59.7 
49 Barrow & Furness 59.7 
50 Wells 59.7 
The analysis also considered the age profile of the most marginal seats based 
on the results of the 2005 election. In particular seats held by the Labour Party. With 
a majority in the House of Commons from the 2005 election of 65, the loss of 33 seats 
in a 2009 election would translate into a loss of that majority in the Commons for the 
Labour government. As can be seen from Figure 6.19 below, there are a number of 
ultra marginal Labour seats (majorities of less than five per cent and fairly marginal 
seats (majorities of less than 10%) where there are large proportions of older voters. 
If the age gap in turnout were to remain constant at 2005 levels four of these seats 
are projected as having a majority of votes cast by older voters. Additionally, there are 
33 Labour held marginal seats where the Grey Vote is projected to be higher than 
43.8%. This data clearly suggests that the behaviour of older voters in these seats 
could be highly critical in determining the outcome of the next election. With only one 
exception, Ynys Mon, all these seats are Labour-Conservative battlegrounds, 
suggesting that in Labour's Grey Marginals it is the Conservative Party who are the 
clear challengers. 
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Figure 6.19: The Estimated Size of the Grey Vote in a 2009 Election in 33 Labour-Held 
Marginal Seats. 
Constituency Grey Post-2005 Marginality Post-2005 
Vote Battleground 
2009 Status 
South Dorset 52.7 Ultra marginal: majority 2005 It Lab-Con seat 
4.99% 2005 
Great Yarmouth 52.1 Fairly marginal: maj 2005 5.0- Lab-Con seat 
9.99% 2005 
South Thanet 51.5 Ultra marginal: majority 2005 It Lab-Con seat 
4.99% 2005 
Wirral South 50.7 Fairly marginal: maj 2005 5.0- La b-Con seat 
9.99% 2005· 
Ynys Mon 49.7 Ultra marginal: majority 2005 It Lab-PC seat 
4.99% 2005 
Carmarthen West & South 49.6 Fairly marginal: maj 2005 5.0- Lab-Con seat 
Pembrokeshire 9.99% 2005 
Dumfries and Galloway 49.6 Fairly marginal: maj 2005 5.0- La b-Con seat 
9.99% 2005 
Brigg & Goole 49.3 Fairly marginal: maj 2005 5.0- Lab-Con seat 
9.99% 2005 
Conwy 49.2 Fairly marginal: maj 2005 5.0- La b-Con seat 
9.99% 2005 
Staffordshire Moorlands 49.1 Fairly marginal: maj 2005 5.0- Lab-Con seat 
9.99% 2005 
Hastings & Rye 48.3 Ultra marginal: majority 2005 It La b-Con seat 
4.99% 2005 
Tynemouth 48.0 Fairly marginal: maj 2005 5.0- Lab-Con seat 
9.99% 2005 
Stroud 47.8 Ultra marginal: majority 2005 It Lab-Con seat 
4.99% 2005 
Wirral West 47.7 Ultra marginal: majority 2005 It La b-Con seat 
4.99% 2005 
Stafford 47.6 Ultra marginal: majority 2005 It Lab-Con seat 
4.99% 2005 
Cleethorpes 47.5 Fairly marginal: maj 2005 5.0- La b-Con seat 
9.99% 2005 
High Peak 46.5 Ultra marginal: majority 2005 It Lab-Con seat 
4.99% 2005 
Gedling 46.5 Fairly marginal: maj 2005 5.0- Lab-Con seat 
9.99% 2005 
South Ribble 46.3 Ultra marginal: majority 2005 It La b-Con seat 
4.99% 2005 
Wansdyke 46.1 Ultra marginal: majority 2005 It Lab-Con seat 
4.99% 2005 
City of Chester 45.8 Ultra marginal: majority 2005 It La b-Con seat 
4.99% 2005 
North West Leicestershire 44.9 Fairly marginal: maj 2005 5.0- Lab-Con seat 
9.99% 2005 
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Nuneaton 44.9 Fairly marginal: maj 2005 5.0- La b-Con seat 
9.99% 2005 
Broxtowe 44.6 Ultra marginal: majority 2005 It Lab-Con seat 
4.99% 2005 
Stourbridge 44.6 Ultra marginal: majority 2005 It Lab-Con seat 
4.99% 2005 
Ochil and South Perthshire 44.5 Ultra marginal: majority 1997 It Lab-SNP seat 
4.99% 2005 
Selby 44.3 Ultra marginal: majority 2005 It La b-Con seat 
4.99% 2005 
Pendle 44.3 Fairly marginal: maj 2005 5.0- Lab-Con seat 
9.99% 2005 
Elmet 44.2 Fairly marginal: maj 2005 5.0- La b-Con seat 
9.99% 2005 
Calder Valley 43.9 Ultra marginal: majority 2005 It Lab-Con seat 
4.99% 2005 
Sittingbourne & Sheppey 43.9 Ultra marginal: majority 2005 It La b-Con seat 
4.99% 2005 
Warrington South 43.8 Fairly marginal: maj 2005 5.0- Lab-Con seat 
9.99% 2005 
The Labour-Conservative Grey Battleground 
In the first past the post system a large proportion of seats are considered safe, 
where the incumbent would only be unseated by abnormally high swings against, 
therefore attention of the media and political strategists alike is given over to the 
marginals, the seats where the gaps between the first and second placed candidates 
last time around is narrow enough to mean the seat could potentially be lost by the 
incumbent if relatively small swings in public opinion are favourable to the 
challengers. It is natural to focus on the marginals as they are pivotal in determining 
whether the incumbent government will hold onto power in the House of Commons. 
Within the electoral calculus of First Past the Post any grouping of marginal seats that 
can be argued to share certain key demographic characteristics become of enhanced 
strategic interest for campaigners. Therefore, in this context it was potentially 
significant that the analysis identified the emergence of what could be described as a 
Labour-Conservative marginal Grey seats battleground. 
The Conservatives made little progress amongst the Grey Vote in 2005. Their 
vote share remained unchanged amongst the baby boomers (55-64 age group), and 
they only managed to increase vote share by 1 % amongst voters aged 65+. The 
Liberal Democrats added 4% to their national vote share, but only improved by 1 % 
amongst voters aged 65+ (Figure 6.20). 
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However, one consequence of the 2005 election is that Labour, while it 
performed relatively well, or relatively less badly, with the pensioner vote, in that its 
vote share fell by a smaller degree that their average national loss, there are now a 
number of marginal seats where Labour would be vulnerable to further swings against 
them from Grey Voters. There are 27 seats which look of particular strategic interest 
in this regard. All of them were Labour gains in the landslide of 1997, and in all of 
them, it is the Conservatives who are challenging in second place. 
Firstly, there are 12 ultra marginal seats i.e. majorities from 2005 of less than 
5%, where the estimated Grey Vote under the scenario of the age remaining constant, 
will be higher than 44.6% of turnout (Figure 6.20). In this scenario in two seats, it is 
estimated there will be a Grey Majority: 
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Figure 6.21: Labour Held Seats from the 2005 General Election with Majorities of less than 5%, 
with estimated Grey Votes of over 44.6% under scenario where age gap in turnout widens. All 
gained by Labour in 1997. All with Conservatives in second place. 
Ultra Marginal 
Majorities of Les 
than 5% and with Grey 
over46%GV Vote. Region Swing in 2005 
4.3% Lab to 
Stourbridge 44.6 West Midlands Con 
3.6% Lab to 
Broxtowe 44.6 East Midlands Con 
6.7% Lab to 
City of Chester 45.8 North West Con 
3.8% Lab to 
Wansdyke 46.1 South West Con 
1.9% Lab to 
South Ribble 46.3 North West Con 
3.9% Lab to 
High Peak 46.5 East Midlands Con 
3.7% Lab to 
Wirral West 47.7 North West Con 
3.4% Lab to 
Stafford 47.6 West Midlands Con 
4.3% Lab to 
Stroud 47.8 South West Con 
2.9% Lab to 
Hastings & Rye 48.3 South East Con 
1.5% Lab to 
South Thanet 51.5 South East Con 
1.7% Con to 
South Dorset 52.7 South West Lab 
There are also 10 Labour seats that are fairly marginal, with a majority between 
5 and 10% in the election of 2005, but have considerable estimated Grey Votes of 
46.5% or over in 2009. These are 
Gedling 46.5 
Cleethorpes 47.5 
Tynemouth 48.0 
Brigg & Goole 49.3 
Staffordshire Moorlands 49.1 
Conwy 49.2 
Dumfries and Galloway 49.6 
Carmarthen West & South Pembrokeshire 49.6 
Wirral South 50.7 
Great Yarmouth 52.1 
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Finally, there are five Labour held seats: Dover; Morecambe & Lunesdale; Vale 
of Clwyd; Blackpool North & Fleetwood; and Waveney which although fairly safe with 
majorities between 10 and 15%, all have estimated Grey Votes in 2009 of very close 
to or over 50%, and as such will be more vulnerable to significant swings amongst this 
age group. 
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Section 6.4 Summary of Results 
The election of 2001 saw a historically low turnout of 59.4%, and the campaign 
in 2005 only saw a marginal improvement to 61.3%. Common to both elections has 
been the wide differences in turnout rates between younger and older voters. These 
differences have been long established, but at much smaller margins, until the mid-
1990s where a rising age gap in participation rates began to be identified. The 
combination of population ageing, allied to the higher turnout levels for older voters 
has accelerated the transformation the age structure of the UK electorate. 
In the General Election of 2005 the research found that the estimated 
proportion of turnout made up voters aged 65 and over is now over a quarter of votes 
cast in England and Wales. The 'Grey Vote' - all voters aged over 55 - accounted for 
41.2% of all votes cast. In England and Wales, in contrast, the 'youth vote' i.e. those 
aged 18-24 only accounted for 6.6% of the turnout. In 2005, there were more voters 
aged over 65 than there were aged under 35. In gross numbers, there were an 
estimated 1.6 million votes cast by the 'Youth Vote' - ages 18-24, a figure that pales 
in comparison to the estimated 10.1 million votes cast by Grey Voters. As discussed 
in Section 3.2 the significance of the non-voting of cohorts who have entered the 
electorate in the late 1990s/early 2000s is in the idea that an individual's attitudes and 
behaviours are likely to be forged by the dominant influences experienced as a young 
adult. 
In the election of 2005 the strongest regional variations in the age structure of 
the turnout came in the South West, which had the highest proportion of older voters -
45.3% of the turnout coming from the Grey Vote - to London which had the lowest 
proportion (32.5%). 
Analysis of the 70 seats with the highest proportion of older voters suggests 
that the image of constituencies with the highest number of older voters as being 
predominantly in southern England and naturally Conservative voting, if ever true, is 
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certainly no longer a robust correlation now. As was demonstrated in Section 3.3 
there is a range of opinion that assumes the ageing process heightens the individual's 
propensity to be politically conservative. Geographically, in 29 of the 70 oldest seats, 
approaching half of them are to be found outside of southern England. Politically, 
prior to the 2005 election the Conservative party held less than half (32) of these 
seats. Around 8% of all seats contested at the last election changed hands. 10 of the 
70 Grey Majority seats changed hands - 14% - marking them as being more likely to 
have swung from one party to the other than the average. On this small sample at 
least lies a contradiction of any assertion that a predominance of older voters results 
in non-volatile electoral politics. 
By the time of an election in 2009 or 201 0 the Labour government's Grey 
Marginals will become more apparent. There are a number of ultra marginal Labour 
seats (majorities of less than five per cent and fairly marginal seats majorities of less 
than 10%) where there are large proportions of older voters. Four ofthese seats are 
projected as having a majority of votes cast by older voters, and overall there are 33 
Labour held marginal seats (which if lost would deprive Labour of its Commons 
majority) where the Grey Vote is projected to be higher than 43.8%. With only one 
exception, Ynys Mon, the 33 Labour Grey Marginals with highest proportion of Grey 
Voters are Labour-Conservative battlegrounds. 
. 
In 2009 the Grey Vote will increase in the great majority of seats. However, 
ONS projections suggest some inner city seats will see a decrease in the Grey Vote. 
Seats with the largest projected increases in the Grey Vote are spread across the 
country, and mostly away from the coastal retirement towns already associated with 
possessing large numbers of older voters. Age Stretch: the age difference between 
the 'youngest' and 'oldest' seats is noticeably wider by an election in 2025. In 2005 
the there is a 34% difference between the constituencies with the highest and lowest 
levels of older voters. By 2025 this figure stretches to 46%. 
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When projecting the models into the further future the data found in England 
and Wales, that the key headline Grey Vote figure, or all votes cast by people aged 55 
and over, is estimated to rise a further 2.1 % in 2009 to 43.3%. This represents an 
additional 1.2m votes to be cast by older voters, from the 2005 baseline, if a general 
election were to take place in 2009. This figure is estimated to rise to nearly half of all 
votes cast by 2025 at 49.9% - or an additional4.4m votes - roughly the current total 
population of Norway - cast by older voters. By the year 2020 the Grey Vote in 
Scotland and Wales is predicted to become a Grey Majority by passing 50% of votes 
cast by 2020. 
By the year 2025, if the age gap in turnout remains at 2005 levels, every region 
in England, with the exception of London, is projected to have a Grey Majority. The 
model shows that by 2025 the ageing of the electorate is set to be dramatic. The 
number of votes cast by voters aged 65+ is set to increase by 5.8%, and the size of 
the Grey Vote will rise by 8.7%. In 2025 it is estimated that 295 of the seats in 
England and Wales will have a Grey Majority i.e. where voters aged 55+ will account 
for 50% or more of the votes cast. This means most seats (52%) will have a Grey 
Majority. 
As has already been established in earlier chapters age, and a voter's position 
in the life cycle, has become a strong predictive indicator of a voter's propensity to 
vote and be active in civic politics. In combination with population ageing the higher 
levels of electoral participation by older people magnifies and accelerates the age 
transformation of British politics, The trends of previous generations to increase their 
levels of electoral participation as they age are by no means certain to be applied to 
younger cohorts today (phelps 2005). This raises the prospect that these cohorts, and 
the new cohorts who enter the electoral over the next decade, will always have 
participation rates below those of previous generations. Consequently, locking in, and 
accelerating, the age transition of the electoral market. In an increasingly grey 
electorate valence issues - where there is broad agreement amongst older voters of 
an issue's importance such as pensions or social care - will become pivotal in 
influencing electoral outcomes (Stokes 1992). If in 10 to 15 years time approaching 
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300 members of parliament will be elected as legislators based on constituencies 
where the majority of active voters are grey voters, any discernable perceptions 
amongst those older voters that a candidate or party will perform more efficiently in 
policy areas of high valence will be highly significant. These are predictable changes 
to politics in Britain, and a potentially enticing electoral award is available to any major 
party which can re-orientate itself to be the beneficiaries of the age transformation. 
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Chapter 7 - Mediating the Grey Vote - the UK General Election Campaign of 2005 
A core concern for this research is to seek out how population ageing, and the 
manner in which it has been mediated, is influencing the conduct of democratic 
politics and elections. The political communications activities of the main parties will 
present important evidence on how ruling elites are seeking to mould society's 
response to the policy challenges presented by an ageing population. The content 
generated by the need to communicate with voters - either through the mediated 
channels of the press and broadcasting, or through more direct channels such as 
face-to-face, direct mail and on line communications - present useful windows on how 
parties are framing the key ageing issues, the narratives they are developing, the 
language deployed, their targeting of sub-groups and their conceptualisation of what 
later life and retirement means, not least as a basis for justifying and allocating state 
resources toward older people. 
This chapter will provide in depth content and strategic analysis of how the 
media and the political parties portrayed older voters and ageing issues in the general 
election of 2005. It will do this through an analysis of the narratives and imagery used 
by the parties in their election communications cross-referenced with press 
commentary on the conduct of the campaign. Chapter Six demonstrated the 
transformative rise of the grey vote across a large proportion of Westminster seats. In 
an election held in 2009 there will be 125 seats where they grey vote will account for 
more than half of the votes cast, in another two or three elections' time there will be 
close to 300 seats where the outcome will be determined by this new 'Grey Majority'. 
The demographics strongly suggest an imperative for political parties to strategically 
re-orientate towards the greying electorate. Political communications may have been 
expected in the 2005 general election to show early indicators of this shift, but has 
been seen in Chapter Two there are other factors which might pull the parties into 
other directions. In particular, the kind of pressures identified by Bergstrom and 
Carrigan and Szmigin on the press and advertisers to disassociate their brands from 
older consumers, and how in turn this influences the thinking of political strategists 
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who hold close links to these industries and their norms (Carrigan & Szmigin; 
Bergstrom 2001). But, also the ideological influence of the neo-liberal narratives of 
population 'time bombs' and generational conflict over rising welfare spending urging 
the political elite to abandon the European Social Model, as well as the residual levels 
of ageism that still inform much social and cultural discourse. There also remained the 
possibility that the political parties would adopt discursive elements of the Third Age 
movement's attempts to recast and reconstruct the meaning of later life as an 
opportunity and place emphasis on contribution, fulfilment and engagement. 
As will be seen as this chapter progresses, the 2005 campaign in its early 
stages included a stream of articles in the national press that portrayed the grey vote 
as possessing electoral power, as well as predictions of the main parties taking 
extensive action to cultivate older voters. In fact, the early or 'phoney' campaign 
included some key exchanges as the Conservatives launched specific initiatives 
aimed at older voters that drew a significant response from Gordon Brown in his last 
Budget before the general election was formally declared. The analysis of the content 
of the main parties' campaigning materials identifies the deployment of multiple 
discourses and narratives by the parties. Depending on the issue context, the parties 
use variations on language and discourses that dip into repertoires of the 'elderly', of 
the' pensioner' as well as more upbeat active ageing language and approaches that 
framed ageing issues in more age-neutral terms. There are also indications that 
political and media discourses on the consequences of population ageing are at odds 
with each other, and this chapter includes examples of where elite journalists clash 
with high profile politicians over the framing of the policy implications of ageing. This 
elite dissonance implies, at least a partial rejection by political parties of the adoption 
of the assumptions behind apocalyptic demography and inter-generational conflict 
into some media framing. 
The contents of this chapter are largely based upon an analysis of a sample of 
political communications outputs produced by the main political parties in the run up 
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to polling day on May 5, 2005. The project undertook to monitor and collect relevant 
materials that were identified over the course of the campaign. All the main 
manifestos were included in the sample as were specific speeches or documents 
aimed at older people and ageing issues. In addition to the thematic analysis of the 
election materials produced by the main parties, the research also monitored media 
coverage of the campaign for reports that specifically considered older voters or the 
parties' attempts to court their electoral favour. The same Lexis Nexis database with 
the same set of newspaper titles and content as the earlier population ageing analysis 
was searched for all articles that included either the phrase 'older voters' or 'grey vote' 
over a period stretching from just before the launch of the campaign proper on March 
1st until a week afterthe election date May 12th , in order to capture both the pre-formal 
campaign assessments in the press of party strategies and any post-mortems in the 
immediate aftermath. A further search of 'pensioners' and 'election' was undertaken to 
widen the pool of available articles. This enabled some informative cross-
comparisons on the varying manners in which the media and the political parties 
framed the issues at hand. The key items within the sample included: 
Produced by the Labour Party 
New opportunities for later life manifesto for older people 
Full Manifesto Britain Forward not Back 
Web site: 'What is Labour doing for older people?' 
March health policy document 
February council tax briefing 
Atiack document: 'Tory quotes on pensions' 
Rebuttal statement of Conservative pensions plans Feb 22 
Web site: Statement by Alan Milburn on pensions 
Web site: Statement by Patricia Hewitt on pensions 
Web site: Statement by Alan Johnson launching pensioners' manifesto 
Labour activists guidebook 
Sunday Times story - 'Blair's pension offer to mothers' - evidence of placed story 
Produced by the Conservative Party 
Full Manifesto: Are you thinking what weTe thinking? Its time for action. 
Older People Manifesto 
Press ad February 2005. 
Action for pensioners leaflet 
Web site Attack document: 'Labours secret pensions 'tax' agenda 
Michael Howard Northampton speech 
Produced by the Liberal Democrats 
Full Manifesto 
Women manifesto 
Pre-election manifesto 
Older People manifesto 
February pensions policy brief 
Autumn 2004 pensions policy paper 
Press release launching older people manifesto 
We oppose we propose poster on ageing issues 
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Section 7.1 The Phoney Election Campaign 
The 2005 general election was held on May 5 and was announced by Tony 
Blair exactly one month earlier on April 5. This calendar month may have presented a 
neat and tidy fence around what might be defined as the 'election campaign'. But to 
. do so would have ignored the permanent aspects of political campaigning that are 
now widely considered as a continuous cycle rather than four yearly set piece events 
(BlumentahI1982; Sparrow & Turner 2001). The campaign of 2005 certainly saw 
significant political campaign activity in the three months prior to April 5 where parties 
outlined new policy commitments, sought to frame issues and managed adjustments 
in their strategic political positioning - not least in regard to ageing issues and the 
courting of older voters. This pre-election period may sometimes be referred to as 
'phoney' campaigning, but many of the key developments took place in this period. 
Indeed, in recent elections party manifestoes rarely include 'surprise' commitments as 
voters are given longer periods of time to digest parties' positions and pOlicies. The 
Conservative Party were the first major party to pro-actively and explicitly campaign 
for the grey vote, these initiatives were responded to directly by Labour and formed 
the basis of a strand of press commentary that presents grey power as an actuality 
rather than a potential future outcome. 
The Conservatives made older voters a central plank of their pre-election 
campaigning. On February 17 party leader, Michael Howard, made a key note 
speech titled 'A better life for Britain's pensioners' in Northampton. In this speech 
Howard heaped general praise on older people for their 'service' to the country and 
through their role as family carers. He made a specific attack on the increasing 
proportion of retired people who had been brought into the means testing system for 
allocating income benefits on the grounds that they were a disincentive to save for 
younger people and an affront to the 'dignity' of older voters. Howard used the 
speech to make several policy announcements; to increase the state pension by £7 a 
week for single pensioners; reduce the number of retired people on means tested 
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benefits; to abolish the requirement that people with private pensions are forced to 
buy an annuity at the age of 75; and 'free' long-term care after three years for people 
who have paid for their own residential care. On the face of it putting forward 
moderate increases to the state pension as a central plank in the party's appeal to 
older voters was an atypically conservative initiative. However, it can be seen in the 
light of the wide consensus critical of Brown's means testing as positioning the 
Conservatives within a tent that included both the TUC and the CBI, without 
necessitating the foregrounding of longer term, and electorally less popular, 
Conservative objectives of shifting retirement incomes away from the state pension 
toward private provision. 
The Conservatives immediately followed the Wednesday speech by placing full 
page adverts in Howard's name with the strap line 'I believe Britain's pensioners 
deserve better' in the Sunday Telegraph, the Sunday Express and the Sunday Times 
and pre-announcing pledges to use income generated from 'efficiency savings' to cut 
council tax for households with at least one pensioner resident by up to £500 a year. 
In a strong sign of the electoral importance of older voters the Conservatives in this 
. announcement had allocated over a quarter of their funds designated for tax cutting 
within their shadow budgets to pensioner households. Alongside the Conservative 
'leaks' of their Monday announcement on Council Tax and the full page advert, the 
front page of the same edition of the Sunday Timeswas headlined 'Blair's pension 
offer to mothers' in a story that claimed Labour were planning to 'significantly boost' 
women's pensions. At this stage of the pre-campaign ageing issues and older voters 
were attaining high prominence as election issues, although they were never to 
dominate election exchanges for any prolonged period of time. 
If the significance of older voters is to be at least partly measured by the 
prominence allocated to their concerns by the parties in their pro-active campaigning, 
then that significance may be reinforced if both major parties actively compete over 
the same ground. To this extent, the emerging salience of the grey vote to UK 
elections may have been confirmed by Labour's response to the Conservative Party's 
pre-election campaigning on ageing issues by using the media coverage of the 
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Gordon Brown's last Budget of the Parliament to respond directly to Conservative 
initiatives. Coming quickly after Labour were able to at least temporarily neutralise the 
possibility of industrial action by some of the major unions on proposed changes to 
public sector pensions, the Budget placed older voters at the heart of Brown's final 
flourish in his speech, in the sure knowledge this is the section most likely to be re-
broadcast on that evening's news programmes. Brown announced new measures on 
subsidised transport for older people, above inflation increases to Pension Credit, the 
abolition of cuts to state pensions for longer hospital stays as well as a Council Tax 
'rebate' of £200 for pensioner households. The 'rebate' required a high level of 
credulity to believe this was a purely policy based decision as the measure was 
temporary and only valid for that election year. The Budget measures were followed a 
week later by Labour's launch of its older voters manifesto' new opportunities for later 
liff!, with the close proximity to the Budget certainly allowing for a reinforcement in 
voters' minds of the messages and policies announced by Brown. 
The early campaign initiatives by the Conservatives and the direct response 
from Labour in Gordon Brown's pre-election Budget was widely covered in the press 
who, overall, portrayed both the Conservatives' push for the grey vote and Brown's 
budget as possessing high levels of electoral efficacy through their clear offer of fiscal 
gains for older voters. The media largely portrayed the Conservative PartY's push for 
the grey vote in February as well-targeted and likely to go down well with older voters. 
A Daily Telegraph headline on February 22 decreed 'Howard's pledge on council tax 
is winner with pensioner vote,14 and other titles also backed up this claim. The Sun 
reported Howard as offering "£1K for Oldies"15 and The Times claimed the 
Conservatives had 'stolen a march on Labour in the battle for the grey vote.'16 
Some commentators attributed the perceived success of the Conservatives' 
campaign initiatives as being in some way rooted in eliciting responses from a natural 
political conservatism discussed in Chapter Three amongst older voters. Peter Riddell 
14 'Howard's pledge on council tax is winner with pensioner vote'. The Daily Telegraph. February 22, 2005. 
IS '£ IK For Oldies'. The Sun, February 23, 2005. 
16 Tories woo grey vote with tax cut. The Times, February 22, 2005. 
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of the Times portrayed older voters as 'natural' Tory supporters whose support was 
being strengthened without elaborating on which elements of Conservative ideology 
may logically resonate with people who find themselves in the life stage of retirement 
and later life. Riddell referred to older voters as 'pensioners' perhaps suggesting an 
allusion to their social-economic status as being the key driver in leaning towards the 
Conservatives 17. Riddell's Timescolleague Mary Ann Sieghart also agreed that the 
Conservatives were 'on a roll' with older voters, but not through any social-economic 
reasoning, but rather through a successful appeal based on values, arguing that 
Conservative language of 'duty' and 'responsibility' was more likely to resonate with 
older voters. Sieghart's viewpoint wasn't backed up by any kind of evidence and so in 
the process of drafting this copy clearly expected that readers would share and accept 
the idea that concepts of duty have an electoral meaning - and that the meaning of 
duty and responsibility are particularly popular with people in later life: 
'The Tories are on a bit of a roll with the elderly. They know how to use 
the right language: words such as 'values', 'duty' and 'responsibility' 
resonate. Mr Howard's introduction begins: 'How a country treats the 
older generation is a test of its values: And it goes on: 'Many served this 
country in its greatest hour of need, preserving liberty, freedom and 
Britain's independence for future generations. We should never forget the 
contribution they have made -and continue to make -to our society." The 
Times, February 25, 2005. 
The assessment that the Conservatives were doing well in the pre-election 
campaign was shared across politically partisan reporting lines. This manifested itself 
into public anxiety for explicitly Labour supporting commentators such as Paul 
Routledge in the Mirror, who was personally convinced of the importance of older 
voters, and demonstrated an obvious exasperation with what he called Blair's 'young 
country' obsession. Routledge also correctly identified that Labour were waiting to use 
the Budget as the main vehicle for their response and fight back: 
'Perhaps the government's sweetener for women pensioners is being 
held back until March 15, when Gordon Brown unveils his pre-election 
Budget. If so, that is a mistake. Older voters - who are twice as likely to 
go to the polls as the 18-255 - feel deeply let down by Tony Blair and his 
17 'Never mind the policies, this is all about the turnout'. The Times, February 22, 2005. 
'young country' obsession.' Paul Routledge. The Mirror, February 25, 
2005. 
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Routledge's prediction of the Budget's role in Labour's response to the 
Conservative's grey campaigning was backed up by Anne Ashworth in The Times 
who wrote on February 26 that she expected Brown 'to produce some sweeteners to 
counter the challenge from the Conservatives for the grey vote.' As has already been 
seen, Gordon Brown's last Budget of the parliamentary term was eventually 
presented on March 16 included a number of high profile measures targeted at older 
voters. This was certainly the conclusion drawn by a number of commentators in the 
national print media, who portrayed the Budget as a direct response to the pre-
election initiatives taken by the Conservative Party. The Independent reported that 
'Labour and the Tories are locked in a heated battle for the all-important grey vote."8 
The Times summarised the connections made in the reporting between the Budget's 
measures and strategies for securing the grey vote: 
'The Chancellor pitched for the grey vote in an electioneering Budget 
containing carefully targeted tax cuts worth £ 1.5 billion in the coming 
year and £ 1.1 billion the following year ... Mr Brown's moves in a 50-
minute Budget, the shortest of modern times, delighted Labour MPs 
unnerved by the faltering start to Labour's campaign and the Tories' 
moves to win the grey vote with their promise of halving council tax bills.' 
The Times, March 17,2005. 
The front pages of The Herald and the Daily Telegraph on the morning after 
show the impact of the press framing of Brown's Budget as being, in large part, an act 
of electoral strategy targeted at older voters. Both front pages portray the Budget as a 
unidirectional transfer of resources from the government to the 'grey vote'. The 
Heralds headline is 'The grey vote giveaway' while the Telegraph chose 'Pay day for 
the grey voter'. The strap lines and sub-headlines give the impression that the transfer 
is of considerable value, but the language deployed appears keen to undermine the 
fiscal credibility of the Budget measures for older people via the use of 'handouts' and 
'sweeteners' - which chip away at the economic seriousness of the measures in a 
direction which suggests to readers a degree of electoral frippery by the Chancellor. 
18 'Brown Budgets for the Grey Vote'. The Independent, March 17, 2005. 
208 
The content analysis from Chapter Five on population ageing in the national press, in 
harmony with other key studies such as Groombridge (1999) found that although age 
and ageing frequently appear in newspaper copy they rarely dominate any given 
day's news agenda. The election of 2005 demonstrates that in a political context 
population ageing can and does have the potential to become a dominant theme 
within certain periods of the news cycle. However, this would appear, currently, to be 
a sporadic rather than constantly dominant theme. The Graphic below reproduce the 
Budget front pages of the Herald and Daily Telegraph and demonstrate the 
prominence of their grey vote narrative in reporting the story: 
Figure 7.2: The Herald's front page report on the 2005 Budget: ' The Grey Vote Giveaway. ' 
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Figure 7.3: The Daily Telegraph's front page report on the 2005 Budget: 'PayDay forthe Grey 
VoteI'. 
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The pre-campaign focus on older voters by the Conservatives and Labour's 
high profile response was interpreted as an indicator of the significance of the grey 
vote by the press, and this narrative would be reiterated as the campaign moved 
closer to polling day. From the analysis there emerged a somewhat settled 
acceptance of the importance of older people in the electoral process who were, as a 
group, categorised as possessing ·power'. This nature of this power was not 
articulated to any depth but was almost always considered to be derived through a 
combination of the large number of older voters, and that this section of the electorate 
was growing in proportion and because of their higher turnout levels. The press 
coverage demonstrated a universal acceptance of the electoral significance of older 
voters - when they were the subject of discussion - and there were no dissenting 
voices within the coverage. If older voters were so powerful and so critical to the 
outcome of the 2005 general election it should be expected that the press coverage of 
the grey vote to be high profile, voluminous and consistent? Perhaps, but newspaper 
consideration of older voters in this sample could hardly be argued to constitute 
saturation coverage. In fact it was more a case of several flurries of interest and 
occasional opinion pieces. In the period of the most intense campaigning and 
210 
saturation media coverage of the election between April 1 and polling day on May 5, 
the analysis only found 22 articles that contained the terms 'older voters' or 'grey 
vote'. The majority of articles in the sample came from outside this period. If older 
voters were as important to the outcome of the election as they were portrayed then 
should this have been reflected in much higher levels of coverage and consideration. 
Below are several examples of press coverage that confidently proclaims the power 
and importance of older voters: 
'With many observers expecting the 'grey vote' to play a deciding role in 
the election next month, council tax discounts could become one of the 
most important battlegrounds.' Laura Milne The Express, April 6, 2005. 
'Getting younger readers is the Holy Grail of newspaper publishing. It's 
an impossible task, which is why you have to cling on to your older, loyal 
readers ... lt's just the same for politicians and they may be getting a harsh 
reminder of that in the forthcoming General Election ... It's simple. Young 
people don't vote. Old people do. And there are more old people than 
ever before.' Harry Blackwood. Mail on Sunday, April 3, 2005 
'When Gordon Brown this week raised Labour morale with a flurry of 
budget benefits aimed at older voters, he was acknowledging the growing 
power of the 'grey vote' at election time ... There are 11 million pensioners 
in Britain, more every year, and - unlike the young - they are highly 
reliable voters .. .' Michael White. The Guardian, March 18,2005 
The examples above show that the power of older voters was also attributed to 
their higher levels of electoral participation which were directly contrasted to the less 
interested sections of younger voters. That the large and growing numbers of older 
voters directly translates into political power resembles Sinn's gerontocracy 
hypothesis (2002) and needs the necessary assumption that older voters share the 
same, or similar, assessment of their social-economic needs and interests and will 
vote accordingly. This narrative requires the playing down of diversity and 
heterogeneity within the ranks of the grey vote as well as requiring a rather 
deductionist electoral arithmetic for predicting the campaign's outcome. 
Although the 'grey power' narrative found within the British media in 2005 could 
be construed as a positive development in that it represented a clear move away from 
previous more disempowering portrayals of older people, it was, none the less, devoid 
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of sophistication, of any recognition of the differing, or indeed competing, social-
economic position of various sub-groups within the ranks of the nation's retired 
population. A person's position within the class system during their time when they 
were eligible for participation in the labour market, in most instances is frozen in 
retirement as people who were on lower incomes do not have the option of re-entering 
the labour market to boost their incomes, nor do they possess the capital or savings 
resources to draw upon for investment, 'rainy days' or intra-family support. 
Furthermore, medical research suggests health inequalities between rich and poor 
widen further after retirement (Chandola at al 2007). But the extent to which the 
income poor in later life fare differently to those with more generous occupational 
pensions, saving and capital assets, are ignored by the narratives of 2005. Older 
voters may have been homogenised into the grey vote when the press discussed 
political strategy, but, as will be seen in the next section, there was significant 
variation in the narratives and language used by the parties and press alike to 
describe older people and ageing issues dependent on the issue context. 
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Section 7.2 Campaign Communications (1) - Discourses of the Elderfy 
Section 7.1 has demonstrated the high profile of the explicit campaign 
initiatives targeted at older voters by the main parties in the very early stages of the 
2005 election. During this period national press coverage was content to label these 
exchanges as evidence of the actuality of grey power. A key component to this 
research has been the identification of how societal ageing is being narrated and 
framed by both the national news media and the main political parties in order to 
better understand current and future adjustments to the age transformation. As such 
this thesis accepts the mediation of ageing will by degree shape the social and 
political responses. Fairclough (2000) argues political differences have always been 
constituted in variations in language and the competing discourses seek to secure a 
position of dominance. Competing narratives do not only seek dominance but can 
also be seen as part of a process of negotiation, persuasion and the creation of 
legitimacy (Chilton 2004). 
The next sections of this chapter detail how the analysis of the campaign 
identified three distinct discourses for debating ageing issues and the position of older 
people that were dependent on the issue or values context of the text. These 
discourses ranged from the traditional compassionate ageism centred around talk of 
'the elderly', through to the more economically situated discourses of 'pensioners' and 
the contractual language used to jUstify the major party consensus that additional 
state spending should be allocated to older people. 
The analysis of communications materials produced by the parties themselves, 
as will be seen, found the word elderly was only used to a limited extent, and when 
deployed was frequently associated with health and care issues. In contrast the press 
coverage of the campaign, in both tabloid and broadsheet, used the word elderly 
frequently and across all areas of policy. In the two examples below from the Times 
and the Telegraph we see the intriguing use of the phrase the elderly' which appears 
to, all be it compassionately, other older people in a manner that would not be 
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accepted for other groups in society - i.e. 'the Muslims' or 'the blacks' - and aligns 
political advocacy on ageing issues as being conducted on behalf of older people and 
not the empowered social agency of by older people: 
'Labour has made the £ 200 rebate the centrepiece of its efforts to woo 
the 'grey vote'. Launching the party's policies for the elderly yesterday .. .' 
The Daily Telegraph March 24, 2005, 
' ... But the package, which will cost nearly £ 1.5 billion, was dismissed as 
'gesture politics' by campaigners for the elderly .. .' The Times, March 17, 
2005 . 
This language fits with the Chapter Five findings that when considering 
population ageing and ageing issues in general the mainstream media tap into a 
repertoire of negative stereotyping. In a promising contrast the main political parties 
demonstrated a greater sensitivity to their use of language in regard to older people 
as well as a reluctance to draw upon the negative stereotyping associated with 
discourses of the elderly - even if that reluctance was inconsistently applied. Articles 
within the sample used the word elderly consistently across all types of reporting 
genres and within all subject areas. Press usage of elderly provided a noticeable 
contrast with the restricted usage of the word and its associated discourses in the 
controlled content put out by the main political parties. 
In the communications outputs of the political parties there was no one single 
pattern of language that was consistently applied to older voters. This suggest parties 
were clearly conscious of older people as actors who needed addressing as 
evidenced by the targeted communications that were produced. But, there was an 
absence of a single unified grammar to describe older voters. Instead, the analysis 
found a series of over-lapping constructions and discourses in which the construction 
of the older voter was dependent on the policy or rhetorical context. There was only 
limited use of 'elderly' and its associations with physical and mental decrepitude. If 
the political communications materials in the sample had conformed to a construction 
of benign ageism, then it might have been expected to see older voters understood 
within the discourses as being naturally structurally dependent. However, the use of 
the word elderly can still be argued, from this data, as signifying a rather 
214 
disempowering portrayal of the older person. The political parties used elderly as a 
signifier of fragility' and weakness in the context of crime - where the older person 
could be a victim of crime or living in fear of crime - as well as in discussions of social 
care where it was used to emphasise dependency. The Conservative Party, with 
limited frequency, used the word elderly in what might be thought of as its traditional 
context. Take, for example, the following extract from Michael Howard's key note 
speech in Northampton on older people. 
'We will end the situation where the elderly are forced to sell their homes, 
saying goodbye forever to their independence as they go into residential 
care.' 
'Many pensioners have become prisoners in their own homes - too 
frightened of yobs and muggers to go out even during the day. 
'Thousands of elderly patients - people who have worked hard all their 
lives - have to wait in pain for operations.' 
Source: Michael Howard Speech. February 17 2005. 
In the first paragraph we see the use of elderly as a device for emphasising 
weakness. The elderly are 'forced to sell their homes' implying the older person is in 
a less powerful position than the external agency which is doing the forcing. Elderly in 
this paragraph is also used in conjunction with the concept of independence, or more 
pertinently an idealised personal independence which has its mirror condition of 
dependence. In the discourse of these passages within the speech the elderly person 
is portrayed as being both passive and powerless. The second paragraph does not 
use the word elderly, but it does come directly after the paragraph on residential care 
which has already fulfilled the function of framing this section of the speech. In this 
paragraph we see an emphasis on fear where an image is conjured up of older people 
disengaged from society and too frightened to go out 'even during the day'. The third 
paragraph selected does its communicative work in a similar vein by pulling together 
'elderly patients' in close association with pain and waiting. Pain provides an 
emphasis on physical inability and the waiting portrays the older person as lacking the 
capacity for social action or potential empowerment. When analysing data such as the 
Michael Howard speech it is important to understand the functionality of the copy that 
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is developed and delivered. The speech needs to find rhetorical devices that can 
ensure impact and maximise audience reception. So, while it is not surprising that the 
rhetoric is tempted down the road of utilising dependency repertoires that often 
incorporate the word elderly - it can lead to an inconsistent application of values or 
aspirations. 
The use of the word elderly is largely absent from the key documents published 
by the Labour Party analysed within the sample. But, again, although elderly was only 
used on a few occasions, including a direct challenge to the negative connotations of 
being considered elderly, it was still deployed within the pattern of elderly signifying 
and magnifying images of weakness or pity. For example, the word elderly only 
occurs once in the Labour's Party's manifesto for older people. It appears in a section 
headlined: Choice and quality in support for older people' within the following 
paragraph: 
'Too often older people find that when they need services the most, the 
state does not allow them to make choices. No longer should there be 
some point where people go from being respected adults, treated as 
being able to make choices and lead their own lives, to elderly people in 
need of the care, and because of this assumed to be incapable of 
deciding things for themselves.' 
Source: Labour Party 2005 manifesto for older people 
This paragraph is an apparent rejection of the negative connotations of 
discourses of the excluded, disempowered and othered 'elderly'. The copy takes 
elderly as signifying a post-transformative stage in later life where a person has lost 
their agency to make choices' and is transformed into being assumed to be 
incapable of deciding things for themselves. ' The text appears to accept the criticisms 
of the use of the word elderly advanced within this publication. It provides a textual 
clue in explaining the absence of the word elderly in the vast majority of materials· 
produced by Labour covering ageing issues and later life. But the content of this 
paragraph is not restricted to countering ageist discourses. It is also framing the 
concept of empowered/disempowered older people within a debate on competing 
models for organising and delivering public services. The absence of 'choices' is 
216 
constructed as a problem built around assumptions that older people want choices, 
particularly in relation to care services. This fits with conception of citizens as 
consumers in the reform of public services, used by Labour as a narrative for the 
'modernisation' of the social democratic welfare state (Clarke & Newman 2005). The 
desire for 'choice' - or any kind of enhanced agency - may well be a real one for a 
significant proportion of older service users, but the manifesto text couches choice in 
predominantly consumerist terms, rather than other available left wing discourses of 
democratic control, co-operation, shared risk/ownership or facilitation of voice in 
regard to service priorities, delivery and design. It bears echoes of Finlayson's (2003) 
identification of the centrality of the individualisation (i.e. 'choice', 'tailor made 
packages', 'personal advisers') of social policy and service delivery in New Labour 
welfare rhetoric. From consideration of this text and the wider party manifesto choice 
between competing or diversified providers is put forward as the policy vehicle for 
delivering empowerment and rejecting the social disengagement and passivity of 
being labelled 'elderly'. 
The attempt to harmonise choice and empowerment raises the question of 
which, if any, of the two concepts, is dominant and which is a secondary imperative. 
For example, does the text reject elderly incapacity and put forward choice as the 
solution? Or is the imperative to make the political case for choice with the protection 
of capability an inspirational rhetorical device harnessed to push the arguments for 
choice? However, although the Labour Party attempted to drop the use of elderly 
discourses, with the exception of challenging disempowerment in the context choice 
in care services, the party did on one occasion deploy elderly in the more traditional 
manner: 
'The success of satellite and cable television in driving take-up of digital 
shows how changes in technology bring real benefits - in terms of greater 
choice, and increasingly, in access to services. Our aim is to make those 
benefits available to all. We will achieve digital switchover between 2008 
and 2012 ensuring universal access to high-quality, free-ta-view and 
subscription digital TV. This will happen region by region, and we will 
make sure that the interests of elderly people and other vulnerable 
groups are protected.' 
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Source; Extract from the full Labour Party Manifesto. Paragraph taken from the section 
headlined 'Digital Switchover'. 
In this section detailing an element of media policy the Labour Party deploy 
elderly in an almost classically negative way. Here the elderly 'and other vulnerable 
groups' are contrasted and excluded from the ability to enjoy or engage with the 
modern. Elderly is taken to be synonymous with vulnerability. The contrast between 
later life and technological modernity invites the reader to draw upon a negative 
stereotype of the confused older person unable to cope with everyday technological 
advances in consumer electronics. As with the copy taken from the manifesto for 
older people the idea of disempowerment of 'vulnerable' older people is couched 
within a frame of consumer choice - although minus the choice of sticking with 
analogue services. 
As with the Labour Party, the Liberal Democrats appear to reject ageist 
discourses in large sections of their communications, but in a similar vein apply the 
more positive language to describe later life inconsistently and choose in key 
publications to deploy the language of the 'elderly'. In the Liberal Democrat manifesto 
for older people the word elderly does not occur once. However, in the party's pre-
election manifesto the word elderly is used relatively frequently. Take, for example, 
the following extract from the document: 
'Liberal Democrats would stop the scandal of elderly people having to 
pay for the personal care they need if they have to go into residential 
care. Older people would no longer be threatened with having to sell their 
homes or use up their children's inheritance, simply because they are 
unfortunate enough to need care in the last part of their life: 
Source: Liberal Democrat 2005 pre-election manifesto 
As with other materials produced by the Conservative and Labour parties a 
correlation can be seen between the use of elderly and the issue of long-term care. 
Older people are in the position of being 'threatened', 'unfortunate' and in 'need'. On 
the same page in the document (page 6) a head and shoulders photograph (Figure 
7.4) is used in conjunction with text explaining Liberal Democrat policies on 'pensions 
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and benefits'. The picture is of what appears to be an older woman enjoying herself at 
an event and clapping her hands. Perhaps the reader is invited to belief she is 
clapping her hands in joy at the announcement of the latest Liberal Democrat policies. 
More important is the likely setting of the photo and its background, which appears 
from the size and decor to be in a social care location - although it's hard to say with 
full confidence that the woman is in a care home as the photo has been cropped. The 
picture serves the function of emphasising the link between being elderly and 
requiring social care. 
Figure 7.4: Screen clipping of picture taken from Liberal Democrat 'pre-election manifesto' 
The Liberal Democrats deployed the elderly discourse in their pre-election 
manifesto, abandoned it in their manifesto for older people but deployed it again in the 
design of one of their key general election posters (Figure 7.5). The poster followed 
the 'we oppose ... we propose' template and branding that the party used across the 
election campaign. Against a black background with a picture of Charles Kennedy on 
the right-hand side the text of the poster read: 
We oppose: 
Selling your home to pay the care 
We propose: 
Free personal care that the elderly 
We oppose: 
Means testing pensioners 
We propose: 
£100 extra per month for over 75s 
Figure 7.5: 'We Oppose .. .we Propose .. .' Liberal Democrat poster from the 2005 election 
campaign. 
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The poster fits with the theme found in all the major party campaigns of using 
the elderly discourse when developing narratives of disengagement particularly in the 
framing of social care policy. The Liberal Democrat poster specifically targets a policy 
which would assist families or individual households wealthy enough, at least in terms 
of capital assets, to be homeowners who may have to sell those homes in order to 
pay for social care. So although the discourse around personal care is couched in 
terms of helping the most needy - by definition families with capital assets such as 
homes are not typically from the lowest income brackets. It is families in the middle or 
lower middle income brackets who are most adversely affected by the absence of free 
personal care, and without doubt it is an issue that raises serious issues of principle 
and causes great distress to many families. However, the Liberal Democrats do not 
explicitly use text or imagery associated with middle income groups in their attempts 
to frame this issue. This may be because they felt they could tap into more generous 
levels of public empathy for 'vulnerable' 'elderly' than existed for 'capital-rich-income-
poor' older people who are often at the sharp end of anomalies that exist in long-term 
care funding arrangements. 
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The SNP also drew upon the disempowered elderly repertoire through the 
release of one campaign poster (Figure 7.6 ).The poster featured a photograph of an 
older woman cropped into her upper body and face. On the right hand side of the 
poster is the text: 'What Labour's Means Test Means'. The woman is staring into the 
camera and looking slightly upwards, given the effect for the viewer of looking slightly 
downward onto her face. That the viewer has no choice but to look down, all be it with 
sympathy, onto the older woman almost makes this political poster the perfect 
pictorial representation of compassionate ageism - the combination of sympathy 
delivered in a format that takes away power and independent agency from the person 
we are being invited to pity or assist. 
Figure 7.6: 'What Labour's Means Test Means': SNP poster from the 2005 election campaign. 
The woman is holding tightly to her chest a very small purse, an image which 
must be assumed is used to pictorially represent only minimal levels of disposable 
income, On her forehead there is an ink stamp with the words '2nd Class'. By linking 
low income and lower social status in later life with means testing - a system for 
conditionally assessing need - this SNP poster attempted to associate Labour's 
Pension Credit initiative with diminished financial means. However, an alternative 
interpretation of the clutched purse may be a representation of how older people need 
to declare their income to the DWP before gaining any possible entitlement to 
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increased payments from Pension Credit, and that by having to undertake this 
assessment the older person is losing some element of their social standing in wider 
society. The SNP's rejection of means testing indicates that there are reasons, 
perhaps practical, maybe philosophical, why older people are to be treated differently 
from other age groups in the administrations of tax and benefits. Citizens in all age 
groups and stages of life frequently have to declare personal financial information; this 
could be through tax self-assessment, in applying for Family Credit, or on seeking to 
know their eligibility for a student maintenance grant. While the SNP may not be 
content with aspects of all these policy areas, it is only on pensions and the Pension 
Credit where age or life stage is the key variable in arguing against non-universal 
state entitlements. 
The SNP poster in some ways straddles the imagery and discourses of the 
elderly with another distinct set of discourses found in the analysis of the campaign-
that of the pensioner which is discussed in the next section. Where elderly discourses 
were more likely to deployed in discussion of social care issues, the language of 
pensioners was frequently found in exchanges on personal finance and in appeals to 
economic rational choice voting. 
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Section 7.3 Campaign Communications (2) - Discourses of the Pensioner 
In the sample older voters were most frequently described by the political 
parties as 'pensioners'. In this manner older people are primarily constructed through 
their economic status of having exited from the labour market, and are attributed an 
identity almost wholly based around their status of qualifying as recipients of state 
welfare spending through the Basic State Pension. In society as a whole the use of 
the word pensioner is prevalent, so it should not be surprising to see the political 
parties reflect this usage, and it is true to say that in all likelihood the vast majority of 
people who deploy the word pensioner in written text, media or everyday speech are 
making no value judgement on the receipt of welfare payments, yet, none the less, 
society defines most older people through their social security status. Not as citizens, 
residents, friends, neighbours, volunteers, carers, family members, but as recipients 
of state pensions. 
In wider society the use of the word pensioner can be pejorative and seek to 
activate negative stereotypes in the intended audience. It depends on the context and 
in this sense assessing the use of the word pensioner is similar to the use of words to 
describe other groups who are often the subjects of negative stereotyping or prejudice 
such as 'gay' or 'black' people. Where the political parties utilised the discourses of 
being elderly it was in order to emphasise weakness and activate sympathy. When 
the parties deployed the discourses of the pensioner it was frequently framed within 
the politics of economic resources and rational choice voting. There was an apparent 
consensus between the major parties in the campaign that pensioners deserved 
additional economic resources, however, the rhetoric in this policy area included a 
clear process of negotiating the terms and eligibility of the claim for more generous 
provision in areas such as pensions. It seemed impractical to try and separate this 
combination, therefore, the following analysis combines the political construction of 
the 'pensioner' with the associated economic policy themes. 
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Although ideologically committed to reducing state social spending overall the 
Conservatives expressed support for additional resources for older voters. In the early 
days ofthe campaign the Conservatives placed adverts in national newspapers which 
marked out the negotiated terms on which they felt able to justify the additional 
spending. The full page advertisement placed in the Sunday Express published on 
February 20 2005 was entirely comprised of text set out in capital letters under the 
headline 1 believe Britain's pensioners deserve better' and is in the format of a signed 
statement in the name of the Michael Howard the party leader. There was a footer on 
the bottom of the page which reprints in bold text the party's campaign slogan are you 
thinking what we're thinking' and the name 'Conservative' (minus the words 'party' 
and any party logo or image). In the copy of the ad older people are primarily 
constructed through the economic status and identity as recipients of state welfare 
spending through the prominent use of the word 'pensioner'. The economic claim on 
welfare resources is justified as an entitlement based upon 'hard work' and serving 
Britain ' ... bravely in her greatest hour of need. ' The second entitlement refers directly 
to hardships endured by voters who were adults during the Second World War. In 
paragraph five this entitlement is underlined by the statement: 
'Those who have given so much should surely receive their due' 
The line is preceded by the statement: 'I believe that Britain is a great country'. 
This sets a patriotic context to frame the concept of service and obligations between 
citizen and state. The use of language here leaves open the possibility that older 
people categorised as not contributing 'hard work' to the country should not share the 
same claim on welfare resources. Equally cohorts who reached adulthood after the 
Second World War cannot be allocated an entitlement based on 'serving' in the 'hour 
of need' - therefore making it reasonable to assume that the Conservative Party policy 
offer incorporated in this ad is not necessarily applicable to younger voters when they 
reach their own 'old age'. After Howard establishes the conditional basis for why 
pensioners deserve more, the text in his name then sets out an economically 
grounded appeal for voters to choose the Conservative Party: 
'So I will increase the value of the state penSion in line with earnings, 
making pensioners up to £11 a week better off.' 
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This appeal to economic rational choice voting is calibrated into exact 
monetary figures '£11 a week better off". So, while Howard frames issues affecting 
pensioners within a grand narrative of patriotism and reciprocal dues in return for war 
time service the policy product offer is less about patriotic aspirations but instead is 
entirely grounded in the economics of personal finance and in the context of 
competing policy products. The '£11 a week' clearly hopes to generate the kind of 
valence advantage identified by Clarke et al. (2004) by constituting an attractive offer 
that voters will ultimately endorse at the ballot box as the best deal around. It is an 
appeal to voters to maximise material gains, and as will be seen, it's an appeal 
utilised by all the major parties. 
The style of the advert, written in the first person and credited to the party 
leader makes no mention of any of the parties by name in the body of the text. The 
only opponent to be mentioned is 'Mr Blair', framing the choice in terms of competing 
leaders rather than parties and their policy platforms (the constitutionally correct 
framing for a British parliamentary election). This may have been a Conservative 
attempt to exploit the apparent unpopularity of Tony Blair amongst many voters, 
rather than an assessment of any great electoral appeal of Michael Howard himself. 
The advert also makes an explicit attack on the re-branding of Labour into New 
Labour for creating a narrative that excludes older citizens: 
The older generations may have been air-brushed out of Mr Blair's 
Britain, but I will stand up for them.' 
This quote is a clear reference to the age-related rhetorical dimensions to the 
creation of the New Labour brand. New, of course, is an oppositional concept to the 
properties possessed by the old and a perceived desire to be associated with youth 
can generate the perception of wanting to be distanced from the old. Labour may not 
have deliberately sponsored the talk of 'cool Britannia', neither did the party contest 
the association, and Tony Blair's personal branding, including his book of key note 
speeches 'My Vision ofa Young Country'opened his government up to the charge of 
'airbrushing' older voters out of the picture. The Conservatives may have, belatedly, 
realised the New Labour was not an age-neutral brand and branding designed to 
appeal to certain age groups may repel the untargeted age groups. 
The other dominant narrative in the flurry of Conservative communications 
activity during this week of the campaign is to be found in the first paragraph of 
Michael Howard's Northampton speech on pensioners: 
'If you want to know about a family, look at how they treat their older 
relatives. And if you want to know about a country, look how it cares for 
older people.' 
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This is an interesting attempt to use 'treatment' of older people as a proxy 
measurement for the moral or ethical health of a nation. The language still fits with the 
idea of the weakened and passive older person as 'treat' implies their welfare is 
entirely in the hands of others. This measurement by proxy was echoed by Labour 
Chancellor of the Exchequer Gordon Brown a few weeks later when he delivered the 
pre-election Budget: 
'Mr. Deputy Speaker, you also judge a society by how it treats its most 
vulnerable. Thousands of pensioners and other patients in hospital are 
effectively charged a payment, with, for many, cash deducted from their 
weekly pension and benefits to pay for their stay. It is because this 
Government believe in a high-quality NHS free at the paint of use and 
reject charges that I am, from today, permanently abolishing these 
hospital charges in the NHS. The British national health service is, and 
will remain, safe in this Government's hands.' 
Hansard 16 Mar 2005 : Column 269 
Brown's quote does not directly relate to pensioners, but does use pensioners 
as the prime example of society's 'most vulnerable'. 'Treatment' of 'pensioners' by the 
country/society is a minor SUb-theme of mediated population ageing politics which is 
part of a discourse which ranks older people higher than most other social groupings 
as a cause deserving of public spending. By way of contrast, it would not be expected 
during this current period in social history to hear the major parties declaring that you 
can judge the country by the way it treats its long-term unemployed, or how the penal 
system treats former offenders. 
226 
One possible indicator of the electoral importance that Labour were putting on 
older voters is how the final section of Brown's budget speech he is almost entirely 
devoted to issues of obvious concern to older people. This is the section of the 
Chancellor's speech that traditionally gets replayed the most on the broadcast media: 
In 1997, there was no winter fuel allowance. This autumn, we will again 
pay a £200 winter fuel allowance for pensioners-£300 for the over-80s. 
In the pre-Budget report, I announced a £50 council tax refund. Today, 
with the resources now available, I can announce that we will pay to 
every pensioner household, 65 and over, paying council tax, a refund not 
of £50 but a council tax refund of £200-a measure that is fairer and worth 
more to more pensioners than all other proposed schemes. 
Since 1997, free TV licences for the over-75s, free eye tests for all 
pensioners, free hospital charges, a £200 winter allowance free of tax 
and a £200 council tax refund. And I can do more' 
Hansard 16 Mar 2005 
The only construction of older people in the Budget speech is as 'pensioners'. 
This fits with the general trend in the analysis of pensioner being used in the context 
of financial issues. Gordon Brown uses the concept of the 'fair deal' which develops 
the frequently occurring theme of an implied contractual relationship between the 
state and the individual. The budget, of course, is a statement of fiscal policy, so it's 
not surprising to see an almost total emphasis on financial matters and data. 
However, this section of the budget speech still provides a good example of how older 
people who are popularly defined by the social-economic status - pensioners - are 
fittingly targeted by economic policy measures with the fiscal benefits clearly spelt out 
in pounds and pence. 
Labour published a special manifesto targeted at older voters titled: new 
opportunities for later life. Pensioner is a high frequency word within the body of the 
document, however, the use of 'later life' in the document title is a clue to how their 
discourses are beginning to move away from constructing older people through their 
welfare status or the absolute status of being 'elderly', instead 'later life' locates its 
target audience in a relative age position. Laterlife suggest not old, but older. 
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The manifesto's format was broadly a familiar traditional manifesto document, 
in that it consisted of text on policy detail and commitments with an introductory page 
signed off jointly in the names of Tony Blair and Alan Johnson, the then Secretary of 
State for Work and Pensions. Earlier in this section it was noted that the use of 
elderly in this document fitted the pattern found in other political communications 
materials produced by all the parties in that deployed 'elderly' to emphasise physical 
decline and need. The elderly discourse was only used in a small proportion of the 
text where constructions of older people took place. On a basic word count there are 
65 uses of pensioner in the manifesto and 62 uses of older. This strongly suggests 
that for Labour's communications elderly was only a minor discourse compared to the 
mainstreamed discourses of older voters as pensioners and older people. In the 
manifesto the use of 'pensioner' is frequently coupled with financial issues and direct 
appeals to rational choice voting. For example, the first paragraph of the introductory 
letter in the name of Blair and Johnson states: 
'Labour has delivered for older people. Since 1997 Labour has helped 
millions of pensioners achieve security and a better quality of life. We 
have ensured that all pensioners can share fairly in riSing national 
prosperity, whilst giving special help to the poorest through Pension 
Credit. As a result of Labour's measures, pensioner households are on 
average £1,500 a year better off in real terms than in 1997, and the 
poorest third are £2,000 a year better off. Pensioners' living standards 
are riSing more quickly than those for the population as a whole, and we 
have lifted 1.8 million penSioners - the majority of them women - out of 
absolute poverty; a reduction of two thirds.' 
Source: Labour 2005 election manifesto for older people 
The first line in the quote is an emphasis on delivery and can be seen as an 
example of the kind of discourse associated with explicit political marketing, where the 
party adjusts its product according the electoral market and places great stock on 
satisfying consumer demand through delivery. The rest of the paragraph aligns 
pensioners with an economic rational choice discourse. The text details Labour's 
claimed economic impact on individual pensioner households and on pensioner 
incomes across the population as a whole. There is a strong message of delivering 
material gains particularly for those who are less well off. The manifesto's introductory 
letter emphasises rational choice rather than emotional or psychological appeals. 
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However, the following section is headlined values. 'Values' is slightly misleading as 
this section, perhaps, could be more accurately labelled as a policy framework· 
combining statements on the demographic background alongside expressions of 
policy objectives. For example: 
'Government's role is to support people in making choices throughout life 
and into old age; providing security in retirement, tackling poverty and 
ensuring pensioners benefit from the nation's rising prosperity.' 
'The second half of our lives will provide opportunities unknown to our 
parents and grandparents. People will be generally better educated, 
healthier, better housed and potentially more self-sufficient than any 
previous generation of older people.' 
Source: Labour 2005 election manifesto for older people 
Whether through the discourse of the elderly or the pensioner the major parties 
were in broad agreement that older people should benefit from increase state 
spending and support. However, these increases were not unconditional and a 
complex contractual narrative appears within the election campaign's rhetoric. Some 
of this rhetoric drew upon older concepts of the contributory principle and the 
Beveridge Report, but as we shall see in the next section it was inter-meshed with 
new discourses on citizenship. 
Section 7.4 Campaign Communications (3) - Discourses of Dignity and the 
Contributory Principle OR Who should benefit from the 'grey giveaway'? 
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The previous two sections have shown how the political parties agreed, in 
broad terms, that older people deserved to receive more resources and support from 
the state, but did the parties consider all people should benefit equally? Or were there 
important qualifications and distinctions drawn between different types of older 
person? Who should benefit from the grey giveaway and how could it be justified? 
By moderate degree there was a recurring concept found the sample of 
materials analysed was of 'respect' and 'dignity'. From the examples below from the 
Conservative and Labour manifestoes we can see the deployment of these concepts. 
In the Conservative manifesto for older people the word dignity occurs five times as 
does the word respect. In two occurrences both words appear together. 
Giving our older generation what is their due and enabling everyone to 
prepare for a decent retirement are fundamental to the values of what is 
best about Britain. And these will be the values of the next Conservative 
Government. We will provide dignity and security in retirement and 
proper recognition of the contribution the older generation has made to 
this country.' 
'The choice at the next election is clear: respect, dignity and security for 
pensioners with the Conservatives, or higher council tax and more means 
testing under Mr Blair.' 
Source: The Conservative Party Manifesto for Older People. 
'People should continue to enjoy independence, dignity and choice no 
matter what their age.' 
Source: The Labour Party Manifesto for Older People. 
Dignity appears to be a state of being that is lost by many when they reach 
later life, and from the Conservative literature at least, is constructed as being directly 
related to means testing - the process of being assessed for eligibility for income 
related benefits - and other income related issues such as Council Tax. It isn't entirely 
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clear from the copy whether low income is the cause of the loss of dignity as there is 
almost no discourse centred on poverty or social exclusion. This would lead to the 
conclusion that for the Conservatives the process and administration of items such as 
Pension Credit or Council Tax raised the more substantive objection. The selected 
text from the Labour manifesto for older people links possession of the attribute of 
dignity to the ability to make choices and associates dignity with independence. 
The three main parties all appeared to agree during the election campaign that 
older people deserved more money, whether it be directly paid to them in the form of 
income or through other policies and concessions such as Council Tax relief or travel 
subsidies. The main parties also all campaigned on the claim that their policy offer 
would deliver these increases in material resources for older voters. Certainly no 
mainstream party was arguing for cut backs or reallocation of resources away from 
older voters. The question remained however, who was to benefit from the parties' 
largesse and what kind of conditionality was attached to the offer of more? One key 
finding from the analysis is that there was, indeed, a large level of conditionality 
contained within the political discourses of the election campaign. Better pensions 
were explicitly linked as a reward for those who worked hard and served their country. 
The hard work discourse was prominent but it wasn't linear and variations and 
alternative formulas for justifying increased state spending were apparent. These 
could be derived from notions of citizenship, through non-employment based 
contributions to society and an implicit and particularly universalist rejection of poverty 
in later life. 
This chapter has already observed how older people were primarily 
constructed by the Conservative Party through the economic status and identity as 
recipients of state welfare spending through the prominent use of the word 
'pensioner'. Pensioners' economic claims on welfare resources were justified in the 
party's manifesto for older voters as an entitlement based upon 'hard work' and 
serving Britain ' ... bravely in her greatest hour of need.' The second entitlement refers 
directly to hardships endured by voters who were adults during the Second World 
War. In paragraph five this entitlement is underlined by the statement: 
'Those who have given so much should surely receive their due' 
Source: Conservative Party 2005 election manifesto for older people 
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The use of language here leaves open the possibility that older people 
categorised as not contributing 'hard work' to the country should not share the same 
claim on welfare resources. Equally cohorts who reached adulthood after the Second 
World War cannot be allocated an entitlement based on 'serving' in the 'hour of need" 
- therefore making it reasonable to assume that the Conservative Party policy offer 
was not necessarily applicable to younger voters when they reach their own later life. 
These themes were developed further during Howard's Northampton speech: 
'imagine you you've worked hard and saved all your life .. .' -
' ... honour our older generations' 
' ... to those who have given so much, we must surely give what is their 
due' 
In some senses Howard appeared to be setting out a generational accounting 
sheet where the provision of hard work - and service in war - entails entitlement to 
state resources, but by linking so clearly hard working and war service this makes that 
entitlement highly conditional and partly resting on circumstances such as world wars 
that are unlikely to reoccur in the near or medium term future. Here is another 
example from the Conservatives' 'action for pensionem'leafiet: 
'I Believe pensioners have worked hard all their lives and deserve to be 
rewarded. That's why a Conservative Government will halve Council Tax 
for pensioners over 65, with up to £500 off per bill.' 
Source: Conservative Party 'action for pensionelS'leafiet. 
It's not merely 'working' that justifies the entitlement, it is specifically working 
'hard' that entails deserving to be 'rewarded'. This emphasis could be put down to an 
attachment to National Insurance and the contributory principle of putting into the pot 
when working in order to take out of the pot when retired. If this was the case it should 
have been expected to be communicated either implicitly or explicitly across the 
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volume of campaign materials. But there are no references to NI or the contributory 
principle and there is also an absence of any Conservative narrative based around 
citizenship as the basis for entitlement. In some ways the Conservatives left 
observers with a paternal model of the state assessing the economic rectitude of its 
citizens, either collectively or as individuals. They may have rejected means testing of 
individuals in their campaign literature, but a deeper analysis of their discourse could 
justify accusing the Conservatives of wanting to means test the suitability of a whole 
population cohorts before allocating increased resources. 
The privileged place of 'hard working families' was notable in a number of 
Labour's communications outputs, but it was only deployed to a limited extent in their 
materials about or aimed at older people. Labour chancellor Gordon Brown dubbed 
his Budget as one for 'hard working families and pensioners' and in his speech at the 
launch of Labour's election manifesto the phrase was used several times. For 
example: 'No cap on opportunities for anyone who works hard and makes the effort ... ' 
At the same launch event the party's deputy leader, John Prescott, used the phrase: 
'we believe that every hard working family should benefit from rising prosperity 
wherever they live'. The use of 'hard working' was both consistent and prominent in 
Labour electoral rhetoric, it offered no definition of who was considered 'hard working' 
and more intriguingly which families were not. Did this apply to the unemployed, or 
were some people in full time employment but not considered to be working hard 
enough to be entitled to benefit from rising prosperity? What kind of citizen of was the 
target of this contrasting discourse? Driver and Martell (2007) have argued that this 
apparent commitment to the traditional family is an important rhetorical function that 
promotes certain behaviours and encourages the achievement of social inclusion 
through paid work. BBC political reporter, Brian Wheeler (2005), also posed the 
question 'who are Britain's hard working families' and speculated that that the phrase 
might be a vehicle for distancing itself from 'hand outs' to people. 
The rhetoric of hard working families places work and employment at the 
centre of political discourse. There are obvious limitations to applying this discourse to 
older people who, on the whole, are retired and no longer in paid employment. 
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Gordon Brown fused together 'hard working families and pensioners' in his Budget 
speech and this combination was also used in a press statement that was issued in 
the name of Alan Milburn: 
Our campaign is founded on the fundamental issues facing this country. 
How to keep a strong and stable economy. How to create a fair society. 
How to keep public services improving with both resources and reforms. 
How to bring about greater opportunity and prosperity for Britain's hard 
working families and pensioners.' 
Source: Press statement by Alan Milburn on the Labour Party web site 
Despite the Brown and Milburn examples Labour, on the whole, did not deploy 
the hard working families rhetoric to their materials that were specifically aimed at 
older people or those about ageing issues. Indeed, as shall be seen in a subsequent 
section of this analysis, Labour appeared keen to portray issues such as pensions as 
ageing issues of relevance to a large number of voters rather than ghettoised as 
pensioner issues. 
In contrast to the other parties' use of hard work and service the Liberal 
Democrats put forward eligibility and justification for improved first tier state pensions 
on the basis of residency or citizenship. While the Liberal Democrat's use of a 
citizenship discourse contrasted with the other main parties, this discourse wasn't 
consistently applied, indeed, it did not appear as the dominant theme. The primary 
argument deployed in favour of this change was unfairness to women in terms of 
outcomes in the current pensions system. As such the Liberal Democrats didn't argue 
for change in terms of human dignity for all, of basic rights regardless of societal 
contribution or participation in the work force .. but rather in terms of gender inequality 
in outcomes: 
'Based on a simple residency requirement, rather than on an often-
patchy national insurance record. Women will particularly benefit they will 
no longer receive a lower pension as a result of having given up work to 
bring up children or look after sick relatives ....... We will make it a Citizens 
Pension, given as of right' 
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Source: Liberal Democrat 2005 election manifesto for older people 
Even though the Liberal Democrats based their policies on pensions on the 
basis of citizenship or residency as the criteria for entitlement - in the process 
consciously moving away from the contributory principle - there were still examples 
within their campaign literature where they also dipped into the rhetoric of state 
spending justified on the basis that older people had earned it in some way. For 
example this pull-out quote from the Liberal Democrat's 'pre-election' manifesto: 
'Give elderly people the pension they have earned - and deserve' 
Source: Liberal Democrats pre-election manifesto 
Again in this quote there is the concept of 'pensioners' as a deserving cause, 
who have managed to pass criteria which justify electoral promises to use the state to 
'give' them, as the Liberal Democrats phrase it in this instance, additional retirement 
incomes. So even though Liberal Democrat policy was based on the state pension as 
being an entitlement based on residency, in key communication publications such as 
this one they still used the language of an earned contractual-style entitlement 
The campaign materials of the three major parties demonstrated a consensus 
that older voters should enjoy improved policy product offers that would involve 
additional state spending. The parties also attempted to stake out the conditions and 
justifications for these increases that involved at least some kind of reciprocal 
entitlement based on either, hard work, service, contributions, citizenship - or some 
combination of more than one of these factors. These discourses appeared as a 
public negotiation of the terms and conditions of improved public services and higher 
state spending. One important strand of this discourse was the negotiation of which 
people deserved higher levels of support and who should benefit the most. 
The one group within the electorate who were consistently nominated by the 
Labour and Liberal Democrat parties, and to a lesser extent by the Conservatives, 
were women. The UK state pension's historical reliance on national insurance 
contributions as the basis for qualifying for the pension, and for the determining the 
level of state pension - presupposed that someone would have to spend almost their 
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entire working life making NI contributions (39 years for a woman, 44 years for a 
man). Basing the state pension on NI contributions meant that people who spent 
intermittent periods out of the labour market would have little or no hope of qualifying 
for a full state pension. The group most obviously affected by this requirement was 
women. This was not seen as a problem at the time of the Beveridge Report as it was 
produced on the assumption that women would take on full child care responsibilities 
within families, exit the labour market upon parenthood and depend on the male 
partner's wages and pensions. By 2005 it had finally reached a point of near 
consensus that a pensions system based on the sociology of the family in the 1940s 
would need a radical overhaul. 
In Labour's generalised framing of debates the place of 'hard work' has already 
been noted, but within the more detailed discussions of policy within the party's 
election materials a different emphasis can be found in relation to how the issue 
affected women. Take this example from the full Labour manifesto: 
We are clear about the goals of a reformed system. It must tackle poverty, 
provide everyone with the opportunity to build an adequate retirement 
income, and be affordable, fair and simple to understand. In particular it must 
address the disadvantages faced by women.' 
Source: Labour Party 2005 election manifesto 
The Labour manifesto pledged to strive to ensure that the policy output of a 
reformed pensions system will result in 'addressing' the disadvantages faced by 
women. The text hints at a vow to reduce income inequality in later life, although from 
the wording hardly provides a cast iron commitment to end such inequality. The 
Labour Party manifesto for older people gave more detail on how the inequalities 
might be removed: 
' ... ensuring women and carers have opportunities to build up security 
in retirement, looking at whether a residence-based (as opposed to 
contribution-based) eligibility for the basic state pension would 
provide a cost effective way of improving entitlements' 
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From this 2005 manifesto quote the Labour Party can be seen to be putting 
forward 'residence' as the qualification for improved state pensions. Residence as the 
determining factor for qualifying for increased state spending would appear to be at 
sharp variance with the rhetoric of 'hard work'. So, at the level of practical policy there 
is a rejection of basing welfare payments on 'hard work' criteria, but this policy change 
of direction is not integrated into the campaign framing or political rhetoric. Certainly 
critics such as Levitas (1998) have argued that the government's emphasis on paid 
work devalues and is unsupportive of unpaid work mostly undertaken by women, 
especially caring for children or other family members. Labour's commitments on the 
distribution of additional state spending were by no means restricted to women. The 
party remained publicly committed to measures aimed at increasing the incomes of 
the 'poorest', and the analysis found that Labour's discourse was still strong on 
negotiating additional resources for the income poor. Take this quote from Labour's 
manifesto for older people 
'Labour has delivered for older people. Since 1997 Labour has helped 
millions of pensioners achieve security and a better quality of life. We have 
ensured that all pensioners can share fairly in rising national prosperity, 
whilst giving special help to the poorest through Pension Credit. As a result 
of Labour's measures, pensioner households are on average £1,500 a year 
better off in real terms than in 1997, and the poorest third are £2,000 a year 
better off. Pensioners' living standards are rising more quickly than those for 
the population as a whole, and we have lifted 1.8 million pensioners - the 
majority of them women - out of absolute poverty; a reduction of two thirds.' 
Source: Labour Party 2005 election manifesto for older people 
The first line is an emphasis on delivery and can be seen as an example of the 
kind of discourse associated with explicit political marketing, where the party adjusts 
its product according the electoral market and places great stock on satisfying 
consumer demand through delivery. It is also a good example of 
Labour's continuing, almost traditional, social democratic commitment in this area of 
public policy to increasing incomes of low income groups. However, it would appear 
that although some of the policy aims are clea r, the Labour message is deliberately 
obscured by trying to counter elements of public opinion antagonistic to the value of 
redistribution through the use of the pejorative term of 'handouts' 
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Certainly Labour has been criticised before for a mismatch between its rhetoric 
and its welfare policies (Kenny 2007). Stuart Hall has also noted this confusion of 
signals when analysing New Labour rhetoric. Hall believes the 'leading' narrative for 
the current government is one of alignment with the broad interests and values of 
corporate capital, but this is paralleled by a subsidiary political repertoire of social 
democracy (Hall 2003). Within this sample there is certainly hybrid discourses that 
draw upon both neo-liberal and social democratic assumptions or values. Hall argues 
that the social democratic narratives are subordinate to the neo-liberal content and 
that where possible the subordinate narrative will be transformed into the dominant 
one. This may hold validity elsewhere, but as noted from Section 3.5 the Labour 
government has shifted from technocratic management of Conservative pensions 
architecture to new policies based on entitlement through citizenship and a social 
democratic commitment to gender equality. In this case it can be argued the 
transformation can work in both directions, for the time being at least. 
The Liberal Democrats in their campaign materials also showed concern over 
the gender impact of basing the state pension on NI contributions. The Liberal 
Democrats went a bit further than Labour in proposing a 'citizens pension', although 
there were only minor differences the core criteria for entitlement was to be residency. 
One of key passages in this area came from the Liberal Democrat manifesto for older 
people: 
'Based on a simple residency requirement, rather than on an often-patchy 
national insurance record. Women will particularly benefit they will no longer 
receive a lower penSion as a result of having given up work to bring up 
children or look after sick relatives .. .we will make it a .Citizens Pension., 
given as of right' 
Source: Liberal Democrat 2005 manifesto for older people 
The Liberal Democrats attempted to sell their policies in this area with a press 
release titled: 'We offer most to older people!' The text of the press release is strongly 
themed around gender inequality and the case for improved resource outcomes for 
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women. The press release includes an endorsement quote from a third party in the 
shape of Margaret Watts from SWAPP (Support Women against Pensioner Poverty). 
This kind of third party endorsement is rare in the materials analysed, in contrast to 
the emphasis on endorsements in US campaign materials. The policy offer in this 
area is mostly based on the projected gender impact on basing entitlement to the 
state pension on residency rather than National Insurance contributions. However, the 
Liberal Democrats were no exceptions to the rule of mixed and contradictory use of 
language on older people and ageing issues. There was a slightly mixed message on 
the criteria on which older people can claim state resources in retirement. An 
important policy for the Liberal Democrats in their product on offer was the citizen's 
pension. Yet, in the quote from party leader Charles Kennedy there is another 
narrative related to the ones on entitlement based on hard work or war time service: 
'Our message to older citizens is that we understand our debt to you.' 
The Conservative Party's campaign also included a recognition of the bias in the 
pensions system against women. However, the Conservative Party's full election 
manifesto made no mention of women at all, in any context, but there was one section 
in the Conservative manifesto for older people that addressed gender inequality: 
'Many women in particular are not getting a fair deal from the state 
pensions system and we are committed to addressing this. We have 
already set out firm proposals, together with further options for tackling 
this problem. We will abolish the rule which stops women who have paid 
National Insurance Contributions for less than ten years getting anything 
from the basic state pension. We will also modernise the way state 
pension rights are earned so it becomes easier for women to build them 
up.' 
Source: Conservative Party 2005 manifesto for older people 
The general election of 2005 took place during an historical period where an 
apparent major party consensus agreed on the desirability of increasing state 
spending and support for older people. This is a political equilibrium that may not 
enjoy a long future if the proponents of inter-generational conflict are to be proved 
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correct in their predictions. The criteria for justifying increased state spending on older 
people still remains partially grounded in the legacy of World War 11 with some 
narratives emphasising the nation's debt to the service and sacrifice of the cohorts 
who carried the burden of the war effort. The war service justification is intertwined 
with post-war social reforms and the popular perception of the contributory principle 
and the place of National Insurance. The contributory prinCiple finds a more modern 
echo in the rhetoric of hard working families, yet the social outcomes of basing state 
retirement income on employment and National Insurance records have generated 
large scale gender inequalities amongst older people. This has been recognised, at 
least by the Liberal Democrat and Labour parties who have begun to downgrade NI 
contributions in favour of residency for determining entitlements to the state pension. 
However, the political rhetoric trails behind the policy reality. None the less, there is 
one narrative that was notable for its absence in the political communications outputs 
of the major parties during the 2005 election campaign, and that was the kind of neo-
liberal apocalyptic demography discussed in Chapter Two. Demographic change was 
occasionally present as a factor in framing and contextualising some manifesto 
commitments, but there was a fascinating rejection of the more pessimistic narratives 
and frames that have been enthusiastically endorsed in some quarters of the 
country's media elite. 
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Section 7.5 Elite Dissonance - Embracing Active Ageing and Rejecting Media Time 
Bomb Narratives 
Although older voters and ageing issues enjoyed a high prominence in various 
strands of the 2005 election campaign, demographic framing of the key issues was in 
relatively short supply. To analyse any selection of communication content it is often 
worthwhile to consider what themes are missing from the text and imagery alongside 
what is to be found within the material. Chapter Two demonstrated that negative 
stereotyping of the characteristic of an aged society run alongside the pessimistic 
narratives of the ageing population 'time bomb'. We have seen the evidence of 
negative or ageist portrayals or older people in the press (Midwinter 1991; 
Groombridge 1999; Bergstrom 2001) and section 5.3 analysed the privileged position 
allocated to neo-liberal narratives of apocalyptic demography and inter-generational 
conflict in the flagship BBC drama-documentary If. .. the generations fall apart. The If. .. 
synopsis was to be mirrored during the 2005 campaign by another flagship BBC 
current affairs show when Newsnightdevoted the majority of one programme over to 
an analysis of the parties' efforts to campaign for the grey vote. Yet, the political 
parties either omitted these negative narratives from their campaigns, or in the case of 
Newsnight, their representatives directly challenged their assumptions. Further to the 
apparent rejection of media narratives there was also evidence from the campaign 
that the parties are beginning to construct ageing issues such as pensions as being of 
general concern rather than as ghetto issues only of concern to pensioners. This 
almost age-neutral campaign tone on ageing issues is also harmonious with the 
incorporation by political strategists of the upbeat reconstructions of later life found in 
the active ageing movement. 
Labour's special manifesto targeted at older voters' new opportunities for later 
lite was a policy document that did couch the party's product offer in the context of 
demographic change and population ageing, and in the extracts below it can be seen 
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that there was an attempt to portray ageing issues as being of general concern to all 
voters rather than purely of interest to older people: 
'We live in a society with more people living longer and healthier lives than ever 
before. This is a cause for celebration. It is a clear indicator of social progress. 
Older people are now healthier, better educated and better off than any previous 
generation .... 
.. As we consider an ageing society we are faced with the prospect of more 
people dependent on those who are of working age. A society with more older 
people does of course present significant policy challenges: the future of 
pensions and how care will be provided in the future. Labour is facing up to 
these challenges, taking the long-term decisions now to deal with emerging 
issues of tomorrow. 
Source: Labour Party 2005 election manifesto for older people 
In many ways the Labour manifesto appears to be a conscious attempt to 
adopt a balanced or even nuanced tone between rejecting apocalyptic demography 
and recognising the genuine policy challenges the age transformation presents. The 
text avoids the suggestion that population ageing is a gloomy prospect for society or 
that is necessitates draconian reductions in social spending. However, the text does 
use population ageing to frame the context in which policy is developed and as such 
this performs to some extent the function of putting a limiting fence around options 
that may be considered. This theme is also used by the Liberal Democrats in their 
manifesto for older people. The following quotation comes from a 'letter' from Charles 
Kennedy that comprised the first section of the manifesto: 
These promises will address many of the consequences for public services of 
the demographic changes. But with more people living longer more active lives 
we need to see the so-called 'demographic timebomb' not as a threat, but as an 
opportunity - an opportunity to re-engage people as they retire, to make sure 
their skills and energy are not lost to society and to the economy' 
Source: Liberal Democrat 2005 election manifesto for older people 
In this text there is a more explicit rejection by the Liberal Democrats- the so-
called demographic time bomb' - of apocalyptic demography than can be found in 
Labour's document, but the Liberal Democrats still frame the possibility of 
'consequences' for public services of demographic changes. The language is fairly 
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upbeat but it certainly doesn't represent a blank cheque book. Although the Liberal 
Democrats pre-election manifesto drew heavily on the discourse of the elderly their 
manifesto for older people never uses the word 'elderly'. The most frequent 
descriptions of older voters are either 'older' or 'pensioner'. 
The Liberal Democrat manifesto for older people was produced as an eight 
page bookleVreport style publication mainly consisting of statements of policy 
positions, and included a mock up of a letter from Charles Kennedy. There is a 
combination of photographs of either Kennedy posing with older people or stock 
library shots of older subjects. The masthead is titled 'Focus on older people' this 
builds upon the 'focus' brand used by the Liberal Democrats in their local 
campaigning. The front page has a large stock photo of a smiling older person looking 
at a younger person. The younger person has her hand on the older person's 
shoulder perhaps suggesting friendship or solidarity. The 'letter' from Charles 
Kennedy then runs into a shopping list of policy pledges, the prominence of the state 
pension signifying either a tactical assessment of foregrounding this issue as 
beneficial and/or party research indicating the valence of the issue for target voters. 
The list in the description the Liberal Democrat top five priority pledges was as 
follows: 
1. 'fairer state pensions' 
2. 'free personal care' 
3. 'axing the unfair council tax' 
4. 'free off-peak local travel for all pensioners' 
5. 'a flexible decade of retirement' 
The last item 'flexible decade of retirement' is interesting as it gives an 
indication that the target older voters in this document included older people still in the 
labour force - probably in the age ranges of 50-60. This is partly indicative of 
positioning policies as ageing issues as supposed to issues for the aged, but it is a 
sub-narrative that is lower down in the discursive mix than can be found in some of 
the Labour materials. A later section in the manifesto uses the sub-heading: 
'increasing opportunities in the third age' which deploys some of the language 
identified with the active ageing movement. It heads the section where the Liberal 
Democrats detail their policies on employment, education and retirement for older 
people and explicitly discuss problems faced by people aged 50 and over. 
'The attitude of many older people has changed immensely. People are living a 
longer, more active and healthier life. With that, has come the desire to continue 
some form of work past the traditional retirement age.' 
Source: Liberal Democrat 2005 election manifesto for older people 
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This section of their manifesto for older people provides at least some evidence 
that the Liberal Democrats when targeting older voters with their political 
communications work, used the broader definition of older voters i.e. not just those 
above state pension age, but all voters aged 50 and above. 
While the political parties alluded to demographic restrictions on spending, but 
on the whole rejected any associated economic pessimism, the analysis of the media 
coverage of ageing issues for this thesis during the election campaign found several 
examples of American conservative generational equity narratives within commentary 
and features that considered the importance of older voters. Alice Miles in The Times, 
for example, attempted to adopt Kotlikoffs generational accounting - how much paid 
in, how much paid out - in framing her conception of fairness in the distribution of 
welfare payments: Miles posited that 'people start to get less from the welfare state 
than they put into it.' In another example, The Daily Telegraph in an editorial directly 
endorsed the neo-liberal framing of generational conflict by claiming policies that may 
benefit older people were 'at the expense of their children': 
'Because of their greater numbers and higher likelihood to vote, older voters 
have eight times the power of younger ones at this election. Yet older people 
have received more from the welfare state than they paid in, a balance which 
switches when you get to the postwar baby-boomer generation: people start to 
get less from the welfare state than they put into it. Byline: Alice Miles. The 
Times February 23, 2005. 
'Like the Tory promise to give pensioners a 50 per cent discount on council tax, 
a local income tax is in effect a political attempt to attract the growing number of 
older voters at the expense of their children. 'The Daily Telegraph, March 1, 
2005. 
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This generational conflict or generational equity framing of the social and 
economic consequences of population ageing has been identified as originating in the 
USA in the 1980s and linked to Conservative journalists and think tanks such as the 
Cato Institute and the Olin Foundation (2003 Williamson et al). At the heart of this 
frame is the concept that each generation should self-fund for its retirement. 
Advocates of this approach repeatedly cited the demographer Samuel Preston's 
assertion that the economic status in the US of older people was improving at least to 
some extent at the expense of children. The political conclusion of this lobby was the 
need to reduce state spending on social security and welfare. The generational 
equity approach does not incorporate intergenerational transfers of wealth and 
support and downplays over social divisions such as class and ethnicity. A feature 
and discussion piece on BBC Newsnightin response to the Conservative Party's 
shows just how deep conservative thinking from America has penetrated some elite 
journalists' paradigms for interpreting and framing the politics of population ageing. 
In a package broadcast on February 21 2005 Newsnight's economic editor, 
Stephanie Flanders, whole heartedly took the conservative framing of population 
ageing to investigate and interpret the increase in the number of older voters. This 
programme is significant as it stands as the main in-depth consideration of ageing and 
older voters during the election campaign by the BBC. Flanders gave an uncritical 
endorsement of Michael Howard's war generation rhetoric of entitlement based upon 
war time service whilst simultaneously adding to the construction of the baby boomers 
as being less deserving of our empathy than older people today. But in the same 
section of her report Flanders also editorialised US conservative ideology by stating 
that cutting state provision of welfare by Margaret Thatcher - in this case the state 
pension was without any qualification, doubt or hedging of bets, good news for 'youth' 
as it 'put a lid on what the beat generation could eke out of the system': 
Transcript - Flanders: 'Now no-one minds if the generations who went through 
two world wars do better than everyone else. The interesting question is what 
happens to the baby boomer generation. Here Margaret Thatcher, believe it or 
not, was a crusader for youth, by the linking the state pension to prices rather 
than earnings, she put a lid on what the beat generation could eke out of the 
system.' 
245 
Flanders' Newsnightreport is also an interesting case in how it portrays older 
people and interweaves that portrayal with the narrative she develops in her feature. 
The background shots for Flanders' voice-overs on the film are mostly of a group of 
older Scottish men taking part in their regular ice hockey session. The physical activity 
of the men is clearly meant to clash with a pre-conceived media image the producers' 
expect the audience to hold of the frail and inactive older person. But the use of the 
older ice hockey players isn't merely used with the intention of contradicting traditional 
stereotypes, as Flanders adds her own twist to expected audience reactions. The 
viewer may respond in a positive manner to seeing pictures of healthy, vigorous older 
men obviously enjoying a robust leisure pursuit, but Newsnight's intention would 
appear to force the viewer to re-assess their emotional response as the spoken 
dialogue over the pictures clearly tells the viewer that numerous, active, and critically, 
assertive older people is a problem. The report suggests viewers need to re-educated 
and that their appropriate response should be replaced with a nervous angst. 
For example, the use of the quote from one of the ice hockey players: 'I'll 
hopefully be playing hockey until I'm about 90' looks as if it wasn't intended to be a life 
affirming good news human story because it is immediately followed by Flanders 
commenting that 'We've got a battle on our hands alright and judging from the past 
few weeks this isn't going to end well for the young'. Flanders then seeks to explicitly 
other older people through the use of 'we've got a battle' and in the same sentence 
draws upon the US conservative narrative by seeking to construct an inverse 
relationship between the social welfare of the old with the young. As with Samuel 
Preston, Flanders attempts to argue that if the former is doing well then the latter must 
be the victims. 
Transcript - Flanders: It turns out it's not the really 'old we have to worry about, 
it's the nearly old, the ones who want to live hard and die not very young at all. 
With the poor 21 st century tax payer footing the bill. 
Ice hockey player: I've got a lot of life, a lot of life to go yet. I'll hopefully be 
playing hockey until I'm about 90. I wanna be buried in this kit. 
Flanders: We've got a battle on our hands alright and judging from the past few 
weeks this isn't going to end well for the young. 
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As with the BBC Ifdocudrama the Newsnightspecial on older voters presented 
an opportunity for the UK's main public service provider to investigate and explain the 
political implications of population ageing. In both cases the senior journalists 
responsible for putting the programmes together framed and discussed ageing 
through the neo-liberallens of generation accounting. Both broadcasts assumed the 
cutting of social spending to be a normative economic priority and portrayed any 
failure by governments to do so as likely to herald the kind of inter-generational 
conflict advanced by Kotlikoff. One important difference was that the Newsnight 
broadcast did contain a platform for dissenting voices. These voices came in the 
guise of the politicians invited for the panel discussion following the Flanders' film, 
and in the only part of the broadcast which had not been pre-scripted and tightly 
editorially controlled by the BBC's own staff. 
The analysis of the political communications outputs during the election of the 
three major political parties did not find any evidence of any kind of supportive rhetoric 
for the kind of generational conflict narrative seemingly so warmly embraced by 
Newsnight. Indeed this particular Newsnight programme indicated a possible dividing 
line between elite journalists and elite members of the political classes. In the studio 
discussion chaired by Jeremy Paxman following the Flanders report the three guest 
politicians refused to endorse the narrative, indeed two of the guests proactively 
challenged Flanders' underlying thesis. The three guests were Malcolm Wicks, then 
Labour's pensions minister of state, George Os borne for the Conservatives and Steve 
Webb for the Liberal Democrats. Osborne refused invitations from Paxman to 
endorse the narrative, although he never directly challenged it, but both Wicks and 
Webb attempted to challenge the premises of generational conflict presented by 
Flanders. 
247 
Malcolm Wicks directly challenged Paxman/Flanders' analysis and the idea of 
older people as being a burden as 'frankly old fashioned' citing higher employment 
rates for over 65s, the grey pound and their roles as carers for family members as 
evidence to support his counterpoint. Wicks also challenged the idea of the grey vote 
as monolith stating 'you know there's no such thing as the grey vote, older people 
come in all shapes and sizes', resisting in the process journalistic certainty in their 
ability to homogenise people in later life and claim to know their unified collective 
needs and viewpoints. Wicks argued that people in what might be called 'early' old 
age have differing priorities to the 'older' old and that older people come in all 'shapes 
and sizes'. Wick's argument may seem simplistic, but he clearly felt the need to 
critically engage with the even greater simplifications presented by Paxman and 
Flanders: 
Transcript: BBC Newsnight February 21 2005 
Paxman: (looking at Wicks) Can you explain to him (Osborne) who is going to 
pay for this 50% (council tax) discount? 
Wicks: Well, I'd love to come onto that, but first of all Jeremy can I say that this 
ana lysis that somehow older people are just a burden on the economy and 
society ... 
Paxman: Look 
Wicks: No, don't just say look, is frankly old fashioned. I mean a million people 
are still working in jobs over the age of 65, there's immense consumer power 
there, many of the younger elderly are carers for the older elderly and are 
making a major contribution to society. So, I thought the analysis was slightly old 
fashioned. 
Paxman: But we are talking about people who are drawing pensions? 
Wicks: drawing pensions, and of course the frail elderly are consuming a lot of 
the resources of the National Health Service, and rightly so, but you know there's 
no such thing as the grey vote, older people come in all shapes and sizes, and 
all ages, you know young 60 somethings (gestures to Paxman) as you and I 
might become one day, to people in their 80s or 90s who are a different kettle of 
fish, some are playing ice hockey, I didn't know that, so there's a range of 
, interests and a range of social policies that we need to address. Not in an 
alarmist way, but how do we adjust to this ageing society. 
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As the Liberal Democrat representative in the studio discussion Steve Webb 
also attempted to challenge the legitimacy of Flander's generational conflict narrative. 
Webb chose to object to Flander's report on the grounds that it gave a misleading 
impression of the social position of many older people in today's society, which was 
then used to imply they receive too much in state spending, and attempted to use 
statistics on excess winter deaths to make his point. Webb also challenged the notion 
that improved policy offers to older voters necessitate a worsening product on' offer to 
younger people by referring to the Liberal Democrat's manifesto commitment to scrap 
tuition fees: 
Paxman: (to Webb) can you then explain how a fifty percent cut for pensioners 
would be funded, who would fund it? 
Webb: But, that's not what the Liberal Democrats ... we are talking about raising a 
similar sum of money for local government in a fairer way, and I think my 
objection to the way it's just been presented in your piece is it is though 
pensioners have never had it so good, and yet we still live in a country ... 
Paxman: well, actually that's true 
Webb: We are living in a country where literally thousands of pensioners each 
winter have excess winter deaths compared with much colder countries 
(Later contribution .... ) 
Webb: But, for example, something like scrapping tuition fees which we are 
arguing for aims at the younger people but generates, if we can get more people 
in the higher education hopefully a bigger economy and that's got to be the key 
in the long term for paying for a larger elderly population. 
This studio debate resonated with another episode of politicians challenging 
the media expert in the 2005 campaign. This episode also took place on Newsnight 
and again involved Stephanie Flanders. On this occasion Labour minister, David 
Miliband, challenged a Flanders' report that rated the Labour government's record on 
managing the economy as 'completely false' (Billig 2007). As Billig notes Jeremy 
Paxman, who routinely challenges politicians' judgement and honesty, did not on this 
249 
occasion let a challenge to a BBC expert pass unquestioned. The rarity of a politician 
directly challenging the judgment of senior reporters, and preparedness of the political 
guests to challenge Flanders on her ageing framing is one demonstration of the 
distance between the BBC's framing of ageing and the discourses favoured by the 
main parties. 
One important dimension to the language used by the parties on pensions, but 
particularly true of the Labour Party was the significant proportion of material that 
covered issues such as pensions which did not frame the issue of being of primary 
concern to older people, or indeed, mention older people in conjunction with the issue 
at all. It has long been the contention of active-agers and campaign groups for older 
people that discussion of pensions as an issue only of interest to pensioners only 
helped to push the issue to the periphery of political debate. Furthermore, as 
pensioners in previous general elections were not perceived as key swing voters this 
reduced the likelihood of policy competition between the main parties and sharply 
improved policy offers on pensions. It was not only the vested interests of grey 
campaign groups who were concerned at any possible marginalisation of ageing 
issues, other groups such as trade unions also believed pensions, as a system of 
deferred pay, should be an issue of general concern to voters, all of whom aspire to 
live long, healthy lives, and who will need a robust pensions system to deliver a good 
standard of living in retirement. The analysis of election materials found that it was 
the Labour Party who were the most consistent in framing issues such as pensions as 
an ageing issue of general concern rather than an issue to be sidelined in the ghetto 
of 'pensioner issues'. As already noted the Liberal Democrats included all voters aged 
over 50 into their 'pensioner' materials, but it was Labour who were the most explicit 
in attempting to make ageing issues age neutral. For example this quote from a press 
statement in the name of work and pensions secretary Alan Johnson: 
'by abolishing the State Second Pension they (the Conservatives) would deny 20 
million women, low paid workers and disabled people the chance to build up a 
decent pension' 
Source: Labour website statement by Alan Johnson 
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Another strong example of what might be called age-neutral campaigning is 
how Labour chose to brief the press on the details of their forthcoming manifesto. 
Selective details of the Party's pensions policies were leaked to Robert Winnett and 
Labour's press team chose to pro-actively brief that the chief beneficiaries were to be 
middle class women living in marginal constituencies who usually 'fall foul' of the 
system. The story placement resulted in the Sunday Times headlining the story as 
'Blair's pension offer to mothers'; 
'Tony Blair is planning to woo stay-at-home mothers in the forthcoming general 
election by pledging a big increase in their basic state pension if Labour is re-
elected. 
The proposed manifesto pledge, worth at least £3 billion, would mean that 
women would be entitled to full state pensions regardless of how many years 
they had worked.' 
The leaking of manifesto plans showed Labour using pensions to target not 
older voters, but younger women. In the process, and in many ways, in doing so the 
turned on their head many presuppositions of how pensions are deployed as an 
election issue. Strategically, this may reflect a n understanding that older voters should 
not necessarily be addressed through their chronological age, when, for many their 
cognitive age is at conflict with how other perceive them. As Balazs argues (2004) 
. many older voters have a self-identity that rejects any consideration of themselves as 
being 'old' and as such reject messages targeted at them on the sole criteria of being 
of interest to the 'old'. 
From this study of the 2005 general election campaign it is clear that in their 
rhetoric and imagery the main British political parties have not incorporated any 
significant elements of apocalyptic demography. There is still a pronounced tendency 
to draw upon compassionate ageism, and discourses ofthe elderly. There is also the 
discourse of the pensioner, which does utilise some rational choice inspired notions of 
bank balance voting and defines older people by their welfare status. There is also 
evidence that ageing issues are being 'mainstreamed' out of any status as 'pensioner 
issues', partly out of a realisation of the voters' general interest in these areas of 
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policy, but also perhaps, out of a new understanding of the doubtful efficacy of 
targeting older voters with materials drawing upon aged identities that many older 
people reject. There is a current consensus across the main parties supporting more 
state resources and higher quality public and social services. The parties, including 
the Conservatives, had all moved away from the more neo-Iiberal orthodoxies, such 
as the strategic goal of replacing state pensions with private alternatives that informed 
public policy and debate in areas such as pensions at the end of the last Conservative 
administration in 1997. Whether the foundations for this new consensus will continue 
into the medium-term future is a question of some complexity and uncertainty. 
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Chapter Eight - Analysis and Conclusion: Constructing the Grey Vote 
The campaign of 2005 provided this thesis with a rich seam of activity and 
material in which to evaluate the impact of ageing on the conduct of communications 
activity. This chapter further reviews the impact of population ageing on the interface 
between politics and the media based on some of the new evidence generated by this 
project. Ageing may be rising in prominencewithin the mass media, but negative 
stereotyping remains a key feature of press content alongside some pessimistic 
framing of the social and economic implications of an ageing society. Media narratives 
are not in harmony with the apparently evolving political discourses analysed in this 
research, and yet the political parties' new rhetoric also fails to chime consistently with 
their own policy directions. The rhetoric of conditional entitlements remain firmly in 
place in a period where pensions and income benefits have become less conditional, 
indeed state pensions are tentatively edging towards citizenship orientated grounds 
for qualification. There were significant political exchanges on ageing issues in the 
2005 campaign, but it was in the 1997 election that pensions dominated the final 
exchanges in what became a bad tempered row between the Conservative and 
Labour parties. This chapter, adds the 1997 campaign to the discussion of the rise of 
the grey vote as a factor in general elections, but, perhaps, with a slightly surprising 
conclusion. The democratic implications of the increased use of segmentation are 
also discussed alongside the prospects for continued inter-generational solidarity in 
the new 'old' Britain where Sunderland will soon have the demographics of today's 
Torbay. 
The process of population ageing in Britain is transformative in nature. The 
next general election will take place in the middle of the age transformation of the 
electoral 'market'. Prior to the transition older people, in many ways were an politically 
excluded sub-section of the electorate (Philipson 1982). Post-transition as Chapter Six 
has demonstrated older people will represent a majority of voters in the vast majority 
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of parliamentary constituencies. And yet, as has been detailed in the Introductory 
chapter, and clear throughout the planning and execution of this thesis, a specialised 
or detailed focus on the impact of population ageing on the on the UK political 
process, on media content and portrayals is disconcertingly thin on the ground 
(Midwinter 1991; Pilcher 1995; Vesperi 2003; Sedlakova 2005; Williams et aI2007). 
When considering the politics of population ageing social gerontologists have 
traditionally focused on activity without really addressing the efficacy of that campaign 
activity. Yet it is clear that visible campaign activity does not directly translate into 
influence. Some recent examples would include the prolonged campaign by the 
Countryside Alliance to block parliament passing a ban on fox hunting. The campaign 
may have kept the issue in the spotlight, it certainly lead to a delay in the passing of 
the legislation, but ultimately it was unsuccessful. The largest demonstration since the 
Second World War took place in 2003 in opposition to an invasion of Iraq, yet 
parliament approved the military action by a massive majority. There is no correlation 
between a campaign's visibility or level of support and its efficacy. Yet in so many 
social-gerontology textbooks that allocate space to the politics of ageing many are 
content to historically trace the activities of major organisations that seek to represent 
the interests of older people. For example, Hilt & Lipschultz (2005) dedicated an 
academic book chapter to the 'political issues of media and gerontology'. Ostensibly, 
a potentially valuable resource for this thesis, however, their methodology is limited to 
a summary of some of the key ageing issues in US politics such as the future of 
Medicare with the rest of the chapter almost wholly given over to thematically studying 
the content of publications produced by the American Association of Retired Persons. 
In a UK context to replicate this approach would be to merely study the newsletters 
and publications of Age Concern and Help the Aged and claim this allows an 
authoritative overview of the politics of population ageing. But such an a pproach only 
provides a restricted and narrow sample for understanding the evolving discourses 
and mediation of ageing. Vincent et al (2001) used accounts of pressure group activity 
as a measurement of grey power. But they, more usefully, also attempted to analyse 
the policy rather rhetorical content of political manifestos from previous elections as 
well as interview some political and third party activists. Vincent et al also argue that 
an issue for further research is to investigate 'to what extent are these (national) 
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debates being framed around issues of generational conflict, fiscal responsibility, or 
the threat of population ageing?' This is both an endorsement of elements of this 
thesis and acknowledgement of the holes in traditional academic consideration of 
ageing and politics. 
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Section 8.1 Ageing and the Media 
The content analysis in Chapter Five of the press treatment of population 
ageing in early part of 2004 enabled this project to benchmark current discourses 
against the main bodies of work that did exist in the form of publications by Midwinter, 
Groombridge and Bergstrom, and provided a reference point for the more specific 
content analysis of party political communications outputs. This study has produced 
data that has enabled some useful analysis of how national newspapers approach the 
issue of population ageing. It has also allowed a comparison between academic 
theory and mass media reality, as well as scoping the arenas of political discourse 
where we have seen the beginnings of public policy being formulated within new 
frames that envisage ageing as an opportunity to advance progressive changes, and 
not just as a justification to roll back the frontiers of social solidarity. 
The study of press content in 2004 found that population ageing appeared in a 
wide range of articles - 235 in total - across most national newspapers in the three 
month period in the sample. However, it was rare for population ageing to be the 
principal issue focus - 11.5% of the stories accepted for analysis. The broadsheets 
accounted for a greater proportion of the coverage (71.6%), although popular press 
coverage may be underrepresented due to the language in the search terms being 
. more broadsheet in style. The study did not find that the majority of articles were not 
predominantly based upon negative stereotypes or concepts about population ageing. 
The majority (80.4%) were coded as being neutral. However, there is a noted absence 
of positive comment on population ageing with only 11 articles in the sample coded as 
positive, and no tabloid articles coded as positive. There is also evidence that in 
everyday news reporting, journalists draw upon a repertoire of negative stereotypes in 
which to portray ageing. Positive perspectives on ageing are more likely to occur 
where that article considers ageing in-depth. 
While there is a well defined and pessimistic discourse on the implications of 
population ageing, there is a lack of an alternative discourse, or construction, about 
the implications for the future of population ageing. There is evidence of articles which 
seek to engage with and consciously rebut pessimistic assumptions, but as these 
occur in response to more negative agendas, the content analysis in Chapter Five 
decided to label these efforts as a countering rather than a counter discourse. 
256 
Within the negative discourses surveyed within this research there is a strong 
strand of pessimism about economic consequences of population ageing, some of 
which is purely based on stereotypes on the personal qualities of older people. This 
pessimism links directly to a political programme of support for lower taxes and a 
reduction of the state's role in welfare. There is a strong narrative which is critical of 
the more generous welfare provisions for older people in the EU, and Germany in 
particular, which is portrayed as being unsustainable due to the 'burden' of larger 
numbers of older people, that was echoed by Sinn's 'gerontocracy' thesis (2002). As a 
public service broadcaster, the BBC, in the view of this author, missed a vital 
opportunity to investigate the diversity of perspectives on population ageing when it 
commissioned the flagship drama documentary If.. the generations fall apart. 
However, instead the programme, as with the BBC NewsniYhtbroadcast analysed in 
Chapter Seven, became a showpiece exposition of pessimistic narratives about 
population ageing and leaned heavily towards neo-liberal framing of the associated 
issues. As such it is evidence of the potential for how quickly mass media coverage 
could switch from a moderate tendency to the negative about ageing to a full blown 
neo-liberal agenda. 
The stereotype of the frail and dependent older person still resonates strongly 
in the press. However, this stereotype generates two different media identities for 
older people as a group. The first is the deserving cause, worthy of public sympathy 
and who should be a priority for state welfare spending. The second is the passive 
burden continually putting upward pressure on state spending, with the growing 
numbers of older people predicted to bring the levels of spending to a breaking point 
at some point in the future. The first stereotype is can be applied generally, but the 
second is becoming intertwined with new constructions of 'selfish' baby boomers who 
are accordingly less deserving of our generosity (Kitch 2003). This construction of the 
selfish boomer is further meshed into the growing consensus in the press seen in 
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Chapters Five and Seven that older people are becoming more politically assertive, 
and that the grey vote is becoming more powerful. This consensus, in turn, seems to 
have produced conflicting verdicts on the desirability of this development. For some, 
this represents a welcome assertion from a group who have been marginalised and 
deserve better, however, for others the grey vote is seen as a problem, because it is 
perceived as a barrier to political parties adopting policies of welfare privatisation. The 
news media are becoming increasingly interested in the baby boomers and are 
developing a new narrative and identity for this cohort. They are portrayed as being 
more individualistic and are likely to convert their strong position as consumers into 
political power on retirement (Huber & Skidmore 2003). Some of these constructions 
can be understood as being quite positive as they accord agency and empowerment 
to the boomers, but in media narratives, but not, so far at least, political narratives, 
there is evidence that the boomers as being portrayed as less worthy of state support 
when they reach retirement (Islam 2007). 
Sociological and media theory has not paid sufficient attention to the interplay 
between the mass media and population ageing. Where work has been developed it 
has tended to focus on older people rather than ageing issues. Historical sociological 
theories such as disengagement, structuralism and more recently active ageing can 
all still make a valuable contribution to an understanding of the age transformation of 
our society. However, theoretical works appear to have not kept pace with increasing 
diversity to be found within the retired community and the growing diversity in media 
production. More attention is required on the political economy of this relationship, on 
the role of advertising in pressuring commercial media to deliver younger audiences, 
set against the growing spending power of older consumers. Frankly, too little is 
known about how this tension is evolving and how it will influence future media 
content or the development of new platforms. 
One immediate concerning in reviewing the results of this study is the lack of 
similar work with which it can be compared, and to some extent its validity can be 
judged. However, there were enough similarities, and differences, with the Midwinter, 
Bergstrom and Groombridge studies discussed in Section 2.7 to inspire confidence. 
258 
Content analysis has been widely used in exploring mass media portrayals of socially 
excluded groups within our society, and in this research it provided a sound launching 
pad for exploring how newspapers have approached ageing. 
At all stages it's important to consider what the sample can, and cannot 
measure. At the simplest level this study has taken a time period and measured how 
many articles mentioned population ageing, and how and where those articles 
appeared. Yet, even at this simplest of levels we have seen how the data begins to 
piece the parts of the overall puzzle together. The quantitative section of this work has 
~een careful to ensure is measures what it claims to measure - and no more. Working 
within those sensible limitations the content data needed the qualitative thematic 
examination to make more sense of the sample. An examination of newspaper 
coverage has been clearly beneficial, however, in today's fluid multi-media news 
environment, research should always strive to collect data that ranges across formats. 
In this regard, the in-depth consideration of the BBC's drama documentary and 
Newsmghttreatment of population ageing enabled a process of cross-referencing 
which strengthened the analysis. The subject of population ageing is a constant that 
infuses newspaper copy across a diverse range of themes and issues. If the scope of 
the study had been widened to include newsprint that considered all aspects of 
biological and social ageing, and brought in material that used the language of 
'pensioners' and 'the elderly', the size of the sample would have multiplied many 
times over. However, the main aim was to consider the portrayal of population ageing 
as an issue, and not the more general portrayals of older people. 
Although population ageing often appears, it infrequently comes up as an 
issue in itself, but is woven into the contexts and strands of debate that are headlined 
by other concerns. In this sense the results fit with Groombridge's (1999) conclusion 
that ageing receives steady 'medium' level coverage, but rarely hits the front page. 
However, the situation is now unrecognisable from 1977 when the Royal Commission 
on the Press admitted difficulties in finding coverage that considered ageing issues 
such as pensions. The prominence of ageing issues is clearly rising incrementally 
over time, although in the sample for this research at least, rarely from the perspective 
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of, or written by, older people. The majority of the articles in the sample came from the 
quality press titles, however, a different sampling strategy, perhaps more concerned 
with issues such as fear of crime, would have been likely to increase coverage for 
consideration from the popular titles. It is hard now to agree with Midwinter (1991) that 
the media ignores age issues, the newspapers do not ignore ageing issues, but there 
is a clear absence of a positive policy agenda on population ageing. There is a 
diversity of perspectives, of sorts, and ageing informs many of the most important 
political debates of the day, however, in the space occupied by the mass media, the 
language used to describe the issues too often relies on a historic palette of ageist 
attitudes, which should no longer be seen as acceptable. 
In many senses, it is extremely troubling, if not entirely unexpected, to find in 
this research the apparent dominance of a deeply negative repertoire for covering 
ageing issues, particularly as the assumptions are often based on ageist notions. In 
this negative narrative population ageing is bad news; it views older people as 
dependents, as burdens with nothing to contribute to society. It ignores contexts such 
as the forced nature of retirement, and ignores the contributions that older people 
make as carers for children, as carers for other older family members, as the bedrock 
of voluntary organisations and local democracy. The narrative constructs a picture of 
bleak economic prospects which will ferment political crises, particularly for countries 
which follow the European Social Model. Population ageing's main economic crime is 
to act as a driver for increased public spending, and as such mounting significant 
barriers to tax cutting and the privatisation of welfare agenda. These contexts show 
the continuing relevance of the structuralist approach to understanding the politics of 
ageing. Walker (1981) and Townsend (1981) saw ageing constructed as a social 
problem, and that still holds true today found in the media discourse of older people 
as a 'burden' and population ageing as a 'timebomb'. UK society could be portrayed 
as possessing strong elements of inter-generational solidarity, as evidenced by public 
support, across all age ranges, for increased public spending on pensions and 
education. Where the notion of inter-generational interests did emerge in the 
coverage, although only on a few occasions in the print coverage, but writ large in the 
BBC's ft. .. docudrama, the dominant portrayal was one of coming generational conflict 
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in competition for resources. As such, in the sampled coverage, the media privileges 
the arguments advanced by Kotlikoff (2004) over more inter-generational solidarity 
orientated writers such as Robertson (1997) and Mullan (2002). 
In the political sphere, the media coverage of ageing is now far away from the 
disengagement theories of the Chicago School. There is a persistent awareness and 
portrayal of older people as actors who have a level of influence on political 
outcomes, although there is some confusion on how to respond to the apparent rise of 
grey power. There is a sense that older people, or rather the 'elderly', are a deserving 
cause, and that recent rebellions by pensioner groups on the issues of the state 
pension and council tax described in Chapter Three are in some way supported by 
natural justice. However, there is an apparent ceiling to the levels of support the press 
will accord, perhaps influenced by an ideology, that stretches, as we have seen, as far 
back as Beveridge, that is opposed to the notion of the state funding high standards of 
living for retired people. This may help to explain the more ambivalent attitude 
expressed towards the baby boomers. The impending retirement of the boomers will 
heighten the perceived political clout of the retired, but boomers are sometimes 
portrayed, with the focus on them as consumers, as less needy, and also less 
deserving due to a sense that they are more selfish than older cohorts. 
In a way, the early signs of a back lash against the boomers may be an 
unintended consequence of the assertiveness found in the Active Ageing literature 
(Laslett 1989;Gilleard & Higgs 2002). The strand of press articles that can be found 
which focus on the 'grey pound' mean that Midwinter (1991) is out of date in asserting 
that is no sense that many older people are healthy and well-off, indeed, the balance 
may have swung too far in the other direction, as the boomers are now almost 
uniformly portrayed as being affluent and assertive, as a consequence the true 
diversity in terms of income inequality and social exclusion of this cohort is being 
ignored. 
As ageism is a mainstream behaviour in our society (Bytheway 1995), it 
should, perhaps, not be surprising that there is an inability in the mass media to 
positively envision a society where a greater proportion are older. Where population 
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ageing is the main theme, in the press - but not in BBC drama documentaries - there 
was a greater diversity of perspectives. But, in everyday news discourse journalists 
dip into a sophisticated repertoire of negative stereotypes of the meaning of age. The 
overall picture can conceal a great deal of diversity in how to approach the issue, and 
there is a steady stream of perspectives which pro-actively challenge the 'time bomb' 
narrative. However, they take the 'time bomb' as their starting point, and as such are 
working within the boundaries of the negative discourse. As already observed, there is 
a countering rather than a counter ageing discourse to be found. Yet, there is plurality 
,in how the mass media approach ageing and older people, and ~igns, perhaps, the 
trends are emerging that will gradually see a progressive evolution in tone and 
content. An e-mail survey of 100 journalists conducted by the Journalists Exchange 
on Aging (JEoA 2007) inquired about appropriate editorial usage in the news and 
information media on issues on ageing. Within this sample, at least, perhaps reflecting 
a pre-existing interest in the issues, there was a general dislike of the world elderly 
and a consensus that it should only be used as modifier i.e. elderly patients when 
referring to people who discernibly old and frail. There was recognition that many 
older people disliked the term as they found it stigmatised all older people together in 
an image of frailty and decline. The survey also cited reflective efforts by same 
newspapers to purge ageist language and assumptions from their copy. The Gannett 
Newspapers group, which includes USA Today, in its updated stylebook for staff 
journalists asks for an avoidance of patronising stereotypes such as 'sweet',' feeble', 
'eccentric', 'grandmotherly' etc as well as the description of an older individual as 
'active' with its implication that this is some deviation from the norm. It also asks 
reports to not gratuitously mention family relationships when there is no relevance to 
the subject: Golda Meir, a doughty grandmother, told the Egyptians ... '(JEoA 2007). 
At the level of the individual there appears to be a mixing of active ageing 
perspectives, and more traditional 'compassionate ageism' (Vincent 2003), where 
empathy is expressed in terms that allocate the older person a passive and 
dependent role. Personal freedom and assertiveness in old age is now being 
encouraged, but at the level of individualist consumerism while collective rights to 
state support and sponsorship are being called into question. Furthermore, the macro-
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economic implication of ageing are more likely to be debated at a European or global 
scale, than in a purely UK context. This is possibly an indication that the economic 
consequences are being wrapped up into the wider discourse of global markets and 
the globalisation agenda. The analysis of the sample also served as a reminder to not 
disregard the importance of the political economy in considering mass media 
portrayals of population ageing. The advertising industry's desire to find media outlets 
which reach younger audiences puts considerable pressure on newspapers to 
develop editorial styles which consciously exclude older readers. It is the influence of 
advertising money which partly explains the perceived invisibility of older people and 
their concerns form the media. 
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Section 8.2 - Ageing and Political Campaigning 
The print media may draw upon a negative repertoire to describe population 
ageing and older people, and public broadcasters such as the BBC have keenly 
promote an agenda of inter-generational conflict, but for all the inconsistencies of 
language, the analysis of the materials produced by the political parties for the 2005 
general election found that the parties largely managed to steer clear of the worst 
excesses of linguistic ageism. While the discourses of the elderly are ever present in 
media content, they appeared more sporadically in party political campaign. 
discourses, and the Labour Party in particular has appeared to have consciously 
moved away from the language of the hapless elderly. Chapter Seven included the 
fascinating rupture between media and political discourses that took place in an 
episode of the BBC's Newsnightprogramme, as the invited political guests proactively 
challenged the 'old fashioned' notion of older people as a 'burden' that featured so 
heavily as a concept in the Newsmghtreporting. This is not, however, to say that this 
research found the discourses of political parties to be a haven of progressive and 
egalitarian visions of citizenship in later life. It is hard to gauge on this evidence 
whether this apparent split between political and media elites is based on ideological 
or practical groundings. Both are conscious of their audiences, but it is likely to be the 
case that the political classes feel the need to tread more carefully around the 
sensitivities of language when discussing later life. Perhaps political copy writers 
assess a greater risk of insulting public opinion on the position of older people within 
society than the institutions of the mass media, that it is a worse condition for a 
political party to alienate its older audiences than for the mass media that is often, as 
Bergstrom (2001) demonstrated, distancing itself from any association with 'the old'. 
It is also worth considering whether political content providers assume the 
position of early adapters when it comes to developing new discourses on later life as 
they are more likely through the incorporation of political marketing to be constantly 
researching public responses to the use of language and picking up any dislike for the 
negative stereotyping of older people. Of course the mass media researches its use 
of language and advises its reporting staff, but again, with signs of some apparent 
264 
confusion. For example, in a clear echo of the rejection of ageist language by some 
specialist American reporters (JEoA 2007), the Guardian advises its journalists in its 
style guide: 
Elderly: do not use to describe anyone under 70, and say elderly people (or even 
better, older people), never the elderly' (author's emphasis) 
Yet in the style guide for the Times states that 'A sensitive consensus is 
building for the term 'older people', but in the guide's advice on the use of pensioners 
it states: 
'If in doubt, write the elder~(author emphasis) or older people, or as last resort, 
senior citizen.' 
The routine use of the word elderly is also found in academia. A simple search 
for the word 'elderly' for this thesis in the on line database of the International 
Bibliography of the Social Sciences produced 1868 articles that have the word in their 
title. This is not the legacy of older work submitted prior to more modern and elevated 
awareness of ageism, as in 2006 and the first half of 2007162 new academic papers 
entered the database which use 'elderly' in the title. Indeed, there is also frequent use 
ofthe impersonal and stigmatising noun 'the elderly'. 
As a leading sociologist and third way thinker Giddens (2007) believes age 
discrimination bears a number of resemblances to sex discrimination, indeed he says 
'ageism is the sexism of our time'. Old age should no longer be considered as 
something that just happens to someone. Giddens argues that moving away from 
elderly discourses is only a first stage and that the language of pensioners should 
also be removed from the communications of major political parties: 
'Labour should drop the term 'pensioner' altogether. It suggests that when 
people reach a certain age they become dependent, need to be provided for by 
the rest of the community, unable to live an independent and flourishing life.' 
(Giddens 2007) 
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The labels of elderly or pensioner, and the attitudes that go with them are often 
taken on board by those they are applied to, reinforcing any absence of self worth, 
and Giddens also questions how far is the popular image of an ageing society - with 
its implication of a net increase in the levels of social impairment and morbidity - a 
misnomer when, in terms of the lifestyles of older people are merging with those of 
younger ones. Giddens is an important inte"ectual contributor to the New Labour 
project, but his influence is limited. However, his quotes show the line of thinking that 
may be behind the shift to different kind of language in political campaigning on 
ageing issues. 
Reliance on elderly discourses may appear to be on the way out of political 
communications outputs, but the use of pensioner is still widespread. The use of 
pensioner is slightly more problematic to analyse in that elderly can be very clearly 
negative is much of its deployment whereas, despite its structured roots pensioner is 
in many ways considered something of a neutral description of an older person in 
current language usage. None the less, the term pensioner still defines older people 
by their relationship to the welfare state, although it was intriguing to discover the 
emergence in the election campaign of active ageing discourses, especially coming 
from the parties of the centre/centre-left. 
From the content analysis of 2005 campaign materials it appeared that a" three 
main parties were in agreement that, in general terms, older people deserved to 
receive more money and state support. The main parties also a" campaigned on the 
claim that their policy offer would deliver these increases in material resources for 
older voters. This fits with research into the party election manifestos in 1959 and 
1974 that found evidence of narratives across a" major parties that drew upon the 
concept of pensioners as the 'deserving poor', and that older people's high visibility 
welfare requirements dominates as the defining image of old age in a political context 
(Vincent et aI2001). It was certainly true that no-one· was arguing for cut backs or 
reallocation of resources away from older voters. However, there were high levels of 
conditionality contained within these offers of more. Overall, the parties resisted the 
temptation to base their appeals on strong rhetoric or imagery that drew upon 
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compassionate ageism. However, this was a distinctly possible finding in the analysis 
as compassionate ageism is still a device deployed in recent elections in other 
English speaking democracies. Kaid and Garner's (2004) analysis ofthe 2000 US 
presidential campaign found a large increase in the number of political adverts on 
television that addressed the concerns of older voters. AI Gore devoted 38% of his 
'spots' to ageing issues and George W Bush 35%. Gore's spots tended towards 
negative attacks that used images of frail older hands and women walking slowly with 
support from a walker, in contrast, as the incumbent eager to demonstrate 
governmental delivery Bush's sports were more positive and used images of older 
people in leisure pursuits with their friends and families. The SNP's 'means test' 
poster (Figure 7.6) discussed in Chapter Seven came the closest to a classical 
compassionate ageism appeal, but overall the main parties consciously resisted the 
use of weak and helpless older people in their campaigning materials and narratives. 
The Conservative Party deployed the war heroes rhetoric - of those who gave 
so much in the Second World War, should receive their 'due'. But at the time of writing 
it has been over six decades since the end of the Second World War, so even the 
youngest adults of 18 years of age on VJ Day will be over 80 years old today. This 
Conservative narrative could be construed, fairly, or unfairly, as a rhetorical slight of 
hand that appears to promise a more generous settlement in retirement to all, but in 
fact a declaration of reduced entitlements for future cohorts. Increased resources in 
return for war time service and hardships is a rarely occurring set of circumstances 
that are unlikely, we hope, to future retiring cohorts. On what basis will these cohorts 
claim the pro-active support of the state in later life? In this regard the Conservative 
Party rhetoric was unclear. 
The Labour Party's rhetoric was also inconsistent on the criteria for increasing 
state support in later life, on one hand there was a clear and traditional social 
democratic language of assistance for those who are financially less well off. But this 
was muddied by the qualifying 'hard working' families rhetoric. This would appear to 
make the offer of more conditional on some measure of thrift or endeavour, yet in the 
post-election period Labour moved to reform pensions based on residency rather than 
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employment and tax contributions. For Biggs, it is not surprising that we find changing 
narratives of old age when there are parallel changes in public policy, and that new 
ageing policies appear to challenge ageism in how they affect access to work and 
services and in their recognition of a greater flexibility in modern lifestyles and 
potential in later life (Biggs 2001). 
Reality is that in this current phase of UK politics policy is moving away from 
state income support in retirement based on NI contributions and the individual's 
employment history and toward entitlements based upon residency or citizenship. But, 
clearly the political rhetoric used by the main parties does not perfectly reflect change 
in public policy. Current reforms are rarely justified on the basis of citizenship, instead 
there is a constant referencing of 'service' or 'hard work' interlaced with more 
progressive concerns of gender inequality within the current pensions architecture. 
Perhaps we should not be surprised in the knowledge of how totemic the principles of 
the Beveridge Report have been in post-war British social and political history, that it 
is in all likelihood a political impossibility to leap in one bound from the la nguage of 
conditional earned entitlements to welfare in.later life as a right of citizenship. 
However, the final destination in the direction of travel for current rhetoric is unclear. It 
may be just as likely that new restrictions and barriers to full welfare entitlements are 
negotiated, hence the interest in the new social constructions of the baby boomers, 
as it is that Britain may enter a new age of citizenship based upon politically 
entrenched rights to claim resources. 
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8.3 Comparisons with the 'pensions row' in the 1997 general election. 
The role of older voters and party competition over key ageing issues formed a 
constant set of sub-narratives in the 2005 election campaign. However, it would be 
hard to stand up any assertion that the campaign was in any way dominated by a 
battle for the grey vote. This was by no means the first grey election, although there 
was plenty to indicate grey roots. 
This stands in an apparent contrast with the campaign of 1997 which was 
dominated for a period during the later stages by a bad tempered row centring on the 
Conservative Party's plans for pensions reform. The Conservative manifesto of 1997 
planned to introduce a system where younger workers would opt-out of the Basic 
State Pension and have their National Insurance contributions credited to a private 
pensions account instead. Speaking as shadow chancellor, Gordon Brown attacked 
the scheme on April 25 1997 claiming the plan was an ideologically driven attempt to 
privatise the state pension. Gordon Brown seized on a Conservative statement that 
older people could be brought into the scheme at a 'later date', an attack which 
became (conveniently) misinterpreted in media reports as a threat to the state 
pension payments of existing pensioners. The charges and counter charges exploded 
into one of the most heated exchanges seen in recent British general elections. John 
Major accused Labour of telling lies and 'scurrilous and outrageous' claims (BBC 
1997) 
In this instance it appears the Conservatives became the victims/prisoners of 
years of their own, and specifically Thatcherite rhetoric of rolling back the welfare 
state, privatising elements of public service and promoting private responsibility over 
state support. Many voters appeared to readily believe that the Conservatives were 
about to abolish the Basic State Pension. To John Major's clear frustration the 
Conservatives were drawn into desperately briefing the media and reassuring voters 
that they had no plans to take away the state pension. Journalists following 
candidates campaigning in marginal seats reported older people 'in tears' out of fear 
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that the Conservatives would abolish the state pension, and that Labour candidates 
felt moved to explain that 'not even the Conservatives' would be so heartless as to 
leave pensioners 'destitute' (Winter& McSmith 1997). 
The 1997 pensions row is clearly of interest as it appears, on the face of things 
at least, that a central ageing issue was dominating an election campaign that 
culminated in an historic shift in British public opinion, with both the Conservative and 
Labour parties using the issue strategically. Yet, the suspicion remains that older 
voters were not the core objective of the two main parties clashing over pensions. 
Vincent et al (2001) point out that the Conservative Party plan was targeted at 
younger voters as the main financial beneficiaries, and that the 'liar' row was ironic in 
that sense as the Conservatives' intention was use the Basic Pension Plan proposal 
to appeal to younger voters by demonstrating a renewed momentum for rolling out 
radical free market policies. In contrast to the 2005 campaign the Conservative 
manifesto of 1997 used population ageing to frame pensions policy as facing a 
potential future crisis from which their initiative could protect younger people. The 
issue was pensions, but the target audience were younger voters and the desired 
brand image impact was a generalised sense of renewed radicalism. The Tory Basic 
Pension Plan may have shown the valence of pensions as an issue in UK elections, 
but it was not a campaigning tool aimed at securing the grey vote. 
From the Labour Party's perspective the prime motivation for stirring the 
pensions row did not appear to come from a strategic segmentation of older voters. 
Sparrow (2001) cites the importance of internal Labour polling during the campaign 
that began to show the Conservatives appearing to reduce Labour's national lead, 
partly as a consequence of the continued focus on Europe. Without direct evidence 
that it was intentional, Sparrow notes the pensions row successfully moved the 
campaign agenda away from Europe. This chimes with the author's personal 
experience of working as part of Labour's press team during the 1997 campaign. The 
author's own assessment of this part of the campaign was designed to illustrate the 
theme of 'fear of a fifth term', the pensions attack was a case study to try and give 
weight to the attack that the Conservatives would push further to the right politically if 
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they could win an unprecedented fifth election victory. That the clashes on pensions 
raised doubts about the Conservative Party's intentions for current pensioners was 
not the intention, but rather a political advantageous side-effect of the debate's 
escalation into a bad tempered row. 
Without doubt pensions is an issue with the potential to assume high valance 
value in British politics, although it has yet to reach the 'third rail' status that Social 
Security has reached in American politics. In the 2005 campaign pensions were more 
likely to be raised in apparent connection with party strategic objectives to cultivate 
older voters, with the exception of Labour media relations which seemed keen to 
stress pensions as an issue of importance for younger workers, particularly women. 
However, later life, and other life stages were clearly part of the main parties' 
segmentation strategies during the 2005 campaign. 
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8.4 Voter segmentation and the shifting demographics of the electoral marKet 
Voter segmentation has always, to some extent or other, taken place, but the 
analysis of the 2005 election campaign it appears that age and life cycle are 
becoming increasingly important factors in the identification of potential target 
electoral segments. But, there are clearly limitations in the extent to which such 
strategies can be implemented within political campaigning in contrast to campaigns 
for consumer durables. In many ways, national election campaigns can still be 
considered to be exercises in mass communications, with only token nods and winks 
within the communications mix targeted at sub-groups. Perhaps, at this stage, the 
best hope for the parties is the concept of the 'dog whistle' - that within the furious 
generation of news outputs in a campaign coded signals in their visual 
representations and in their use of language will be received and decoded by the 
target sub-groups. Within this debate may lay the explanation as to why parties often 
pro-actively leak to the media elements of their segmentation strategies. By letting it 
be known that a group within society is a central concern of a party, there is a 
potentially powerful signal, or dog whistle, that that group's interests will be addressed 
if the party wins - or in other words - the segment is the message. 
For segmentation to succeed the parties cannot, and do not, rely on mass 
communications alone. Further consideration is required of the ways in which the 
parties have developed their direct mail strategies, and the continuing importance of 
local campaigning for delivering messages from the parties to target voters. A further 
question rotates around the problem of what consequences increasing segmentation 
will have for the quality of democratic responsiveness. Bannon (2004) has already 
raised the problem of what happens to sections of the population who are ignored in 
the segmentation process? Surely they have the right to access public services on an 
equitable footing? As already noted in the 2005 campaign saw groups such as 
Operation Black Vote and Age Concern actively lobby to be segmented. As 
commercial newspapers sell their readers to advertisers, so lobby groups appear to 
sell 'their voters' to political parties. 
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In an interesting contribution to this debate Greg Cook (2005), then Labour's 
head of Political Intelligence, has rejected the notion that segmentation inevitably 
leads to an ever narrowing of electoral focus. He has argued that the electoral market 
is now more diverse, socially and geographically, older voters are now almost as likely 
to switch parties as younger age groups, and 45% of parliamentary seats have 
changed hands at least once in the past 25 years. In this context, the idea of a 
minority of swing seats in between monolithic blocs of safe seats holding the key to 
victory has long gone. Cook further argues that assumptions of small groups of swing 
voters holding disproportionate influence is also outdated: 
• ... glance at a selection of the ten most marginal Labour held constituencies .. .what 
'type of voter' is common to, for example, South Dorset, Braintree, Cardiff Central, 
Shipley and Dumfries and Galloway, comprising as they do elderly seaside towns, 
upmarket suburbia, commuter belt, market towns, sparsely populated rural 
districts and densely populated inner-city spread across most parts of the 
country?' 
(Greg Cook. Progress March/April 2005) 
Cook's argument is not against segmentation, but a recognition that in age 
where levels of party identification and trust in the political system as a whole are in 
decline, simplistic categorisations of voters is an inadequate response. Yet, despite 
this evidence of awareness of the strategic challenge facing Labour and other parties, 
there is little sense that the parties know how they will re-engage with voters. Indeed, 
in an age of lower turnout, the temptation is to turn any election campaign into a battle 
of marginal turnout, where proactive political communications are strictly targeted at 
people who vote, and ignores those who do not, or who are identified to have strong 
loyalties with competing parties. The danger here is a damaging cycle of shrinking 
campaigns in response to shrinking turnouts, which further decrease the pool of active 
voters. 
Within these trends the 2005 election demonstrated how the parties, 
historically dismissive of the strategic importance of older voters, are now increasingly 
adapting their strategies in a direction which allocates rising priority to initiatives 
targeted on segmented groups of older voters. As already stated, this evidence 
273 
suggests that the age gap in turnout which became so apparent in the 1997 and 2001 
elections continued to grow during parliamentary term leading up to 2005 (Clarke et al 
2005; Phelps 2005). It seems that non-voting is becoming a 'habit' for many people in 
younger age cohorts, raising the question of how far these trends represent a 
permanent age shift in patterns of electoral participation, with significant implications 
for political parties who will need to adapt to working within a political 'market' 
dominated by voters aged 50 and over. 
The age transformation of the electorate is now well advanced. The next 
general election will take place in the middle of the age transformation, and by 2025 
the electoral destiny of the most parliamentary seats will be settled by older voters, 
who will cast over 50% of votes on polling day. Yet, debate and evaluation of the 
inexorable rise of the grey vote has been strangely muted. However, a new urgency, 
could, and should be brought about by the ever widening age gap in turnout and by 
the emergence of a Labour-Conservative 'Grey Battleground' at the next general 
election. According to the projections in Chapter Six, at the 2005 general election, for 
the first time, pensioners accounted for more than one in four of votes cast. There are 
now more votes cast by voters aged over 65 than there are cast by voters aged under 
35. In the model the Grey Vote accounted for a hefty 41.2% of the 2005 turnout. In 24 
of the 'oldest' seats, the model estimates that over half the turnout came from the grey 
vote These Grey Majority seats represent a new phenomenon where older voters 
comprise a physical majority of votes in the ballot box on polling day. At the next 
election, if the age differences in turnout remain unchanged, there will be an 
additional 1.3 million votes cast by older voters and there will be 79 seats with a Grey 
Majority. 
What is going to be different about the new electoral demographics? 
Obviously, older people are not homogenous, as with the rest of society there is 
diversity in areas such as class, ethnicity and attitudes. Simplistic campaign targeting 
is doomed to failure. But, age, either as a chronological, life stage, or cohort 
phenomenon, clearly does affect political behaviour. Older people are more likely to 
vote, join campaigns and contact elected representatives (Electoral Commission 
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2006). They have higher levels of political literacy and are more likely to be keen 
consumers of the news media. Ageist stereotypes need to be challenged, age does 
not equate to decrepitude, but it does incorporate, at widely varying rates, a process 
of gradual loss of physical ability and decline of the senses. A proportion of older 
people will be living with more serious longer term chronic conditions. Yet, in many 
ways, the 'problem' of ageing is how others start to treat you differently. According to 
a recent report by the Audit Commission (2006), it was found that public services 
often fail to meet the special needs of older people, an(l evidence 'of a lack of dignity 
and respect in the way older people are treated when in hospital.' Older people are 
the biggest users of the NHS. It is questionable whether public services delivered in 
this manner are politically sustainable, particularly bearing in mind the impending 
retirement of baby boomers who may well have much higher expectations of public 
services than older cohorts who were bought up in post-war austerity (Huber & 
Skidmore 2003). Another defining characteristic of the grey vote is the high proportion 
who are financially insecure. This explains why Council Tax rising faster than 
pensions has caused so many political problems, and why the long-term response to 
the Turner commission on pensions will be so important. 
The 2005 campaign saw the opposition parties attempt to gain electoral capital 
from Labour's perceived difficulties with several ageing issues. In the early campaign 
the Conservatives placed newspaper adverts which featured a carefully targeted 
swipe at the 'young' Britain imagery associated with the New Labour re-branding. The 
ad, in Michael Howard's name, stated: The older generations may have been air-
brushed out of Mr Blair's Britain, but I will stand up for them.' The Conservatives 
returned to ageing issues at the beginning of April by claiming Labour would be forced 
to solve the 'pensions crisis' by increasing direct taxes. This was followed the 
following day with two different press conferences on pensions. The Liberal 
Democrats attempted to use the issue of long-term care by highlighting their role in 
the Scottish Executive in the introduction of free personal care. They also used the 
last Friday of the campaign to promote policies on a citizens' pension, long term care 
and the replacement of Council Tax with a local income tax. The Budget in March 
2005 was used by Labour to directly respond to the opposition parties on Council Tax. 
Labour's older people manifesto hew opportunities for later life' stressed the 
importance of the economy in providing security in retirement. 
275 
For all their pro-active campaigning, on polling day the Conservatives made 
little progress amongst the grey vote. Their vote share remained unchanged amongst 
the baby boomers, and they only managed to increase national vote share by 1 % 
amongst voters aged 65+. The Liberal Democrats added 4% to their national vote 
share, but only improved by 1 % amongst voters aged 65+ (MORI 2005). The fallout 
from 2005 is that Labour, while it performed well, or perhaps relatively less badly, with 
older voters, there are now a number of seats where Labour would be vulnerable to 
swings against them from grey voters. There are 27 seats, in three different 
categories, that emerged from the model in Chapter Five, and which look of particular 
strategic interest in this regard. Firstly, there are the ultra-marginals with majorities of 
less than 5% with large grey votes. These include the more obvious seats such as 
Thanet South and Hastings. But, this category also includes seats such as High Peak 
and Wirral West. Then there are the fairly marginal seats, with majorities of between 5 
and 10%, which have considerable grey votes, indeed, in this category, if the age gap 
widens, Great Yarmouth, Carmarthen West, Staffordshire Moorlands, amongst others, 
will have Grey Majorities next time around. Finally, there are a clutch of more 
comfortable Labour seats which will have Grey Majorities and would be vulnerable to 
significant swings away by grey voters of which Morecambe and the Vale of Clwyd 
are two examples. These seats also have other important shared characteristics. All 
of them were Labour gains in the landslide of 1997 and, in all of them it is the 
Conservatives who are challenging in second place. It is this grey battleground 
between Labour and the Conservatives which holds the potential to be a crucial front 
in determining the outcome of the next campaign. 
The research in Chapter Six has revealed some strong regional differences in 
how the geographical spread of the ageing of the electorate. After 2009, the 
proportion of older voters takes a step increase of around two per cent at each staging 
post through to 2025. By 2025, using 2005's turnout rates, the estimated number 
voters aged 65+ comprise about one third of the voting public. A little lower in England 
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(30.9%), but more than a third in Scotland (33.7%) and Wales (34.4%). Taking all 
voters aged 55+, by 2025 the grey vote is estimated to make up one half of all the 
votes cast (49.9% in England, up to 53% in Scotland. Looking at the regions of 
England, two vary by a high degree from the national averages. Firstly London, which 
looks likely to buck the national trends. The 65+ vote will only grow by 2% between 
2009 and 2025, and that is going from the low base of 18.7%. By way of contrast in 
the South West voters aged 65+ are predicted to comprise more than one third of the 
turnout by 2020, and comprise 35.6% in 2025. The rapid ageing of seats in Scotland 
is striking, and more pronounced than for the other countries in the UK. In 2009, there 
will still only be two Grey Majority seats in 2009 under the scenario that turnout by age 
remains constant at 2005 levels (North East Fife 54.4% and Kirkcaldy and 
Cowdenbeath 54.7%) - but by an election in 2025 there will be a grey majority in an 
estimated 39 out of the 59 Westminster constituencies in Scotland. Under the politics 
ota devolved system of government for the UK the different nations and regions of 
the country will have distinctly different experiences of population ageing. All things 
being equal, this should translate into divergent perspectives on spending priorities 
and the configurations of public services. 
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8.5 Framing inter-generational relations and the construction of grey power 
It is possible to reasonably advance the contention that the British polity 
currently holds to a broad consensus on society's obligations to people in later life. 
This consensus builds upon basic human solidarity and empathy to legitimate action 
to ensure that all enjoy at least modest incomes alongside access to the latest health 
and social care in old age. There is a widespread appreciation that in an age,ing 
society this commitment will drive up levels of state spending. There is no way 
around this, although the extent of the increased spending can be ameliorated 
through public policy measures such as increased labour force participation, higher 
levels of personal savings, new concepts in housing planning and the building of 
surpluses in state pension funds in the short term to deal with longer term 
commitments. The latter measures have featured strongly in debates in Australia and 
New Zealand on the implications of ageing for those countries (McDonald 2005). The 
threat to this consensus would be any real, or politically contrived, social change in 
attitudes that picked apart the bonds of inter-generational solidarity. 
Chapter Two introduced the debate around inter-generational solidarity against 
inter-generational conflict and the framing of population ageing in terms of 
generations scrabbling for resources. The 'strain' on public spending has been 
predicted by some to lead to political resentment and struggles between younger and 
older recipients of state spending (Turner 1989). Irwin (1996) calls this the 'age 
stratification' approach where members of different age cohorts perceive their 
interests to be at odds with members of other age cohorts. This has lead to some 
policy debates being haunted by the spectre of demographic time bombs. Although it 
must be noted that throughout the research process for this thesis no evidence of 
concerned public opinion amongst younger voters was ever put forward by 
proponents of inter-generational conflict, who preferred to make their case based on 
theoretical or normative arguments. Indeed, in 2003 Deeming & Keen inquired into 
public attitudes on long-term care by conducting a survey of 1,000 UK residents they 
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found that support for state-financed personal care provided within care homes was 
significantly more popular among the youngest 
age group (25-44). The youngest respondents were also more supportive of state-
financed nursing care provided at home than respondents in the 65+ category. 
Predictions of inter-generational conflict in a post age-transformation society are 
based on highly contestable assumptions about human nature and the durability of 
social solidarity, that has struggled, to date, to find any supportive evidence amongst 
public opinion. 
Rational choice writers such as Sinn (2002) make confident predictions of inter-
generational conflict in electoral politics and the advent of gerontocracy in advanced 
democracies such as Germany. Yet the assumptions of Sinn require a re-engineering 
of human nature and a re-programming of the human condition to be deficient in 
empathy for extended family members or to lack an appreciation of enlightened co-
operation. Reducing voter concerns only to the here and now, what's in it for me with 
'in it for me' defined by changes in tax bills. Chapter Five included the analysis of the 
BBC 2 drama-documentary- It.. The Generations Fall Out which. The producers of the 
programme used its flexible format to heavily promote a narrative of population ageing 
as an intolerable burden on the young who would reach a breaking point and political 
rise up against their older peers. This narrative was reproduced in 2005 when the 
BBC's flagship current affairs programme Newsnightreported on the political parties' 
attempts to court the grey vote. In this report active older people were constructed as 
a threat to the economic prospects of younger cohorts. In more general press 
coverage population ageing is portrayed as the reason why continental social models 
would be economically unsustainable in the future. These narratives are not replicated 
in mainstream political communications. Population ageing is used to frame a need 
for financial restraint, but adequate incomes and high quality health services were 
never portrayed as unattainable in a future grey society. The political parties 
demonstrated no desire to elaborate or associate themselves with the discourses of 
inter-generational conflict, indeed there is evidence of at least a partial adoption of 
active ageing discourses and tone. In contrast, media discourses are more negative 
and the continuing imperative to win younger audiences is a possible explanation that 
requires more research and critical scrutiny from regulatory authorities. In an age 
where the mass media are keener to be seen to represent their audience in some 
way, is it possible that some editors or producers believe they can represent they 
young by negatively framing the old? 
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This research has investigated the mediation and constructions of population 
ageing by both the mass media and the main political parties, and considered the 
political position of older voters. It has not attempted to define and measure political 
power or apply that definition to older voters or any organisations that seek to 
represent their interests. The question in mind has been how the ageing society has 
been portrayed and how political communications strategies have engaged with this 
societal transformation. 
From the research the dramatically rising proportion of older voters has been 
quantified and confirmed. The inquiry has seen that the grey vote has certainly been 
portrayed as being important and powerful by the media and political parties appear to 
be responding with improved policy products and taking more care with their use of 
language. The parties segment the electorate by life stage and there is policy 
competition on key ageing issues that suggest the crucial possibility of valence. Yet, 
at the same time as the media build up the importance of the grey vote they also 
promote negative discourses over the meaning of ageing and its consequences for 
society. The media and political parties are also fearful of allowing their brands to 
appear too 'old' or grey friendly leading them to nervously court younger readers, 
viewers and voters as a priority over the 'brand loyal' older audiences. Gilleard & 
Higgs (2000) ask the question: Why has age not taken off as a political identity in the 
same way as disability, ethnicity, gender and sexuality? One possibly important factor 
is the desire of many older voters to resist rather than identify with ageing. The 
renowned author J.B Priestly, at the age of 79, summarised well how uncomfortable 
many people feel about assuming an aged identity: 
'It is as though walking down Shaftesbury Avenue as a fairly young man, I was 
suddenly kidnapped, rushed into a theatre and made to don the grey hair, the 
wrinkles and the other attributes of age, then wheeled on stage. Behind the 
appearance of age I am the same person, with the same thoughts, as when I was 
younger.' 
J.B Priestly quote taken from Conway and Hockey (1998) 
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Ageing is not a desirable quality in most consumer products, and age in public 
life can leave the possessor of that quality vulnerable. Society accords high value to 
being young and/or new. The constant rise in the size and range of anti-ageing 
products and commercial health schemes present some evidence that people want to 
resist an aged-identity. But, then isn't the prime goal in life for nearly all citizens to live 
long and healthy lives? Regardless at the levels or absence of ageism in society, it is 
surely rational, if a longer life span is desired, to modify lifestyle variables such as diet 
and fitness. Some writers contend that today's older people generally feel as much as 
15 years younger than people did at the same age a generation ago' (Binstock & 
Quadagno 2001). 
Election campaigns in the future will be run in multi-age electoral markets, 
perhaps with enfranchisement at 16, but dominated by the older age ranges. This is a 
challenge to traditional campaign thinking, often infected by advertising industry 
ageism, and its adversity to appealing to the old for the fear of driving away the young. 
But, this formula can work in reverse, and the time has now past for visions of a young 
Britain. Success depends on age-neutrality - but not age blindness - in developing 
political brands. Perhaps no more so than at the next election where further growth in 
the grey vote will be accompanied with a high one-off increase in the number of first 
time voters. The winning party will succeed at both ends of the age scale. Each major 
party is presented with a strategic dilemma of how they intend to working with the 
emerging grey vote to secure electoral success. So far, only a minority of seats have 
the age structure that will be typical of most seats in the future. The age profile of 
seats such as Torbay and Scarborough in 2005, by 2025, will be replicated in seats in 
places such as Bury, Wolverhampton, Huddersfield and Stoke-an-Trent. In 2025 
Labour heartland seats in coalfield communities such as Easington, will have 
electorates 'older' than Torbay is today (Author's calculation). In these circumstances 
a strategic imperative for party planning is how to be the beneficiary of the age 
transformation of the electorate. 
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Logic still dictates that larger numbers of older voters will lead to a growing 
importance of ageing issues in electoral politics, as will the importance of the quality 
and delivery of public services that matter most to the quality of life for older people. 
This is not to fall into the trap of homogenising older voters or ignore the growing 
diversity of the retired population. Pensions will matter, but they will matter in different 
ways depending on the circumstances of various sub-groups within the retired 
population. State provision will be a touchstone issue for some older voters, others 
will be more sensitive to changes in occupational provision. Without doubt, more 
research is required into this topic, across a wider range of mass media, and across 
different time periods. Longitudinal work should not just focus on the broad issue of 
ageing, but should look for opportunities to focus on key ageing issues such as 
pensions, social care and age discrimination in employment. The very act of 
conducting this research would show that the academic community is leading the way 
in shaking off outdated ageism in the conduct of public policy - a position it has sadly 
yet to adopt 
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8.6 Final Summary 
This project has presented compelling evidence of the profound nature of the 
oncoming age transformation of society. The demographics are straight forward. The 
Government's Actuary Department estimates the proportion of the population aged 
over 65 will rise from 13.2% in 1971 to 24.4% in 2050 (House of Lords 2003). 
Analysts can look forward with a high degree of certainty, natural or man-made 
catastrophes aside, to seeing this trend continue through the first half of the 21 st 
Century, by which point the age structure of society will have become radically 
different to that of the mid-20th Century. Elections conducted twenty years ago were 
pre the great age transformation. Elections in twenty years' time will be post-
transformation. The time period for this thesis comes in the middle of this 
transformation when the strategic reorientation of media and politics is only in its 
earliest stages. 
The continued rise of the grey vote has been projected by this research to put 
older voters in the position of numerically forming majorities in large number of . 
Westminster seats. In particular, the rapid pace of change in the Celtic nations stands 
out as Scotland and Wales move from the cleavages of large manufacturing sectors 
to those of societies with large retired populations. In the General Election of 2005 
the research found that the estimated proportion of turnout made up voters aged 65 
and over is now over a quarter of votes cast in England and Wales. The grey vote - all 
voters aged over 55 - accounted for 41.2% of all votes cast. In England and Wales, in 
contrast, the 'youth vote' Le. those aged 18-24 only accounted for 6.6% of the turnout. 
In 2005, there were more voters aged over 65 than there were aged under 35. In 
gross numbers, there were an estimated 1.6 million votes cast by the 'Youth Vote'-
ages 18-24, a figure that pales in comparison to the estimated 10.1 million votes cast 
by Grey Voters. In 2025 it is estimated that 295 of the seats in England and Wales 
will have a Grey Majority Le. where voters aged 55+ account for 50% or more of the 
votes cast. This means most seats (52%) will have a Grey Majority. 
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The emergence of around 300 seats with a Grey Majority leads this author to 
contend that no political party that seeks to regularly form a majority in the House of 
Commons will succeed without securing voting support from older people that gets 
into at least the mid-30s of national vote share. A political party which cannot gain 
support from 35% or more of grey voters will find it increasingly difficult to win general 
elections, and could only compensate for this failure by polling incredibly well with 
other sections of the electorate, but in the process would loss consensual legitimacy 
as any such party would not attain power based on support drawn from across 
society as a whole, and this would have serious implications for the social and political 
cohesion of the country. 
The Chicago School's disengagement theory - a mutual process where the 
individual and society would reduce their levels of social interaction - was the first 
body of work to dominate sociological theorising on ageing. Disengagement was 
superseded by theorists who wrote from gerontological and political economy fields 
who argued that dependency in old age was produced structurally by the workings of 
the welfare state, and that old age was being artificially constructed as a social 
problem. In the 1970s and 80s much of the focus on the welfare state was born out of 
a desire to challenge the distressing poverty experienced by many in later life. In a 
similar vein the 1990s saw another conscious attempt in guise of the active ageing 
movement to use research and theory to challenge marginalisation and social 
dependence in later life by reconstructing the social meaning of old age and re-
inventing the exit from full-time employment as an opportunity rather the beginning of 
the end of an individual's social contributions. 
An ageing society constitutes news as well the potential to alter news values. It 
will radically alter the labour market and patterns of consumption. It will change the 
shape and interactions of the family that will affect patterns of media use including the 
age composition of various audiences over each 24 hour cycle. Older people are also 
the most avid consumers of news media. Despite the persuasive demographic 
. changes, there are a number of barriers and impediments to the realisation of greater 
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influence for any organised lobbies of older people. Ageist attitudes are still held 
widely in society and negative stereotyping is prevalent in the media. The advertising 
industry has been identified as one of economic pressures to deliver younger 
audiences and in the process marginalise older people in the media, either by 
ignoring them, or portraying them through the use of negative stereotypes. There is 
paucity of research that specifically addresses the mediation of population ageing as 
a policy as supposed to larger pool of work on generalised portrayals of older people. 
The research did identify three key contributions from Groombridge who specifically 
focused on demographic issues, Midwinter who oversaw a wide ranging project that 
incorporated the media's treatment of some key ageing issues, and Bergstrom who 
produced an industry insider's perspective on the treatment of age in daily 
newspapers. Groombridge and Midwinter found age as a widely used variable in 
news reporting, often alongside the use of negative stereotypes or ageist language. 
Age was prevalent in press copy although it was rare for ageing to be the main story 
itself. Bergstrom detailed how the incorporation of market research and the fear of 
losing younger readers to the new media were driving content away from explicitly 
addressing the interests of older readers. 
Taken together, the quantitative and qualitative data in this research indicate 
that population ageing infrequently appeared as a lead story, instead it was more 
usual to see ageing incorporated into stories on other areas of public policy. Where 
population ageing was the main theme, the narrative of the 'time bomb' was a central 
reference point. Some of the neo-liberal interpretations of what population ageing 
means for politics and economics - inter-generational conflicts partly due to 
constrained opportunities for cutting public welfare - have found their way into 
mainstream broadcasting, such as the uncritical acceptance of apocalyptic 
demography in the BBC It. .. drama documentary and the Newsnightspecial on older 
voters. However, negative stereotyping in the media runs parallel to more positive 
streams of media content as well as the well meaning but compassionately ageist 
streams of content typified by the 'abseiling granny'. A whole cultural movement, that 
includes many media practitioners, is challenging residue ageism and attempting to 
positively reconstruct the meaning of later life and the portrayal of older people. In 
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conjunction with the active ageing movement the elements of post-material politics 
possessed by many in the more socially diverse baby boomer generations will further 
change the nature of retirement and the social place of the old. 
The upbeat narratives of active ageing are by no means unchallenged. The 
emergence of active ageing has coincided with the development of a wide range of 
writing that adopted a more negative prognosis on the prospects for ageing societies, 
often under the narrative metaphor of the time bomb. Some strands of economic 
thinking alongside elements of neo-liberal thought have framed population ageing as 
a threat that would require the state to jettison its responsibilities in areas such as 
pensions as social care in order to preserve the perceived benefits of a shrinking 
state. Problems and traits which are stereotypically associated with older people at 
the level of the individual, such as dependency, conservatism, low productivity, and 
an absence of dynamism and innovation, are grafted onto the future traits of society 
as a whole. The inter-generational conflict and time bomb narratives are replicated 
and amplified by quality broadcasters who appear to be adopting this mostly neo-
liberal viewpoint as an orthodoxy or template for framing debate. In response some 
writers and activist have sought to counter the time bomb framing and that inter-
generational solidarity should be consciously fostered. 
This apparent conflict between the active agers and the proponents of the time 
bomb thesis has one intriguing front, the construction and reconstruction of the 
characteristics of the baby boomer generation. On one extreme the boomers can be 
portrayed as active, energetic citizens infused with idealism who will herald a new era 
of socially active and economically productive retired community, On the other 
extreme boomers are portrayed as representing a selfish block-vote sucking out finite 
state resources to be wasted in a vainglorious pursuit of personal fulfilment - spending 
the next generation's inheritance. 
With older people more likely to register and vote at increasingly diverging 
rates from younger voters the ageing of the electoral register, and more crucially 
votes cast on polling day accelerates at a faster rate than the ageing of the population 
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as a whole. These electoral demographics alongside the continuing decline of class-
based voting create the apparent potential for political success for explicitly grey 
political platforms. Many democracies have seen the establishment of 'pensioner' 
parties, and there have been several examples, such as in Israel, Slovenia, Croatia 
and Scotland, where these parties have made electoral breakthroughs. In many 
advanced democracies such as Australia and the USA highly charged battles for the 
grey vote have become the norm. 
It is clear that rational choice theory of voting, if applied in a determinist manner 
as has been done by some highly respected theorists, produce somewhat alarmist 
predictions of democracies transforming within the next five years into 
'gerontocracies'. Yet older voters as demonstrated in Chapter Three are highly 
supportive of school spending, and younger voters of pensions, It is equally, if not 
more, rational to expect that voters perceive their individual interest intertwined with 
the happiness and welfare of their own families, local community and social networks. 
Extreme rational choice theory is based upon the notion that citizens will vote on 
personal financial interest alone and that they will not consider the interests of their 
parents or children in this calculation. These models provide great utility for neo-
liberal pessimists who would like to argue that the current period is a now or never 
opportunity for removing the state from welfare support in later life, but supply little in 
the way of a more critically realistic realistic assessment of how the new politics of the 
grey society built upon social attitudes that continue to value inter-generational 
support and solidarity. 
From this project's study of the 2005 general election it became apparent, that 
in the current period at least, the main British political parties have not incorporated 
any significant elements of apocalyptic demography into their political 
communications strategies or narratives. Political parties still draw strongly upon 
compassionate ageism, and discourses of the elderly. There is also the discourse of 
the pensioner, which does draw upon some rational choice inspired notions of bank 
balance voting and defines older people by their welfare status. The research found a 
. consensus across the main parties supporting more state resources and higher 
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quality public and social services. The parties, including the Conservatives, had all 
moved away from the more neo-liberal orthodoxies, such as the strategic goal of 
replacing state pensions with private alternatives, that informed public policy and 
debate in areas such as pensions at the end of the last Conservative administration in 
1997. This consensus on delivering better services funded by increased spending 
remained, at the rhetorical level at least, conditional upon concepts such as 'hard 
work' or 'service'. Yet, in the same period public policy moved towards citizenship as 
the criteria for qualifying for state pension and social care services. Despite the 
growing acceptance of residency or citizenship the Beveridge Report and the 
contributory principle still cast long shadows over current debate and the language 
deployed by the parties. 
While Conservative rhetoric tended to hark back in justifying spending on older 
people through post-war narratives of ensuring dignity in return for service to the 
nation the Labour and Liberal Democratic parties are clearly adopting some of the 
aspirationallanguage of active ageing. Additionally both parties showed a tendency to 
campaign on pensions, not as an issue only of concern to pensioners, but in an age-
neutral manner that included strong appeals to younger women. There are two 
explanations for age-neutral campaigning that have arisen from aspects of this 
research. Firstly, political parties, like many commercial products, do not want to be 
associated as a brand the particularly appeals to older people for fear of repelling 
younger people. But, they are also aware that an overly youthful brand, once 
desirable, runs a similar danger of putting off the growing majority older voters. Age-
. neutral campaigning avoids these perceived pitfalls. Secondly, there is also evidence 
that older people don't respond well to being targeted with a product, political or 
otherwise, because they are old. 
The project has also established that the targeting of older voters is now a 
priority area in election strategy and campaigning for the main political parties, without 
necessarily reaching the intensity that some would argue is merited by the existing 
size of the grey vote. In the 2005 general election the pre-election campaigning that 
took place two to three months before polling day was dominated over several news 
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cycles and political exchanges by explicit initiatives aimed at winning support from 
older voters. Campaign initiatives by the Conservatives and Liberal Democrats were 
countered directly by Labour with measures in the final Budget of the parliament. 
During this period media comment portrayed these exchanges as evidence of the rise 
of grey power in British electoral politics. 
Voter segmentation - the process of defining and targeting key sub-groups of 
the electorate - is an increasingly deployed facet of political campaigning. From the 
analysis of the 2005 election campaign it appears that age and life cycle are 
becoming increasingly important factors in the identification of potential target 
electoral segments. The campaign response to demographic change does suggest 
that older voters have become a higher priority, which parties are evolving and re-
orientating towards satisfying the real and perceived needs of older voters. The 
media, always keen to attribute competitive motives to policy changes, frequently 
portray grey power as a key influence on party behaviour, but this increased 
importance is developing from a low base and, at this stage in time, the case for 
actually existing grey power is not compelling or pervasive. There are a number of 
trends which suggest the advent of an electoral cycle that increasingly factors in the 
needs and expected responses of older voters at the heart of strategic decision 
making, but these factors are also contradicted by other features of British politics, 
such as the ageist hounding of Ming Campbell by political commentators and 
cartoonists during his tenure as leader of the Liberal Democrats. 
The worlds of politics and media are responding to population ageing. 
Increased numbers of older people makes the obvious equation to more older 
readers, viewers, users and voters. But, in many ways the elites of both worlds have 
been slow to adapt, hampered in their response by residual ageist assumptions and 
fear that in their respective markets that associating with 'the elderly' will terminally 
damage their brand. There is an intriguing dissonance between the elites of the two 
worlds, with quality newspapers and flagship current affairs broadcaster adopting neo-
liberal time bomb narratives, but these narratives do not feature in campaigning 
communications and political elites have rejected the assumptions of the time bomb in 
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set piece media events such as the Newsnightspecial on the grey vote in 2005. 
Ageist attitudes cannot be so strong that organisations will hold onto them despite 
considerable potential harm to their strategic goals. It should be expected that further 
incremental re-orientation towards the new aged society. This author believes there 
are many grounds for optimism that society will adapt to the changes in a manner that 
will strive to main social harmony and inter-generational solidarity. But, not before the 
advocates who favour individual financial responsibility and the withdrawal of the 
social model over social solidarity engineer themselves a strong hearing in the court 
of public opinion through their invoking of the time bomb narrative. 
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Going Grey - APPENDIX One 
TRANSCRIPT OF IF THE GENERATIONS FALL OUT 
DURATION 57'20 
1. COMMENTARY: In Europe and America a new type of conflict has been 
simmering for years. In Britain, in 2024 it is about to reach flash 
point. This conflict is different from anything that has gone before. 
Members of the same family will find themselves on opposite sides. 
2. Bill: You do realize that you're talking about fighting against our 
own parents. 
3. Jack: Yes I am. 
4. PROF LAURENCE KOTLIKOFF (Author "The Coming Generation Storm") It's 
not a matter of if there's going to be a generational fallout, it's a 
matter of when and exactly how nasty it's going to be. 
5. COMMENTARY: In twenty years time, it is the old who are in charge. 
6. PAUL WALLACE (Author "Agequake"): It's going to have seismic effects 
on all aspects of our lives. You can go as far as to call it an age 
quake. 
7. COMMENTARY: The ageing population is bringing Britain to the brink of 
financial collapse. 
8. PROF JAMES SEFTON: If we don't make any changes, there is likely to 
be some sort of political rebellion. 
9. COMMENTARY: Which the young generation are about to ignite. 
10.CHET TREMMEL: (Foundation for the Rights of Future Generations): We 
are not going to keep quite when a band of pampered pensioners steal 
the futUre from us. 
II.COMMENTARY: The experts agree it could happen, unless we act now. 
12.sli IF 
13. The scenario you are about to see is fiction. The interviews and the 
issues raised, are real. 
14. IF ... the Generations FallOut 
15. London March 4th 2004-03-31 
16. TOM KIRKWOOD (Institute for Ageing & Health, Newcastle University): 
we've seen an extraordinary revolution. Today's seventy year olds are 
very much like the sixty year old or even a fifty year old, a 
generation or two ago. 
17.ADAIR TURNER (Chairman, Pensions Commission): What has changed over 
the last twenty or thirty years is that we have major increases in 
life expectancy from say sixty five onwards. 
18. TOM KIRKWOOD (Institute for Ageing & Health, Newcastle University) 
Old people are dying less. Over the last fifty years the death rate 
in people aged eighty and above has tumbled by 50%. 
19.ADAIR TURNER (Chairman, Pensions Commission) 
there is no limit to life. It's possible that 
increase may go on for ever. 
It is possible that 
this life expectancy 
20. TOM KIRKWOOD (Institute for Ageing & Health, Newcastle University) : 
The fact that we humans are living much longer than anyone has lived 
on this planet before is probably the greatest achievement of our 
species. 
21. COMMENTARY: In 2024, for the first time in human history, there are 
more adults over sixty five than children, two million more. 
22. JACK: You're late. 
23. BILL: Yeah, I know 
24. BILL: (to father) Dad I'm off. Be there in about ten. 
25. JACK: Yeah. 
26. COMMENTARY: Jack was born at the beginning of the 21st century when 
birth rates fell to. historic low. It's his generation that's 
expected to carry the burden of caring for, and paying for the ageing 
population. 
27. JACK: I'm waiting 
28. COMMENTARY: The young of 2024 are becoming angry. They're calling it 
generational fraud. Some have decided it can't go on. 
29. PAUL WALLACE (Author, "Agequake"): Through almost all of human 
history, mankind has been very young and the characteristic shape of 
the human population has been a pyramid with a lot of young people at 
the base, and hardly any older people at the top. Now what's happening 
now is that this population pyramid is inverting, and there will be 
more older people at the top and fewer younger people at the base and 
this change really amount to a revolution. 
30. COMMENTARY: The first signs of conflict between young and old 
appeared in Germany. Campaigners carried children's coffins to the 
steps of the Reichstag in protest. 
31. CHET TREMMEL (Foundation for the Rights of Future Generations): 
Politicians are caving in to the grey lobby. They're not listening to 
my generation any more because we don't have the voting power. There's 
already a conflict between the generations in my country, and if the 
necessary reforms are not carried out very soon, this conflict will 
happen also in Great Britain. 
32. COMMENTARY: In Britain, the time bomb exploded in the early 2020s. 
The cost of supporting the ageing population had reached breaking 
point. The government had to act and did so with a dramatic increase 
in taxes. In 2024 the young are paying 80% more tax on what they earn 
than their parents paid twenty years before. Out numbered at the 
ballot box, some are finding other outlets to express their anger. 
33.CHLOE: Hi guys. 
34. JACK: Hi. 
35.CHLOE: Oh, it's freezing out there. 
36. BILL: So we pay they play. Did you think that one up all by yourself? 
37. JACK: Nice one mate. It's the plain truth, that's why we're here, 
that's why you're all here. 
38. CHLOE: Er, actually, I don't know why I'm here. 
39. JACK: Where are all the jokes? We're the jokes because we let a bunch 
of pensioners turn us in to their slaves, so they can have a lovely 
retirement. 
40.BILL: I remember when you used to be fun Jack. 
41. JACK: I remember when I could afford to be fun. 
42. CHLOE: Oh Jack, you should try getting a sense of human it's cheap. 
43. JACK: Fine.... I just don't find getting robbed by my parents very 
funny. 
44.CHLOE: You do realise how stupid this sounds. I mean besides, we're 
all going to get old, including you Jack. 
45. JACK: Yeah. And we can steal from our kids, and they can steal from 
theirs, and we can just pass the misery on. Look, how many of you can 
actually afford somewhere to live. Well forget that, how many of you 
can actually afford a holiday, just a holiday. All right, apart from 
this guy, who is hilariously funny, what do you think you can actually 
do about it. 
46. COMMENTARY: In Britain, in 2024, the old are no longer old, they feel 
younger, healthier and fitter than ever, and many of them are looking 
for ways to turn the clock back even further. 
47. CAROLINE: She's gorgeous. 
48.ELIZABETHJ: Yeah. I bet that's not real. 
49.CAROLINE: She's had help. 
50. ELIZABETH: You really can't tell anymore what's real and what isn't. 
51. CAROLINE: You know you can get it on the National Health now. 
52. ELIZABETH: Can you. 
53. CAROLINE: Are you thinking what I think you're thinking. 
54. ELIZABETH: Maybe. 
55. CAROLINE: I want to be fancied again. When I was with David I never 
thought about it. Getting old didn't seem to matter but now it does. 
56. COMMENTARY: The older genera-tion of 2024 is unlike any previous one. 
They were born in the years following the Second World War when birth 
rates soared. Dominant, demanding and dynamic, they are the baby 
boomers. 
57. COMMENTARY: The baby boomers have always been at the forefront of 
social and economic change. 
58. ROSIE BOYCOTT: (Writer and Broadcaster) We all grew up with the idea 
that we had a voice, and that we were going to be different from our 
parents. 
59. COMMENTARY: When the baby boomers began to wield political power, they 
shook the western world. 
60. MUSIC - BOB DYLAN 
61. MARTIN RAYMOND (The Future Laboratory): Baby boomers are driven by 
issues, so they're not tied to a party, they are tied to a cause and 
an ideology. 
62. ROSIE BOYCOTT: (Journalist & Broadcaster) I've always been a 
campaigner right from my teens, early twenties, when I started Spare 
Rib and campaigned for women's rights. I got the nick-name Rhysler 
Rosie because I began the campaign to de-criminalise cannabis. I 
don't want to give up that sense of being involved in the things to 
do with change and ,that applies to vast numbers of our generation, and 
I think we'll have an exciting old age. I think it is something that 
will be kind of rather thrilling, and it will shake up a lot of 
governments. 
63. MARTIN RAYMOND (The Future Laboratory): The boomers will become one 
of the most powerful lobbying groups ever. They have a history of 
revolution built in to their blood. They are people who are media 
aware, they are financially astute, they are in control of the 
corridors of power; so in twenty years time, we'll see the emergence 
of old parties, of older voting blocks, of oldster lobbies. Suddenly, 
the issues will the crystallised round concerns related only to old 
people. In the future, old and young roles will be swapped over 
completely. The young will be grey, down trodden, watching the world 
to pass. And the world passing of course will be old looking bright 
and blonde and healthy and fit because they have the money, and also 
they have the dream to do so. 
64.CAROLINE: So what are you doing now? 
65. DOCTOR: I'm .... I'm just doing a computer map three dimensional image. 
66. TOM KIRKWOOD (Institute for Ageing & Health, Newcastle University): 
There's nothing about complex life that says that death is inevitable. 
67.CAROLINE: Those creases down the side of my mouth, and the lines above 
my top lip. 
68. DOCTOR: Will disappear. 
69. MARTIN RAYMOND (The Future Laboratory): Age immunity is going to 
become one of the great holy grails people will seek out in the 
future. We won't depend on the basic things of just exercise. We'll 
work with science to keep people from ageing. The arrival for example 
have muscle vaccines which will be injected in to the muscle to make 
them super strong and super youthful. 
70. DOCTOR: Assuming there are no genetic issues, we should be able to 
book you in and proceed as soon as I get the biopsy results. 
7l.CAROLINE: Good. 
72. MARTIN RAYMOND (The Future Laboratory) : You can see the emergence of 
cosmiceuticals, which are cosmetics and medicine working together to 
make you younger. Instead of having botox, you have photox, which is 
injecting proteins in to the skin to make it look healthy and young 
and elastic. 
73. ROSIE BOYCOTT: (Writer & Broadcaster) If the anti-ageing treatments 
are really safe and they 'really aren't going to land you up with eyes 
that are like this, and a frozen looking face and weird smile, then 
I think mine would be, let's go for it. 
74. DOCTOR: Now you do understand there may be a little pain associated 
with the injections but that will pass very quickly. 
75.CAROLINE: Don't worry, I'll be brave. 
76. DOCTOR: Good girl. 
77. TOM KIRKWOOD (Institute for Ageing & Health, Newcastle University): 
Ageing comes from the build-up of damage in the cells and tissues of 
bodies and we're discovering that there are lots of ways in which we 
can slow that build-up of damage. 
78.CAROLINE: How exactly does it work. 
79. DOCTOR: Rejuvenate works by actually re-generating skin cells. 
80.CAROLINE: What all over. 
81. DOCTOR: All over,·the results you get are real. You 
an incredible difference here, here and everywhere. 
disappear. Do you have a family. 
82.CAROLINE: A son, Jack. I'm divorced. 
are going to see 
These lines will 
83. DOCTOR: Well Jack is going to be very pleased. He will have a mother 
who could pass as a sister. Now, take this, it should be able to 
answer any further questions you like. 
84. NEWSCASTER: Mother's Day looks like being demo day, that's the 
warning from top cops in London. They've got evidence that activists 
opposed to what they call generational theft, plan to cause chaos 
across the capital. The activists are angry this year because one 
health authority has said it will offer anti ageing treatment on the 
NHS. 
85. COMMENTARY: In 2024, the young are mobilising. Many grievances are 
driving them to rebel. But one issue overshadows all the others. 
Pensions. 
86. NEWSCASTER: Last year's protests were triggered by the government's 
decision to abolish means testing for pensioners, and re-link pensions 
to earnings. Youth activists fear the government may be planning a 
further increase in the State pension in this year's.budget. 
87. PAUL WALLACE (Author "Agequake): The 2020' s is the decade when you can 
see the threat of generational conflict becoming intense because 
that's when the big generation of post war baby boomers born in the 
late 1950s and the 1960s, turn 65 and retire. And so they'll be 
demanding resources, and of course that will put pressure on those 
people who provide resources through the tax system. 
88. COMMENTARY: The fuse was lit on the pension time bomb from the first 
day the scheme was set up. At the beginning of ,the 20th century, 
poverty in Britain was rife. And the oldest were among the poorest. 
In 1908, Lloyd George's government, offered a pension for the 
neediest, if they were over seventy and could pass a moral character 
test. Few lived long enough to claim it. After the Second World War, 
the government made pensions more generous and universal. 
89. ARCHIVE: How old are you? If you're as old as him, you will have 
found a big increase in your 'old age pension, now twenty six shillings 
for a single person, forty two shillings for a married couple. The 
Exchequer is finding the money to pay you for this. 
90. COMMENTARY: The Exchequer was finding the money for State pensions 
through worker's taxes. 
91.ADAIR TURNER (Chairman, Pensions Commission): Twenty century pension 
systems and the generosity of them were vitally dependent on there 
being many more workers than there were retirees. They were like 
pyramid schemes. They were like chain letters. They only worked with 
that level of generosity because each new generation was larger than 
the one before and the problem is that ,the pyramid is coming to an 
end. 
92. COMMENTARY: The increase in life expectancy combined with a falling 
birth rate, means that the number of workers supporting every retired 
person, known as the support ratio, has fallen dramatically. When 
pensions were introduced, there were twenty two people of working age 
for every retired person. In 2024, there are less than three. 
93. COMMENTARY: When the Conservatives won power in 1979, Margaret 
Thatcher realised that fewer workers to support rising numbers of 
pensioners was going to be costly. 
94. PAUL WALLACE (Author "Agequake": At the start of the 1980s, Mrs 
Thatcher's government, decoupled the basic state pension from earnings 
growth. And earnings actually grow about 2% more a year than prices. 
And so over a time what this meant was that the basic state pension, 
although the same in real terms, was actually becoming an ever 
diminishing sum in relation to the rising prosperity of the country. 
95. COMMENTARY: When Labour won in 1997, they didn't reverse the Tory 
policy, despising their own pledge. Instead they offered help to 
poorer pensioners. 
96. PAUL WALLACE (Author "Agequake": Well the government maintains that 
everything is well. And that we can carry on spending just 5 to 6% of 
the economy on pensions, and you have to ask yourself whether this 
really can be sustained when the number of pensioners is going to grow 
by 40%. And many people looking at this just think that the sums don't 
add up, and that the bill will be much more expensive. 
97. COMMENTARY: In 2004, pensioners were mobilizing to demand higher 
government spending on pensions. And they formed political parties to 
press their case. 
98. JOHN SWINBURNE MSP (Scottish Senior Citizens' Unity p'arty): I started 
the grey party in Scotland, and within eleven weeks, having touched a 
raw nerve, I was elected to the Scottish parliament. 
99. JOHN SWINBURNE: We will seek actually though the courts. 
100. JOHN SWINBURNE MSP (Scottish Senior Citizens Unity Party): If I can 
achieve this in 11 weeks, there is no stopping this movement. 
101. COMMENTARY: In England, rising council tax bills have increased the 
militancy of the old. 
102. CAROLINE: Grey power is here. At my age I don't think it matters if 
I have a prison sentence. They're going to have to take notice of us, 
nearly 25% of the electorate, they can't ignore us completely. 
103. COMMENTARY: But the gains of pensioners will be at the expense of 
younger tax payers. 
104. JOHN SWINBURNE MSP (Scottish Senior Citizens Unity Party): There is 
no doubt in my mind that you will in the future, will have to 
contribute a bit more to make sure that the elderly are kept in a 
comfortable state. 
105. COMMENTARY: In 2024 it's the young, not the old who are 
demonstrating. 
106. JACK: They play we pay. They play we play. They play we pay. 
107. COMMENTARY: Grey power dominates all the parties and sets the 
political agenda. Following years of pressure, the older population 
have managed to re-instate the link between pensions and earnings. The 
rest of the population have to pay for it in tax rises. The young, 
burdened by debt and unable to get a foot on the property ladder are 
bearing the brunt. After years of apathy, they're fighting back. 
108. COMMENTARY: Like most baby boomers in 2024, Caroline Spencer lives 
alone. She retired at Sixty five. A rising state pension is starting 
to compensate for her falling private pension. And by releasing some 
of the equity in her home, she now has a comfortable life style. 
109. ELIZABETH: Hey, you look beautiful. Fantastic. 
110. CAROLINE: It's what's inside that's the problem. 
111. ELIZABETH: No, you look great. When I look in the mirror I feel I'm 
being punished for a crime I didn't commit. 
112. CAROLINE: Now Lizzie, sixty five is the new forty, life begins at 
forty. And you know what you've got to do. 
113. ELIZABETH: You've decided then? 
114. CAROLINE: Decided what? 
115. ELIZABETH: Oh come on. 
116. CAROLINE: You'll just have to wait and see. 
117. TELESALES PERSON: Good morning Rejuvenate. Can I help you. 
118. ALL TOGETHER 
119. MAN: And how old are you. 
120. MAN: Seventy five. 
121. MAN: Yes, your age is fifty sixty, yes that's right. 
122. WOMAN: Good morning. 
123. COMMENTARY: Not all of the old of 2024 live comfortably. Many are 
forced to work in to their 70s and 80s. 
124. MAN: (mumbles) 
125. COMMENTARY: The government's policy of encouraging them not to 
depend on the state for their pension backfired. 
126. PAUL WALLACE (Author "Agequake": We've seen the risk in recent years 
of declining equity markets, and so the risk really from the 
government's point of view is that though the financial markets don't 
deliver the returns, and people turn back to the State and say, please 
help us in our hour need. 
127. MAN: Hello, welcome to Rejuvanate~ The way back. Please submit your 
national ID record and number. Thank you 
128. COMMENTARY: Despite the improving state pension of 2024, many are 
still unable to retire because they misjudged the property market. 
Back in 2004, the value of people's homes was three thousand billion 
pounds. More than double the total value of all pension funds. But 
some jumped on the property band wagon too late to realise their dream 
of a comfortable retirement. 
129. ADAIR TURNER (Chairman, Pensions Commission): If the next generation 
is significantly smaller than the present generation, then that 
generation, the baby boom generation will be trying to sell those 
houses to a smaller next generation, so there is at least a 
possibility that will, there will be a period where house prices will 
fall, or certainly, no go up in the way that they have in the past. 
130. ADVERT: It's changed my life. I- never felt old, but I was living in 
an old person's body. Rejuvenate changed everything. I look better. I 
feel better. I am better. 
131. JACK: Mum. What the hell are you doing with this. 
132. CAROLINE: What. 
133. JACK: That promo. 
134. CAROLINE: I'm thinking about it. 
135. JACK: You're, thinking about it. 
136. CAROLINE: Erm. 
137. JACK: You're thinking about what exactly. Mum, you look fine. Why 
do you want to get yourself pumped full of chemicals. 
138. CAROLINE: I just want to look in the mirror and like what I see. I 
thought you might be pleased. 
139. JACK: No, this isn't the way. We're the ones who have to pay for 
this. I have to pay for this. 
140. CAROLINE: What are you talking about. It's my life. 
141. JACK: Well you enjoy it then. 
142. CAROLINE: Jack. Jack. 
143. COMMENTARY: Doctor Robert Vine is the public face of the anti-
ageing treatment, Rejuvanate. He's a consultant. He splits his time 
between the NHS and a private practice. Now, controversially, he's 
making Rejuvanate available on the NHS. 
144. MARTIN RAYMOND (The Future Laboratory): Demand for anti-ageing 
treatment is going to become greater and greater. Currently boomers 
demand things like fertility treatment on the National Health, which a 
generation ago would have seemed quite odd. In the generation hence, 
they are going to start demanding beauty procedures as part of a 
national health scheme. 
145. COMMENTARY: In 2024, the NHS is struggling under the burden of an 
explosion in the numbers of old people. Under pressure from the 
demands of an older population health care spending has risen far 
higher than governments have predicted. 
146. PAUL WALLACE (Author "Agequake"): It's around that time that we have 
the big increase in the number of sixty five year olds as the baby 
boomers retire. So we can see the potential for even bigger 
increases. On average someone who's sixty five or over costs about 
four times as much as someone younger than sixty five. You only have 
to think about hip replacements, cataracts, all the various repairs 
that are done to try to withstand the ravages of ageing. 
147. COMMENTARY: In 2004, not everyone had been so pessimistic. Back 
then, studies show that the older the age at which people died, the 
less the cost. So paradoxically, one view was that an ageing society 
could save the NHS money. 
148. PHIL MULLAN (Author "The Imaginary Time Bomb"): The sort of causes 
of earlier deaths, like road traffic accidents are which are more 
demanding on health resources. There's more need for intensive health 
care and so on. Whereas in contrast, if one dies at a later age, in 
your 80s or 90s from diseases which are more generally associated with 
old age, say heart disease or stroke or cancer, then the amount of 
intensive health care is less. 
149. COMMENTARY: In 2024 some NHS costs have been kept down because of 
the baby boomers healthy life style~ They've continued to exercise, 
eat healthily and smoke less than other generations. 
150. MARTIN RAYMOND (The Future Laboratory): They're the first 
generation concerned about maintaining their wellness rather than 
looking at issues when they get ill~ So in twenty years time you're 
going to find a health system that isn't about illness maintenance, it 
is going to be about wellness management. And that's a hugely 
different concept to grapple with than the kind of health service 
we're dealing with today. 
151. COMMENTARY: But in 2024 it's this very desire among baby boomers to 
be fit and healthy which is increasing health care costs. 
152. PAUL WALLACE (Author "Agequake") The baby boomers will be very 
demanding about the health care that they want. They'll want to be as 
fit and as young as possible. They'll want not just hip replacements, 
they'll want every sort of replacement. And they'll be the original 
bionic generation. 
153. DOCTOR: Mr Wilson. 
154. MR WILSON: That's right. 
155. DOCTOR: How are you today? 
156. MR WILSON: Fine thank you. 
157. COMMENTARY: And the direct cost to the health service is only part 
of the problem. 
158. DOCTOR: Now, you can go home to-day. 
159. MR WILSON: Right. 
160. DOCTOR: Is there anyone there to look after you. 
161. MR WILSON: No, I'm afraid not. 
162. COMMENTARY: In 2024, the increased break-down of family life has 
meant that many old people can no longer be looked after at home by 
friends and relatives. The alternative has always been expensive. 
163. PAUL WALLACE (Author "Agequake"): People reaching the age of sixty 
five, there's a one in three chance if you're a CAROLINE, of ending up 
in residential care. One in five chance if you're a man, and the 
bills are very expensive. Looking forward there are gOing to be more 
people potentially requiring this and so the bills will go up, and so 
there will be demands really for the State to come up and pick up more 
of that bill. 
164. COMMENTARY: In Scotland, the State picked up some of this bill from 
as early as 2002. At first, England and Wales resisted because of the 
cost. But in 2024 they have caved in. 
165. CHLOE: A new kind of politics. 
166. JACK: Yeah, it's got this really amazing twist where everyone gets 
treated fairly. 
167. BILL: Jack, you do realise you're talking about fighting and 
demonstrating against our own parents. 
168. JACK: Yes, I am. How much money have you got in your bank account. 
169. JACK: What about you. 
170. CHLOE: Yeah. Like I'm going to answer that. 
171. JACK: What's, what's the highest amount you've ever had in the bank. 
172. BILL: All right, well for me, it's less than zero but I'm always 
skint; so what's your point. 
173. JACK: Oh no, that's a wonderful life you've got to look forward to. 
All of us in debt, to fund a State, run by pensioners for pensioners. 
And to cap it all, now they're getting make-overs on the NHS. 
174. COMMENTARY: At the end of the 20th century, Britain's increasing 
bills were met by economic growth. 
175. PHIL MULLAN (Author "The Imaginary Time Bomb) Productivity increases 
means that the whole of society can become more wealthy and 
prosperous. It is quite possible to generate enough wealth, so that 
those who are working do not have to make sacrifices, do not have to 
cut their own living standards in order to provide for others; so we 
can pay more taxes, and still have more to look after ourselves and 
our families. 
176. COMMENTARY: Although the economy is still growing in 2024, the rate 
of growth has slowed. 
177. PAUL WALLACE (Author "Agequake") We'll have fewer people working; 
so overall economic growth will decline and the prospects of 
productivity growth are probably gloomier rather than more optimistic, 
more upbeat because an ageing population tends to be less 
enterprising. 
178. COMMENTARY: So in 2024, funding pensions, the NHS and care of the 
elderly has meant taxes on income have had to rise by 80%. Among the 
young, news of a fight back is spreading. 
179. PROF JAMES SEFTON (Nat Inst of Economic & Social Research) The 
government estimate that income tax will only have to rise by one or 
two 'p' in the pound before 2024 if we are to balance the budget. 
However one must look at the assumptions underlying these projections. 
Firstly, is it realistic to expect that pensions, as a share of GD? 
will remain constant, especially when a greater proportion of our 
population become retirees. Also, is it realistic to expect that 
after 2010, health care spending will fall to rates of growth that we 
have never seen historically. 
180. COMMENTARY: The huge tax rise of 2024 could have been much smaller 
but it required tough decisions. It meant slowing down the rise iQ 
spending on pensions and healthcare. But under pressure from the grey 
lobby, governments have failed to act'. 
181. PROF JAMES SEFTON (Nat Inst Of Economic & Social Research) If we 
assume that pensions carry on rising at 2% per year per capita which 
is the rate that they have gone up in the last twelve years and health 
expenditure carries on rising at 3.5% per capita, per year, then we 
could see the tax on our income and wages rise from about 30p, lOp on 
national insurance, about 20p on income tax, rise to about 50, 55p by 
2024. 
182. COMMENTARY: This tax rise of around 80% was unavoidable by 2024 
simply because governments made no change to the spending levels of 
2004. 
183. PROF LAURENCE KOTLIKOFF (Author "The Coming Generational Storm"): 
When taxes get sky high people start avoiding them they even start 
leaving the country the country and tax revenues actually fall and the 
government can't pay its bills, it starts printing money, it starts 
trying to borrow more, interest rates go sky high, inflation takes 
off, and you have economic melt down. And that scenario is coming for 
the UK as well as other developed countries. 
184. JACK: Ready mate? 
185. MAN: It's a silly idea Jack, let's just go home. Come on, let's go 
home. 
186. NEWSCASTER: The doctor behind a controversial anti ageing treatment 
has said he won't be intimidated, following acts of vandalism against 
him. Doctor Robert Vine has been under attack from protestors for his 
role in making the Rejuvan age treatment available on the NHS. 
187. DOCTOR ROBERT VINE: What we offer is a legitimate and approved 
medical treatment, which is helping many many people lead richer 
lives. This or any other kind of mindless behaviour will not defect 
us on the important work that we are doing. Thank you. 
188. COMMENTARY: In 2024 everyone is chasing the grey pound. Baby 
boomers, the inventors of consumerism are still big spenders. 
189. MARTIN RAYMOND (The Future Laboratory) Your currently boomers and 
people in their 50s own 70% of the nation's wealth. You know in twenty 
years time they will own 85 to 90% of the disposable income of people 
in the UK. 
190. VOICE OVER: RADIO: Planners real-drive, the car that puts you back 
in control. 
191. MARTIN RAYMOND (The Future Laboratory) So what you will see are 
advertising campaigns, all targeting this group that hitherto just 
didn't figure in how we saw things being sold to us. 
192. VOICE OVER: RADIO: Do you have fond memories of turning a steering 
wheel and applying the brakes. Do you dream of pressing your foot hard 
down on a manual accelerator. 
193. ELDERLY WOMAN - ADVERT: You lot to-day, it's all work work work. 
You don't have time for lunch, time for hobbies, time for your 
friends. 
194. MARTIN RAYMOND (The Future Laboratory) Imagine instead of seeing a 
field of young people in our campaigns, you see people over seventy 
and eighties, with tans and fast cars, on the beach, dancing, 
partying, all of the things we associated with youth, have suddenly 
become the things that we'll associate with people over 70. 
195. VOICE OVER: RADIO: Do you want to be back in control, back in the 
driver's seat, just like it used to be. Let us put you right there. 
Erm, you can almost smell the petrol. Bi-focal windscreens and 
predictive steering option. 
196. COMMENTARY: In 2024 most young people don't vote. They don't see 
the point. They can never hope to make their views felt at the ballot 
box, they will always be in a minority. 
197. CHET TREMMEL (Foundation for the Rights of Future Generations) In 
Germany in forty years, there will be twice as many people over sixty 
than people below twenty. And that's why we want to lower the voting 
age, first to sixteen and then to zero because everybody who is able 
to express his will to vote, even if he is or she is eight or nine 
year old, should have the possibility to vote. 
198. PROF. LAURENCE KOLTIKOFF (Author ""The Living Generation Storm") We 
are systematically taking from young and future generations without 
letting them have any voice in this and also while pretending it's not 
happening. 
199. COMMENTARY: But the young are waking up. 
200. JACK: Look we did what we did, Shut up and get on with it or you 
can quit like the others. 
201. TOM: No. Look, I just think it's a bit weird. What do I say to my 
parents when they find out. What do I tell them. 
202. JACK: Just tell them the truth. Maybe they want to help us out. 
They don't have to steal from us Torn. It's a whole new politics. 
203. TOM: Well you must ... 
204. JACK: Leave it. Yeah. I'll talk to you tomo~row all right. 
205. TOM: But .... 
206. COMMENTARY: Just as their grandparents discovered Marx, some have 
discovered generational accounting. 
207. PROF LAURENCE KOLTIKOFF (Author "The Coming Generation Storm") I 
co-invented gene rational accounting because I thought it was very 
important to understand as an economist, and also as a parent, what's 
going to happen to the next generation. And when we did the numbers 
for the US, I was really shocked because they show that my kids and 
other people's kids are going to face tax rates that are twice as high 
as the rates we now face. 
208. PROF JAMES SEFTON (Nat Int of Economic & Social Research) 
Generational accounting has revealed in the UK that under some 
reasonable set of assumptions, we could be handing over very large 
debts to our children of the region of a 100 and 150% of GDP. Now I 
don't think any reasonable person would consider that this is a fair 
or just policy. 
209. STUDENTS ON MARCH: We say fight back ... We say fight back ... 
210. COMMENTARY: The first signs of a generational conflict appeared in 
Britain in 2003 when students protested at the debts they must bear 
for their university education. 
211. PROF LAURENCE KOLTIKOFF (Author "The Coming Generation Storm") The 
governments are going broke and as they go broke they're going to be 
looking for every penny they can get, where ever they can get it. A 
good example here is the top-up fees that are being charged now to 
university students. Their parents got a free education, so they're 
protesting and this is just the beginning of a conflict that's going 
to be coming between the kids and the adults. 
212. COMMENTARY: In 2004, pensioners were protesting too about the level 
of their pensions and the rise in council tax bills. 
213. JOHN SWINBURNE MSP (Scottish Senior Citizens Unity Party) We are 
going to fight for our rights and we'll put the fear of death in to 
every political party. We represent one quarter of the electorate and 
by 2024, the balance of power will be in the hands of senior 
citizens, and we will be able to dictate policies which will be 
relevant to them and to their benefit. 
214. PROF LAURENCE KOLTIKOFF (Author, "'The Living Generation Storm") If 
you look at the number of old people that we're going to have to take 
care of in the future, and if you look at the bills that our kids are 
going to have to pay, anybody that doesn't think there's a 
generational storm and a big generational war coming, must be on 
Prozac. 
215. COMMENTARY: There are choices we can make that might lessen the 
force of the generational storm. 
216. NEWSCASTER: The Home Secretary has said he will leave the monthly 
immigration quota unchanged for the third month in a row. The CBI 
called his decision disappointing, and said it would damage the 
economy. The under of immigrants entering the country last year 
reached 250,000. 
217. COMMENTARY: Since the 1990s immigration has been rising but not 
fast enough to make up for the shortage of young workers in 2024. 
218. ADAIR TURNER (Chairman, Pensions Commission) The problem is that 
you need very large numbers of immigrants and you need them to be 
increasing numbers over time because those people in themselves grow 
old and therefore need even more numbers of immigrants to support 
them. And so in order to solve the problem entirely by immigration, 
you would have to take the population of Britain from 60 million to-
day to eight five million or something of that order of magnitude by 
2050 and then keep increasing it by the same percentage increase every 
fifty years, ever there after. 
219. COMMENTARY: In 2024, only a few parts of the world have a high 
enough birth rate to allow them to provide young workers. 
220. ADAIR TURNER (Chairman, Pensions Commission) The vast majority of 
those immigrants would come from Africa and Western Asia, countries 
like Pakistan and Afghanistan, Iraq, countries where we have a lot of 
the concentration of failed states and some of the poorest states in 
the world. And that probably would increase the integration challenge. 
221. COMMENTARY: Even if greatly increased immigration can be made 
politically acceptable, its effect will be far-reaching, Britain will 
become over-crowded, and that could have a dramatic impact on the 
environment. 
222. ADAIR TURNER (Chairman, Pensions Commission) Either we now want to 
get the environmental benefits of stable populations'but with the 
problems that that creates to pension systems or we want to solve our 
pension system crisis with immigration or higher birth-rates but at 
the expense of increasing congestion and pollution and environmental 
problems and that really is a fundamental choice that society now 
faces. 
223. VIDEO: VOICE OVE: It's the woman who carries the baby. In the time 
it takes fbr a mother to produce one child, a man can father hundreds 
of them. 
224. COMMENTARY: In 2024, the government is trying to find ways to raise 
the birth rate. If they can produce enough young workers, perhaps 
generational conflict can be avoided. 
225. TEACHER: Okay, let's stop it there. The point is you all have 
choices. What the film is trying to say in a rather unsubtle way is 
that people of your age, should be having children younger for the 
future good of the country. Lots of children; so what do we think 
about that. 
226. SIX FORMER: I don't want to have an education and then not be able 
to do anything with it. 
227. ADAIR TURNER (Chairman, Pensions Commission) Wherever you have 
three conditions; economic prosperity, a high level of female 
literacy and a supply of contraceptives, which is legal and reasonably 
cheap, you get a fall in birth rates, down to and below replacement 
levels. 
228. SIX FORMER - woman: It's making us revert to the role that we had 
kind of hundreds of years ago. 
229. SIX FORMER - man: It's not, it's not asking us you to have 
something like a whole herd of ten children, just one 'or two more than 
you would usually. 
230. COMMENTARY: The government of 2024 want women to have at least two 
children each, in order to raise the birth rate to replacement level. 
231. TEACHER: If you have your children younger, then it gives you 
plenty of time to have a fulfilling career after that. 
232. SIX FORMER: But children become part of your life, and so you can't 
put in those extra hours at the office because you need to go home and 
feed your kids. 
233. PAUL WALLACE (Author "Agequake") The difficulty is in convincing 
younger women in the future is because they're going to be emerging 
from University, where apparently 50% will be attending, laden down 
with debt. They'll obviously be anxious to capitalise on that 
education as swiftly as possible, and in addition, they'll be paying 
higher taxes to support the older generation; so the proposal although 
a sensible one, doesn't seem to have much chance of succeeding. 
234. SIX FORMER: Say you have those children, with all the money that's 
now going in to the, the health service, there's going to be 
absolutely no money for pre-school, for child care, and there's going 
to be ..... 
235. COMMENTARY: In 2024, the sexual liberation the baby boomers fought 
so hard for is under threat from the drive to raise the birth rate. 
236. SIX FORMER: You're piling the whole responsibility of society on 
women. 
237. ADAIR TURNER (Chairman, Pensions Commission) What is absolutely 
clear is that you don't achieve that by demanding of women traditional 
social roles of just looking after children. We have the highest 
birth rates where we make it easiest for women to combine work and 
family life. 
238. SIX FORMER: But you were chosen to have children. 
239. TEACHER: Right, well that's it. Just one parting thought, I 
suppose in the past someone as influential as me would be expected to 
say something like, if you can't be good then at least be careful. 
Now I'm expected to say, have fun. 
240. CHET TREMMEL (Foundation for the Rights of Future Generations) We 
have rising life expectancy and falling birth rates and there's 
nothing inherently bad in that situation, but we have to adapt to it. 
But the necessary reforms are blocked by the old generation of today 
because ... they might lose their privileges, and this is at the expense 
of my generation. . 
241. PROF LAURENCE KOLTIKOFF (Author "The Coming Generation Storm", The 
issue of how we're going to take care of our kids in the futu~e is the 
great moral question of our generation. Our parents fought World War 
2, they made sure that we were safe and that we had a good economy. We 
don't want to be leaving our kids with a damaged economy and sky high 
tax rates. 
242. CHET TREMMEL (Foundation for the Rights of Future Generations) We 
are not going to keep quiet when a band of pampered pensioners steal 
the future from us. 
243. YOUTHS: ... we pay, they play 
244. PROFESSOR LAURENCE KOLTIKOFF (Author "The Coming Generation Storm") 
I would hope that our kids will start standing up for their rights and 
that the adults will start acting like adults, and start worrying 
about the next gene·ration. 
245. CAROLINE: What's going on out there. 
246. DOCTOR: Oh, don't worry. It's nothing to worry about just a protest 
group. Anne Marie, can you make sure security are dealing with this. 
It's just too many young people with too much free time on their 
hands. 
247. DOCTOR: I'm just using a solution that will clean some of your skin 
cells and pores. 
248. CAROLINE: Oh, it stings a bit. 
249. DOCTOR: Yes, it's meant to do that. Now do you have a holiday plan 
this year. 
250. CAROLINE: This is my holiday. 
251. DOCTOR: Quite. 
252. YOUTH: (repeat) We pay, they play. We pay, they play .... 
253. COMMENTARY: The young of 2024 feel their lives have been sacrificed 
for the old. A protest is about debt and tax. It's about the 
dominance of their elders and a rise in state pension. It's about the 
pressure on the young to have children. Their protest is against the 
medical advances which are improving the lives of older people, but 
which are sucking resources from an over-burdened NHS. 
254. YOUTH DEMO: We pay, they play, we pay they play ... 
255. PROF LAURENCE KOLTIKOFF (Author "The Coming Generation Storm) We 
like to think that the generational storm is ten, twenty years down 
the road, but every year we wait to address the problem, the problem 
gets much worse and from one day to the next, the financial markets 
are going to realise this. And that's when the financial melt down is 
going to begin. 
256. (VISUALS WITH SX) 
257. NEWSCASTER: The government has said it will listen to the 
legitimate concerns of young people following yesterday's protests but 
that it won't be bullied in to changing its policy on tax and 
pensions. 
258. NEWSCASTER: Police have arrested a twenty four year old man in 
connection with a flash mobbing incident at North End Hospital in 
London, against the controversial anti ageing treatment which is 
offered to patients there. 
259. NEWSCASTER: The Mother of all battles, vandalism, demonstration and 
destruction, as the Mother's Day protest turned nasty. What can now be 
done to avoid a full blown conflict between the generations. 
260. PROF LAURENCE KOTLIKOFF (Author "The Coming Generational Storm) 
There's no way we're going to avoid a generational storm, but we can 
get out of its direct path. But to do that we're going to have some 
new ideas, we're going to have to have some real statesmanship, and 
we're going to have to have a change in attitude. And attitudinal 
change is the toughest thing of all. 
261. PROF JAMES SEFTON (Nat Inst of Economic & Social Research) There 
are various possible measures, the most obvious being that we work 
longer. We will retire later. The second is that we must make more 
provision for our retirement and the third is I think inevitable, that 
there will be some means testing on health care benefits. 
262. PHIL MLULLAN (Author "The Imaginary Time Bomb") There should be no 
fixed age of retirement. It should be a voluntary, gradual process, 
rather than sudden and compulsory, which is the way it is too much 
these days. 
263. PAUL WALLACE (Author "Agequake") If people want to retire early, 
then of course they have to expect that their benefits will be lower 
and conversely, if you want to work on then you should expect to get 
more income in retirement. 
264. PHIL MULLAN (Author "The Imaginary Time Bomb) Conditions should be 
made easier for people to work later. We're going to be fitter and 
healthier in our older ages, many of us are going to want to work 
longer; so rather than ageing being a burden for society, in fact 
ageing is an opportunity which can be used to bring about an even more 
prosperous society for all of us. 
265. COMMENTARY: Which way will it go. It will be the baby boomers, the 
generation now in their 40s and 50s who must decide. 
266. ROSIE BOYCOTT (Writer and Broadcaster) Baby boomers have been 
campaigning for change since the 1960s; so if the politicians or 
anyone else think that at some magic moment the baby boomers are all 
going to put on their bedroom slippers and sit in front of the fire, 
and say it's over, they have got another thing coming. 
267. MAN: Hello, well come to Rejuvanate, they way back. 
268. ROSIE BOYCOTT (Writer And Broadcaster) People are going to carry on 
reinventing themselves, taking up new professions in order to keep 
contributing towards the tax system. 
269. CALL CENTRE MAN: All calls are monitored for quality purposes, are 
you happy to proceed. 
270. ROSIE BOYCOTT (Writer And Broadcaster) We will change the attitudes 
towards old age in this country, and we'll change them for the better. 
271. CALL CENTRE MAN: Thank you for your inquiry, please key in your 
national ID record and number. Thank you Mrs Brown. 
FILM ENDS 
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APPENDIX TWO - Steps in Coding and Executing Quantitative Analysis of the Media 
Sample 
In collecting data for analysis, the following variables were coded: 
1. On what date did the article appear? 
Purpose - Recording dates give the potential to compare whether patterns come in 
clusters or are more evenly distributed over the three month period. 
Coding issues - None, recording of the date is not liable to differences of interpretation. 
2. In which newspaper did it appear? 
Purpose - Of obvious importance, it is usual to find a number of differences in how issues 
are covered between individual titles, broadsheets and tabloids, liberal and conservative 
leaning editorial positions. 
Coding issues - None, recording of the title is not liable to differences of interpretation. 
3. What was the headline? 
Purpose - Verbatim recording of the headlines allows for potential quantitative or 
qualitative analysis of the language used. 
Coding issues - None, recording of the headline is not liable to differences of 
interpretation. 
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4. Who was given the byline Le who wrote it? 
Purpose - Recording the bylines was intended to see if any particular writer, or 
associated groups of writers, were responsible for driving the coverage into one direction 
or another. 
Coding issues - particularly in the news sections of a paper, some stories are taken 
straight from news agencies such as Reuters and the Press Association and, as such, no 
by line is given. In these cases I simply recorded the by line as "none'. 
5. How long was the article? 
Purpose - To enable analysis of the volume of newsprint given over to any given angle or 
standpoint. In content analysis judgements are often needed where issue A may be 
endorsed in two small 200 word pieces tucked away in supplementary sections, against 
one negative attack on issue A, a 1,000 words long beginning on the front page. It may 
be simply recorded that issue A received two positive articles against one negative, but 
the analyst must consider which articles/set of articles would have had more impact. 
Coding issues - None, recording the length is not open to differences of interpretation. I 
accepted the Lexis database's calculation of length, and did not attempt any time 
consuming recounts. 
6. Was population ageing the primary or secondary focus of the story? 
Purpose - this project was particularly interested in judging whether there were any 
differences in how population ageing was covered as the main topic focus, against where 
population ageing might appear as a sub-theme in other areas of news. 
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Coding issues - A large number of articles clearly were/were not primarily focused on 
population ageing. In the small number of cases where a more subjective decision was 
needed on how to categorise, I have outlined in a couple of case studies below the 
criteria I used where allocation was not so straight forward. 
7. Within what general topic area was the primary issue focus? 
Purpose - To help understand if population ageing is more likely to come up within a 
broad disciplinary area. For example, is ageing more likely to come up as an issue 
associated with economics rather than cultural implications, or perhaps, it comes up 
evenly across subject areas? 
Coding issues - Again, the great majority of articles were easily placed into the main 
categories. Where the decision was more border line, I have outlined a case study below 
on the criteria used to categorise. 
8. Within what specific area was the secondary issue focus? 
Purpose - In addition to recording in which general topic area issues of population ageing 
came up, the research also recorded more specific issue focus,for example, long-term 
care or occupational pensions related stories. 
Coding issues - straighter forward than the coding for primary issue focus, on all 
occasions, if an article did not sensibly fit into an existing category, a new category would 
be created. 
9. What was the principal geographic focus of the article? 
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Purpose - To allow analysis of any geographical dimensions which might exist in the 
coverage. Preliminary research has already suggested that a steady stream of media 
interest, and comment, existed on how population ageing might effect other economies, 
particularly within the EU. 
Coding issues - Relatively straight forward, during the data collection I decided to add a 
category for "global"as some articles were concerned with implications that might apply 
for all national economies, and used the term "global economy· to indicate a fully 
connected global economy. 
10. Who was quoted in the article? 
Purpose - Recording data on who is quoted within any given article allowed the research 
to investigate who the media perceive as the key protagonists in the relevant debates, 
and to assess whether certain organisations or individuals are allowed to push the debate 
onto their agendas. 
Coding issues - There were no problems in terms of interpreting from the text who had 
been quoted. However, in articles where the main body of text was focused on issues in a 
manner unrelated to population ageing, and copy relevant to ageing was only brief, I 
decided against recording who had been quoted in the non-ageing sections. I was 
primarily concerned with capturing who was been quoted directly on ageing issues, to 
collect to much data on matters which were often tangential at best struck me as 
potentially weakening the data. 
11. Which people or organisations were cited in the article? 
80 
Purpose - The purpose in developing this variable is similar to the recording who was 
being quoted in the coverage. This variable enabled analysis of which individuals or 
organisations were being cited as framing the issues and/or providing the "facts' for 
debate. 
Coding issues - there were no problems in terms of interpretation, but as with the 
collection of who was being quoted was restricted if the bulk of the article was focused 
too far away from concerns with population ageing. 
2) Note on Counting Quotations and Citations 
Collecting data on who is being quoted and cited provides material which can potentially 
indicate which people or organisations are the driving force behind any particular debate. 
However, I decided against recording every single person or organisation who was 
quoted or cited in the sample. 
For example, a small story sub-genre within the sample was the discussion in city pages 
of future growth prospects for various companies. Sometimes a company tipped for 
growth because it is felt its products are associated with population ageing i.e. garden 
centres. Many of these articles discuss the prospects of several companies across 
several unrelated sectors. I did not want to collect data on sources quoted the prospects 
of companies whose growth was in no way being linked to population ageing. 
As I coded articles I implemented a general policy of ignoring quotes and citations that 
were too tangential to the population elements in any given story. 
Appendix Three - Content Analysis - Press Coverage of Population Ageing 
Coding Sheet 
Item no ................... . Name of Coder .............................................•• 
Date .......................... . 
Title 
Daily Telegraph 
The Times 
The Guardian 
The Independent 
The Daily Mail 
The Express 
The Mirror 
The Sun 
Section 
Front Page 
News other 
Comment 
Length (number of words) ..... . 
The Star 
Financial TImes 
The Observer 
The Sunday TImes 
The Sunday Telegraph 
The Independent on 
Sunday 
The Business 
Editorial 
Supplementary Section 
The Mail on Sunday 
The Express on Sunday 
The Sunday Mirror 
The People 
The News of the World 
Daily Star Sunday 
Letters 
Other 
Headline .............................................................................................................................. . 
Byline ............................................................................................................. . 
Tone 
1= strongly positive 
2= fairly positive 
3= neutral 
4= fairly negative 
Population ageing primary or secondary focus 
1= primary 
2= secondary 
Primary Issue Focus 
Pensions 
Family Dependency 
Personal Social Services 
Health Care 
Economic 
Secondary Issue Focus 
Personal Finance 
Occupational Pensions 
NHS Fundin g/Services 
COmpany News 
travel 
Housing Demand 
Migration 
Conservative Party 
Cosmetics 
Political 
Consumer 
Housing 
Demographic 
Importance of older 
voters/consumers 
EU Reform 
Family Structure 
Trends in Popular Culture 
Multicultural Society 
Careers 
Personal Health 
Long Term Care 
5= strongly negative 
Religion 
IT and older people 
Public Transport 
Inheritence Issues 
Fiction Book Review 
Public Finances 
Science POlicy and Ethics 
COmpany Relocations 
Design Issues 
Obituary 
Labour Markets 
Political Situation in 
Germany 
USA Political Situation 
Private 
Pensions/Regulation 
Principal geographic focus 
Germany 
Italy 
France 
USA 
Australia 
Japan 
State Pension Reform 
Social Isolation/Exclusion 
Budget 2004 
BBC IF ... Reviews 
Administration of Welfare 
Prison Policy and 
Administration 
EU 
Global 
Kosovo 
China 
Public Health 
Elder Abuse 
Local Government 
Economic Outlook 
Media Industry and 
Trends 
Table: All Westminster Constituencies ranked by the estimated 
proportion of votes cast by voters aged 55+ ("Grey Vote") in a 
general election held in 2009. 
Grey Vote Grey Vote GreyVote . 
Constituency 2005 2009 2025 
East Devon 58.5 61.9 69.4 
Christchurch 59.3 61.4 68.1 
Harwich 57.9 60.7 68.1 
New Forest West 56.8 60.7 68.5 
Bexhill & Battle 57.1 60.0 67.4 
North Norfolk 55.2 59.8 68.8 
West Dorset 53.7 58.1 67.4 
Totnes 52.4 57.8 66.6 
Louth & Horncastle 52.4 57.3 66.2 
Worthing West 55.2 55.7 62.0 
Suffolk Coastal 50.7 55.6 64.1 
Torridge & West Devon 49.3 55.4 64.5 
Westmorland & Lonsdale A9.5 55.2 65.7 
Lewes 52.4 55.1 61.6 
Bognor Regis & Uttleharnpton 52.2 54.7 62.7 
Chichester 51.7 54.6 61.9 
Teignbridge 50.5 54.5 63.3 
North East Fife 44.8 54.4 53.7 
Ryedale 50.1 54.2 62.7 
Ludlow 49.2 54.1 63.3 
North West Norfolk 50.1 54.1 62.1 
Berwick Upon Tweed 47.5 53.8 65.4 
Eastbourne 52.6 53.8 61.1 
Scarborough & Whitby 48.7 53.6 62.9 
Boston & Skegness 49.4 53.6 62.5 
Leominster 48.8 53.6 63.0 
Isle of Wight 51.6 53.6 61.3 
East Yorkshire 48.7 53.5 63.2 
Poole 49.5 53.4 59.6 
Torbay 50.9 53.4 60.9 
ClywdWest 51.6 53.4 59.1 
Clwyd West 49.7 53.2 59.9 
Meirionnydd Nant Conwy 51.5 53.2 58.8 
West Worcestershire 49.7 53.1 60.4 
Kirkcaldy and Cowdenbeath 43.3 53.1 52.0 
North Devon 48.8 53.0 60.7 
Hexham 46.9 52.9 63.3 
Waveney 48.9 52.9 60.2 
North Dorset 48.4 52.9 61.3 
South Dorset 48.5 52.7 61.6 
South East Cornwall 48.3 52.6 61.7 
North Thanet 50.9 52.4 59.0 
North Cornwall 49.0 52.4 59.6 
Bridgwater 48.1 52.3 . 61.1 
Truro & SI. Austell 49.6 52.3 58.3 
Arundel & South Downs 48.7 52.2 59.8 
Great Yarmough 47.8 52.1 60.7 
Castle Point 45.2 52.0 59.7 
South Suffolk 46.7 51.8 59.1 
Wells 47.9 51.8 59.7 
South port 49.1 51.6 60.0 
Skipton & Ripon 46.4 51.6 60.0 
Mid Norfolk 47.1 51.6 59.9 
South West Norfolk 47.2 51.6 59.6 
South Holland & the Deepings 47.8 51.5 59.5 
South Thanet 49.1 51.5 58.7 
Blackpool North & Fleetwood 50.8 51.3 57.7 
South Norfolk 47.2 51.3 58.7 
Weston-Super-Mare 47.6 51.2 57.2 
Gainsborough 46.9 51.0 61.0 
West Derbyshire 45.7 51.0 60.2 
Yeovil 47.0 51.0 58.8 
South Staffordshire 44.0 50.8 61.9 
Brecon & Radnorshire 49.7 50.8 58.9 
Wirral South 47.9 50.7 57.6 
Havant 46.8 50.7 59.3 
Hereford 45.4 50.6 60.5 
Falmouth & Cambome 47.7 50.6 57.1 
Wyre Forest 44.3 50.5 58.2 
Folkestone & Hythe 47.7 50.4 57.4 
Vale of Clwyd 48.5 50.4 56.2 
Morecambe & Lunesdale 47.7 50.3 59.2 
Penrlth 45.8 50.3 58.8 
Wealden 46.3 50.2 58.2 
Carmarthen East & Dinefwr 49.0 50.2 54.3 
Workington 45.5 50.1 58.9 
Fylde 48.7 50.0 57.5 
Tatton 46.1 50.0 59.1 
Haltemprice & Howde 45.8 50.0 60.5 
Stratford-on-Avon 45.8 49.9 57.7 
Caernarfon 48.1 49.8 55.5 
East Hampshire 44.4 49.7 58.3 
Ynys Mon 48.0 49.7 55.2 
Na h-Eileanan an lar 47.7 49.6 63.0 
Sleaford & North Hykeham 46.1 49.6 57.5 
Aldrldge-Brownhills 47.3 49.6 56.5 
Stone 45.4 49.6 59.9 
Maldon & East Chelmsford 43.7 49.6 56.6 
Dover 45.9 49.6 57.8 
Carmarthen West & South 
Pembrokeshire 48.4 49.6 53.9 
Dumfries and Galloway 47.4 49.6 61.1 
Barrow & Fumess 44.5 49.5 59.7 
Cotswold 46.6 49.5 57.2 
Forest of Dean 44.6 49.5 57.7 
Woodspring 46.0 49.4 55.5 
Redcar 44.3 49.3 59.7 
Brigg & Goole 44.6 49.3 59.3 
North Essex 45.6 49.3 56.7 
South West Devon 44.0 49.3 57.8 
Cheadle 45.7 49.2 56.7 
North Shropshire 45.1 49.2 59.3 
Taunton 46.1 49.2 56.5 
Conwy 47.4 49.2 55.2 
Monmouth 48.5 49.2 52.6 
Mid Worcestershire 43.5 49.1 58.1 
Solihull 46.3 49.1 53.8 
Staffordshire Moorlands 43.8 49.1 58.1 
Central Suffolk & North Ipswich 45.7 49.1 58.3 
Crosby 46.7 49.0 57.6 
East Worthing & Shoreham 48.1 49.0 54.3 
Presli Pembrokeshire 47.7 48.9 53.2 
Wansbeck 44.3 48.8 58.4 
Vale of York 43.5 48.8 57.8 
North West Durham 44.7 48.7 58.0 
Hazel Grove 45.3 48.7 56.2 
Beverley & Holderness 44.4 48.7 59.2 
MoleValley 46.2 48.6 53.5 
New Forest East 44.4 48.6 56.5 
Gower 47.3 48.6 52.9 
Bishop Auckland 44.1 48.5 58.6 
Harrogate & Knaresborough 43.9 48.5 56.7 
Grantham & Stamford 43.4 48.5 58.0 
Newark 44.7 48.5 56.9 
Somerlon & Frome 45.3 48.5 57.1 
Llanelli 47.3 48.5 52.9 
Shrewsbury & Atcham 44.1 48.4 57.5 
North East Cambridgeshire 45.4 48.3 55.1 
Hastings & Rye 46.1 48.3 56.4 
Montgomeryshire 47.2 48.3 56.3 
Dumfriesshire, Clydesdale and 
Tweeddale 46.0 48.2 59.9 
Rutland & Melton 43.5 48.2 57.0 
Richmond (Yorks) 43.7 48.1 58.4 
Tynemouth 45.5 48.0 55.3 
Bury St. Edmunds 43.6 48.0 55.7 
Southend West 46.4 48.0 54.7 
Mid Dorset & North Poole 44.1 48.0 54.2 
Bromsgrove 44.5 47.9 54.7 
Dunfermline and West Fife 38.8 47.9 47.1 
Congleton 42.3 47.8 56.3 
North East Derbyshire 45.1 47.8 55.2 
Stroud 44.5 47.8 54.8 
Berwickshire, Roxburgh and Selkirk 46.3 47.7 56.8 
Wirral West 45.0 47.7 54.8 
Dudley North . 44.6 47.7 54.1 
Westbury 44.7 47.7 54.5 
Easington 43.5 47.6 56.6 
Bosworth - 41.9 47.6 -56.2 
Chamwood 43.2 47.6 55.6 
Lichfield 43.5 47.6 57.8 
Stafford 42.5 47.6 57.3 
Brentwood & Ongar 45.4 47.6 53.9 
Cleethorpes 44.6 47.5 57.7 
Bolsover 44.2 47.5 55.2 
Ayr, Carrick and Cumnock 45.9 47.4 56.1 
Perth and North Perth shire 45.5 47.3 56.7 
Caithness, Sutherland and Easter Ross 45.0 47.3 58.4 
Macclesfield 43.4 47.3 54.1 
Sevenoaks 43.5 47.3 52.5 
Argyll and Bute 46.3 47.2 52.6 
Angus 44.8. 47.1 58.7 
Scunthorpe 42.7 47.1 57.3 
Harborough 42.7 47.1 56.2 
Upminster 45.6 47.1 52.2 
Sedgefield 43.3 47.0 55.8 
Ribble Valley 44.0 47.0 55.2 
Ceredigion 46.1 47.0 55.2 
Fareham 43.1 46.9 55.3 
Aberavon 45.6 46.9 51.4 
Ross, Skye and Lochaber 44.5 46.9 58.1 
Bassetlaw 42.8 46.8 55.8 
Crewe & Nantwich 43.1 46.7 55.8 
West Lancashire 42.9 46.7 55.9 
Rayleigh 42.1 46.7 53.4 
North Down 45.8 46.7 No Data 
Blaydon 44.8 46.6 54.2 
Stoke-on-Trent North 43.9 46.6 55.4 
Gosport 42.3 46.6 56.4 
Banff and Buchan 41.9 46.5 60.4 
North Ayrshire and Arran 44.5 46.5 57.9 
Newcastle Upon Tyne North 44.6 46.5 53.9 
Gedling 42.5 46.5 52.4 
High Peak 41.5 46.5 56.1 
Halesowen & Rowley Regis 45.4 46.5 52.4 
Romsey 43.1 46.5 53.7 
Bournemouth West 47.4 46.5 50.0 
Salisbury 43.7 46.5 52.9 
Copeland 42.9 46.4 57.3 
North Warwickshire 41.7 46.4 54.4 
Lancaster & Wyre 44.5 46.3 54.1 
SI. Helens South 42.4 46.3 54.4 
South Ribble 41.9 46.3 54.0 
AmberValley 43.0 46.3 54.1 
Sherwood 42.8 46.3 52.8 
Rochford & Southend East 43.5 46.3 52.9 
South West Surrey 43.3 46.3 50.8 
Swansea West 45.2 46.3 51.1 
Dudley South 43.1 46.2 52.5 
Norwith North 44.1 46.2 55.2 
Tonbridge & Mailing 42.7 46.2 52.4 
North Durham' . - ·· .. 41.8 46.1 55.3 
South Shields 43.6 46.1 . 55.3 . 
Chesterfield- 43.8 46.1 53.4 
Wansdyke 44.0 46.1 50.7 
Rhondda 45.5 46.1 49.7 
Old Bexley & Sidcup 44.2 46.0 53.1 
Beaconsfield 44.0 46.0 50.8 
Witney 41.4 46.0 54.3 
Carlisle 43.2 45.9 53.7 
Doncaster Central 42.8 45.9 55.0 
Henley 42.6 45.9 53.0 
Mid Sussex 42.0 45.9 52.3 
Neath 44.6 45.9 50.2 
Blyth Valley 39.4 45.8 54.9 
Middlesbrough South & East Cleveland 41.9 45.8 56.3 
City of Chester 42.9 45.8 52.5 
Saffron Walden 41.6 45.8 56.3 
St. Helens North 42.0 45.7 53.9 
Newcastle Under Lyme 42.8 45.7 54.7 
Epsom & Ewell 43.7 45.7 50.1 
Winchester 43.0 45.7 51.7 
Tewkesbury 44.8 45.7 54.4 
Bamsley East & Mexborough 42.8 45.6 53.5 
Bamsley West & Penistone 43.0 45.6 53.2 
Faversham & Mid Kent 42.2 45.6 51.9 
Blackpool South 45.6 45.5 51.9 
Don Valley 42.3 45.5 54.4 
Dundee East 44.5 45.4 54.2 
Halton 40.6 45.4 54.0 
Wallasey 42.7 45.4 52.4 
Sheffield Heeley 45.4 45.4 50.7 
Rugby & Kenilworth 43.3 45.4 52.7 
Devizes 40.8 45.4 53.1 
Jarrow 43.0 45.3 54.1 
Bootle 44.6 45.3 46.4 
Ellemere Port & Neston 42.5 45.3 52.0 
Wigan 42.6 45.3 52.4 
Wentworth 42.2 45.3 53.4 
Canterbury 44.7 45.3 51.4 
Sunderland South 42.6 45.2 52.7 
Eddisbury 41.8 45.2 52.9 
Doncaster North 42.0 45.2 54.1 
Well in borough 40.3 45.2 54.1 
East Dunbartonshire 43.1 45.1 55.6 
Darlington 42.4 45.1 53.7 
Sunderland North 42.4 45.1 52.7 
Orpington 44.5 45.1 49.0 
Blaenau Gwent 44.4 45.1 48.5 
Bridgend 44.4 45.1 48.5 
Hemsworth 42.3 45.0 52.5 
Cynon Valley 44.3 45.0 48.5 
Pontefract & Castleford 42.2 44.9 52.5 
North West Leicestershire 42.0 44.9 51.9 
Nuneaton 40.8 44.9 52.5 
Kingswood 42.2 44.9 50.3 
Ashfield 42.8 44.8 52.2 
Maidstone & The Weald 41.6 44.8 50.6 
Hartlepool 42.2 44.7 53.7 
Chorley 39.8 44.7 52.6 
Rother Valley 41.7 44.7 52.7 
Ashford 42.5 44.7 51.8 
Plymouth Devonport 41.8 44.7 52.3 
Orkney and Shetland 42.1 44.7 58.3 
North Tyneside 42.2 44.6 51.8 
Rotherham 41.6 44.6 52.7 
Broxtowe 41.6 44.6 49.8 
Stourbridge 41.7 44.6 51.0 
Ochil and South Perthshire 42.7 44.5 54.7 
Great Grimsby 41.1 44.5 53.7 
Rushcliffe 41.3 44.5 50.1 
Walsall South 42.0 44.5 51.2 
Homchurch 43.0 44.5 49.7 
East Lothian 43.4 44.4 52.1 
East Surrey 41.6 44.4 50.4 
Clywd South 42.6 44.4 49.9 
Delyn 42.6 44.4 49.8 
Knowsley North 42.7 44.3 53.6 
Pendle 40.9 44.3 51.8 
Kingston Upon Hull West & Hessle 42.3 44.3 52.9 
Selby 40.3 44.3 52.6 
Mansfield 42.4 44.3 52.3 
Meriden 41.6 44.3 48.7 
Horsham 40.1 44.3 52.7 
Bolton North East 42.2 44.2 50.5 
Liverpool Garston 45.0 44.2 50.7 
Elmet 44.5 44.2 48.2 
Erewash 41.3 44.2 51.0 
Kettering 40.8 44.2 52.8 
Boumemouth East 44.8 44.2 47.7 
Bumley 40.6 44.1 51.6 
The Wrekin 39.5 44.1 53.7 
Belfast East 44.5 44.1 No Data 
Dundee West 42.1 44.0 52.8 
Stoke-on-Trent Central 41.6 44.0 52.0 
Wolverhampton South East 43.4 44.0 50.0 
Epping Forest 42.3 44.0 49.7 
South Cambridgeshire 40.6 44.0 49.4 
Birkenhead 41.2 43.9 50.6 
Calder Valley 41.0 43.9 50.6 
Sittingbournes & Sheppey 40.5 43.9 51.2 
Merthyr Tydfil & Rhymney 43.3 43.9 47.3 
Wrexham 42.0 43.9 49.5 
Inverclyde 42.5 43.9 56.0 
Central Ayrshire 42.2 43.8 53.8 
Inverness. Naim. Badenoch and 
Strathspey 41.5 43.8 54.9 
Leigh 41.0 43.8 50.9 
Warrington South 40.3 43.8 53.4 
Bamsley Central 41.3 43.8 51.2 
Stoke-on-Trent South 41.2 43.8 52.6 
Gravesham 41.5 43.8 49.9 
North West Hampshire 39.2 43.8 51.3 
Islwyn 43.1 43.8 47.2 
Stockion North 40.9 43.7 53.5 
Halifax 40.8 43.7 50.3 
South Derbyshire 40.8 43.7 52.1 
Burton 41.4 43.7 53.5 
Spelthome 41.9 43.7 49.2 
Wantage 39.3 43.7 49.5 
Northavon 40.8 43.7 49.7 
Newport West 43.0 43.7 47.2 
Edinburgh West 44.1 43.6 48.0 
Denton & Reddish 41.1 43.6 51.2 
Moray 41.8 43.5 51.3 
Gateshead East & Washington 41.4 43.5 50.9 
Tamworth 37.1 43.5 52.7 
Wolverhampton South West 43.0 43.5 49.6 
Bexleyheath & Crayford 41.6 43.5 50.5 
Brighton Kemptown 43.7 43.5 47.7 
North East Hampshire 38.9 43.5 49.9 
Keighley 43.5 43.4 46.6 
Blaby 38.9 43.4 52.0 
Sutton Coldfield 45.9 43.4 45.6 
Walsall North 41.0 43.4 50.1 
West Bromwich East 44.5 43.4 48.3 
Bromley & Chislehurst 42.9 43.4 47.3 
Romford 41.8 43.4 48.5 
Maidenhead 40.2 43.4 49.4 
Bath 42.4 43.4 47.3 
North Wiltshire .39.6 43.4 51.1 
Belfast North 43.7 43.4 No Data 
Huddersfield 40.5 43.3 49.7 
Sheffield Attercliffe 43.2 43.3 48.6 
Billericay 39.5 43.3 49.6 
Reigate 41.0 43.3 48.5 
Tunbridge Wells 41.4 43.3 47.7 
South East Cambridgeshire 40.4 43.3 48.5 
Bury North 40.6 43.2 48.6 
Hyndbum 41.0 43.2 50.1 
Vale of Glamorgan 42.5 43.2 46.5 
Heywood & Middleton 40.5 43.1 48.8 
Braintree 39.1 43.1 50.9 
Huntingdon 37.8 43.1 51.2 
North East Hertfordshire 40.7 43.1 49.1 
Corby 40.0 43.0 52.3 
Paisley and Renfrewshire South 41.6 43.0 54.5 
Altrincham & Sale West 42.4 42.9 47.5 
Bolton West 40.9 42.9 49.1 
Wakefield 39.4 42.9 49.3 
South West Hertfordshire 40.9 .42.9 48.3 
Kilmarnock and Loudoun 41.8 42.S 52.4 
East Renfrewshire 41.3 42.S 51.9 
Weaver Vale 38.4 42.S 51.4 
Cannock Chase 38.7 42.S 52.5 
West Chelmsford 38.6 42.S 48.8 
North Antrim 42.3 42.7 No Data 
Old ham West & Royton 40.5 42.7 48.7 
Shipley 42.6 42.7 45.8 
Redditch 36.0 42.7 51.2 
Wolverhampton North East 42.1 42.7 48.8 
Basildon 39.9 42.7 51.7 
Torfaen 41.9 42.7 46.0 
Stirling 41.2 42.6 49.9 
Colne Valley 39.9 42.6 49.0 
Sheffield Hillborough 42.6 42.6 48.0 
Derby North 42.5 42.6 49.2 
Northampton North 39.0 42.6 51.0 
Hertsmere 40.5 42.6 48.2 
Swansea East 41.3 42.6 46.8 
Lanark and Hamilton East 41.3 42.6 51.5 
City of Durham 38.7 42.5 51.2 
Middlesbrough 39.6 42.5 52.8 
Bury South 39.8 42.5 47.8 
Motherwell and Wishaw 41.2 42.4 52.2 
Ashton Under Lyne 40.3 42.4 49.2 
Buckingham 38.2 42.4 50.2 
Makerfield 39.5 42.3 49.1 
Kingston Upon Hull East 41.0 42.3 51.3 
Midlothian 40.6 42.3 51.0 
Houghton & Washington East 39.4 42.2 49.4 
Knowsley South 40.5 42.1 51.5 
Warwick & Leamington 41.1 42.1 47.7 
West Suffolk 39.6 42.1 45.9 
Ayslesbury 37.9 42.1 47.8 
Glenrothes 41.1 42.0 49.6 
Sheffield Brightside 41.9 42.0 47.3 
Daventry 37.8 42.0 51.3 
Newbury 37.9 42.0 50.1 
Cardiff North 41.4 42.0 45.9 
Newport East 41.2 42.0 45.4 
West Dunbartonshire 40.8 41.9 52.3 
Eccles 42.6 41.9 45.7 
Hitchin & Harpenden 40.8 41.9 46.9 
Dewsbury 39.0 41.8 48.1 
Welwyn Hatfield 41.2 41.8 46.5 
Eastleigh 37.9 41.8 48.8 
Gloucester 39.4 41.8 49.2 
Oldham East & Saddleworth 39.3 41.7 47.7 
Windsor 38.3 41.7 46.8 
Warrington North 38.2 41.6 51.1 
Hemel Hempstead 38.9 41.6 47.6 
Alyn & Deeside 39.8 41.6 46.9 
Linlithgow and East Falkirk 40.6 41.6 50.0 
Stockton South 38.6 41.5 51.0 
Stalybridge & Hyde 39.4 41.5 52.0 
Bailey & Spen 38.6 41.5 47.7 
Runnymede & Weybridge 40.4 41.5 47.1 
Ogmore 40.7 41.5 44.7 
West Aberdeenshire and Kincardine 37.1 41.5 55.6 
Strangford 41.3 41.5 No Data 
Coventry North West 41.8 41.4 47.8 
Ipswich 41.0 41.4 45.8 
Medway 38.1 41.4 48.7 
Cheltenham 41.2 41.4 46.2 
. Glasgow South West 42.3 41.3 47.3 
Pudsey 41.7 41.3 45.3 
North West Cambridgeshire 37.3 41.3 47.7 
South West Bedforshire 38.4 41.3 48.9 
Dartford 39.8 41.3 47.7 
Rutherglen and Hamilton West 40.0 41.3 50.2 
Glasgow North West 42.3 41.3 47.1 
EastAntrim 41.0 41.2 No Data 
Rossendale & Darwen 39.0 41.2 47.5 
Leeds North East 41.6 41.2 45.1 
Broxboume 40.5 41.2 45.9 
East Kilbride, Strathaven and 
Lesmahagow 39.8 41.2 50.1 
Colchester 36.9 41.1 48.2 
Norwich South 40.9 41.1 46.1 
Esher & Walton 41.1 41.1 45.6 
Guildford 39.7 41.1 45.1 
Fermanagh and South Tyrone 40.1 41.1 No Data 
Glasgow North East 41.9 41.0 47.0 
Worsley 40.6 41.0 45.6 
City of York 39.3 41.0 46.7 
Sheffield Hallam 41.6 41.0 46.6 
Paisley and Renfrewshire North 39.6 40.8 52.5 
Newcastle Upon Tyne East 39.0 40.8 47.8 
Stockport 37.3 40.8 47.7 
Warley 41.7 40.8 45.7 
Ruislip Northwood 41.3 40.8 45.4 
Falkirk 40.1 40.8 48.5 
Bolton South East 38.8 40.7 46.9 
Worcester 38.0 40.7 48.1 
Croydon South 40.0 40.7 47.9 
North Swindon 38.9 40.7 47.3 
Plymough Sulton 38.4 40.7 48.3 
East Londonderry 40.3 40.6 No Data 
Normanton 38.2 40.6 48.2 
Lincoln 39.6 40.6 46.7 
Peterborough 38.3 40.6 46.8 
Wycombe 36.4 40.6 44.5 
Cardiff South & Penarth 39.8 40.6 44.2 
Leeds East 40.8 40.5 44.2 
Birmingham Yardley 43.1 40.5 42.7 
North East Bedfordshire 39.5 40.4 48.1 
Rochdale 37.8 40.3 45.9 
Stretford & Urmston 39.8 40.3 44.9 
West Bromwich West 41.1 40.3 45.0 
Caerphilly 39.7 40.3 43.6 
Pontypridd 39.7 40.3 43.6 
Lagan Valley 40.0 40.3 No Data 
Aberdeen North 38.2 40.3 53.4 
Loughborough 36.9 40.2 48.2 
Mid Bedfordshire 37.6 40.2 47.6 
Cardiff West 39.5 40.2 43.6 
Gordon 36.5 40.1 54.6 
Tyne Bridge 38.3 40.1 47.3 
Bedford 38.1 40.1 46.3 
Harlow 38.7 40.1 46.1 
Airdrie and Shotts 38.8 40.0 49.7 
Birmingham Hall Green 42.6 40.0 42.4 
Harrow East 38.7 40.0 46.3 
IIford North 40.5 40.0 45.1 
Aberdeen South 37.9 40.0 53.3 
Gillingham 36.7 39.9 47.3 
Woking 37.9 39.9 45.1 
Exeter 39.6 39.9 44.3 
Glasgow East 40.8 39.9 45.9 
Newry and Armagh 38.8 39.8 No Data 
Northampton South 35.9 39.7 47.8 
Hertford & Stortford 36.5 39.7 45.5 
Derby South 39.4 39.6 46.1 
Surrey Heath 38.2 39.6 43.6 
Coventry South 40.1 39.5 46.0 
Chingford & Woodford Green 41.5 39.5 44.7 
Sutton & Cheam 38.8 39.5 45.5 
Banbury 35.9 39.4 47.8 
Chatham & Aylesford 36.1 39.4 45.4 
Portsmouth North 39.5 39.4 45.8 
Tiverton & Honiton 39.8 39.3 36.0 
Coatbridge. Chryston and Bellshill 38.1 39.3 48.9 
Telford 34.7 39.2 48.5 
South Down 38.2 39.1 No Data 
Birmingham Hodge Hill 41.6 39.1 41.3 
Basingstoke 34.5 39.1 46.2 
Preston 37.1 39.0 45.8 
Leicester East 39.2 39.0 46.0 
SI. Albans 38.3 39.0 42.6 
Harrow West 37.8 39.0 45.3 
Enfield South gate 39.5 38.9 45.8 
Liverpool Walton 39.4 38.8 44.9 
Upper Bann 38.7 38.8 No Data 
Liverpool West Derby 39.3 38.7 44.9 
Nottingham North 41.1 38.7 42.4 
Bristol South 40.6 38.7 39.0 
South Antrim 39.0 38.6 No Data 
Salford 39.7 38.6 42.7 
West Tyrone 37.3 38.5 No Data 
Wylhenshawe & Sale East 40.7 38.5 42.0 
Morley & Rothwell 38.8 38.5 42.1 
Stevenage 37.7 38.5 45.7 
Chipping Bamet 38.8 38.5 43.7 
Crawley 36.5 38.5 44.7 
Birmingham Erdington 41.0 38.4 40.7 
Coventry North east 38.7 38.4 44.7 
Luton North 37.6 38.4 44.3 
Chesham & Amersham 37.2 38.4 36.0 
Wokingham 34.0 38.4 45.0 
Birmingham Northfield 40.8 38.3 40.6 
Oxford West & Abingdon 36.9 38.3 44.2 
Bradford South 38.1 38.0 41.0 
Beckenham 37.6 38.0 41.8 
Brent North 36.6 38.0 46.3 
Liverpool Wavertree 38.6 37.9 44.2 
Thurrock 35.1 37.9 44.5 
Reading West 36.4 37.9 42.8 
Manchester Blackley 41.1 37.7 39.8 
Edinburgh South 38.1 37.6 42.3 
Hove 40.9 37.6 39.8 
Southampton Itchen 38.4 37.6 40.4 
Cumbemauld. Kilsyth and Kirkintilloch 
East 36.0 37.4 46.8 
Carshalton & Wallington 36.6 37.3 43.3 
Portsmouth South 37.8 37.2 43.7 
Bristol North West 38.4 37.2 38.2 
Glasgow South 38.2 37.2 43.0 
Mid Ulster 36.6 37.1 No Data 
Birmingham Egdbaston 39.6 37.1 39.4 
Kingston Upon Hull North 35.6 37.0 45.8 
Bradford North 37.1 36.9 40.0 
Watford 36.5 36.8 42.2 
Aldershot 33.0 36.8 43.5 
South Swindon 35.0 36.8 43.2 
Croydon Central 35.9 36.7 43.6 
Bristol East 38.5 36.7 36.9 
Bracknell 32.9 36.6 45.0 
Belfast West 36.8 36.6 No Data 
Eltham 39.8 36.5 40.8 
Leeds West 36.8 36.4 40.1 
Dagenham 40.3 36.4 41.2 
Hendon 36.4 36.0 41.2 
Uxbridge 36.8 36.0 40.6 
Milton Keynes South West 31.9 36.0 44.4 
Enfield North 36.4 35.9 42.8 
Blackbum 35.0 35.8 41.5 
Leeds Central 36.4 35.8 39.7 
Finchley & Golders Green 36.2 35.8 40.9 
Leicester West 35.8 35.7 42.5 
Edinburgh East 36.1 35.7 40.4 
Foyle 34.8 35.6 No Data 
Newcastle Upon Tyne Central 34.4 35.5 42.2 
Birmingham Perry Barr 38.0 35.5 37.8 
Eailing North 34.9 35.0 40.9 
Leeds North West 36.0 34.9 39.3 
Birmingham Selly Oak 37.4 34.9 37.2 
Richmond Park 35.1 34.9 38.7 
Southampton Test 35.7 34.8 37.7 
Luton South 33.8 34.7 40.5 
Edmonton 35.3 34.7 41.6 
Kingston & Surbiton 34.9 34.7 38.7 
North East Milton Keynes 30.7 34.7 43.0 
Edinburgh South West 35.1 34.7 39.2 
Belfast South 34.8 34.4 No Data 
Twickenham 34.7 34.0 37.9 
Livingston 32.8 33.9 42.1 
Slough 32.2 .33.9 41.1 
Liverpool Riverside 34.7 33.8 40.0 
Sheffield Central 34.1 33.8 38.8 
Brent South 31.9 33.6 41.9 
Mitcham & Morden 34.1 33.6 38.2 
Glasgow Central 34.4 33.6 39.5 
Bradford West 33.8 33.5 36.6 
Leicester South 33.6 33.5 40.2 
Feltham & Heston 33.2 33.5 39.5 
Edinburgh North and Leith 33.9 33.5 37.8 
Lewisham East 34.5 33.4 40.7 
Nottingham South 36.0 32.8 36.5 
Croydon North 32.0 32.8 39.5 
IIford South 33.0 32.6 37.5 
Cardiff Central 32.2 32.5 36.6 
Hayes & Harlington 33.0 32.4 36.7 
Readi ng East 32.3 32.4 36.8 
Wimbledon 32.8 32.3 36.8 
Oxford East 34.4 32.1 36.2 
Brentford & Isleworth 31.6 32.0 37.9 
Barking 35.5 31.9 36.6 
Erith & Thamesmead 31.3 31.5 36.9 
Brent East 29.4 31.4 39.5 
Cambridge 36.1 31.3 34.4 
Nottingham East 33.5 31.1 34.4 
Glasgow North 31.6 30.8 36.6 
Birmingham Sparkbrook & Small Heath 33.1 30.8 33.1 
Ley10n & Wanstead 31.2 30.8 35.4 
Lewisham West 31.5 30.5 37.6 
Brighton Pavilion 33.4 30.4 32.7 
Eaililng Southall 30.2 30.3 35.9 
Greenwich & Woolwich 33.0 30.1 34.2 
Manchester Central 33.2 29.9 32.0 
Eailing; Acton & Shepherd's Bush 29.9 29.8 34.9 
Kensington & Chelsea 33.0 29.8 32.3 
Manchester Withington 32.0 28.5 30.5 
Birmingham Ladywood 30.7 28.4 30.7 
Bristol West 30.3 28.3 29.0 
Walthamstow 29.7 28.2 33.1 
Manchester Gorton 31.3 28.1 30.4 
Putney 31.1 28.1 29.2 
Camberwell & Peckham 29.1 27.9 34.8 
Regent's Park & North Kensington 32.2 27.9 30.3 
Homsey & Wood Green 28.8 27.6 33.3 
Dulwich & West Norwood 29.5 27.4 32.4 
Tottenham 28.4 27.4 33.3 
Hackney South & Shored itch 29.0 27.2 33.0 
Hampstead & Highgate 30.3 27.2 30.6 
West Ham 28.9 26.9 33.3 
Cities of London & Westminster 32.1 26.8 29.2 
Islington South & Finsbury Park 29.9 26.4 29.8 
Hammersmith & Fulham 28.1 26.3 30.1 
North Southwark & Bermondsey 27.1 26.3 32.7 
East Ham 27.5 25.7 31.8 
Holbom & SI. Pancras 27.9 25.2 28.4 
Hackney North & Stoke Newington 26.3 24.8 30.4 
Lewisham Deptford 25.0 24.5 31.2 
Poplar & Canning Town 26.8 24.4 30.0 
Streatham 25.8 24.2 28.5 
Islington North 27.2 23.8 27.3 
Tooting 26.5 23.7 25.0 
Vauxhall 25.0 23.6 27.7 
Bethnal Green & Bow 28.8 23.5 26.0 
Battersea 24.9 22.3 23.7 
Author: Seot! Davidson. Loughborough University. 
Changes in the Grey Vote 
Appendix Table: Constituencies in England and Wales. Estimated 
Proportion of Turnout in General Elections Comprised of Voters aged 
55+. 
2009 
onstituency Region 2005 2009 2025 (Scenario 2) 
,erwick Upon Tweed North East 47.5 53.8 65.4 55.2 
,is hop Auckland North East 44.1 48.5 58.6 50.0 
,Iaydon North East 44.8 46.6 54.2 48.2 
,Iyth Valley North East 39.4 45.8 54.9 47.4 
ity of Durham North East 38.7 42.5 51.2 44.2 
'arlington North East 42.4 45.1 53.7 46.8 
asington North East 43.5 47.6 56.6 49.3 
iateshead East & Washington North East 41.4 43.5 50.9 45.2 
lartlepool North East 42.2 44.7 53.7 46.3 
lexham North East 46.9 52.9 63.3 54.2 
loughton & Washington East North East 39.4 42.2 49.4 43.8 
arrow North East 43.0 45.3 54.1 46.9 
liddlesbrough North East 39.6 42.5 52.8 44.3 
liddlesbrough South & East 
:Ieveland North East 41.9 45.8 56.3 47.4 
lewcastle Upon Tyne Central North East 34.4 35.5 42.2 37.5 
lewcastle Upon Tyne East North East 39.0 40.8 47.8 42.6 
lewcastle Upon Tyne North North East 44.6 46.5 53.9 48.0 
lorth Durham North East 41.8 46.1 55.3 47.7 
lorth Tyneside North East 42.2 44.6 51.8 46.3 
lorth West Durham North East 44.7 48.7 58.0 50.2 
:edcar North East 44.3 49.3 59.7 50.9 
:edgefield North East 43.3 47.0 55.8 48.5 
:outh Shields North East 43.6 46.1 55.3 47.7 
:tockton North North East 40.9 43.7 53.5 45.4 
:tockton South North East 38.6 41.5 51.0 43.0 
:underland North North East 42.4 45.1 52.7 46.9 
:underland South North East 42.6 45.2 52.7 46.9 
yne Bridge North East 38.3 40.1 47.3 41.8 
'ynemouth North East 45.5 48.0 55.3 49.5 
Vansbeck North East 44.3 48.8 58.4 50.5 
.Itrincham & Sale West North West 42.4 42.9 47.5 44.5 
.shton Under Lyne North West 40.3 42.4 49.2 44.1 
larrow & Furness North West 44.5 49.5 59.7 51.1 
lirkenhead North West 41.2 43.9 50.6 45.6 
Ilackburn North West 35.0 35.8 41.5 37.5 
Ilackpool North & Fleetwood North West 50.8 51.3 57.7 52.9 
Ilackpool South North West 45.6 45.5 51.9 47.2 
lolton North East North West 42.2 44.2 50.5 45.9 
lolton South East North West 38.8 40.7 46.9 42.5 
lolton West North West 40.9 42.9 49.1 44.5 
2025 
(Scenario 
2) 
66.9 
60.1 
56.0 
56.5 
53.1 
55.4 
58.2 
52.7 
55.4 
64.7 
51.1 
55.8 
54.7 
57.9 
44.4 
49.8 
55.7 
57.0 
53.6 
59.6 
61.4 
57.4 
57.0 
55.2 
52.6 
54.4 
54.4 
49.2 
56.9 
60.0 
49.2 
51.0 
61.3 
52.4 
43.2 
59.3 
53.6 
52.1 
48.7 
50.7 
:ootle North West 44.6 45.3 46.4 47.1 48.0 
:urnley North West 40.6 44.1 51.6 45.8 53.4 
:ury North North West 40.6 43.2 48.6 44.8 50.4 
:ury South North West 39.8 42.5 47.8 44.2 49.6 
:arlisle North West 43.2 45.9 53.7 47.6 55.4 
:headle North West 45.7 49.2 56.7 50.7 58.3 
:horley North West 39.8 44.7 52.6 46.3 54.2 
:ity of Chester North West 42.9 45.8 52.5 47.5 54.3 
:ongleton North West 42.3 47.8 56.3 49.4 57.9 
:opeland North West 42.9 46.4 57.3 47.9 58.9 
:rewe & Nantwich North West 43.1 46.7 55.8 48.3 57.4 
:rosby North West 46.7 49.0 57.6 50.5 59.2 
lenton & Reddish North West 41.1 43.6 51.2 45.2 53.0 
ccles North West 42.6 41.9 45.7 43.6 47.5 
ddisbury North West 41.8 45.2 52.9 46.8 54.4 
.lIesmere Port & Neston North West 42.5 45.3 52.0 46.9 53.7 
ylde North West 48.7 50.0 57.5 51.6 59.1 
lalton North West 40.6 45.4 54.0 47.1 55.8 
lazel Grove North West 45.3 48.7 56.2 50.3 57.8 
leywood & Middleton North West 40.5 43.1 48.8 44.7 50.6 
Iyndburn North West 41.0 43.2 50.1 44.9 51.9 
:nowsley North North West 42.7 44.3 53.6 45.9 55.3 
:nowsley South North West 40.5 42.1 51.5 43.8 53.2 
an caster & Wyre North West 44.5 46.3 54.1 48.2 56.0 
eigh North West 41.0 43.8 50.9 45.6 52.5 
iverpool Garston North West 45.0 44.2 50.7 45.8 52.4 
iverpool Riverside North West 34.7 33.8 40.0 35.7 42.0 
iverpool Walton North West 39.4 38.8 44.9 40.5 46.8 
Iverpool Wavertree North West 38.6 37.9 44.2 39.7 46.0 
iverpool West Derby North West 39.3 38.7 44.9 40.4 46.7 
lacclesfield North West 43.4 47.3 54.1 48.8 55.7 
lakerfield North West 39.5 42.3 49.1 43.9 50.8 
lanchester Blackley North West 41.1 37.7 39.8 39.5 41.5 
lanchester Central North West 33.2 29.9 32.0 31.7 34.0 
lanchester Gorton North West 31.3 28.1 30.4 30.0 32.3 
lanchester Withington North West 32.0 28.5 30.5 30.3 32.5 
lorecambe & Lunesdale North West 47.7 50.3 59.2 51.9 60.7 
Ildham East & Saddleworth North West 39.3 41.7 47.7 43.3 49.4 
IIdham West & Royton North West 40.5 42.7 48.7 44.4 50.6 
'endle North West 40.9 44.3 51.8 46.0 53.5 
'enrith North West 45.8 50.3 58.8 51.8 60.2 
'reston North West 37.1 39.0 45.8 40.8 47.7 
:ibble Valley North West 44.0 47.0 55.2 48.6 56.8 
:ochdale North West 37.8 40.3 45.9 42.0 47.8 
:ossendale & Darwen North West 39.0 41.2 47.5 42.8 49.2 
,to Helens North North West 42.0 45.7 53.9 47.4 55.5 
,t. Helens South North West 42.4 46.3 54.4 47.9 56.0 
:alford North West 39.7 38.6 42.7 40.5 44.6 
:outh Ribble North West 41.9 46.3 54.0 47.9 55.7 
:outhport North West 49.1 51.6 60.0 53.1 61.6 
:talybridge & Hyde North West 39.4 41.5 52.0 43.2 53.7 
:tockport North West 37.3 40.8 47.7 42.5 49.6 
,tretford & Urmston North West 39.8 40.3 44.9 41.9 46.7 
·atton North West 46.1 50.0 59.1 51.5 60.6 
~allasey North West 42.7 45.4 52.4 47.1 54.1 
~arrington North North West 38.2 41.6 51.1 43.1 52.8 
~arrington South North West 40.3 43.8 53.4 45.4 55.1 
~eaverVale North West 38.4 42.8 51.4 44.4 53.0 
~est Lancashire North West 42.9 46.7 55.9 48.4 57.6 
~estmorland & Lonsdale North West 49.5 55.2 65.7 56.7 67.1 
~igan North West 42.6 45.3 52.4 46.9 54.1 
~irral South North West 47.9 50.7 57.6 52.2 59.2 
~irral West North West 45.0 47.7 54.8 49.2 56.4 
~orkington North West 45.5 50.1 58.9 51.7 60.5 
~orsley North West 40.6 41.0 45.6 42.6 47.2 
~ythenshawe & Sale East North West 40.7 38.5 42.0 40.2 43.8 
Yorks and 
larnsley Central Humber 41.3 43.8 51.2 45.5 53.0 
Yorks and 
larnsley East & Mexborough Humber 42.8 45.6 53.5 47.3 55.3 
Yorks and 
larnsley West & Penistone Humber 43.0 45.6 53.2 47.2 54.8 
Yorks and 
lath~y & Spen Humber 38.6 41.5 47.7 43.1 49.5 
Yorks and 
leverley & Holderness Humber 44.4 48.7 59.2 50.2 60.6 
Yorks and 
Iradford North Humber 37.1 36.9 40.0 38.7 41.8 
Yorks and 
Iradford South Humber 38.1 38.0 41.0 39.7 42.8 
Yorks and 
Iradford West Humber 33.8 33.5 36.6 35.3 38.6 
Yorks and 
Irigg & Goole Humber 44.6 49.3 59.3 50.7 60.7 
Yorks and 
:alder Valley Humber 41.0 43.9 50.6 45.5 52.2 
Yorks and 
:ity of York Humber 39.3 41.0 46.7 42.9 48.7 
Yorks and 
:Ieethorpes Humber 44.6 47.5 57.7 49.1 59.3 
Yorks and 
:olne Valley Humber 39.9 42.6 49.0 44.2 50.7 
Yorks and 
lewsbury Humber 39.0 41.8 48.1 43.5 49.9 
Yorks and 
Ion caster Central Humber 42.8 45.9 55.0 47.7 56.7 
Yorks and 
Ion caster North Humber 42.0 45.2 54.1 46.9 55.8 
Yorks and 
Ion Valley Humber 42.3 45.5 54.4 47.0 56.0 
Yorks and 
:ast Yorkshire Humber 48.7 53.5 63.2 55.0 64.7 
Yorks and 
:Jmet Humber 44.5 44.2 48.2 45.8 49.9 
Yorks and 
lreat Grimsby Humber 41.1 44.5 53.7 46.2 55.5 
Yorks and 
lalifax Humber 40.8 43.7 50.3 45.4 52.1 
Yorks and 
la Item price & Howden Humber 45.8 50.0 60.5 51.6 61.9 
Yorks and 
larrogate & Knaresborough Humber 43.9 48.5 56.7 50.2 58.3 
lemsworth Yorks and 42.3 45.0 52.5 46.6 54.2 
Humber 
Yorks and 
luddersfield Humber 40.5 43.3 49.7 45.0 51.6 
Yorks and 
:eighley Humber 43.5 43.4 46.6 45.1 48.3 
Yorks and 
:ingston Upon Hull East Humber 41.0 42.3 51.3 44.0 53.0 
Yorks and 
:ingston Upon Hull North Humber 35.6 37.0 45.8 38.6 47.6 
Yorks and 
:ingston Upon Hull West & Hessle Humber 42.3 44.3 52.9 46.0 54.6 
Yorks and 
eeds Central Humber 36.4 35.8 39.7 37.8 41.7 
Yorks and 
eeds East Humber 40.8 40.5 44.2 42.3 46.1 
Yorks and 
eeds North East Humber 41.6 41.2 45.1 42.9 46.9 
Yorks and 
.eeds North West Humber 36.0 34.9 39.3 36.9 41.4 
Yorks and 
.eedsWest Humber 36.8 36.4 40.1 38.2 42.0 
Yorks and 
lorley & Rothwell Humber 38.8 38.5 42.1 40.2 43.9 
Yorks and 
lorrnanton Humber 38.2 40.6 48.2 42.4 50.0 
Yorks and 
'ontefract & Castleford Humber 42.2 44.9 52.5 46.6 54.1 
Yorks and 
'udsey Humber 41.7 41.3 45.3 43.0 47.0 
Yorks and 
tichmond (Yorks) Humber 43.7 48.1 58.4 49.8 60.0 
Yorks and 
tother Valley Humber 41.7 44.7 52.7 46.4 54.4 
Yorks and 
totherham Humber 41.6 44.6 52.7 46.2 54.4 
Yorks and 
tyedale Humber 50.1 54.2 62.7 55.7 64.1 
Yorks and 
,carborough & Whitby Humber 48.7 53.6 62.9 55.1 64.4 
Yorks and 
,cunthorpe Humber 42.7 47.1 57.3 48.8 59.0 
Yorks and 
,elby Humber 40.3 44.3 52.6 45.9 54.3 
Yorks and 
,heffield Attercliffe Humber 43.2 43.3 48.6 45.0 50.3 
Yorks and 
,heffield Brightside Humber 41.9 42.0 47.3 43.7 49.0 
Yorks and 
,heffield Central Humber 34.1 33.8 38.8 35.8 40.9 
Yorks and 
,heffield Hallam Humber 41.6 41.0 46.6 42.8 48.5 
Yorks and 
,heffield Heeley Humber 45.4 45.4 50.7 47.1 52.5 
Yorks and 
,heffield HiIIsborough Humber 42.6 42.6 48.0 44.2 49.7 
Yorks and 
,hipley Humber 42.6 42.7 45.8 44.3 47.6 
Yorks and 
,kipton & Ripon Humber 46.4 51.6 60.0 53.1 61.5 
'ale of York Yorks and 43.5 48.8 57.8 50.5 59.3 
Humber 
Yorks and 
iakefield Humber 39.4 42.9 49.3 44.6 50.9 
Yorks and 
ientworth Humber 42.2 45.3 53.4 46.9 55.1 
East 
.mber Valley Midlands 43.0 46.3 54.1 47.9 55.7 
East 
.shfield Midlands 42.8 44.8 52.2 46.5 53.9 
East 
lassetlaw Midlands 42.8 46.8 55.8 48.3 57.4 
East 
Ilaby Midlands 38.9 43.4 52.0 45.0 53.8 
East 
lolsover Midlands 44.2 47.5 55.2 49.1 56.8 
East 
loston & Skegness Midlands 49.4 53.6 62.5 55.2 64.0 
East 
losworth Midlands 41.9 47.6 56.2 49.2 57.8 
East 
Iroxtowe Midlands 41.6 44.6 49.8 46.3 51.7 
East 
:harnwood Midlands 43.2 47.6 55.6 49.2 57.1 
East 
:hesterfield Midlands 43.8 46.1 53.4 47.8 55.2 
East 
:orby Midlands 40.0 43.0 52.3 44.6 54.0 
East 
laventry Midlands 37.8 42.0 51.3 43.5 52.8 
East 
lerby North Midlands 42.5 42.6 49.2 44.4 51.0 
East 
lerby South Midlands 39.4 39.6 46.1 41.4 47.8 
East 
:rewash Midlands 41.3 44.2 51.0 45.9 52.6 
East 
lainsborough Midlands 46.9 51.0 61.0 52.5 62.4 
East 
ledling Midlands 42.5 46.5 52.4 48.2 54.1 
East 
lrantham & Stamford Midlands 43.4 48.5 58.0 50.1 59.6 
East 
larborough Midlands 42.7 47.1 56.2 48.8 57.8 
East 
ligh Peak Midlands 41.5 46.5 56.1 48.1 57.6 
East 
[ettering Midlands 40.8 ·44.2 52.8 45.8 54.4 
East 
.eicester East Midlands 39.2 39.0 46.0 40.7 47.7 
East 
.eicester South Midlands 33.6 33.5 40.2 35.3 42.1 
East 
.eicester West Midlands 35.8 35.7 42.5 37.4 44.3 
East 
.incoln Midlands 39.6 40.6 46.7 42.5 48.6 
East 
.oughborough Midlands 36.9 40.2 48.2 42.1 50.1 
East 
.outh & Horncastle Midlands 52.4 57.3 66.2 58.7 67.6 
nansfield East 42.4 44.3 52.3 46.0 54.0 
Midlands 
East 
lewark Midlands 44.7 48.5 56.9 50.1 58.6 
East 
lorth East Derbyshire Midlands 45.1 47.8 55.2 49.3 56.8 
East 
lorth West Leicestershire Midlands 42.0 44.9 51.9 46.5 53.5 
East 
lorthampton North Midlands 39.0 42.6 51.0 44.4 52.8 
East 
lorthampton South Midlands 35.9 39.7 47.8 41.3 49.6 
East 
lottingham East Midlands 33.5 31.1 34.4 33.0 36.4 
East 
lottingham North Midlands 41.1 38.7 42.4 40.4 44.2 
East 
lottingham South Midlands 36.0 32.8 36.5 34.8 38.7 
East 
tushcliffe Midlands 41.3 44.5 50.1 46.2 51.9 
East 
tutland & Melton Midlands 43.5 48.2 57.0 49.8 58.6 
East 
iherwood Midlands 42.8 46.3 52.8 47.9 54.5 
East 
ileaford & North Hykeham Midlands 46.1 49.6 57.5 51.2 59.1 
East 
iouth Derbyshire Midlands 40.8 43.7· 52.1 45.3 53.7 
East 
iouth Holland & the Deepings Midlands 47.8 51.5 59.5 53.1 60.9 
East 
Vellinborough Midlands 40.3 45.2 54.1 46.8 55.7 
East 
Vest Derbyshire Midlands 45.7 51.0 60.2 52.4 61.6 
West 
Ildridge-Brownhills Midlands 47.3 49.6 56.5 51.3 58.2 
West 
lirmingham Edgbaston Midlands 39.6 37.1 39.4 38.9 41.3 
West 
lirmingham Erdington Midlands 41.0 38.4 ·40.7 40.3 42.5 
West 
lirmingham Hall Green Midlands. 42.6 40.0 42.4 41.8 44.0 
West 
lirmingham Hodge Hill Midlands 41.6 39.1 41.3 40.9 43.2 
West 
lirmingham Ladywood Midlands 30.7 28.4 30.7 30.3 32.6 
West 
lirmingham Northfield Midlands 40.8 38.3 40.6 40.0 42.3 
West 
lirmingham Perry Barr Midlands 38.0 35.5 37.8 37.4 39.7 
West 
lirmingham Selly Oak Midlands 37.4 34.9 37.2 36.7 39.1 
lirmingham Sparkbrook & Small West 
leath Midlands 33.1 30.8 33.1 32.6 34.8 
West 
lirmingham Yardley Midlands 43.1 40.5 42.7 42.3 44.4 
West 
Iromsgrove Midlands 44.5 47.9 54.7 49.5 56.3 
West 
lurton Midlands 41.4 43.7 53.5 45.2 55.2 
:annock Chase West 38.7 42.8 52.5 44.5 54.2 
Midlands 
West 
:oventry North east Midlands 38.7 38.4 44.7 40.2 46.5 
West 
:oventry North West Midlands 41.8 41.4 47.8 43.2 49.6 
West 
:oventry South Midlands 40.1 39.5 46.0 41.4 47.8 
West 
ludley North Midlands 44.6 47.7 54.1 49.3 55.8 
West 
ludley South Midlands 43.1 46.2 52.5 47.9 54.2 
West 
lalesowen & Rowley Regis Midlands 45.4 46.5 52.4 48.1 54.1 
West 
lereford Midlands 45.4 50.6 60.5 52.2 62.1 
West 
.eominster Midlands 48.8 53.6 63.0 55.1 64.4 
West 
.lchfield Midlands 43.5 47.6 57.8 49.0 59.4 
West 
.udlow Midlands 49.2 54.1 63.3 55.6 64.7 
West 
!eriden Midlands 41.6 44.3 48.7 45.9 50.4 
West 
!id Worcestershire Midlands 43.5 49.1 58.1 50.6 59.6 
West 
lewcastle Under Lyme Midlands 42.8 45.7 54.7 47.5 56.4 
West 
lorth Shropshire Midlands 45.1 49.2 59.3 50.8 60.8 
West 
lorth Warwickshire Midlands 41.7 46.4 54.4 48.0 56.1 
West 
luneaton Midlands 40.8 44.9 52.5 46.5 54.1 
West 
tedditch Midlands 36.0 42.7 51.2 44.3 52.9 
West 
tugby & Kenilworth Midlands 43.3 45.4 52.7 47.0 54.3 
West 
ihrewsbury & Atcham Midlands 44.1 48.4 57.5 49.9 59.0 
West 
iolihull Midlands 46.3 49.1 53.8 50.7 55.5 
West 
iouth Staffordshire Midlands 44.0 50.8 61.9 52.3 63.4 
West 
itafford Midlands 42.5 47.6 57.3 49.2 58.9 
West 
itaffordshire Moorlands Midlands 43.8 49.1 58.1 50.7 59.7 
West 
itoke-on-Trent Central Midlands 41.6 44.0 52.0 45.8 53.9 
West 
itoke-on-Trent North Midlands 43.9 46.6 55.4 48.3 57.1 
West 
itoke-on-Trent South Midlands 41.2 43.8 52.6 45.5 54.2 
West 
itone Midlands 45.4 49.6 59.9 51.0 61.4 
West 
itourbridge Midlands 41.7 44.6 51.0 46.2 52.8 
West 
itratford-on-Avon Midlands 45.8 49.9 57.7 51.5 59.2 
iutton Coldfield West 45.9 43.4 45.6 45.0 47.2 
Midlands 
West 
amworth Midlands 37.1 43.5 52.7 45.2 54.4 
West 
elford Midlands 34.7 39.2 48.5 40.9 50.2 
West 
heWrekin Midlands 39.5 44.1 53.7 45.8 55.5 
West 
~alsall North Midlands 41.0 43.4 50.1 45.0 51.9 
West 
~alsall South Midlands 42.0 44.5 51.2 46.2 53.0 
West 
~arley Midlands 41.7 40.8 45.7 42.5 47.4 
West 
~arwick & Leamington Midlands 41.1 42.1 47.7 43.9 49.5 
West 
~est Bromwich East Midlands 44.5 43.4 48.3 45.2 49.8 
West 
~est Bromwich West Midlands 41.1 40.3 45.0 42.0 46.6 
West 
~est Worcestershire Midlands 49.7 53.1 60.4 54.7 61.9 
West 
~olverhampton North East Midlands 42.1 42.7 48.8 44.5 50.5 
West 
Volverhampton South East Midlands 43.4 44.0 50.0 45.6 51.8 
West 
Volverhampton South West Midlands 43.0 43.5 49.6 45.3 51.4 
West 
Vorcester Midlands 38.0 40.7 48.1 42.4 49.8 
West 
Vyre Forest Midlands 44.3 50.5 58.2 52.2 59.9 
lasildon East 39.9 42.7 51.7 44.5 53.4 
ledford East 38.1 40.1 46.3 41.8 48.1 
Iillericay East 39.5 43.3 49.6 44.9 51.4 
Iralntree East 39.1 43.1 50.9 44.8 52.6 
Irentwood & Ongar East 45.4 47.6 53.9 49.3 55.5 
Iroxbourne East 40.5 41.2 45.9 42.8 47.5 
lury St. Edmunds East 43.6 48.0 55.7 49.7 57.4 
:ambridge East 36.1 31.3 34.4 33.4 36.5 
:astle Point East 45.2 52.0 59.7 53.6 61.3 
:entral Suffolk & North Ipswich East 45.7 49.1 58.3 50.6 59.8 
:olchester East 36.9 41.1 48.2 42.9 50.1 
:pping Forest East 42.3 44.0 49.7 45.5 51.3 
lreat Yarmouth East 47.8 52.1 60.7 53.7 62.2 
larlow East 38.7 40.1 46.1 41.7 47.8 
larwich East 57.9 60.7 68.1 62.2 69.5 
lemel Hempstead East 38.9 41.6 47.6 43.1 49.4 
lertford & Stortford East 36.5 39.7 45.5 41.4 47.2 
lertsmere East 40.5 42.6 48.2 44.2 50.0 
litchin & Harpenden East 40.8 41.9 46.9 43.6 48.5 
luntingdon East 37.8 43.1 51.2 44.8 53.0 
Jswich East 41.0 41.4 45.8 43.2 47.5 
.uton North East 37.6 38.4 44.3 40.1 46.0 
.uton South East 33.8 34.7 40.5 36.4 42.3 
~aldon & East Chelmsford East 43.7 49.6 56.6 51.1 58.2 
~id Bedfordshire East 37.6 40.2 47.6 41.8 49.1 
~id Norfolk East 47.1 51.6 59.9 53.1 61.4 
lorth East Bedfordshire East 39.5 40.4 48.1 41.9 49.7 
lorth East Cambridgeshire East 45.4 48.3 55.1 50.0 56.7 
lorth East Hertfordshire East 40.7 43.1 49.1 44.7 50.7 
lorth Essex East 45.6 49.3 56.7 50.9 58.2 
lorth Norfolk East 55.2 59.8 68.8 61.2 70.1 
lorth West Cambridgeshire East 37.3 41.3 47.7 42.9 49.4 
lorth West Norfolk East 50.1 54.1 62.1 55.6 63.6 
lorwich North East 44.1 46.2 55.2 48.0 57.0 
lorwich South East 40.9 41.1 46.1 43.0 48.0 
'eterborough East 38.3 40.6 46.8 42.3 48.6 
tayleigh East 42.1 46.7 53.4 48.3 55.0 
tochford & Southend East East '43.5 46.3 52.9 47.9 54.7 
laffron Walden East 41.6 45.8 56.3 47.4 57.9 
It. Albans East 38.3 39.0 42.6 40.7 44.3 
louth Cambridgeshire East 40.6 44.0 49.4 45.6 51.0 
louth East Cambridgeshire East 40.4 43.3 48.5 44.9 50.1 
louth Norfolk East 47.2 51.3 58.7 52.8 60.1 
louth Suffolk East 46.7 51.8 59.1 53.4 60.6 
louth West Bedfordshire East 38.4 41.3 48.9 42.8 50.5 
louth West Hertfordshire East 40.9 42.9 48.3 44.5 50.0 
louth West Norfolk East 47.2 51.6 59.6 53.2 61.3 
louthend West East 46.4 48.0 54.7 49.6 56.4 
Itevenage East 37.7 38.5 45.7 40.1 47.4 
iuffolk Coastal East 50.7 55.6 64.1 57.1 65.4 
fhurrock East 35.1 37.9 44.5 39.7 46.3 
'1atford East 36.5 36.8 42.2 38.4 43.9 
'1aveney East 48.9 52.9 60.2 54.5 61.8 
'1elwyn Hatfield East 41.2 41.8 46.5 43.4 48.2 
'lest Chelmsford East 38.6 42.8 48.8 44.5 50.6 
'lest Suffolk East 39.6 42.1 45.9 43.9 47.6 
~arking London 35.5 31.9 36.6 33.6 38.3 
~attersea London 24.9 22.3 23.7 23.9 25.3 
~eckenham London 37.6 38.0 41.8 39.8 43.6 
~ethnal Green & Bow London 28.8 23.5 26.0 25.0 27.5 
~exleyheath & Crayford London 41.6 43.5 50.5 45.1 52.2 
~rent East London 29.4 31.4 39.5 33.1 41.3 
~rent North London 36.6 38.0 46.3 39.5 47.9 
~rent South London 31.9 33.6 41.9 35.2 43.6 
~rentford & Isleworth London 31.6 32.0 37.9 33.7 39.7 
~romley & Chislehurst London 42.9 43.4 47.3 45.1 49.0 
:amberwell & Peckham London 29.1 27.9 34.8 29.3 36.4 
:arshalton & Wallington London 36.6 37.3 43.3 38.9 45.1 
:hingford & Woodford Green London 41.5 39.5 44.7 41.0 46.4 
:hipping Barnet London 38.8 38.5 43.7 40.2 45.5 
:ities of London & Westminster London 32.1 26.8 29.2 28.5 30.9 
:roydon Central London 35.9 36.7 43.6 38.4 45.5 
:roydon North London 32.0 32.8 39.5 34.4 41.3 
:roydon South London 40.0 40.7 47.9 42.3 49.6 
)agenham London 40.3 36.4 41.2 38.0 42.9 
)ulwich & West Norwood London 29.5 27.4 32.4 29.0 34.0 
::allng; Acton & Shepherd's Bush London 29.9 29.8 34.9 31.4 36.7 
::aling North London 34.9 35.0 40.9 36.6 42.6 
::allng Southall London 30.2 30.3 35.9 31.9 37.6 
::ast Ham London 27.5 25.7 31.8 27.1 33.5 
:dmonton London 35.3 34.7 41.6 36.3 43.2 
:ltham London 39.8 36.5 40.8 38.2 42.4 
:nfield North London 36.4 35.9 42.8 37.5 44.5 
:nfield Southgate London 39.5 38.9 45.8 40.4 47.5 
:rith & Thamesmead London 31.3 31.5 36.9 33.2 38.7 
:eltham & Heston London 33.2 33.5 39.5 35.2 41.3 
:inchley & Golders Green London 36.2 35.8 40.9 37.5 42.7 
lreenwich & Woolwich London 33.0 30.1 34.2 31.8 35.9 
lackney North & Stoke Newington London 26.3 24.8 30.4 26.3 31.8 
lackney South & Shored itch London 29.0 27.2 33.0 28.7 34.6 
lammersmith & Fulham London 28.1 26.3 30.1 28.0 31.8 
lampstead & Highgate London 30.3 27.2 30.6 28.8 32.1 
larrow East London 38.7 40.0 46.3' 41.6 48.0 
larrowWest London 37.8 39.0 45.3 40.7 47.0 
layes & Harlington London 33.0 32.4 36.7 34.2 38.5 
lendon London 36.4 36.0 41.2 37.7 42.9 
lolborn & SI. Pancras London 27.9 25.2 28.4 26.7 30.0 
lornchurch London 43.0 44.5 49.7 46.1 51.3 
lornsey & Wood Green London 28.8 27.6 33.3 29.2 34.9 
Iford North London 40.5 40.0 45.1 41.6 46.7 
Iford South London 33.0 32.6 37.5 34.3 39.1 
slington North London 27.2 23.8 27.3 25.3 28.8 
slington South & Finsbury Park London 29.9 26.4 29.8 28.0 31.4 
Censington & Chelsea London 33.0 29.8 32.3 31.6 34.0 
Cingston & Surbiton London 34.9 34.7 38.7 36.5 40.4 
.ewisham Deptford London 25.0 24.5 31.2 26.0 32.8 
.ewisham East London 34.5 33.4 40.7 35.0 42.3 
.ewisham West London 31.5 30.5 37.6 32.0 39.2 
.eyton & Wanstead London 31.2 30.8 35.4 32.4 37.1 
nitcham & Morden London ,34.1 33.6 38.2 35.3 39.8 
lorth Southwark & Bermondsey London 27.1 26.3 32.7 27.8 34.4 
)Id Bexley & Sidcup London 44.2 46.0 53.1 47.7 54.7 
)rpington London 44.5 45.1 49.0 46.7 50.7 
'oplar & Canning Town London 26.8 24.4 30.0 26.0 31.6 
'utney London 31.1 28.1 29.2 29.7 30.8 
!egent's Park & North Kensington London 32.2 27.9 30.3 29.6 31.9 
Uchmond Park London 35.1 34.9 38.7 36.6 40.4 
!omford London 41.8 43.4 48.5 45.1 50.2 
!uislip Northwood London 41.3 40.8 45.4 42.4 47.2 
ltreatham London 25.8 24.2 28.5 25.7 30.0 
lutton & Cheam London 38.8 39.5 45.5 41.1 47.2 
rooting London 26.5 23.7 25.0 25.3 26.6 
rotten ham London 28.4 27.4 33.3 29.0 35.0 
rwickenham London 34.7 34.0 37.9 35.7 39.S 
Jpminster London 45.6 47.1 52.2 48.7 53.9 
Jxbridge London 36.8 36.0 40.6 37.9 42.4 
fauxhall London 25.0 23.6 27.7 25.0 29.4 
lIIalthamstow London 29.7 28.2 33.1 29.8 34.7 
Illest Ham London 28.9 26.9 33.3 28.5 34.9 
lIIimbledon London 32.8 32.3 36.8 34.0 38.4 
~Idershot South East 33.0 36.8 43.5 38.4 45.4 
~rundel & South Downs South East 48.7 52.2 59.8 53.7 61.2 
~shford South East 42.5 44.7 51.8 46.4 53.4 
~ylesbury South East 37.9 42.1 47.8 43.8 49.6 
lanbury South East 35.9 39.4 47.8 41.1 49.5 
lasingstoke South East 34.5 39.1 46.2 40.7 48.0 
leaconsfield South East 44.0 46.0 50.8 47.5 52.4 
lexhill & Battle South East 57.1 60.0 67.4 61.3 68.7 
lognor Regis & Littlehampton South East 52.2 54.7 62.7 56.4 64.2 
Iracknell South East 32.9 36.6 45.0 38.2 46.7 
Irighton Kemptown South East 43.7 43.5 47.7 45.2 49.5 
Irighton Pavilion South East 33.4 30.4 32.7 32.2 34.4 
luckingham South East 38.2 42.4 50.2 43.9 51.8 
:anterbury South East 44.7 45.3 51.4 47.2 53.3 
:hatham & Aylesford South East 36.1 39.4 45.4 41.0 47.2 
:hesham & Amersham South East 37.2 38.4 36.0 39.8 37.2 
:hichester South East 51.7 54.6 61.9 56.1 63.5 
:rawley South East 36.5 38.5 44.7 40.1 46.4 
)artford South East 39.8 41.3 47.7 43.0 49.4 
lover South East 45.9 49.6 57.8 51.2 59.5 
oast Hampshire South East 44.4 49.7 58.3 51.2 59.8 
oast Surrey South East 41.6 44.4 50.4 45.9 52.0 
oast Worthing & Shoreham South East 48.1 49.0 54.3 50.6 55.9 
:astbourne South East 52.6 53.8 61.1 55.5 62.6 
:astleigh South East 37.9 41.8 48.8 43.4 50.6 
:psom & Ewell South East 43.7 45.7 50.1 47.3 51.7 
:sher & Walton South East 41.1 41.1 45.6 42.7 47.2 
'areham South East 43.1 46.9 55.3 48.6 57.0 
'aversham & Mid Kent South East 42.2 45.6 51.9 47.2 53.6 
'olkestone & Hythe South East 47.7 50.4 57.4 52.1 . 59.0 
3illingham South East 36.7 39.9 47.3 41.6 49.0 
30sport South East 42.3 46.6 56.4 48.3 58.1 
3ravesham South East 41.5 43.8 49.9 45.5 51.6 
3uildford South East 39.7 41.1 45.1 42.8 46.9 
lastings & Rye South East 46.1 48.3 56.4 49.8 58.0 
lavant South East 46.8 50.7 59.3 52.3 60.9 
lenley South East 42.6 45.9 53.0 47.4 54.6 
lorsham South East 40.1 44.3 52.7 45.9 54.3 
love South East 40.9 37.6 39.8 39.3 41.5 
sle ofWight . South East 51.6 53.6 61.3 55.2 62.7 
.ewes South East 52.4 55.1 61.6 56.6 63.1 
4aidenhead South East 40.2 43.4 49.4 45.0 51.2 
4aidstone & The Weald South East 41.6 44.8 50.6 46.5 52.3 
4edway South East 38.1 41.4 48.7 43.1 50.5 
4id Sussex South East 42.0 45.9 52.3 47.5 53.9 
40le Valley South East 46.2 48.6 53.5 50.1 55.0 
4i1ton Keynes South West South East 31.9 36.0 44.4 37.7 46.2 
~ewbury South East 37.9 42.0 50.1 43.6 51.8 
~ew Forest East South East 44.4 48.6 56.5 50.2 58.2 
~ew Forest West South East 56.8 60.7 68.5 62.0 69.8 
~orth East Hampshire South East 38.9 43.5 49.9 45.1 51.6 
~orth East Milton Keynes South East 30.7 34.7 43.0 36.2 44.6 
~orth Thanet South East 50.9 5:2.4 59.0 54.0 60.6 
~orth West Hampshire South East 39.2 43.8 51.3 45.4 53.0 
)xford East South East 34.4 32.1 36.2 33.9 38.1 
)xford West & Abingdon South East 36.9 38.3 44.2 40.3 46.1 
'ortsmouth North South East 39.5 39.4 45.8 41.1 47.7 
'ortsmouth South South East 37.8 37.2 43.7 39.2 45.8 
teading East South East 32.3 32.4 36.8 34.2 38.8 
teading West South East 36.4 37.9 42.8 39.7 44.6 
teigate South East 41.0 43.3 48.5 45.0 50.1 
tomsey South East 43.1 46.5 53.7 48.2 55.3 
tunnymede & Weybridge South East 40.4 41.5 47.1 43.2 48.8 
ievenoaks South East 43.5 47.3 52.5 48.9 54.1 
iittingbourne & Sheppey South East 40.5 43.9 51.2 45.5 52.8 
Hough South East 32.2 33.9 41.1 35.6 42.8 
iouth Thanet South East 49.1 51.5 58.7 53.1 60.3 
iouth West Surrey South East 43.3 46.3 50.8 47.9 52.5 
iouthampton Itchen South East 38.4 37.6 40.4 39.5 42.4 
iouthampton Test South East 35.7 34.8 37.7 36.7 39.7 
ipelthorne South East 41.9 43.7 49.2 45.3 50.8 
iurrey Heath South East 38.2 39.6 43.6 41.2 45.4 
·onbridge & Mailing South East 42.7 46.2 52.4 47.8 54.1 
. 
unbridge Wells South East 41.4 43.3 47.7 45.0 49.3 
Vantage South East 39.3 43.7 49.5 45.4 51.2 
'1ealden South East 46.3 50.2 58.2 51.7 59.6 
'1inchester South East 43.0 45.7 51.7 47.4 53.4 
'1indsor South East 38.3 41.7 46.8 43.4 48.5 
'1itney South East 41.4 46.0 54.3 47.5 55.9 
'1oking South East 37.9 39.9 45.1 41.5 46.9 
'1okingham South East 34.0 38.4 45.0 40.0 46.8 
'1orthing West South East 55.2 55.7 62.0 57.3 63.5 
'1ycombe South East 36.4 40.6 44.5 42.3 46.3 
3ath South West 42.4 43.4 47.3 45.3 49.2 
30urnemouth East South West 44.8 44.2 47.7 46.0 49.5 
30urnemouth West South West 47.4 46.5 50.0 48.4 52.0 
3ridgwater South West 48.1 52.3 61.1 53.9 62.7 
3ristol East South West 38.5 36.7 36.9 38.4 38.7 
3ristol North West South West 38.4 37.2 38.2 38.9 39.9 
3ristol South South West 40.6 38.7 39.0 40.5 40.7 
3ristol West South West 30.3 28.3 29.0 30.1 30.8 
:heltenham South West 41.2 41.4 46.2 43.2 48.1 
:hristchurch South West 59.3 61.4 68.1 62.7 69.5 
:otswold South West 46.6 49.5 57.2 51.1 58.8 
)evizes South West 40.8 45.4 53.1 46.9 54.7 
:ast Devon South West 58.5 61.9 69.4 63.3 70.7 
:xeter South West 39.6 39.9 44.3 41.9 46.3 
:almouth & Camborne South West 47.7 50.6 57.1 52.3 58.6 
:orest of Dean South West 44.6 49.5 57.7 51.1 59.3 
310ucester South West 39.4 41.8 49.2 43.5 51.0 
(ingswood South West 42.2 44.9 50.3 46.6 52.1 
Vlid Dorset & North Poole South West 44.1 48.0 54.2 49.5 55.9 
~orth Cornwall South West 49.0 52.4 59.6 54.1 61.2 
~orth Devon South West 48.8 53.0 60.7 54.5 62.2 
~orth Dorset South West 48.4 52.9 61.3 54.5 62.8 
~orth Swindon South West 38.9 40.7 47.3 42.3 49.0 
~orth Wiltshire South West 39.6 43.4 51.1 45.1 52.8 
~orthavon South West 40.8 43.7 49.7 45.3 51.2 
'Iymouth Devonport South West 41.8 44.7 52.3 46.3 54.1 
'Iymouth Sutton South West 38.4 40.7 48.3 42.6 50.4 
'oole South West 49.5 53.4 59.6 55.0 61.3 
,!.Ives South West 49.7 53.2 59.9 54.7 61.4 
ialisbury South West 43.7 46.5 52.9 48.3 54.6 
iomerton & Frome South West 45.3 48.5 57.1 50.0 58.6 
iouth Dorset South West 48.5 52.7 61.6 54.3 63.1 
iouth East Cornwall South West 48.3 52.6 61.7 54.0 63.1 
iouth Swindon South West 35.0 36.8 43.2 38.4 45.0 
iouth West Devon South West 44.0 49.3 57.8 50.9 59.4 
itroud South West 44.5 47.8 54.8 49.3 56.3 
. 
aunton South West 46.1 49.2 56.5 50.8 58.1 
"eignbridge South West 50.5 54.5 63.3 56.0 64.8 
"ewkesbury South West 44.8 45.7 54.4 47.2 56.0 
"iverton & Honiton South West 39.8 39.3 36.0 40.5 37.0 
~orbay South West 50.9 53.4 60.9 55.1 62.5 
rorridge & West Devon South West 49.3 55.4 64.5 56.8 65.8 
rotnes South West 52.4 57.8 66.6 59.1 67.9 
rruro & St. Austell South West 49.6 52.3 58.3 53.9 59.8 
l\Iansdyke South West 44.0 46.1 50.7 47.6 52.3 
l\Iells South West 47.9 51.8 59.7 53.2 61.1 
l\Iest Dorset South West 53.7 58.1 67.4 59.5 68.8 
l\Iestbury South West 44.7 47.7 54.5 49.3 56.1 
l\Ieston-Super"Mare South West 47.6 51.2 57.2 52.8 58.9 
l\Ioodspring South West 46.0 49.4 55.5 51.0 57.0 
(eovil South West 47.0 51.0 58.8 52.7 60.4 
~beravon Wales 45.6 46.9 51.4 48.6 52.9 
~Iyn & Deeside Wales 39.8 41.6 46.9 43.3 48.6 
~Iaenau Gwent Wales 44.4 45.1 48.5 46.7 50.2 
~recon & Radnorshire Wales 49.7 50.8 58.9 52.2 60.2 
~ridgend Wales 44.4 45.1 48.5 46.7 50.2 
:aernarfon Wales 48.1 49.8 55.5 51.4 57.0 
:aerphilly Wales 39.7 40.3 43.6 41.9 45.2 
:ardiff Central Wales 32.2 32.5 36.6 34.5 38.7 
:ardiff North Wales 41.4 42.0 45.9 43.7 47.6 
:ardiff South & Penarth Wales 39.8 40.6 44.2 42.4 45.9 
:ardiff West Wales 39.5 40.2 43.6 41.9 45.4 
:armarthen East & Dinefwr Wales 49.0 50.2 54.3 51.6 55.8 
:armarthen West & South 
'embrokeshire Wales 48.4 49.6 53.9 51.2 55.4 
:eredigion Wales 46.1 47.0 55.2 48.7 56.9 
:Iwyd South Wales 42.6 44.4 49.9 46.0 51.4 
:lwydWest Wales 51.6 53.4 59.1 54.9 60.6 
:onwy Wales 47.4 49.2 55.2 50.9 56.8 
:ynon Valley Wales 44.3 45.0 48.5 46.7 50.1 
)elyn Wales 42.6 44.4 49.8 46.0 51.3 
:;ower Wales 47.3 48.6 52.9 50.2 54.5 
slwyn Wales 43.1 43.8 47.2 45.5 48.9 
.lanelli Wales 47.3 48.5 52.9 50.1 54.5 
l'Ieirionnydd Nant Conwy Wales 51.5 53.2 58.8 54.8 60.1 
l'Ierthyr Tydfil & Rhymney Wales 43.3 43.9 47.3 45.6 49.0 
l'Ionmouth Wales 48.5 49.2 52.6 50.7 54.1 
l'Iontgomeryshire Wales 47.2 48.3 56.3 49.8 57.8 
~eath Wales 44.6 45.9 50.2 47.6 51.7 
~ewport East Wales 41.2 42.0 45.4 43.6 47.0 
~ewport West Wales 43.0 43.7 47.2 45.3 48.8 
)gmore Wales 40.7 41.5 44.7 43.1 46.4 
'ontypridd Wales 39.7 40.3 43.6 41.9 45.3 
'reseli Pembrokeshire Wales 47.7 48.9 53.2 50.5 54.7 
Ihondda Wales 45.5 46.1 49.7 47.8 51.4 
Iwansea East Wales 41.3 42.6 46.8 44.3 48.5 
Iwansea West Wales 45.2 46.3 51.1 48.2 53.0 
·orfaen Wales 41.9 42.7 46.0 44.2 47.7 
'ale of Clwyd Wales 48.5 50.4 56.2 51.9 57.7 
'ale of Glamorgan Wales 42.5 43.2 46.5 44.8 48.2 
Vrexham Wales 42.0 43.9 49.5 45.5 51.1 
rnys Man Wales 48.0 49.7 55.2 51.3 56.6 
Author: Scott Davidson. Loughborough University. 
Changes in the 65+ Vote 
Appendix Table: Constituencies in England and Wales. Estimated 
Proportion of Turnout in General Elections Comprised of Voters aged 
65+. 
2009 2025 
Scenario Scenario 
Constitu ency 2005 2009 2 2025 2 
Berwick Upon Tweed 29.3 32.1 33.0 43.9 44.9 
Bishop Auckland 27.2 28.5 29.4 37.4 38.4 
Blaydon 27.1 27.3 28.3 33.0 34.1 
Blyih Valley 22.8 25.0 25.9 35.3 36.4 
City of Durham 22.5 24.5 25.5 31.9 33.1 
Darlington 26.8 26.9 27.9 33.9 35.0 
Easington 26.9 29.2 30.3 37.2 38.3 
Gateshead East & Washington 24.8 25.0 26.0 30.8 31.9 
Hartlepool 26.1 26.4 27.4 33.1 34.2 
Hexham 28.4 30.1 30.9 41.3 42.2 
Houghton & Washington East 23.3 23.7 24.6 29.8 30.8 
Jarrow 27.4 27.5 28.5 34.0 35.1 
Middlesbrough 25.0 25.6 26.7 33.6 34.8 
Middlesbrough South & East Cleveland 25.0 26.5 27.4 35.3 36.3 
Newcastle Upon Tyne Central 22.6 21.9 23.1 27.0 28.4 
Newcastle Upon Tyne East 25.4 24.9 26.0 30.4 31.7 
Newcastle Upon Tyne North 28.6 27.9 28.8 33.6 34.7 
North Durham 24.6 26.5 27.4 34.5 35.6 
North Tyneside 26.8 26.1 27.1 .32.5 33.6 
North West Durham 27.5 28.6 29.5 36.8 37.8 
Redcar 26.6 29.4 30.4 39.2 40.3 
Sedgefield 25.7 26.5 27.3 33.9 34.9 
South Shields 28.4 28.4 29.4 35.3 36.4 
Stockton North 25.4 25.6 26.6 33.8 34.8 
Stockton South 22.7 22.9 23.7 30.5 31.5 
Sunderland North 27.4 27.8 28.9 34.6 35.7 
Sunderland South 26.8 27.1 28.1 33.7 34.8 
Tyne Bridge 24.2 24.2 25.2 29.6 30.8 
Tynemouth 29.1 28.3 29.2 34.9 35.9 
Wansbeck 27.4 29.5 30.5 38.7 39.8 
Altrincham & Sale West 25.9 25.2 26.1 28.1 29.1 
Ashton Under Lyne 24.2 24.7 25.7 29.8 30.9 
Barrow & Furness 26.8 29.3 30.2 38.4 39.4 
Birkenhead 24.7 25.1 26.1 30.7 31.8 
Blackburn 19.6 18.6 19.5 22.1 23.0 
Blackpool North & Fleetwood 33.4 33.0 34.0 37.2 38.2 
Blackpool South 27.9 26.9 27.9 30.7 31.7 
Bolton North East 25.4 25.8 26.8 31.0 32.0 
Bolton South East 23.3 23.7 24.7 28.7 29.8 
Bolton West 24.1 24.5 25.4 29.5 30.5 
Bootle 25.7 26.7 27.7 33.2 34.4 
Burnley 
Bury North 
Bury South 
Carlisle 
Cheadle 
Chorley 
City of Chester 
Congleton 
Copeland 
Crewe & Nantwich 
Crosby 
Denton & Reddish 
Eccles 
Eddisbury 
Ellesmere Port & Neston 
Fylde 
Halton 
Hazel Grove 
Heywood & Middleton 
Hyndburn 
Knowsley North 
Knowsley South 
Lancaster & Wyre 
Leigh 
Liverpool Garston 
Liverpool Riverside 
Liverpool Walton 
Liverpool Wavertree 
Liverpool West Derby 
Macclesfield 
Makerfield 
Manchester Blackley 
Manchester Central 
Manchester Gorton 
Manchester Withington 
Morecambe & Lunesdale 
Old ham East & Saddleworth 
Old ham West & Royton 
Pendle 
Penrtth 
Preston 
Ribble Valley 
Rochdale 
Rossendale & Darwen 
SI. Helens North 
SI. Helens South 
Salford 
South Ribble 
Southport 
Stalybrtdge & Hyde 
Stockport 
Stretford & Urmston 
Tatton 
Wallasey 
Warrington North 
Warrington South 
Weaver Vale 
West Lancashire 
24.9 
23.6 
23.9 
27.3 
27.7 
22.3 
27.0 
24.4 
25.6 
26.1 
28.8 
24.8 
26.4 
23.6 
25.3 
31.8 
24.5 
27.6 
24.9 
24.7 
26.4 
25.0 
28.6 
23.3 
29.2 
21.6 
24.4 
24.5 
24.7 
25.8 
21.6 
25.8 
20.1 
19.5 
20.9 
30.7 
22.4 
24.3 
25.3 
27.9 
22.8 
26.3 
22.7 
22.9 
24.8 
24.8 
25.8 
24.7 
32.8 
23.2 
23.4 
25.1 
28.7 
27.1 
22.2 
23.0 
22.6 
24.5 
25.5 
24.4 
24.8 
27.6 
29.4 
24.8 
28.6 
28.0 
27.2 
28.0 
29.6 
25.5 
24.8 
25.3 
26.8 
31.8 
25.2 
29.2 
24.7 
25.1 
26.6 
25.2 
28.6 
25.1 
26.9 
19.7 
22.4 
22.5 
22.7 
27.7 
23.3 
22.1 
16.8 
16.3 
17.4 
30.8 
23.1 
25.0 
24.9 
29.3 
23.1 
27.5 
22.5 
22.6 
26.6 
26.7 
24.0 
27.4 
33.8 
23.4 
25.2 
24.4 
30.2 
27.6 
24.1 
24.9 
23.8 
27.1 
26.5 
25.3 
25.8 
28.6 
30.3 
25.7 
29.7 
28.9 
28.1 
29.0 
30.5 
26.4 
.25.8 
26.2 
27.7 
32.8 
26.1 
30.2 
25.6 
26.1 
27.6 
26.2 
29.8 
26.1 
27.9 
20.8 
23.4 
23.6 
23.7 
28.6 
24.2 
23.1 
17.8 
17.4 
18.5 
31.8 
24.0 
26.0 
25.9 
30.2 
24.2 
28.5 
23.5 
23.4 
27.6 
27.6 
25.2 
28.3 
34.8 
24.4 
26.3 
25.4 
31.1 
28.6 
25.0 
25.8 
24.7 
28.1 
32.8 
29.6 
30.0 
34.5 
35.5 
33.1 
34.7 
36.6 
35.1 
35.3 
36.2 
30.9 
27.0 
31.4 
32.7 
37.2 
34.2 
35.3 
30.1 
30.9 
32.0 
30.4 
34.5 
31.0 
31.3 
23.6 
26.3 
26.6 
26.7 
34.4 
28.9 
22.6 
17.4 
17.1 
18.1 
37.8 
27.9 
30.0 
32.2 
37.2 
28.5 
34.5 
27.7 
27.6 
33.8 
33.8 
26.5 
34.6 
40.7 
33.1 
30.8 
27.4 
38.3 
33.6 
31.2 
32.0 
31.7 
35.3 
33.9 
30.7 
31.1 
35.6 
36.5 
34.1 
35.9 
37.6 
36.1 
36.3 
37.2 
32.0 
28.1 
32.3 
33.7 
38.2 
35.3 
36.3 
31.2 
32.0 
33.0 
31.4 
35.7 
32.0 
32.3 
24.8 
27.4 
27.7 
27.8 
35.4 
29.9 
23.6 
18.5 
18.2 
19.3 
38.8 
28.9 
31.2 
33.2 
38.1 
29.7 
35.5 
28.8 
28.6 
34.8 
34.8 
27.7 
35.7 
41.8 
34.2 
32.0 
28.5 
39.3 
34.7 
32.2 
33.0 
32.7 
36.4 
Westmorland & Lonsdale 31.2 33.9 34.8 43.9 44.8 
Wigan 24.9 26.6 27.6 32.7 33.8 
Wirral South 29.8 30.1 31.0 36.2 37.2 
Wirral West 27.6 27.9 28.8 34.0 35.0 
Workington 27.8 29.4 30.3 38.0 39.0 
Worsley 23.9 23.4 24.3 26.3 27.2 
Wylhenshawe & Sale East 27.0 24.3 25.4 26.1 27.2 
Barnsley Central 24.8 25.4 26.4 31.3 32.4 
Bamsley East & Mexborough 25.9 26.6 27.6 33.0 34.1 
Barnsley West & Penistone 25.7 26.3 27.2 32.3 33.3 
Bailey & Spen 22.8 23.1 24.0 28.8 29.9 
Beverley & Holderness 26.4 28.1 29.0 37.3 38.2 
Bradford North 23.4 21.9 23.0 24.7 25.8 
Bradford South 23.4 21.9 22.9 24.7 25.7 
Bradford West 21.0 19.6 20.6 22.3 23.5 
Brigg & Goole 26.8 28.8 29.6 37.2 38.1 
Calder Valley 24.7 24.9 25.8 31.0 32.0 
City of York 25.4 25.5 26.7 30.7 32.0 
Cleethorpes 27.1 29.0 29.9 35.6 36.6 
Colne Valley 24.1 24.3 25.2 30.2 31.2 
Dewsbury 23.3 23.6 24.5 29.3 30.4 
Doncaster Central 27.5 28.6 29.7 36.1 37.2 
Doncaster North 25.7 26.7 27.7 33.8 34.9 
Don Valley 25.0 25.9 26.8 32.9 33.9 
East Yorkshire 30.0 32.0 32.9 41.1 42.1 
Elmet 26.2 25.1 26.0 28.2 29.2 
Great Grimsby 25.7 27.1 28.1 34.0 35.2 
Halifax 25.1 25.4 26.4 31.5 32.6 
Haltemprice & Howden 27.9 29.6 30.6 39.0 39.9 
Harrogate & Knaresborough 28.3 31.2 32.3 38.9 40.0 
Hemsworth 24.8 25.4 26.3 31.4 32.4 
Huddersfield 25.7 26.0 27.0 32.1 33.3 
Keighley 27.5 25.9 26.9 28.9 30.0 
Kingston Upon Hull East 26.9 25.6 26.6 31.3 32.3 
Kingston Upon Hull North 21.6 20.4 21.3 25.5 26.5 
Kingston Upon Hull West & Hessle 27.3 26.6 27.6 32.0 33.0 
Leeds Central 23.1 22.0 23.2 25.0 26.3 
Leeds East 25.6 24.6 25.7 27.6 28.8 
Leeds North East 27.5 26.4 27.5 29.6 30.8 
Leeds North West 23.5 22.1 23.4 25.5 26.9 
Leeds West 23.2 22.2 23.3 25.1 26.3 
Morley & Rothwell 23.1 22.1 23.1 24.9 26.0 
Normanton 22.8 23.3 24.3 29.3 30.4 
Pontefract & Castleford 25.9 26.5 27.5 32.8 33.8 
Pudsey 25.7 24.6 25.6 27.7 28.8 
Richmond (Yorks) 25.6 27.3 28.3 36.3 37.3 
Rother Valley 23.7 25.1 26.0 31.7 32.7 
Rotherham 25.4 26.8 27.8 33.8 34.9 
Ryedale 31.2 32.7 33.6 40.8 41.7 
Scarborough & Whitby 30.9 32.4 33.3 41.4 42.4 
Scunthorpe 26.3 28.2 29.2 36.5 37.6 
Selby 23.6 24.8 25.7 32.6 33.6 
Sheffield Attercliffe 26.9 26.4 27.5 29.4 30.4 
Sheffield Brightside 25.7 25.3 26.3 28.2 29.2 
Sheffield Central 22.2 21.6 22.9 24.6 25.9 
Sheffield Hallam 26.6 25.8 26.9 29.0 30.2 
Sheffield Heeley 29.1 28.6 29.7 31.7 32.8 
Sheffield Hillsborough 25.1 24.6 25.5 27.4 28.4 
Shipley 
Skipton & Ripon 
Vale 01 York 
Wakefield 
Wentworth 
Amber Valley 
Ashfield 
Bassetlaw 
Blaby 
Bolsover 
Boston & Skegness 
Bosworth 
Broxtowe 
Charnwood 
Chesterfield 
Corby 
.Daventry 
Derby North 
Derby South 
Erewash 
Gainsborough 
Gedling 
Grantham & Stamlord 
Harborough 
High Peak 
Kettering 
Leicester East 
Leicester South 
Leicester West 
Lincoln 
Loughborough 
Louth & Horncastle 
Mansfield 
Newark 
North East Derbyshire 
North West Leicestershire 
Northampton North 
Northampton South 
Nottingham East 
Nottingham North 
Nottingham South 
Rushcliffe 
Rutland & Melton 
Sherwood 
Slealord & North Hykeham 
South Derbyshire 
South Holland & the Deepings 
Wellinborough 
West Derbyshire 
Aldridge-Brownhills 
Birmingham Edgbaston 
Birmingham Erdington 
Birmingham Hall Green 
Birmingham Hodge Hill 
Birmingham Ladywood 
Birmingham Northfield 
Birmingham Perry Barr 
Birmingham Selly Oak 
26.5 
28.4 
26.1 
23.2 
25.5 
25.7 
25.2 
25.1 
22.3 
26.8 
30.8 
24.9 
25.2 
25.9 
27.4 
23.1 
20.9 
27.1 
24.9 
24.8 
28.0 
26.3 
26.7 
26.1 
24.6 
24.4 
25.1 
21.1 
23.0 
25.4 
22.2 
32.6 
25.7 
27.1 
27.0 
24.8 
24.0 
21.3 
21.5 
25.7 
24.6 
25.1 
25.7 
25.0 
27.7 
24.3 
29.9 
23.9 
27.6 
27.9 
25.0 
26.3 
26.9 
26.9 
18.6 
25.6 
23.8 
23.8 
25.0 
30.8 
29.4 
24.3 
27.0 
26.9 
26.1 
26.8 
24.7 
28.1 
32.7 
27.1 
26.4 
27.5 
27.6 
23.9 
22.6 
26.3 
24.2 
26.1 
29.9 
28.2 
28.5 
28.1 
26.7 
24.8 
23.0 
19.3 
21.1 
24.4 
23.2 
34.8 
26.3 
28.9 
27.6 
25.5 
24.6 
22.0 
18.8 
22.7 
21.2 
26.4 
28.0 
26.5 
29.7 
24.7 
31.3 
26.0 
29.9 
29.6 
23.0 
24.2 
24.8 
24.9 
16.9 
23.6 
21.8 
21.8 
25.9 
31.7 
30.4 
25.2 
27.9 
27.8 
27.1 
27.7 
25.6 
29.0 
33.6 
28.0 
27.4 
28.4 
28.6 
24.8 
23.4 
.27.4 
25.3 
27.1 
30.8 
29.2 
29.4 
29.1 
27.7 
25.7 
24.0 
20.3 
22.1 
25.5 
24.3 
35.6 
27.3 
29.9 
28.5 
26.4 
25.6 
22.9 
19.9 
23.7 
22.5 
27.4 
28.9 
27.4 
30.7 
25.6 
32.3 
26.9 
30.7 
30.6 
24.1 
25.4 
25.9 
26.0 
18.0 
24.6 
22.9 
22.9 
27.9 
38.8 
38.0 
29.7 
33.9 
33.5 
32.3 
34.5 
31.9 
34.3 
41.6 
36.2 
32.0 
35.2 
33.8 
30.7 
30.4 
30.5 
28.3 
31.9 
38.8 
34.4 
37.5 
36.1 
35.6 
32.2 
27.4 
23.4 
25.4 
29.3 
30.4 
44.1 
32.1 
36.4 
33.7 
31.7 
32.0 
28.9 
19.9 
23.8 
22.7 
32.1 
35.9 
32.7 
37.0 
31.4 
38.8 
34.0 
38.8 
34.2 
22.9 
24.1 
24.6 
24.7 
17.0 
23.4 
21.7 
21.8 
29.0 
39.8 
39.0 
30.7 
35.0 
34.5 
33.4 
35.5 
33.0 
35.3 
42.6 
37.2 
33.2 
36.2 
34.9 
31.7 
31.3 
31.6 
29.3 
32.9 
39.7 
35.6 
38.5 
37.2 
36.5 
33.2 
28.4 
24.5 
26.5 
30.5 
31.6 
45.0 
33.1 
37.5 
34.7 
32.7 
33.1 
30.0 
21.0 
24.8 
24.1 
33.2 
36.9 
33.7 
38.0 
32.4 
39.7 
35.0 
39.7 
35.2 
24.0 
25.1 
25.5 
25.8 
18.1 
24.4 
22.8 
22.9 
Birmingham Sparkbrook & Small Heath 
Birmingham Yardley 
Bromsgrove 
Burton 
Cannock Chase 
Coventry North east 
Coventry North West 
Coventry South 
Dudley North 
Dudley South 
Halesowen & Rowley Regis 
Hereford 
Leominster 
Lichfield 
Ludlow 
Meriden 
Mid Worcestershire 
Newcastle Under Lyme 
North Shropshire 
North Warwickshire 
Nuneaton 
Redditch 
Rugby & Kenilworth 
Shrewsbury & Atcham 
Solihull 
South Staffordshire 
Stafford 
Staffordshire Moorlands 
Stoke-on-Trent Central 
Stoke-on-Trent North 
Stoke-on-Trent South 
Stone 
Stourbridge 
Stratford-on-Avon 
Sutton Coldfield 
Tamworth 
Telford 
The Wrekin 
Walsall North 
Walsall South 
Warley 
Warwick & Leamington 
West Bromwich East 
West Bromwich West 
West Worcestershire 
Wolverhampton North East 
Wolverhampton South East 
Wolverhampton South West 
Worcester 
Wyre Forest 
Basildon 
Bedford 
Billericay 
Braintree 
Brentwood & Ongar 
Broxbourne 
Bury SI. Edmunds 
Cambridge 
20.6 
27.7 
26.3 
25.1 
22.1 
24.0 
26.1 
25.2 
27.2 
24.9 
27.9 
28.6 
29.7 
23.4 
29.3 
23.4 
25.8 
27.0 
27.6 
23.8 
23.6 
20.4 
26.0 
26.8 
29.4 
25.0 
24.7 
25.5 
26.8 
27.0 
25.1 
26.1 
24.6 
26.9 
28.6 
20.2 
18.7 
22.9 
24.4 
26.0 
26.7 
25.1 
27.9 
25.3 
31.0 
26.4 
27.2 
27.9 
23.1 
25.4 
23.7 
24.2 
23.2 
23.6 
28.0 
24.0 
26.9 
20.2 
18.8 
25.6 
28.5 
25.7 
24.3 
23.1 
25.1 
24.1 
29.3 
26.9 
28.5 
31.1 
32.0 
26.2 
32.8 
25.1 
28.5 
28.0 
29.8 
26.1 
25.7 
22.6 
27.6 
29.2 
31.4 
30.7 
28.1 
28.6 
27.0 
27.5 
25.6 
28.2 
26.5 
29.4 
26.5 
24.2 
20.7 
25.2 
26.1 
27.8 
25.7 
25.6 
26.8 
24.4 
32.9 
26.2 
27.0 
27.7 
23.9 
29.4 
24.4 
24.6 
24.7 
24.7 
28.7 
23.4 
29.5 
18.6 
19.9 
26.7 
29.5 
26.6 
25.3 
24.2 
26.2 
25.3 
30.3 
27.9 
29.5 
32.1 
32.9 
27.0 
33.7 
26.0 
29.4 
29.1 
30.8 
27.0 
26.6 
23.4 
28.5 
30.1 
32.4 
31.6 
29.1 
29.5 
28.1 
28.5 
26.6 
29.0 
27.4 
30.4 
27.5 
25.1 
21.6 
26.2 
27.1 
28.9 
26.8 
26.7 
27.9 
25.5 
33.9 
27.3 
28.0 
28.8 
24.9 
30.4 
25.4 
25.6 
25.6 
25.7 
29.7 
24.3 
30.5 
19.8 
18.9 
25.3 
34.8 
32.0 
31.8 
26.3 
28.4 
27.5 
34.6 
32.0 
32.1 
40.7 
41.2 
35.0 
40.9 
29.1 
37.2 
35.9 
38.1 
33.7 
32.7 
32.5 
33.1 
37.0 
35.9 
40.9 
36.8 
37.2 
33.4 
34.9 
32.9 
38.2 
31.6 
37.2 
26.1 
33.2 
27.9 
33.6 
30.6 
32.4 
30.9 
30.8 
32.0 
29.4 
40.5 
29.7 
30.5 
31.4 
29.5 
38.7 
33.2 
29.1 
30.5 
32.1 
33.6 
25.8 
37.2 
21.7 
19.9 
26.3 
35.8 
33.0 
32.8 
27.3 
29.4 
28.6 
35.7 
33.0 
33.2 
41.8 
42.1 
36.0 
41.8 
30.1 
38.1 
37.0 
39.1 
34.7 
33.7 
33.6 
34.1 
38.0 
37.0 
41.9 
37.8 
38.2 
34.6 
36.0 
33.9 
39.1 
32.7 
38.2 
27.0 
34.3 
28.9 
34.7 
31.7 
33.6 
32.0 
32.0 
33.0 
30.4 
41.5 
30.8 
31.6 
32.5 
30.5 
39.8 
34.3 
30.2 
31.6 
33.1 
34.6 
26.7 
38.3 
23.0 
Castle Point 
Central Suffolk & North Ipswich 
Colchester 
Epping Forest 
Great Yarmouth 
Harlow 
Harwich 
Hemel Hempstead 
Hertford & Stortford 
Hertsmere 
Hitchin & Harpenden 
Huntingdon 
Ipswich 
Luton North 
Luton South 
Maldon & East Chelmsford 
Mid Bedfordshire 
Mid Norfolk 
North East Bedfordshire 
North East Cambridgeshire 
North East Hertfordshire 
North Essex 
North Norfolk 
North West Cambridgeshire 
North West Norfolk 
Norwich North 
Norwich South 
Peterborough 
Rayleigh 
Rochford & Southend East 
Saffron Walden 
St. Albans 
South Cambridgeshire 
South East Cambridgeshire 
South Norfolk 
South Suffolk 
South West Bedfordshire 
South West Hertfordshire 
South West Norfolk 
Southend West 
Stevenage 
Suffolk Coastal 
Thurrock 
Watford 
Waveney 
Welwyn Hatfield 
West Chelmsford 
West Suffolk 
Barking 
Battersea 
Beckenham 
Bethnal Green & Bow 
Bexleyheath & Crayford 
Brent East 
Brent North 
Brent South 
Brentford & Isleworth 
Bromley & Chislehurst 
26.2 
28.0 
22.7 
26.2 
29.9 
24.0 
40.4 
24.3 
21.8 
25.8 
24.7 
21.0 
26.9 
21.3 
20.4 
24.7 
21.3 
28.7 
22.4 
28.5 
24.2 
27.0 
36.1 
21.6 
31.9 
28.1 
27.5 
23.7 
24.8 
28.6 
24.1 
23.2 
23.9 
24.3 
28.7 
28.4 
22.4 
25.4 
29.7 
30.7 
23.3 
33.6 
21.4 
22.2 
31.4 
26.8 
23.3 
23.6 
22.9 
14.8 
24.0 
18.1 
25.6 
17.0 
21.7 
18.3 
18.7 
27.6 
30.3 
29.0 
24.8 
26.2 
31.7 
23.7 
40.9 
24.8 
23.3 
25.2 
25.1 
23.9 
25.2 
21.6 
20.8 
27.9 
22.0 
30.6 
21.0 
29.6 
25.2 
28.0 
38.0 
23.2 
33.7 
28.4 
25.9 
23.8 
27.1 
29.1 
25.8 
23.4 
25.2 
25.4 
30.5 
30.9. 
23.2 
25.7 
31.8 
29.7 
22.7 
35.5 
21.5 
21.9 
32.7 
26.2 
25.5 
24.6 
18.9 
12.6 
23.3 
14.2 
25.6 
18.4 
22.9 
19.6 
17.6 
26.8 
31.2 
29.9 
25.9 
27.1 
32.7 
24.7 
41.9 
25.7 
24.3 
26.2 
26.1 
24.8 
26.3 
22.5 
21.8 
28.8 
22.8 
31.5 
21.8 
30.6 
26.1 
28.9 
38.9 
24.1 
34.6 
29.5 
27.1 
24.8 
28.0 
30.1 
26.7 
24.4 
26.1 
26.3 
31.4 
31.8 
24.1 
26.7 
32.8 
30.7 
23.6 
36.5 
22.5 
22.8 
33.7 
27.2 
26.5 
25.7 
19.9 
13.5 
24.4 
15.1 
26.5 
19.4 
23.8 
20.5 
18.5 
27.9 
39.2 
37.5 
32.2 
30.0 
40.1 
26.9 
47.9 
29.8 
28.7 
29.9 
28.6 
32.2 
29.0 
24.8 
24.2 
35.8 
27.7 
39.3 
27.3 
36.3 
30.1 
34.5 
47.6 
29.4 
41.4 
37.3 
30.3 
29.4 
34.0 
35.0 
34.3 
26.0 
31.5 
30.6 
38.3 
39.2 
29.2 
30.1 
39.9 
35.3 
26.5 
44.5 
27.0 
24.8 
40.3 
28.9 
32.0 
29.7 
19.2 
11.9 
26.0 
12.9 
30.3 
22.0 
26.5 
23.2 
20.5 
29.6 
40.2 
38.5 
33.4 
31.0 
41.1 
27.9 
48.9 
30.9 
29.8 
31.0 
29.6 
33.3 
30.1 
25.8 
25.3 
36.8 
28.6 
40.3 
28.2 
37.3 
31.1 
35.4 
48.5 
30.5 
·42.4 
38.5 
31.5 
30.5 
35.0 
36.2 
35.3 
27.0 
32.5 
31.6 
39.2 
40.2 
30.2 
31.1 
41.0 
36.4 
27.5 
45.4 
28.1 
25.8 
41.4 
30.0 
33.2 
30.8 
20.1 
12.7 
27.1 
13.7 
31.3 
23.0 
27.4 
24.1 
21.5 
30.7 
Camberwell & Peckham 
Carshalton & Wallington 
Chingford & Woodford Green 
Chipping Bamet 
Cities of London & Westminster 
Croydon Central 
Croydon North 
Croydon South 
Dagenham 
Dulwich & West Norwood 
Ealing; Acton & Shepherd's Bush 
Ealing North 
Ealing Southall 
East Ham 
Edmonton 
Eltham 
Enfield North 
Enfield Southgate 
Erith & Thamesmead 
Feltham & Heston 
Finchley & Golders Green 
Greenwich & Woolwich 
Hackney North & Stoke Newington 
Hackney South & Shoreditch 
Hammersmith & Fulham 
Hampstead & Highgate 
Harrow East 
Harrow West 
Hayes & Harlington 
Hendon 
Holborn & SI. Pancras 
Homchurch 
Hornsey & Wood Green 
IIford North 
llford South 
Islington North 
Islington South & Finsbury Park 
Kensington & Chelsea 
Kingston & Surbiton 
Lewisham Deptford 
Lewisham East 
Lewisham West 
Leyton & Wanstead 
Mitcham & Morden 
North Southwark & Bermondsey 
Old Bexley & Sidcup 
Orpington 
Poplar & Canning Town 
. Putney 
Regent's Park & North Kensington 
Richmond Park 
Romford 
Ruislip Northwood 
Streatham 
Sulton & Cheam 
Tooting 
Toltenham 
Twickenham 
17.1 
22.3 
26.1 
24.1 
18.5 
21.7 
18.5 
23.9 
26.8 
18.0 
17.9 
20.6 
17.7 
16.3 
21.0 
24.9 
22.1 
24.6 
18.6 
19.5 
23.4 
20.7 
15.5 
17.3 
16.8 
18.2 
23.7 
22.8 
19.3 
22.8 
16.3 
26.7 
16.8 
25.0 
19.7 
15.6 
18.1 
18.7 
21.8 
14.0 
22.2 
19.4 
18.7 
21.0 
17.0 
27.8 
27.4 
15.6 
19.7 
19.2 
21.4 
26.2 
26.2 
15.6 
24.7 
16.2 
16.3 
21.2 
15.3 
21.2 
23.9 
22.2 
14.8 
20.9 
17.8 
22.9 
22.3 
15.8 
17.1 
19.7 
16.9 
14.6 
20.0 
21.3 
21.1 
23.5 
17.7 
18.3 
21.6 
17.6 
14.0 
15.5 
15.0 
15.2 
24.2 
23.3 
18.0 
20.9 
13.7 
26.2 
15.6 
23.1 
18.1 
12.9 
15.2 
16.7 
19.3 
12.8 
20.3 
17.7 
17.3 
18.9 
15.5 
27.7 
26.6 
13.6 
17.0 
16.2 
18.9 
25.8 
24.7 
13.9 
23.5 
13.8 
15.2 
18.2 
16.1 
22.1 
24.8 
23.2 
15.7 
21.9 
18.7 
23.8 
23.3 
16.7 
18.0 
20.6 
17.8 
15.4 
21.0 
22.3 
22.1 
24.4 
18.7 
19.2 
22.6 
18.6 
14.8 
16.4 
16.0 
16.1 
25.2 
24.3 
19.0 
21.9 
14.5 
27.1 
16.5 
24.0 
19.0 
13.7 
16.1 
17.7 
20.3 
13.6 
21.3 
18.6 
18.2 
19.8 
16.4 
28.7 
27.5 
14.5 
18.0 
17.2 
19.8 
26.8 
25.7 
14.7 
24.5 
14.7 
16.1 
19.1 
16.4 
24.2 
25.5 
25.5 
15.2 
25.0 
21.6 
27.1 
22.5 
16.5 
19.4 
22.6 
19.7 
16.4 
22.7 
22.3 
23.9 
26.3 
20.4 
21.2 
24.9 
18.8 
15.2 
16.8 
15.8 
15.9 
28.3 
27.3 
20.5 
24.2 
14.3 
29.7 
17.6 
25.8 
20.6 
12.8 
15.0 
17.7 
22.4 
14.5 
22.5 
19.7 
19.4 
20.6 
16.7 
32.5 
29.3 
14.9 
15.9 
16.9 
21.7 
29.3 
27.7 
14.5 
26.7 
13.0 
17.3 
21.2 
17.1 
25.2 
26.5 
26.5 
16.1 
26.1 
22.6 
28.1 
23.4 
17.3 
20.4 
23.6 
20.6 
17.3 
23.6 
23.2 
24.8 
27.3 
21.4 
22.2 
26.0 
19.7 
15.9 
17.6 
16.7 
16.7 
29.3 
28.3 
21.5 
25.2 
15.1 
30.7 
18.5 
26.7 
21.5 
13.5 
15.8 
18.6 
23.4 
15.3 
23.4 
20.5 
20.3 
21.5 
17.6 
33.5 
30.3 
15.7 
16.8 
17.8 
22.7 
30.3 
28.8 
15.3 
27.7 
13.8 
18.2 
22.1 
Upminster 
Uxbridge 
Vauxhall 
Walthamstow 
West Ham 
Wimbledon 
Aldershot 
Arundel & South Downs 
Ashford 
Aylesbury 
Banbury 
Basingstoke 
Beaconsfield 
Bexhill & Battle 
Bognor Regis & Littlehampton 
Bracknell 
Brighton Kemptown 
Brighton Pavilion 
Buckingham 
Canterbury 
Chatham & Aylesford 
Chesham & Amersham 
Chichester 
Crawley 
Dartford 
Dover 
East Hampshire 
East Surrey 
East Worthing & Shoreham 
Eastbourne 
Eastleigh 
Epsom & Ewell 
Esher & Walton 
Fareham 
Faversham & Mid Kent 
Folkestone & Hythe 
Gillingham 
Gosport 
Gravesham 
Guildford 
Hastings & Rye 
Havant 
Henley 
Horsham 
Hove 
Isle of Wight 
Lewes 
Maidenhead 
Maidstone & The Weald 
Medway 
Mid Sussex 
Mole Valley 
Milton Keynes South West 
N'ewbury 
New Forest East 
New Forest West 
North East Hampshire 
North East Milton Keynes 
29.9 
22.5 
14.8 
17.8 
17.0 
20.7 
18.6 
30.6 
25.7 
22.5 
21.0 
19.3 
26.1 
39.9 
35.9 
18.4 
28.4 
21.7 
21.1 
28.5 
19.9 
19.1 
34.4 
24.1 
24.1 
28.9 
26.4 
25.2 
31.7 
37.4 
22.7 
27.1 
25.5 
25.9 
24.6 
30.6 
21.1 
27.1 
24.7 
24.8 
29.7 
29.9 
24.9 
24.1 
27.6 
33.1 
35.3 
23.3 
24.7 
21.9 
25.5 
28.2 
17.7 
22.2 
27.2 
39.2 
22.3 
17.2 
29.4 
21.0 
13.2 
16.3 
15.2 
18.7 
20.2 
31.2 
25.9 
25.1 
22.3 
21.5 
27.5 
40.1 
35.5 
19.6 
26.8 
18.4 
22.9 
27.4 
21.4 
19.2 
35.0 
22.9 
24.3 
29.9 
29.2 
25.9 
30.4 
35.9 
23.9 
27.2 
24.0 
28.1 
26.0 
30.7 
22.0 
28.8 
25.7 
24.6 
28.5 
31.4 
26.9 
25.2 
23.7 
33.4 
35.7 
24.8 
26.4 
22.9 
26.6 
28.8 
18.5 
24.0 
28.5 
40.4 
25.9 
18.0 
30.4 
22.1 
14.0 
17.2 
16.1 
19.7 
21.1 
32.1 
26.9 
26.1 
23.3 
22.4 
28.4 
41.0 
36.6 
20.5 
27.9 
19.5 
23.7 
28.6 
22.3 
19.9 
36.0 
23.9 
25.3 
30.9 
30.1 
26.8 
31.4 
37.0 
24.8 
28.1 
24.9 
29.1 
26.9 
31.7 
23.0 
29.8 
26.7 
25.6 
29.4 
32.4 
27.8 
26.1 
24.8 
34.4 
36.7 
25.7 
27.4 
23.8 
27.5 
29.7 
19.3 
24.9 
29.4 
41.3 
26.9 
18.8 
33.1 
23.8 
13.7 
17.7 
17.1 
20.5 
26.2 
37.8 
31.8 
31.2 
28.5 
28.4 
31.9 
47.1 
42.2 
26.2 
29.3 
18.6 
29.7 
32.6 
26.7 
18.0 
41.7 
26.6 
28.2 
37.6 
38.3 
30.5 
34.4 
41.8 
30.5 
31.0 
26.8 
35.7 
31.9 
37.4 
28.5 
37.8 
30.2' 
28.2 
35.1 
39.3 
33.2 
32.3 
23.7 
39.7 
41.5 
30.6 
32.3 
29.4 
33.0 
32.9 
26.0 
31.3 
35.9 
48.7 
32.9 
25.4 
34.2 
24.9 
14.5 
18.6 
17.9 
21.4 
27.3 
38.7 
32.8 
32.4 
29.5 
29.5 
32.9 
48.0 
43.2 
27.2 
30.4 
19.5 
30.7 
33.8 
27.7 
18.6 
42.8 
27.6 
29.2 
38.7 
39.3 
31.5 
35.4 
42.9 
31.6 
32.0 
27.8 
36.8 
32.9 
38.4 
29.5 
38.9 
31.3 
29.3 
36.1 
40.3 
34.2 
33.3 
24.7 
40.6 
42.5 
31.7 
33.4 
30.5 
34.0 
33.9 
27.1 
32.4 
37.0 
49.6 
34.1 
26.4 
North Thanet 
North West Hampshire 
Oxford East 
Oxford West & Abingdon 
Portsmouth North 
Portsmouth South 
Reading East 
Reading West 
Reigate 
Romsey 
Runnymede & Weybridge 
Sevenoaks 
Siltingbourne & Sheppey 
Slough 
South Thanet 
South West Surrey 
Southampton Itchen 
Southampton Test 
Spelthome 
Surrey Heath 
Tonbridge & Mailing 
Tunbridge Wells 
Wantage 
Wealden 
Winchester 
Windsor 
Witney 
Woking 
Wokingham 
Worthing West 
Wycombe 
Bath 
Boumemouth East 
Boumemouth West 
Bridgwater 
Bristol East 
Bristol North West 
Bristol South 
Bristol West 
Cheltenham 
Christchurch 
Cotswold 
Devizes 
East Devon 
Exeter 
Falmouth & Camborne 
Forest of Dean 
Gloucester 
Kingswood 
Mid Dorset & North Poole 
North Cornwall 
North Devon 
North Dorset 
North Swindon 
North Wiltshire 
Northavon 
Plymouth Devonport 
Plymouth Sulton 
34.6 
22.3 
22.3 
22.8 
24.6 
25.0 
19.2 
21.5 
25.8 
25.8 
25.2 
26.3 
23.6 
20.1 
31.7 
26.6 
24.1 
22.9 
25.6 
21.4 
25.7 
25.5 
23.2 
28.5 
26.5 
22.8 
25.0 
23.0 
18.4 
40.1 
21.0 
27.8 
30.4 
32.8 
30.4 
24.0 
23.7 
25.8 
19.3 
27.1 
41.5 
29.6 
24.6 
40.6 
25.3 
29.4 
26.5 
24.3 
26.6 
27.2 
30.3 
30.2 
30.9 
23.3 
23.6 
22.5 
25.1 
24.7 
33.8 
24.5 
19.3 
22.9 
23.1 
23.3 
18.8 
21.4 
25.5 
27.1 
24.9 
28.1 
24.7 
19.8 
31.2 
27.9 
22.1 
20.9 
26.6 
20.9 
27.9 
25.9 
25.4 
29.8 
27.5 
24.6 
27.4 
23.0 
21.0 
38.2 
23.7 
27.5 
28.3 
30.4 
31.5 
21.7 
22.0 
23.3 
17.1 
26.2 
41.6 
29.7 
27.0 
41.1 
24.5 
30.2 
28.7 
25.3 
28.7 
28.6 
31.5 
31.6 
32.6 
23.4 
25.2 
24.6 
25.9 
25.3 
34.8 
25.4 
20.4 
24.1 
24.1 
24.6 
19.8 
22.4 
26.5 
28.1 
25.9 
29.0 
25.6 
20.8 
32.2 
28.9 
23.2 
22.1 
27.6 
21.8 
28.9 
26.9 
26.4 
30.7 
28.6 
25.6 
28.3 
23.9 
21.9 
39.3 
24.7 
28.7 
29.4 
31.6 
32.5 
22.7 
23.0 
24.4 
18.2 
27.4 
42.5 
30.7 
27.9 
42.1 
25.7 
31.2 
29.6 
26.3 
29.8 
29.5 
32.5 
32.5 
33.6 
24.3 
26.2 
25.5 
26.8 
26.5 
39.8 
32.0 
21.4 
27.9 
27.8 
28.2 
21.7 
25.5 
29.8 
34.2 
28.7 
33.3 
30.9 
23.8 
37.6 
32.4 
24.6 
23.5 
29.1 
24.0 
33.9 
29.8 
31.3 
36.9 
33.9 
28.6 
34.8 
26.9 
27.4 
42.8 
28.7 
31.2 
31.7 
33.9 
39.0 
21.7 
22.6 
23.5 
17.5 
29.3 
47.9 
36.3 
34.0 
49.1 
28.5 
36.6 
36.4 
29.9 
33.3 
35.3 
38.8 
39.4 
41.6 
27.9 
32.3 
29.3 
32.7 
32.2 
40.9 
33.0 
22.5 
29.1 
28.9 
29.6 
22.9 
26.5 
30.8 
35.2 
29.8 
34.3 
31.9 
24.8 
38.6 
33.5 
25.8 
24.7 
30.1 
25.0 
35.0 
30.8 
32.4 
37.8 
35.0 
29.6 
35.8 
28.0 
28.5 
43.8 
29.9 
32.5 
32.9 
35.2 
40.0 
22.8 
23.6 
24.5 
18.6 
30.5 
48.9 
37.3 
35.0 
50.0 
29.8 
37.6 
37.4 
31.0 
34.5 
36.4 
39.8 
40.3 
42.6 
28.9 
33.3 
30.2 
33.8 
33.6 
Poole 33.2 34.7 35.8 41.9 43.1 
St.lves 30.7 31.5 32.4 38.5 39.4 
Salisbury 27.6 28.8 29.9 34.8 35.9 
Somerton & Frome 27.8 28.6 29.5 36.4 37.3 
South Dorset 30.8 32.1 33.1 41.3 42.3 
South East Cornwall 29.2 30.7 31.5 40.0 40.9 
South Swindon 21.3 21.5 22.5 25.9 27.0 
South West Devon 26.3 27.8 28.7 36.1 37.1 
Stroud 27.3 28.3 29.2 34.1 35.0 
Taunton 29.8 30.1 31.1 36.7 37.7 
Teignbrtdge 33.0 33.4 34.3 41.6 42.6 
Tewkesbury 27.3 26.5 27.4 34.7 35.7 
Tiverton & Honiton 19.2 21.0 21.6 21.3 21.9 
Torbay 33.6 33.9 35.0 40.8 41.9 
Torridge & West Devon 29.9 33.1 33.9 42.7 43.6 
Totnes 33.7 35.1 35.9 44.5 45.4 
Truro & SI. Austell 31.1 31.6 32.6 37.9 38.9 
Wansdyke 26.7 27.5 28.4 31.6 32.6 
Wells 30.6 31.9 32.8 39.3 40.2 
West Dorset 35.8 36.9 37.8 46.8 47.8 
Westbury 27.7 29.2 30.2 35.3 36.3 
Weston-Super-Mare 30.6 31.9 32.9 38.5 39.6 
Wood spring 27.7 28.7 29.6 35.1 36.1 
Yeovil 30.0 31.1 32.1 38.7 39.8 
Aberavon 29.2 29.9 31.0 36.0 37.1 
Alyn & Deeside 22.7 23.9 24.9 30.0 31.1 
Blaenau Gwent 26.9 27.0 28.0 31.8 32.9 
Brecon & Radnorshire 31.2 31.3 32.2 42.4 43.4 
Bridgend 27.4 27.5 28.5 32.3 33.4 
Caernarfon 29.8 31.1 32.1 38.1 39.1 
Caerphilly 23.1 23.2 24.1 27.6 28.6 
Cardiff Central 20.2 20.1 21.4 24.7 26.1 
Cardiff North 27.7 27.8 28.9 32.8 34.0 
Cardiff South & Penarth 25.8 26.0 27.2 30.7 31.9 
Cardiff West 24.6 24.8 25.8 29.3 30.5 
Carmarthen East & Dinefwr 29.9 30.5 31.4 36.6 37.6 
Carmarthen West & South 
Pembrokeshire 30.1 30.7 31.7 36.9 37.9 
Ceredigion 28.3 28.3 29.3 39.1 40.3 
Clwyd South 25.8 27.1 28.1 33.6 34.6 
Clwyd West 33.8 35.2 36.2 42.4 43.5 
Conwy 31.1 32.5 33.6 39.6 40.8 
Cynon Valley 27.3 27.4 28.4 32.2 33.3 
Delyn 24.7 25.9 26.9 32.3 33.3 
Gower 29.9 30.6 31.6 36.7 37.8 
Islwyn 26.2 26.3 27.3 31.0 32.1 
Llanelli 29.9 30.6 31.6 36.7 37.8 
Meirionnydd Nant Conwy 31.9 33.2 34.2 40.3 41.2 
Merthyr Tydfil & Rhymney 26.2 26.3 27.3 31.0 32.1 
Monmouth 30.0 30.1 31.0 35.1 36.1 
Montgomeryshire 29.1 29.2 30.1 40.0 41.1 
Neath 27.6 28.3 29.3 34.2 35.2 
Newport East 25.4 25.6 26.6 30.2 31.3 
Newport West 26.1 26.3 27.2 31.0 32.1 
Ogmore 23.7 23.9 24.8 28.3 29.4 
Pontypridd 23.1 23.2 24.1 27.6 28.7 
Preseli Pembrokeshire 29.1 29.7 30.7 35.8 36.8 
Rhondda 28.8 28.9 30.0 33.9 35.0 
Swansea East 25.3 26.0 27.0 31.6 32.7 
Swansea West 29.8 30.4 31.7 36.7 38.1 
Torfaen 25.3 25.5 26.4 30.1 31.2 
Vale of Clwyd 31.4 32.8 33.8 39.9 41.0 
Vale of Glamorgan 25.5 25.6 26.5 30.2 31.3 
Wrexham 25.3 26.6 27.6 33.1 34.2 
Ynys Mon 28.9 30.1 31.1 36.9 37.9 
South East Cambridgeshire 24.3 25.4 26.3 30.6 31.6 
Author: Scott Davidson. Loughborough University. 
Changes in the Grey Vote 
TABLE: 57 Seats Currently Labour Held with the Estimated Grey Votes 
of Higher Than 40% Under Scenario 2 in a 2009 Election. 
Scenario Battleground Two Grey Marginal Status after Constituency Vote in 2005 Result Status after 
2009 2005 Result 
South Dorset 54.3 Ultra marginal: Lab-Con seat 
majority 2005 It 4.99% 2005 
Great Yarmouth 53.7 Fairly marginal: rnaj Lab-Con seat 2005 5.0-9.99% 2005 
South Thanet 53.1 Ultra marginal: Lab-Con seat 
majority 2005 It 4.99% 2005 
Wirral South 52.2 Fairly marginal: maj Lab Con seat 2005 5.0-9.99% 2005 
Ynys Mon 51. 3 Ultra marginal: Lab-PC seat 2005 
majority 2005 It 4.99% 
Carmarthen West & 51.2 Fairly marginal: maj Lab Con seat South Pembrokeshire 2005 5.0-9.99% 2005 
Conwy 50.9 Fairly marginal: maj Lab-Con seat 2005 5.0-9.99% 2005 
Staffordshire 50.7 Fairly marginal: maj Lab-Con seat 
Moorlands 2005 5.0-9.99% 2005 
Brigg & Goole 50.7 Fairly marginal: maj Lab-Con seat 2005 5.0-9.99% 2005 
Hastings & Rye 49.8 Ultra marginal: Lab Con seat 
majority 2005 It 4.99% 2005 
Tynemouth 49.5 Fairly marginal: maj Lab-Con seat 2005 5.0-9.99% 2005 
Stroud 49.3 Ultra marginal: Lab Con seat 
majority 2005 It 4.99% 2005 
Stafford 49.2 Ultra marginal: Lab Con seat 
majority 2005 It 4.99% 2005 
Wirral West 49.2 Ultra marginal: Lab Con seat 
majority 2005 It 4.99% 2005 
Cleethorpes 49.1 Fairly marginal: maj Lab-Con seat 2005 5.0-9.99% 2005 
Gedling 48.2 Fairly marginal: maj Lab-Con seat 2005 5.0-9.99% 2005 
High Peak 48.1 Ultra marginal: Lab-Con seat 
majority 2005 It 4.99% 2005 
South Ribble 47.9 Ultra marginal: Lab-Con seat 
majority 2005 It 4.99% 2005 
Wansdyke 47.6 Ultra marginal: Lab-Con seat 
majority 2005 It 4.99% 2005 
City of Chester 47.5 Ultra marginal: Lab-Con seat 
majority 2005 It 4.99% 2005 
North West 46.5 Fairly marginal: rnaj Lab Con seat Leicestershire 2005 5.0-9.99% 2005 
Nuneaton 46.5 Fairly marginal: maj Lab Con seat 2005 5.0-9.99% 2005 
Broxtowe 46.3 Ultra marginal: Lab Con seat 
majority 2005 It 4.99% 2005 
Stourbridge 46.2 Ultra marginal: Lab-Con seat 
maioritv 2005 It 4.99% 2005 
Pendle 46.0 Fairly marginal: maj Lab-Con seat 2005 5.0-9.99% 2005 
Selby 45.9 Ultra marginal: Lab-Con seat 
majority 2005 It 4.99% 2005 
Elmet 45.8 Fairly marginal: maj Lab-Con seat 2005 5.0 9.99% 2005 
Calder Valley 45.5 Ultra marginal: Lab-Con seat 
majority 2.005 It 4.99% 2005 
Sittingbourne & Ultra marginal: Lab-Con seat 
Sheppey 45.5 maioritv 2005 It 4.99% 2005 
Halifax 45.4 Fairly marginal: rnaj Lab-Con seat 2005 5.0-9.99% 2005 
Warrington South 45.4 Fairly marginal: maj Lab-Con seat 2005 5.0 9.99% 2005 
Wolverhampton South 45.3 Fairly marginal: rnaj Lab-Con seat West 2005 5.0 9.99% 2005 
South Derbyshire 45.3 Fairly marginal: maj Lab-Con seat 2005 5.0-9.99% 2005 
Burton 45.2 Ultra marginal: Lab-Con seat 
maioritv 2005 It 4.99% 2005 
Tamworth 45.2 Fairly marginal: maj Lab-Con seat 2005 5.0-9.99% 2005 
Brighton Kemptown 45.2 Fairly marginal: maj Lab-Con seat 2005 5.0 9.99% 2005 
Vale of Glamorgan 44.8 Ultra marginal: Lab-Con seat 
majority 2005 It 4.99% 2005 
Bury North 44.8 Fairly marginal: maj Lab-Con seat 2005 5.0 9.99% 2005 
Corby 44.6 Ultra marginal: Lab-Con seat 
maiority 2005 It 4.99% 2005 
Basildon 44.5 Fairly marginal: maj Lab-Con seat 2005 5.0-9.99% 2005 
Bolton West 44.5 Fairly marginal: maj Lab-Con seat 2005 5.0 9.99% 2005 
Derby North 44.4 Fairly marginal: maj Lab-Con seat 2005 5.0-9.99% 2005 
Northampton North 44.4 Fairly marginal: maj Lab-Con seat 2005 5.0 9.99% 2005 
Redditch 44.3 Fairly marginal: maj Lab Con seat 2005 5.0-9.99% 2005 
Colne Valley 44.2 Ultra marginal: Lab-Con seat 
majority 2005 It 4.99% 2005 
Warwick & Leamington 43.9 Ultra marginal: Lab-Con seat 
majority 2005 It 4.99% 2005 
Cardiff North 43.7 Ultra marginal: Lab-Con seat 
majority 2005 It 4.99% 2005 
Oldham East & Fairly marginal: maj 
Saddleworth 43.3 Lab-LD seat 2005 2005 5.0 9.99% 
Medway 43.1 Ultra marginal: Lab-Con seat 
maiority 2005 It 4.99% 2005 
Dartford 43.0 Ultra marginal: Lab-Con seat 
majority 2005 It 4.99% 2005 
Norwich South 43.0 Fairly marginal: maj Lab-LD seat 2005 2005 5.0-9.99% 
Loughborough 42.1 Ultra marginal: Lab-Con seat 
majority 2005 It 4.99% 2005 
Harlow 41. 7 Ultra marginal: Lab-Con seat 
majority 2005 It 4.99% 2005 
Gillingham 41. 6 Ultra marginal: Lab-Con seat 
majority 2005 It 4.99% 2005 
Portsmouth North 41.1 Ultra marginal: Lab-Con seat 
majority 2005 It 4.99% 2005 
Harrow West 40.7 Ultra marginal: Lab-Con seat 
majority 2005 It 4.99% 2005 
Crawley 40.1 Ultra marginal: Lab-Con seat 
majority 2005 It 4.99% 2005 
TABLE: 23 Ultra Marginal Seats with an Estimated Grey Majority in a 
2009 Election - Assuming Age Gap Remains Constant at 2005 Levels. 
Scenario Battleground Two Grey Marginal Status after Constituency Vote in 2005 Result Status after 
2009 2005 Result 
Harwich 60.7 Ultra marginal: up to Con-Lab seat 4.99% 2005 
West Oorset 58.1 Ultra marginal: up to Con-LO seat 4.99% 2005 
Totnes 57.8 Ultra marginal: up to Con-LO seat 4.99% 2005 
Westmorland & 55.2 Ultra marginal: up to LO-Con seat Lonsdale 4.99% 2005 
Ludlow 54.1 Ultra marginal: up to Con-LO seat 4.99% 2005 
Eastbourne 53.8 Ultra marginal: up to Con-LO seat 4.99% 2005 
Scarborough & 53.6 Ultra marginal: up to Con-Lab seat Whitby 4.99% 2005 
Clwyd West 53.4 Ultra marginal: up to Con-Lab seat 4.99% 2005 
Torbay 53.4 Ultra marginal: up to LO-Con seat 4.99% 2005 
North Dorset 52.9 Ultra marginal: up to Con-LO seat 4.99% 2005 
South Dorset 52.7 Ultra marginal: up to Lab-Con seat 4.99% 2005 
South Thanet 51. 5 Ultra marginal: up to Lab-Con seat 4.99% 2005 
Weston-Super-Mare 51.2 Ultra marginal: up to Con-LO seat 4.99% 2005 
Hereford 50.6 Ultra marginal: up to LO Con seat 4.99% 2005 
Falmouth & 50.6 Ultra marginal: up to LO-Lab seat Carnborne 4.99% 2005 
NOTE: If the age gap widens along lines of Scenario 2, the following ultra 
marginal seats will also have a Grey Majority in 2009: 
• Preseli Pembrokeshire 
• Solihull 
• Taunton 
• Forest of Dean 
• Ynys Man 
Table: Election of 2005: The estimated proportion of turnout by age by 
regions in England. 
18·24 25·34 35-44 45·54 55·64 65+ 55+ 
North 6.6% 13.3% 19.2% 18.7% 16.1% 26.0% 42.1% East 
North 6.5% 14.1% 19.1% 18.5% 16.3% 25.5% 41.8% West 
Yorks and 6.8% 14.2% 19.0% 18.3% 16.1% 25.6% 41.7% Humber 
East 6.5% 14.0% 19.1% 18.6% 16.4% 25.4% 41.8% Midlands 
West 6.6% 14.3% 18.7% 18.2% 16.6% 25.5% 42.1% Midlands 
East 6.0% 14.2% 19.1% 18.6% 16.2% 25.9% 42.1% 
London 8.0% 19.4% 22.5% 17.6% 13.8% 18.7% 32.5% 
South 6.3% 14.1% 19.4% 18.6% 15.9% 25.7% 41.6% East 
South 5.8% 12.7% 17.9% 18.2% 16.7% 28.6% 45.3% West 
Table: Estimated Age Breakdown of Turnout (%) England and Wales in 
Years 2005, 2009, 2013, 2020, 2025. 
Change 2005-
2005 2009 2013 2020 2025 2025 
18-24 6.6 7.1 6.9 6.1 5.8 -0.8 
25-34 14.8 12.8 13.2 13.3 12.6 -2.2 
35-44 19.2 18.6 16.5 15.3 15.9 -3.3 
45-54 18.2 18.2 19.1 17.8 15.7 -2.5 
55-64 15.9 17.6 16.8 18.1 18.8 +2.9 
65+ 25.3 25.7 27.5 29.5 31.1 +5.8 
Table: Seats with the biggest increase in the Grey Vote in the period 
2009-2025 
Constituency Grey Vote Change in Grey 
2025 Vote 2009 - 2025 
South Staffordshire 61.9 11.1 
Copeland 57.3 10.9 
Westmorland & Lonsdale 65.7 10.5 
Haltemprice & Howden 60.5 10.5 
Beverlev & Holderness 59.2 10.5 
Saffron Walden 56.3 10.5 
Middlesbrough South & East 56.3 10.5 
Cleveland 
Stalybridge & Hyde 52.0 10.5 
Hexham 63.3 10.4 
Redcar 59.7 10.4 
Richmond (Yorks) 58.4 10.3 
Stone 59.9 10.3 
Middlesbrough 52.8 10.3 
Barrow & Furness 59.7 10.2 
Scunthorpe 57.3 10.2 
Lichfield 57.8 10.2 
Cleethorpes 57.7 10.2 
Bishop Auckland 58.6 10.1 
North Shropshire 59.3 10.1 
Brigg & Goole 59.3 10.0 
Gainsborough 61.0 10.0 
Hereford 60.5 9.9 
Gosport 56.4 9.S 
Stockton North 53.5 9.S 
· Burton 53.5 9.8 
Stafford 57.3 9.7 
East Yorkshire 63.2 9.7 
Cannock Chase 52.5 9.7 
Wansbeck . 58.4 9.6 
TheWrekin 53.7 9.6 
High Peak 56.1 9.6 
Warrington South 53.4 9.6 
Grantham & Stamford 58.0 9.5 
Stockton South 51.0 9.5 
Warrington North 51.1 9.5 
Knowsley South 51.5 9.4 
Leominster 63.0 9.4 
West Dorset 67.4 9.3 
Scarborouqh & Whitby 62.9 9.3 
Telford 48.5 9.3 
Daventrv 51.3 9.3 
North West Durham 58.0 9.3 
Corby 52.3 9.3 
Knowsley North 53.6 9.3 
Tamworth 52.7 9.2 
West Derbyshire 60.2 9.2 
North Durham 55.3 9.2 
Ludlow 63.3 9.2 
West Lancashire 55.9 9.2 
Central Suffolk & North Ipswich 58.3 9.2 

